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Abstract
This dissertation analyses the adverse urban social impacts generated by regional development 
policies in Eastern Amazonia and illustrated by the town of Parauapebas. After the military coup 
of 1964, Brazilian Amazonia became the centre of attention for development planning. Due to its 
tremendous potential of natural resources as well as its vast areas of uninhabited land, this region 
was regarded by military governments as a means of rapidly tackling a range of economic, social 
and geopolitical objectives. In this regard, several development programmes, such as the Greater 
Carajas Programme (PGC), were planned and implemented by the Federal government. Brazilian 
development policies were heavily influenced by Perroux's development pole theory, which 
suggested that economic growth, interregional equilibrium and integration of backward regions 
could be achieved through a strategy of decentralised development. This basic idea provided a 
convenient theoretical justification not only for economic reasons (accelerated economic growth), 
but also in terms of the geopolitical objectives (national integration and occupation of Amazonia) 
of the military regime. Development pole strategies were vigorously implemented by the Federal 
government through the PND II - Second National Development Plan (1975/79) - and these 
strategies continued with the advent of the PGC in the 1980s.
In order to exploit the huge iron-ore reserves at Carajas mountain, the Carajas Iron-Ore Project 
was established. CVRD was aware that this project would attract a considerable flow of migrants 
to the region and Parauapebas was built with the clear purpose of avoiding the formation an 
enormous shanty town at the company's entrance gate. Despite planning Parauapebas, however, 
CVRD could not avoid the formation of Rio Verde, a peripheral settlement contiguous to the 
planned town. CVRD's under-estimation of the pace of urbanisation, its decision to force service 
workers to live outside the company town allied to the substantial flow of migrants contributed to 
producing a serious situation in which the Parauapebas/Rio Verde region presented inadequate 
urban infrastructure and services; a critical nosological table and worrying problems in the 
educational sector. However, the above factors are unable to explain entirely the worrying 
situation in Parauapebas. In fact, these problems are a direct product of development pole 
strategies, which advocated that the concentration of investments in selected poles would 
generate economic growth, which would in turn "trickle down" to peripheral regions. Investments 
were made, but the beneficial spread effects in Parauapebas fell below expectations and the main 
reason for this lies in the fact that the ferrous-alloy industries were not implemented as originally 
envisaged by the PGC. As a consequence, the lack of option for diversifying the local economy is 
considerable.
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This dissertation analyses in detail the major social and environmental impacts of rapidly urban 
development in Parauapebas. It shows that development strategies in Eastern Amazonia have had 
limited positive effects and that the exploitation of the natural resources of the region has 
occurred in a predatory way and at the same time, it stresses that old projects and future 
undertakings in the region must be compatible with the environment. In this regard, this 
dissertation concludes with the discussion of policy implications for more sustainable policy for 
Eastern Amazonia.
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Chapter 1
Regional Policies and Frontier Integration in Brazilian Amazonia
1.1- Introduction
The general objective of this research is to analyse the social, economic and 
environmental impacts generated by regional development policies implemented by the 
Brazilian government in Eastern Amazonia and illustrated by Parauapebas.
Brazilian Amazonia has been subjected to successive government attempts to stimulate its 
economy. However, since the mid-1960s, under the authoritarian military regime, this 
region has become the target of a renewed and vigorous interest. Indeed, Amazonia, with 
its great potential of natural resources and also vast areas of uninhabited land, was 
regarded by the military governments as a means of rapidly solving a range of economic, 
social and geopolitical problems. In this context, several poorly-planned programmes 
were implemented in order to maximise immediate economic advantages and 
undoubtedly the most important development programme was the Greater Carajas 
Programme (PGC), which was the largest and the most pretentious integrated regional 
development scheme ever devised for any area of tropical rainforest in the world. This 
“integrated” programme involved investments in mineral, agricultural, infrastructural, 
livestock and forestry undertakings, which were associated with tax and heavy financial 
incentive scheme for attracting investors to the region.
In three decades, Amazonia, especially the Eastern region, has undergone a deep 
transformation due to the implementation of regional development policies, which 
attracted thousands and thousands of different workers, who came from distinct parts of 
Brazil, for whom Amazonia was a kind of Canaan, the promised land. However, the job- 
opportunities were transitory, settlements for small farmers had no suitable infrastructure 
and the problems were manifold, so the outcome was a great disappointment for most of 
these migrants. These tremendous impacts on people and also on the environment were 
exacerbated by this “integrated” development programme.
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these migrants. These tremendous impacts on people and also on the environment were 
exacerbated by this “integrated” development programme.
The development policies implemented in Amazonia, and the PGC assumes a 
distinguished importance, were commonly pursued by a combination of domestic and 
foreign interests, allied to an aggressive strategy of integrating this region into the process 
of national development, a strategy which the Brazilian governments adopted, and the 
consequences of all these strategies have been felt up to the present time.
Euclides da Cunha said at the beginning of this century that “Amazonia is the last page of 
Genesis yet to be written”. These words pronounced by virtue of the exuberance and 
perceived potential of the tropical rainforest have been understood by Brazilian 
governments in a different way and some slogans such as “integrate in order not to 
forfeit”, “unite men without land to land without men” and more recently “who has 
Amazonia need not fear the future” can better illustrate their interpretation. However, 
these slogans have reflected not only their interpretation but also their undertakings, 
which have been responsible for significant social and environmental impacts on 
Amazonia. Thus, this last page of Genesis is being written but in a traumatic way.
The aim of this chapter is to analyse the effects of regional policies and frontier 
integration that have been undertaken in Brazilian Amazonia, always highlighting their 
social and environmental impacts on this region.
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1.2 - Understanding Amazonia
‘T o  see Amazonia is the heart’s desire of the youth of this 
country. The legends of Amazonia have their roots deep in the 
soul of our people, and the history of Amazonia, with its tales of 
heroism and bravery, reflects the tragic majesty of the battles we 
have fought against fate. To conquer the land, and tame waters, 
subjugate the jungle, these have been our tasks. And in this 
centuries - old battle we have won victory upon victory. The 
Amazon under the fertile impulse of your will and your labour, 
will not be merely another chapter in the history of the earth, 
but, like other great rivers, will become a chapter in the history 
of civilisation”.
(Getulio Vargas in his speech in Manaus on 10th October 1940
in: SUDAM, 1974)
The Amazon forest conjures up various images in the mind, from a dark, ferocious and 
hostile jungle to idyllic scenes of an earthly paradise. Despite popular images of the 
Amazon forest, several researchers have unanimously appreciated the potential and 
importance of Amazonia’s fragile rainforest ecosystem for generating significant benefits 
for humanity. In terms of their biodiversity, tropical rainforests are superior to any other 
forests and many specialists regard them as an essential genetic bank. Indeed, tropical 
rainforests are a vital source of medicines and some scientists believe that among its 
unstudied millions of species there could be some which would make possible the cure of 
cancer or even of AIDS. In addition, they supply an extensive range of industrial materials 
such as resins, fibres and oils.
The widespread deforestation that has occurred in Amazonia is very worrying because it 
may have destroyed some irreplaceable species of inestimable value, and has permanently 
reduced the productive potential of this region by causing soil erosion and climatic 
instability. It is important to stress here that deforestation in Amazonia has been caused 
mainly by development practices implemented and encouraged by the Brazilian 
government, principally after the military coup in 1964.
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to repeat in detail the history of 
Amazonian development, it is necessary to trace it briefly, highlighting its major 
landmarks in order to understand Amazonia as a whole. Penetration into Amazonia 
occurred at the beginning of 1616 and its first step was the construction of the Forte do
17
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Presepio (Presepio Fortification) by the Portuguese, who wanted to expel the British, 
French and Dutch from Amazonian territory and prevent further incursions by them. This 
small nucleus, based initially at Forte do Presepio, was the origin of the city of Belem, 
capital of the State of Para, and became the hub for expansion and settlement. 
Subsequently, other expeditions were undertaken by explorers such as Pedro Teixeira and 
Antonio Raposo Tavares, who set up fortifications at strategic points along the river 
Amazon, and these fortifications were fundamental for the colonisation of Amazonia. 
Political geography was modified by this efficient method of territorial occupation, this 
occupation being officially recognised by the Treaty of Madrid in 1750, which defined the 
frontiers of Brazilian Amazonia practically as they are nowadays.
During the XVIII century Amazonia, principally the State of Para, was a base for 
extracting forest products such as resins, oils, cinnamon, clove, vanilla, cocoa and etc., for 
export. Nevertheless, with the advent of the vulcanisation of rubber at the end of the first 
half of the last century, Amazonia was for the first time affected by clearly expressed 
economic aims. The golden period of the rubber trade in Amazonia was between 1870 
and 1912 and the two main cities at the time, Belem and Manaus, imported their clothes, 
social behaviour and culture from Europe. The smuggling of rubber seeds to Asia 
contributed to the final collapse of the rubber boom in Amazonia. Some attempts were 
undertaken by the Brazilian government to strengthen its position in the international 
market, but the outcome was negligible or only modest in comparison with the efforts 
made and consequently Amazonia suffered economic stagnation for 40 years.
With the creation of the SPVEA by President Getulio Vargas in 1953, the Brazilian 
government admitted for the first time its former failures in transforming the Amazon 
economy and stressed the importance of elaborating a development plan for the region 
through a regional planning agency. By virtue of the area that would be controlled by 
SPVEA, the Brazilian government created a political definition for Amazonia, which was 
named “Legal Amazonia”. This “Amazonia Legal” covers 4,975,527 square kilometres or 
60 percent of Brazilian territory and is one-third larger than the classic Amazonia.
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Nevertheless, the results obtained by SPVEA during its eleven years of existence were 
unimpressive. Indeed, this agency faced serious problems such as: the funds allocated to it 
never corresponded to those stipulated by constitutional law (3% of the income from 
national taxation and another 3% also the taxation of the States and municipalities which 
were legally defined as part of “Amazonia Legal”), the lack of an organisational structure, 
the failure of Congress to approve its five-year Plan (in 1955) and so on. The construction 
of the Belem-Brasflia highway, which is more than 2,000 kilometres long, and which was 
its major project, was indeed completed in 1960 but was not officially inaugurated until 
five years later. This highway was the first to facilitate large-scale penetration and 
settlement in Amazonia.
In order to understand Amazonia as a whole, it is essential to bear in mind the conditions 
under which its population was generated. Amazonia was originally occupied by 
approximately one thousand indigenous tribes who were concentrated principally in the 
varzeas and whose population was estimated at between two and three million. These 
tribes spoke more than five hundred languages, classified into twenty branches (Ribeiro, 
1995b). Over the centuries, the Amerindians accumulated a detailed knowledge of the 
tropical rainforest and developed a particular way of dealing with it. In this context, their 
harmonious integration with the native forest enabled them to exploit it with no 
destructive consequences. From the XVII century, they suffered massively as a result of 
their contact with European colonisers, which immediately caused huge depopulation 
because of the diseases introduced by white men, such as lung infections, measles, 
mumps, small-pox, venereal disease, and so on, which had been completely unknown to 
them beforehand. In addition to diseases, slavery, the deaths caused by fighting between 
Indians and Europeans colonisers and also the religious missions (Franciscans, Carmelites 
and principally Jesuits) were important factors for reducing the indigenous population. 
The religious missions aimed at converting the natives and as a direct result of this 
process, many Indians lost their mother tongue and their own cultural identity, and were 
neither transformed into white men nor left as Indians, or as Ribeiro (1995b) said they 
were turned into nobodies.
19
Chapter I
Parallel with the reduction of the Indian population, an important component of the 
Amazonian population was being generated by the miscegenation between white men, 
principally the Portuguese, and Indian women. Ribeiro (1995a) emphasises that the 
neobrazilian population of Amazonia was also formed by miscegenation between white 
men and Indian women, through a centuries-long process in which each man bom or 
introduced into the earth [Brazil] had sexual relations with Indian women and mestigas, 
generating a racial type more Indian than white. Thus, the process of turning Indians into 
nobodies by missionary action added to miscegenation generated a new social group in 
Amazonia, named cabloco. They were to form a particular type among other important 
racial groups in Brazilian society. These caboclos inherited from the Indians the 
knowledge of how to cope with the native forest. Indeed, they occupied the area left by 
the former Indian inhabitants, who were devastated by civilisation.
1.3 - The Authoritarian Regime and Its Objectives
The year 1964 can be considered a clear dividing line in relation to actions taken in 
Amazonia. Until then, actions had concentrated on extracting forest products, and the 
concomitant reduction of the Indian population and of caboclos (to a lesser extent) 
without affecting the environment as a whole. However, after that year, the occupation 
planned and implemented by the military government completely modified the situation 
by reason of its effect on the native population - Indians and principally caboclos - and 
initiated an intense process of deforestation in Amazonia.
The Armed Forces took power in 1964, initiating an authoritarian period which persisted 
for twenty-one years. During this period, the military carried out their project of 
accelerating the development of Brazilian capitalism and were supported by the industrial 
and financial bourgeoisie and, moreover, gained acceptance by most of the middle classes. 
It is important to emphasise here that the importance of the military coup is characterised 
by its distinct intention of implementing a new development project for Brazilian society. 
This development project was based on a triple alliance (Evans, 1979) between State
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capital, transnational enterprises and the local bourgeoisie, and it was associated orthodox 
monetary policies with resolute State intervention and widespread political repression.
There were a number of reasons behind the military coup. One is the apparent exhaustion 
of industrialisation based on the import substitution model of liberal democratic 
governments (O’Donnell, 1978; Hirschman, 1981). Nevertheless, this economic 
explanation alone is not sufficient for understanding the coup as a whole. Other factors 
were extremely important for the implementation of the authoritarian regime: the 
increasing incitement to class struggles in the early 1960s, characterised by strong popular 
demands for basic reforms; the climate of the Cold War; the Cuban Revolution (1959); 
the fear of dissemination of guerrilla-war tactics based exclusively on the Cuban example 
and; the determination of the United States to prevent another Cuba (O’Donnell, 1978; 
Cardoso and Falleto, 1979).
In addition, there were tensions, antagonisms and a complete lack of synchronisation 
between the two branches of the Brazilian Republic (Legislative and Executive), which 
generated political indecision and instability. These factors, connected with the weakness 
of popular organisations in Brazilian society contributed to the military control over the 
State, although the main factor was the military's will in undertaking their project of 
modernisation for Brazil (Ianni, 1986).
This military regime’s project was intrinsically related to the National Security Doctrine 
(the influence of ESG's geopolitical thesis may be mentioned here), which was a doctrine 
principally applied to the area of security policy and generally in war-time, but which was 
extended to all sectors of Brazilian society. This doctrine advocated a maximisation of 
economic growth and also the existence of well defined national objectives, which were 
the necessary conditions for surviving a war. Thus, the key-word became security, which 
was considered fundamental for attaining those objectives, principally rapid economic 
growth.
The principal objective of this project was to modernise the nation and at the same time 
construct a "new Brazilian society". In order to attain these objectives, the military
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governments realised several specific goals, which varied from the institutional reforms 
(creation of the Central Bank, the Financial Housing System and so on) to populating 
Amazonia and integrating it into the national territory and also to stimulating its economy. 
Consequently, the Armed Forces believed that it was fundamental to have complete 
control over the State in order to achieving their objectives. This control was considered 
important for consolidating and expanding the leading role of the State (naturally under 
the protection of the Armed Forces), which was understood by the military as the only 
body capable of accelerating modernisation. Planning became the keystone of the 
authoritarian regime fundamentally because it was understood to be a rational and neutral 
technique. According to President Castello Branco (Ianni, 1986) in his speech in 1964, the 
first important objective of planning and economic co-ordination in Brazil was to increase 
the degree of efficacy and rationality of economic policy, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively. The second important objective was to make the country’s representative 
forces conscious of the national objectives to be achieved.
It is important to stress that there was complete harmony between the goals of the military 
project and the National Security Doctrine, the latter expressed in government geopolitics. 
In agreement with the aims of the project, the government strategy had three basic points: 
the establishment of a modem technological structure in some important areas of the 
country; the rapid integration of national territory (especially the Amazon) and; the 
projection of the nation into the international arena.
The authoritarian regime embraced a complex period, which comprised the crisis of the 
1960s, the "miracle" between 1968 and 1973, and the beginning of the recession in the 
early 1980s. Aiming at accelerated modernisation, the government fostered strategies for 
attracting foreign and domestic investments by protecting the internal market, creating 
development banks to provide long-term finance for private and public firms in sectors 
considered strategic, and establishing new State enterprises in public utilities and heavy 
industries. It is important to stress that the modernisation project was also based on a 
territorial programme inspired by ideas of national integration and of Brazil as a great 
power.
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In fact, the economic policy fostered by the military governments followed practically the 
same directives. Nevertheless, until the “miracle” period the Brazilian government 
considered inflation the most important problem to be tackled and the relative success in 
bringing down its annual rate (from 100% in 1964 to 20% in 1969) allied with 
institutional reforms, paved the way for the rapid economic growth initiated in 1968. In 
spite of coinciding with the most brutal period (1968-73) of the military dictatorship (the 
establishment of Institutional Act n° 5 at the end of 1968 initiated a harder and more cruel 
phase of the military repression), Brazil achieved an impressive rate of economic growth, 
which, measured by GDP, showed an annual average of 11,2%, and this economic success 
was termed “the Brazilian economic miracle”. However, this period is also important 
because the Brazilian government, principally under Medici's administration, 
demonstrated an intense preoccupation with regional and national integration questions. 
Amazonia and the Northeast were considered problematic regions and received special 
attention from the government, which expressed these preoccupation in programmes such 
as PIN (which foresaw the construction of the Trans-Amazon highway) and PROTERRA, 
and governmental plans such as Targets and Bases for Government Action and the First 
National Development Plan - PND I.
The so-called "Brazilian miracle" might have been due to: reduction in wages and to the 
expansion of multinational, national, and State-capital - consolidating the "triple alliance"; 
the organisation of the governmental apparatus, which was crucial to the reinforcing of 
the centralising mechanisms of the State; control over the labour market, stimulating 
turnover and movement in the labour force and; reinvigoration of the economy (based 
upon the consumer durable-goods sector because this sector had an enormous potential 
for accumulation of money and, moreover, absorbed a great number of workers and did 
not require significant imports).
Despite the overcoming of the recession, the "miracle" period had a short life by virtue of 
the government's option of achieving rapid economic growth through the consumer 
durable-goods sector and not through the development of the Brazilian industrial park, 
and consequently the intermediate-goods and basic-inputs sectors experienced a relative 
deterioration. As a consequence of the rapidly growing imports, a crisis occurred in the
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balance of payments in 1973, which was made worse in the same year by the first oil 
shock.
This was the situation when General Geisel assumed the Presidency of the Republic 
(1974-1979). However, as Hirschman (1995a) pointed out, instead of applying restrictive 
economic policies so as to rein in imports, his government set up the Second National 
Development Plan - PND II- (1975-1979), which aimed at modifying the focus of the 
economy, from the automobile consumer durables to the sectors that represent the 
ultimate stage of import-substitution industrialisation: the intermediate inputs and capital 
goods. Planners responsible for the economic policy misinterpreted the significance of the 
international crisis provoked by the first oil shock and its impacts on Brazil. As a 
consequence, the crisis of 1973-74 was ignored by the PND n, whose strategy for 
overcoming the serious problems in the balance of payments was to maintain of the high 
rates of investments, which made it possible to attain high rates of economic and also 
industrial growth. These investments were only possible because of the great amounts of 
petrodollars and of the extensive loans made by the major banks. Despite differences from 
other plans developed by military governments, the PND II practically maintained the 
same social objectives, which were to improve income distribution in regional and 
personal terms and also to carry out development without impairing the quality of life. It 
is important to note that social objectives expressed in governmental plans during the 
authoritarian regime were always relegated to a secondary position.
In order to improve the programme of import-substitution, the government made efforts to 
generate a comprehensive energy programme, establish a petrochemical sector and 
increase the production of exportable raw materials (cellulose, iron, steel and aluminium) 
through huge investments in the form of "joint ventures" between the State, multinational 
firms and, to a lesser extent, private national capital. However, it is necessary to 
emphasise here that the BNDES played an important role in this context with its credit 
facilities and also subsidised interest rates.
The crucial role exercised by the State in leading industrialisation aimed at: determining, 
articulating, and providing vast amounts of investments in order to modify the structure of
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the Brazilian economy; generating an infrastructure to integrate the highway, energy, 
urban, and telecommunication systems and; producing intermediate inputs indispensable 
for heavy industrialisation (especially chemical and metallurgical industries). The 
modernisation of the economy was completed successfully, principally in terms of 
achieving the ultimate stage of import-substitution industrialisation. In fact, Brazil has an 
advanced industrial structure, although the military governments were not fundamental 
for its implementation because the structural changes in the Brazilian economy had 
already been initiated in the 1950s.
Despite positive effects, the Brazilian economy continued to have serious problems due to 
its profound dependence on petroleum imports, increasing inflation rates and increasing 
internal debt, at a time when the official banks had agreed to finance enormous projects. 
With the second oil shock in 1979, the Brazilian situation deteriorated because the former 
problems mentioned above adversely affected the balance of payments, decreased 
economic growth, and in particular increased the external debt, which became more and 
more a constant and difficult obstacle to be overcome by subsequent Brazilian 
governments. It is important to stress here that the greater part of the problems, principally 
the impressive increase in the external debt, was a consequence of the economic policy 
adopted during the PND n. Thus, as a result of this situation, the economic policy fostered 
by the government was to contain spending, eliminate incentives, and reduce financing in 
all sectors.
During the Figueiredo Presidency (1979-85), the Brazilian government elaborated the 
Third National Development Plan - PND m  - ,which maintained some of the objectives of 
previous plans, such as: import-substitution of basic inputs, petroleum exploration, 
activities directed at increasing exports etc. These investments, which became top 
priorities (principally the increase in exports) in the PND HI, were made possible by Mr. 
Delfim Netto, Minister of Planning, who was also responsible for the “miracle” years in 
the Medici's administration, and who believed that it was essential to follow the economic 
policy implemented in the previous government in order to achieve high rates of 
economic growth. However, this policy advocated by Mr. Delfim Netto contrasted with 
the necessity of cutting government spending, which was constantly repeated by the
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Brazilian government, in order to tackle serious problems, such as: deficit in the balance 
of payments, high rates of inflation and the exacerbation of the external debt, which were 
considered the main macroeconomic aims.
The objectives expressed in the economic policy elaborated by the military regime can be 
summarised in one general aim: to modernise Brazil in order to make it comparable with 
the developed countries. However, this general aim was associated with the Armed 
Forces’ geopolitical project, which had the clear purpose of integrating national territory 
and, in this context, populating the Amazon through a strategy of implementing growth 
poles.
It is worth noting that the implementation of a new development project for Brazilian 
society was stressed by the military governments and was only possible by virtue of the 
authoritarian domination pattern, which was named “bureaucratic-authoritarian” State by 
O’Donnell (1978). This author pointed out that bureaucratic-authoritarian State is a 
system of exclusion of the popular sector, and is based on the reaction of dominant sectors 
and classes to the political and economic crises to which populism and its 
developmentalist successors led. In turn, such exclusion is the requisite for attaining and 
guaranteeing “social order” and economic stability; these constitute the necessary 
conditions for attracting domestic investments and international capital and, thus, for 
providing continuity for a new impulse toward the deepening of the productive structure. 
Society is deeply transformed by bureaucratic-authoritarian State, seeking to control it and 
render it predictable so that it is possible to obtain the necessary transfusions of 
international capital.
According to Cardoso and Falleto (1979), the State is the expression of the dynamism of 
business enterprises and of the classes that control them as they operate in a context in 
which bureaucracies and the regulative and organisational capacities of the state are 
expanding. The basic ideology of the State is fundamentally “developmentalism”. In view 
of the explicit ends of economic growth and national grandeur, the exploitation of 
workers, if not openly defended by the State, is justified by the argument that the
26
Chapter I
tightening of belts is necessary “at the moment” so that “in the future” the results of this 
economy may be redistributed.
1.4 - Regional Policies and Frontier Integration in Amazonia
When the first military President, Marshall Humberto de Alencar Castello Branco, 
assumed control of the country, he emphasised the importance of making regional 
planning more efficient and of reformulating all federal government policies regarding 
Amazonia in order to bring about a new economic development strategy for the region. In 
this context, a five-member committee was set up in 1965 to elaborate a series of 
measures, known as “Operation Amazonia”.
Among some of this committee’s recommendations were the elimination of the old 
SPVEA, transforming it into the Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia 
(SUDAM), which was created by law n° 5173 on October 27, 1966; the abolition of the 
Credit Bank of Amazonia (BCA), establishing in its place a financial agency by law n° 
5122 on September 28, 1966, named Bank of Amazonia pic (BASA), whose objective 
was to support SUDAM’s projects; the adoption of a diversified policy on fiscal 
incentives; the setting up of the Superintendency for the Manaus Free-Trade Zone 
(SUFRAMA), whose main task was to supervise the Manaus Free-Trade Zone (ZFM). 
The ZFM was established by law n° 288 on February 28, 1967 and the basic aim of this 
law was to create, through fiscal means, an industrial, commercial, and agricultural centre 
in Manaus to serve as the “development poles” for western Amazonia (Mahar, 1979).
Fiscal incentives in the Amazon region came about through the BASA, the SUDAM and 
law n° 5,174, which outlined a programme of fiscal incentives for this region. This law 
permitted registered companies (including private firms) to deduct (until 1982) 50% from 
their income tax owed and invest it in agriculture, cattle-breeding, industry and services 
considered basic, such as education, health, transport, colonisation and tourism thought to 
be fundamental for the development of the region, and this exemption was increased to 
100% until the end of 1994 for those companies whose projects were implemented, or
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expanded, or even for those whose factories had already been built but were not yet in 
operation (Cardoso and Muller, 1977; Hall, 1991a).
These incentives given to private investors in Amazonia led to a large increase in the 
number of approved projects, which rose from only four in 1966 to one thousand by 1985 
(Branford & Glock, 1985; Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992). Most of these projects 
(roughly 70%) were related to the livestock sector and were concentrated in southeastern 
Para, north-eastern Mato Grosso and western Maranhao. These ranches covered up to ten 
million hectares and obtained credits of approximately US$700 million, an amount 
equivalent to slightly less than half of the total fiscal incentive funds allocated by 
SUDAM over this period (Mahar, 1989; World Bank, 1992). In addition to these 
incentives, cattle ranchers in Amazonia obtained rural subsidies through both regional and 
national livestock development programmes. This in fact reflected the Brazilian 
government's belief that cattle ranching would transform the Amazonian economy and 
also its endorsement by multilateral agencies such as the World Bank and the Inter- 
American Development Bank through loans of US$ 1.3 billion throughout the 1960s and 
1970s (Hall, 1991a). As a consequence, the SUDAM incentives totally transformed the 
earlier slow process of penetration into Eastern Amazonia and at the same time provoked 
significant social and environmental impacts on the region.
Instead of supporting productive activities and trying to promote sustainable development, 
the large amount of resources applied to livestock development encouraged land 
speculation, land concentration, the expulsion of smallholders to newer frontier zones and 
environmental degradation as well. A significant area converted into pasture 
(approximately ten million hectares) is only productive for a transitory period because, as 
Hecht (1985) pointed out, soil nutrients during the first years are adequate for animal 
stocking rates of one animal unit (au) per hectare, but to only 0.25 au/hectare after five or 
six years. This process occurs by virtue of soil-nutrient changes, compaction and also 
weed invasion. Another source of environmental degradation is caused by modem 
technologies, such as fertilizers, pesticides, herbicides and large tractors utilised in the 
process of converting rainforest into pasture and agriculture. In addition, cattle ranching 
generates little employment in comparison with the investment made by the Brazilian
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government. Each ranch creates only one permanent job per two thousand head of cattle 
or per 12 square miles, in contrast to the 100 people per square mile which can be 
supported by peasant agriculture in the tropical rainforest. The cost of the jobs created 
averaged US$63,000 each (Hall, 1987; World Bank, 1992).
It is important to emphasise here that “Operation Amazonia” marked a very important 
change in the Brazilian development policy for the Amazon region, revealing the 
government’s transparent strategy directed towards the latifundio, and consequently 
towards social exclusion. In relation to this strategy during the 1960s, State was granted 
on generous terms to private investors for the progressive monopolisation of huge areas of 
the native forest for commercial and speculative exploitation, leading to the 
intensification of land conflict in Amazonia.
Until 1970, the military regime had formulated three national plans: the Governmental 
Economic Action Plan (PAEG, 1964-66), the Decennial Plan (1967-76) and the Strategic 
Development Plan (PED, 1968-70). The PAEG hardly differed from the previous plan, 
the Triennial Plan (1963-65). Its main objective was to tackle the problem of regional 
disparities in Brazil, and although it concentrated on the Northeast, other regions, 
principally Amazonia, received special attention.
This governmental plan was drawn up during a period of high-inflation, so economic 
growth and price stabilisation were fundamental priorities. Indeed, the politico-economic 
problems allied with the PAEG’s deficiencies contributed to the failure of its strategy. 
However, the importance of PAEG is principally due to its concrete proposal for 
integrating regional and national planning (the creation of an Extraordinary Federal 
Ministry to Co-ordinate the Activities of All Regional Agencies may be mentioned here).
According to Ianni (1986), the action of the State became more decisive for the national 
economy through the implementation of PAEG's directives. In order to take advantage of 
exceptional political conditions, which were created by the absolute hegemony of the 
Executive branch over the Legislative; and also to take advantage of favourable economic 
conditions, which were created by the experience of formulating and implementing the
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PAEG, the Brazilian government decided to formulate the Decennial Plan for the 1967-78 
period.
The Decennial Plan’s principal objective was to accelerate national economic growth in 
the long-term. The economists and technicians responsible for elaborating this ten-year 
plan paid attention to the problems of urban and regional development, and also proposed 
the introduction of a “new concept of regional policy” based on the integration of the 
various regions of the country, with a view to creating a unified national market and to 
accelerating national economic growth (Neto, 1989). This plan manifested two important 
preoccupations, with national integration and the populating of “empty spaces”. These 
preoccupations were intrinsically related to the military's geopolitical objectives and one 
of the regional policies to be implemented by this plan in order to tackle those problems 
above was the creation of urban growth poles.
In spite of being an ambitious governmental plan, the Decennial Plan was a mere 
collection of studies, reports and recommendations. It was not implemented by the 
subsequent Brazilian government under General Arthur da Costa e Silva. However, the 
Decennial Plan served as a basis for the Strategic Development Programme (PED) for the 
1968-70 period.
The PED maintained the same attributes as its predecessor, the Decennial Plan. In 
regional terms, the PED aimed at creating a self-sustaining process of development in 
each major region; and at introducing this process into the promotion of national 
integration, whose objective was to have a relative economic differentiation of each 
region and to form an integrated national market (Mendes, 1978). In order to attain these 
aims, this plan established some instruments of economic policy and one of them was to 
create several regional poles, whose main objective was to expand the national market.
After the 1964 military coup, the State was led to intensify its participation in the whole 
economy in order to generate better possibilities for the expansion of private enterprises. 
As a consequence of this intense participation, the process of regional planning was 
centralised and was to be totally consolidated in the first half of 1970s. At the beginning
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of the 1970s, the Brazilian government's presence in Amazonia became greater because 
such objectives as occupation and national integration became more important than all 
others. This presence was strongly reflected in federal programmes such as PIN and 
PROTERRA, and subsequent governmental plans. PIN was established by Decree-Law n° 
1106 on June 16, 1970. This programme envisaged the construction of Transamazdnica 
(the Trans-Amazon highway, BR-230) connecting Amazonia with the Northeast and also 
of the Cuiaba-Santarem highway (BR-165) linking Transamazdnica with the Centre- 
South. In addition, there was a vast colonisation plan for both highways which aimed at 
relieving high-populated areas, such as the Northeast (SUDAM, 1973).
In this context, PIN sought a solution to social difficulties of both the regions considered 
problematic by the government: Amazonia and the Northeast, so the construction of 
highways and colonisation projects were seen as suitable measures for solving these 
problems because these measures would generate employment for masses of displaced 
people, principally from the Northeast which had recently suffered a severe drought, and 
would also encourage emigration on a large scale from crowded regions (principally the 
Northeast) to Amazonia. The Brazilian government believed that emigration would at the 
same time resolve three problems, namely the occupation of Amazonia (the military 
geopolitical aim may be mentioned here), alleviation of social tensions in the Northeast 
and avoidance of exodus from poor areas (especially the Northeast) to the highly- 
populated Centre-South cities.
Three months later, President Emilio Garrastazu Medici, launched the document Target 
and Bases for Government Action for the 1970-72 period. This document was launched in 
the period called “The Brazilian Miracle” and at that time there was a wave of optimism 
and nationalism, which was stimulated by the Federal government in order to transform 
the country into a great world power, and for Brazil to have a prominent role as the leader 
of Latin-American countries.
In relation to its regional objectives, the Targets and Bases aimed at developing the 
Northeast; consolidating the occupation of Amazonia and integrating it into the national 
economy; and centralising regional planning through a national strategy of integrated
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regional development. Although some objectives and strategies had already been 
elaborated in previous plans, this document placed great emphasis on two depressed 
regions of the country: Amazonia and the Northeast. It is important to stress here that PIN 
was incorporated into the Targets and Bases document as its instrument for regional 
policy. Indeed, the Targets and Bases included several distinct programmes for different 
sectors of the Brazilian economy. The INCRA was created in 1970 in order to settle 
thousands of migrants along the Trans-Amazon and Cuiaba-Santarem highways. 
PROTERRA was set up by Decree-Law n° 1178 on June 1, 1971, and was a complement 
to PIN. With the aim of decreasing rural poverty, this programme aimed at redistributing 
unutilised lands and promoting agro-industry in Amazonia and the Northeast. In 1972, the 
Brazilian government decided to construct the 4,040-kilometre Northern Perimeter road 
(the Perimetral Norte, BR-210) along the northern bank of the River Amazon and the 
techniques used for the construction of this highway were based on the Trans-Amazon 
highway.
The INCRA aimed at resettling 100,000 families along the principal highways in 
Amazonia. In order to attract thousands of migrants from southern, as well as 
northeastern, Brazil, the Brazilian government undertook a massive campaign which 
projected an image of Amazonia as a promising land, a land full of opportunities for every 
Brazilian who wanted to build a new life. The destiny of migrants were the colonisation 
schemes along the Trans-Amazon, located principally in Altamira, Itaituba and Marabd in 
the State of Par£. At the beginning, plots of 100 of hectares were offered to INCRA- 
approved families, together with a monthly subsistence allowance, agricultural production 
credit and housing at highly subsidised prices. These colonists were to live in several 
planned new rural and small urban settlements designed by INCRA: the agrovila is a 
small village for up to seventy families placed at ten kilometre intervals along the main 
highway and side-roads, designed to provide a medical post, school and government 
general store as well as offices for INCRA and the extension service, EMATER; the 
agropolis is a small town for up to 600 families built every twenty kilometres as an 
intermediate administrative centre, provided with a small hospital and other services; 
finally, the ruropolis , embracing eight to twelve agropolis with up to 20,000 people, each 
to be the main administrative and commercial centre, with facilities such as banks, a
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hospital, an airport, hotels and restaurants (Hall, 1991a). Despite the significant 
expenditure of government funds, the official aims (100,000 families) were not achieved 
and by 1978 less than 8% or 7,647 households had been settled by INCRA. Thus, this 
scheme proved to be a complete failure and as a consequence, the INCRA desisted from 
colonising the Trans-Amazon highway and colonists opted for more “spontaneous” forms 
of colonisation elsewhere in Eastern Amazonia, but principally in Rondonia and Acre.
There are several reasons which explain the failure of directed colonisation along the 
Trans-Amazon highway. The most important reason is related to INCRA, which was not 
able to deal with the vast number of migrants during the early stages, while bureaucratic 
delays were responsible for the disorganisation of the agricultural calendar, which 
provoked poor harvests and consequently disillusionment. In addition, basic 
infrastructure, educational, health, credit, extension and other important and necessary 
services were not supplied, and land on its own was insufficient to ensure a livelihood in 
an environment strange for migrants from the Northeast and also southern Brazil. It is 
important to note that most of Amazonian soil is infertile (except for a few areas) and the 
colonisation schemes were located in these infertile areas. These problems were 
exacerbated by over-centralised and inefficient planning and also by administrative 
difficulties such as bureaucratic indiscipline, lack of interagency co-ordination and 
inefficiency, which were common to INCRA and other government agencies (Bunker, 
1985; Hall, 1991a), the construction of roads which were inaccessible during the rainy 
season, the provision of seed of fast growing crop varieties which matured at the wettest 
time of the year in Amazonia, as well as long delays in providing colonists with the land 
titles, fundamental for obtaining subsidised credit, which was being monopolised by 
larger commercial producers to the detriment of small farmers.
In addition to the Trans-Amazon, Belem-Brasflia and Cuiaba-Santarem highways, other 
federal and state highways, although less grandiose, were very important for consolidating 
the integration and populating of Amazonia. The total road network in Amazonia has 
grown eight fold since the mid-1960's, from about 6,000 kilometres in 1965 to 46,000 
kilometres only twenty years later (Mahar, 1989). The rapid expansion of the road 
network paved the way for the occupation of the region.
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Various factors can explain this governmental emphasis on the rapid expansion of the 
road network, colonisation projects and agribusiness in Amazonia. Nevertheless, the most 
important one is geopolitics. Thus, integration became the cornerstone of the military 
government because it was seen as an essential condition for national security, which was 
embodied symbolised in the slogan: “to integrate in order not to forfeit”. The communist 
threat represented by only sixty-nine Maoist guerrillas in the Araguaia region of southern 
Para, the expansionist threat presented by neighbouring countries who share the Amazon 
rainforest and other ghosts which were part of the military imagination contributed to a 
strengthening of regional integration in Amazonia. By virtue of this preoccupation, a 
nation-wide campaign was promoted in order to attract thousands of migrants from 
southern and also north-eastern Brazil, and this massive propaganda emphasised projects 
which were being undertaken (principally the Trans-Amazon highway and settlements 
projects of PIN) by the government, the Brazilian economic progress (the “miracle” 
years), the country’s transformation into a great world power and at the same time showed 
Amazonia as a promised land ready for occupation by hard-pressed peasantry. Obviously, 
this intense campaign had two clear motives: to divert public attention from the cruel 
political repression of the military regime and avoid agrarian reform in the North-East and 
South. The second factor is economic, because there was a real interest in exploiting the 
region's vast store of natural resources (the reserves of gold, cassiterite, copper and iron- 
ore had already been discovered). In addition, the Federal government believed that small 
properties could produce a surplus of staple foods such as rice and beans to compensate 
for the loss of production for export. Although colonisation projects showed some 
preoccupation with social issues connected with the northeastern drought, the 
government's main aim was to populate Amazonia's vast empty spaces, which was a 
geopolitical objective, making it viable in agrarian terms and also avoiding agrarian 
reform by encouraging migration from areas with social tensions.
Mahar (1979) stressed that the creation of PROTERRA, like that of PIN, was an attempt 
to reorientate the previous strategy of regional development based on import-substitution 
industrialisation. The First National Development Plan - PND I - was elaborated for the 
1972-74 period. It basically maintained the same objectives as those of the previous plans, 
such as national integration and the acceleration of economic growth through the
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expansion of the national market. With regard to regional development strategies, PND I 
continued to put great emphasis on Amazonia and the Northeast regions and based its 
strategies on programmes (PIN and PROTERRA) which had already been implemented. It 
is important to note that this plan restored growth poles as a strategic part of regional 
development. PND I was complemented by SUDAM’s detailed plan, which was named 
the First Amazon Development Plan (PDA I). The objectives of the PDA I endorsed the 
proposals of PND I.
Although reserves of iron-ore, gold, and copper had already been discovered, the 
Brazilian government plan was to exploit the huge store of natural resources in Amazonia. 
In this context, PDA I stressed the need to discover more minerals, so a sophisticated plan 
of mapping the region was implemented and named the RADAM Project. This project 
was the first systematic aerial survey of Amazonia’s natural resources and went a long 
way towards confirming the vast mineral wealth in the subsoil, as well as the extent of 
timber reserves and land available for livestock production, thus setting the stage for later 
commercial expansion in the region (Hall, 1991a).
The Second National Development Plan - PND II - was launched by the Brazilian 
President, General Ernesto Geisel, on September, 1974. This plan followed the same 
directives established in the PND I and thus national integration continued to be the core 
of the problem. It is important to note that the first oil crisis, which occurred in 1973, 
contributed in large measure to the Brazilian government’s decision to exploit Amazonia 
with the clear purpose of generating foreign exchange through export. Based on this 
governmental decision, the PND II concentrated on expanding infrastructure such as 
energy, transport and communications as well as the export of some specific products, 
and, moreover, on investing in the expansion of basic industries located in selected areas 
of the region (SUDAM, 1976a). Another important point is that PND II understood 
Amazonia as a “tropical frontier” because of its resources of comparative advantage, 
which were mainly in the mineral sector (iron ore, bauxite, manganese etc.), timber 
(laminates, composites etc.), beef (meat), crops (dende oil, cacau, rubber, pepper, jute 
etc.) etc. This understanding was reflected in POLAMAZONIA, which was established by 
Decree-Law n° 74,607 of September 25, 1974.
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POLAMAZONIA aimed to create fifteen “growth poles” in selected areas, which were 
endowed with both investments in infrastructure and a stimulus to export-oriented 
activities in favour of private enterprises. Carajas was one of those “growth poles” and, 
although iron-ore mining was the central objective, there were other interrelated and 
important projects for this area such as the development of cattle-breeding and the 
relocation of the city of Maraba (SUDAM, 1976a). Nevertheless, the most significant fact 
is that POLAMAZONIA marked an important change in government policy in favour of 
large corporate agribusiness, livestock production and private colonisation schemes, allied 
with infrastructure investments, mineral mining and processing activities (including the 
exploitation of iron-ore mine at Carajas). This change was the result of pressures 
exercised by planners, politicians and even SUDAM, which blamed the small farmers for 
the negative impacts of government directed colonisation projects along the Trans- 
Amazon highway. These pressures had a clear intention: to force the Brazilian 
government to return to the previous policy for Amazonia, which was based on 
occupation by large-scale private enterprises, powerfully represented by the AEA, whose 
headquarters was located in Sao Paulo. Curiously, the interest of this influential lobby of 
businessmen were ably represented in the Medici government by the Planning Minister, 
Mr. Joao Paulo dos Reis Velloso (Branford & Glock, 1985).
PDA II was elaborated as a complementary plan to PND II for the 1975-79 period, and the 
strategies for regional development presented in it were in agreement with the aims of the 
national plan. Nevertheless, the PDA II placed more emphasis on the characterisation of 
Amazonia as a “tropical frontier”, highlighting the great potential of this region in 
generating foreign exchange for the country.
The economic situation at the end of the 1970s was totally unfavourable to Brazil, 
principally because of the second oil shock in 1979, which contributed greatly to 
increasing the Brazilian external debt. In this context, the Brazilian government 
formulated PND IE which maintained some characteristics of previous plans but focused 
on increasing exports in order to reduce the external debt crisis. With respect to 
Amazonia, the preoccupations of PND HI were the same as those of previous national 
plans: integration and occupation. However, this plan stressed the necessity of
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intensifying development in selected poles through POLAMAZONIA in order to carry out 
the occupation process of the Amazon region. Thus, this plan placed emphasis on “growth 
poles” as a means of integrating the Amazonian development and obviously of occupying 
this region.
In fact, the Brazilian government, under the PND m, had concluded that cattle-breeding 
was not the best solution for the long-term development of Amazonia and then put its 
trust in the mining sector. Although the Carajas Project had officially started in 1978 
when the iron-ore operation was formally approved by the CDE of the federal government 
and the construction of the initial 80 kilometres of the Carajas railway outward from Sao 
Luis was authorised, the implementation of this project was only intensified after the 
change in the Brazilian government in March 1979. Indeed, the Figueiredo government 
decided to support the Carajas Project on October 15, 1980, authorising CVRD to obtain 
internal and external financing necessary to implement it, and one month later, on 
November 24, 1980, the PGC was officially established by Decree-Law n° 1,813. This 
Decree-Law instituted a special system of incentives for projects included in the PGC area 
and was complemented by Decree-Law n° 1,825 of December 22, 1980, which granted 
exemption from income tax and from additional non-refundable taxes levied on the 
profits earned by exploitation at legal entities for a period of ten years, when the same 
installed, expanded or modernised undertakings included in the Greater Carajas 
Programme by December 31, 1985 (SEPLAN-PR, 1988).
The mining sector was responsible for more than 10% of Brazil's exports, roughly 1.3% of 
GDP and about 1% of government revenues in 1980. While some seventy different 
minerals were produced at that time in Brazil, iron-ore dominated total national output, 
accounting for 26% of all mineral production and more than 90% of the value of mineral 
exports (World Bank, 1992). Moreover, Brazil had vast reserves of metallic and non- 
metallic minerals in Eastern Amazonia. Therefore, the Carajas Project and the PGC were 
regarded by the Brazilian government not only as a historical opportunity for solving the 
foreign debt problem, but also as a possible source of massive loans (from Japan, EEC, 
World Bank, etc.), which were more and more difficult to obtain by virtue of the 
deterioration of the Brazilian macroeconomic situation.
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1.4.1 - Rio Doce Valley Company (CVRD)
The Rio Doce Valley Company (CVRD) has played a major role in Eastern Amazonia. 
Indeed, CVRD was a State-owned mining company, the Bank's client, the Government 
agency responsible for the Carajas project and for the PGC. In order to better understand 
its role in this region, it is important to briefly describe its history within the wider 
Brazilian context. The CVRD was created during the Second World War, specifically on 
the 1st of June, 1942, to exploit iron-ore at the Itabira mines in the state of Minas Gerais. 
Indeed, the establishment of the CVRD was the culmination of intense negotiation 
between Brazil, USA and the UK, who signed an agreement in Washington. According to 
this agreement, the UK purchased the Vitdria - Minas railway as well as the ownership of 
the iron-ore mines from the English company Itabira Iron Ore and transferred them to the 
Brazilian government, while the U.S. lent US$ 14 million to Brazil to purchase machines 
and equipment for CVRD. In addition, both countries agreed to buy all iron-ore 
production to be exported by the State-owned mining company (Teixeira, 1993a; 1993b).
CVRD was created one year later than the National Steel Company (CSN), which was a 
landmark in the history of Brazilian industrialisation. After a long period of negotiation in 
which Brazil allowed American military bases to be built in the Northeast, the Vargas 
government obtained a loan of US$ 20 million (Teixeira, 1993b) from the United States 
to set up the Volta Redonda steel mill, which was the first industrial plant in this strategic 
sector. In fact, the creation of both companies, CVRD and CSN, was successful and the 
reason for this lies partially in the Second World War, from which President Vargas 
benefited by demanding favourable conditions to establish these companies in order for 
Brazil to join the Allied forces. Although the war was an important factor and Vargas 
took advantage of this situation to achieve his objectives, these companies were not a 
consequence of World War II but the result of socio-political changes which occurred 
when Vargas took power in October 1930.
The political and military forces which supported Vargas forced into being a State 
typically bourgeois, which replaced the previous denominated oligarchic State. By 
controlling the political power, these forces, formed by the mercantile and industrial
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bourgeoisie allied to urban middle classes, imposed their interests and vision, eminently 
urban, upon the oligarchic sector, whose interests and vision were intrinsically related to 
an export economy based on the use of natural resources. The central point is the role 
played by the State in the economy and the world economic crisis caused by The Great 
Depression (1929-33) as well as The Second World War (1939-45) affected dependent 
countries such as Brazil and, consequently, led these governments to intervene, to a 
greater or lesser extent, in the economy in order to protect or stimulate the economic 
activities considered essential for the development of their respective nations or even to 
establish and stimulate new economic undertakings (Ianni, 1986).
With respect to Brazil, the world crisis affected the national economy, but they, despite 
the problems generated, did contribute to demonstrating the economic limitations of an 
economy based essentially on the external market. It is worth noting that the solutions for 
tackling these problems had a nationalist character and this nationalism was an important 
factor throughout the two phases of the Vargas administration (1930-45): The first period 
was from 1930 to 1937 and the second was initiated by the coup d'etat that established 
the Estado Novo (New State) in 1937, which was marked by political repression. Thus, 
the 1934 Constitution and the 1937 Constitution (sanctioned during the dictatorship 
period) were nationalist in relation to their economic directives (Ianni, 1986). At the same 
time, the debate on the exploitation of the petroleum deposits and on iron and steel, which 
culminated in the creation of the National Council of Petroleum (1938), the CSN (1941) 
and the CVRD (1942), were also examples of nationalist solutions for Brazilian society.
Insofar as the State was led to a major participation in the economy, the discussion about 
planning as a technical tool for government economic policy became more intense. The 
Second World War caused a decrease and transformation of international trade, which in 
turn generated a number of social, economic, financial, political, organisational and 
technological problems that had to be tackled rapidly and this is the main reason for the 
incorporation of planning as a technique by the Federal government (Ianni, 1986). In this 
regard, the creation of the Co-ordination for the Economic Mobilisation (Coordenagao de 
Mobilizagao Economica), a type of super Ministry, in Ianni's words, which was 
responsible for regulating the national economy, including the industrial planning for the
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country, through the SPI - Sector for Industrial Production (Setor de Produgao Industrial) 
- one of the agencies set up by the Co-ordination itself - is an excellent example. Although 
adopted to face serious problems generated by the World War n, planning was also 
perceived as a means of promoting economic development and the State was an essential 
element for achieving this objective.
The centralised planning began to be implemented during the Vargas' New State (1937- 
1945) and flourished during the military dictatorship (1964-85), although there were 
certain differences between these periods. The main difference lies in the development 
strategy implicit in Brazilian economic policy. While the strategy during the Vargas 
government was to develop a "national capitalism" as the only alternative for the socio­
economic progress, that during the military regime was to build an "associated capitalism" 
(Ianni, 1986). Nationalism was an important factor during the Vargas government and the 
idea that permeated Brazilian society in this period was that it was possible to achieve 
economic development independently, through the construction of a type of capitalism 
eminently national. In this regard, planning State intervention, industrialisation, and 
nationalisation of the economy were essential for constructing this capitalism and, 
consequently, for achieving economic emancipation. With respect to the military regime, 
its development strategy was termed as associated because these governments , by means 
of their economic policies, aimed to integrate the Brazilian economy with the world 
economy, and the presence of multinational enterprises was considered an essential part 
of strategy. Despite the importance of the role played by multinational enterprises in the 
national economy, nationalism was also present in this period, as evidenced by 
geopolitical preoccupations, of which national integration and occupation of Amazonia is 
an excellent example.
State-owned enterprises were located in specific sectors of the economy unattractive to 
private enterprise because of their heavy investment requirements and low profitability. 
Nevertheless, the State enhanced its intervention in the economy principally in those 
sectors which had important backward and forward linkages, of which the steel and basic 
petrochemical industries are traditional examples (Evans, 1986; 1995). The establishment 
of State enterprises played a central role in Brazilian development policies and through
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these public enterprises the State became an active and decisive actor in the development 
process. The power of the State enterprises grew rapidly during 1967-73 and Stepan 
(1985, pp.331) pointed out that in ranking Brazil's thirty largest non financial companies 
according to net assets, thirteen of these were public enterprises in 1987, seventeen in 
1971, and twenty-three in 1974.
This power did not decrease in the subsequent Geisel and Figueiredo administrations. The 
State enterprises played an important role in the PND n, which had opted for a new phase 
of import-substitution industrialisation: capital goods and basic raw materials, specially in 
petrochemical and metallurgical industries. Although more hesitant, the economic policy 
during the Figueiredo government continued the same as before, principally because the 
large industrial projects and programmes, such as POLAMAZ6NIA, elaborated by the 
previous administration had already been initiated, so they were continued willy-nilly. 
Evans and Rueschemeyer (1985) stressed that the State-owned enterprises, acting or not 
in the same way as private companies, represented a significant State intervention because 
through them the State supplanted private capital accumulation and itself became an agent 
for the accumulation of capital. In this regard, some State-enterprises, such as CVRD, are 
extremely profitable which make them relatively independent of the Federal government.
State intervention and the expansion of the role of State enterprises are associated with the 
development planning adopted by the military regime. This planning model, which has its 
roots in Vargas' New State, was a top-down process in which all decisions were 
centralised. By intervening in the economy, the State aimed to regulate all economic 
activities, administering prices, guiding market forces and controlling financial 
institutions. In fact, the military governments saw the State as the one body capable of co­
ordinating the main economic activities, but for this purpose a minimum of consistency 
and co-ordination within and between different State agencies and a rationalisation of its 
objectives and actions was necessary. In this regard, the Federal government elaborated 
four or five years plan, such as PND I, n , and ID, which had to be implemented.
The Ministry of Planning and General Co-ordination - MIPLAN - was in charge of 
governmental planning until 1974, when two agencies, the CDE (Economic Development
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Council) and SEPLAN (Planning Secretariat of the Presidency of the Republic), directly 
attached to the Presidency of the Republic were established in order to assist to the 
President in the formulation of the economic policy (Ulyssea, 1982). Despite the 
importance of the formulation of economic policy, the powerful SEPLAN , which was the 
old MIPLAN, was responsible for co-ordinating government planning, while the CDE 
was principally responsible for co-ordinating the activities of several Ministries. Thus, the 
SEPLAN (General Secretary of the Presidency of the republic) was the key agency in the 
Brazilian Government and its structure until 1979 consisted of some secretaries, institutes, 
foundations, such as: Seplan (Planning Secretariat), SOF (Secretary of Budget and 
Finance), SAREM (Secretary for Connection with state and Municipalities), INPES 
(National Economic and Social Research Institute), IPEA (Institute of Applied Economic 
Research), IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics),etc. After 1979, 
SEPLAN embraced some government bodies which were created by, and others 
transferred to, this secretary, the main ones being: SEST (Secretary for the Control of 
State Enterprises) and the Interministerial Council of the Greater Carajas Programme.
In fact, SEPLAN developed a number of activities, which varied from co-ordinating the 
elaboration of plans and programmes of the Federal Government and promoting 
integration between regional and sectoral plans; and monitoring the implementation of 
these plans and programmes to co-ordinating those activities related to the control of the 
resources and expenses of State enterprises and co-ordinating those activities related to 
integration between different tiers of government: Federal, state and municipal (Ulyssea, 
1982). SEST, which was subordinated to SEPLAN, was in charge of important functions 
ranging from co-ordinating those State enterprise activities which were related to 
resources and expenses that could be adjusted to objectives, policies and directions 
specified in the government plan to monitor the management of State enterprises in 
relation to their performance, operational efficiency, profitability and financial-economic 
situation (Ulyssea, 1982). The Interministerial Council of the PGC was set up within the 
SEPLAN in order to co-ordinate, promote and implement, in an integrated way, those 
measures required for the feasibility of the Carajas programme and for the granting of the 
necessary incentives. This Council was integrated by the Minister and Head of SEPLAN, 
who was its President, other Ministers (Mine and Energy, Transportation, Industry and
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Commerce, Finance, Interior, Agriculture, Labour, and Agrarian Reform and 
Development), The Secretary General of the National Security Council and the Governors 
of the states of Para, Maranhao and Goias (now Tocantins), which formed the activity 
area of the PGC. In addition, the Interministerial Council had an Executive-Secretariat, 
which was directed by an Executive-Secretary designated by the Presidency of the 
Republic (SEPLAN-PR,1988).
The Interministerial Council had authority to determine the polices and general criteria to 
be observed in the analysis and approval of projects and programmes included in the 
PGC; to approve, on the basis of proposals presented by the Executive-Secretariat , the 
implementation of the infrastructure of the PGC; to approve, on the basis of proposals 
presented by the Executive-Secretariat, those undertakings that were to receive the 
benefits of the incentives; to define the conditions under which the Executive-Secretariat 
shall exercise the attributions of other organs and entities of the Federal government, in 
the carrying out of those acts that are necessary to the implementation of approved 
projects and programmes; and to channel complementary financial resources into the 
undertakings of the PGC and to supervise their utilisation. It was the duty of the 
Executive-Secretariat, together with other governmental bodies and entities to study 
projects and programmes; to practise the administrative acts required for the 
implementation of approved projects and programmes (SEPLAN-PR,1988).
The structure of the planning model adopted by the military regime illustrates perfectly 
how centralised decision-making was. The change in SEPLAN's structure that occurred in 
1979 should be understood as a decentralisation undertaken by the Federal Government in 
order to achieve maximum efficiency. Decentralisation was an important measure 
commonly utilised when the Federal government decided to intervene in the market. 
Indeed, the military government opted for the market economy and consequently, 
development planning and government activities were directed towards guiding, 
supporting and stimulating the private sector, while the Federal government, as producer 
and investor, limited itself to those activities and areas considered as being of national 
interest and security. By deciding to intervene in the market in order to further its 
development policy, the Federal government needed to make its actions effective and
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therefore it was important to give autonomy to subunits, but this decentralisation created a 
number of problems for the government, such as difficulty of the co-ordination and the 
integration between different governmental bodies. Despite their importance, it is beyond 
the scope of this research to analyse the problems generated by decentralisation.
What really matters here is that this planning model was highly centralised in the hands of 
the Federal government, which had control over its institutions, agencies, 
Superintendencies, enterprises, etc. State enterprises played an important role in 
expanding the participation of the State in the economy and even those enterprises which 
had a relative degree of autonomy, such as CVRD, were involved with the objectives of 
the Federal government. Therefore, State enterprises were an instrument through which 
the Federal government expanded its role and controlled its territory and the classic 
example of which was Eastern Amazonia, which was controlled by the Brazilian 
government through its State-owned mining enterprise, CVRD.
In relation to CVRD, some important aspects must be taken into consideration in order to 
explain CVRD's brazen attitudes at Carajas and its disregard for the local municipality as 
well as its casual attitude towards the impacts generated in this region. First of all, 
CVRD's attitudes at Carajas must be placed within the historical context in order to be 
better understood. It is important to remember here that CVRD was created during 
Vargas' New State, an authoritarian period in which planning was centralised, and became 
Brazil's iron-mining giant during the military regime, which maintained the tradition of 
centralised planning. As already seen, this top-down planning model was intrinsically 
connected with centralised decision-making, hierarchical organisational structures, and 
authoritarian leadership. Policy decisions were made "from above" and were not 
democratic, because they were handed down as orders which had to be implemented. 
Consequently, state and municipal governments neither participated in the formulation of 
Federal Government plans nor were they consulted about their local problems. Indeed, the 
Federal Government patronised other government tiers and sometimes its attitudes tended 
to be paternalistic, a good example of which is the speech of the President Medici, who, 
after visiting some areas affected by a severe drought in the Northeast, stated: "I want to 
say to the people of the Northeast that I do not promise you anything.(...) I only say that
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everything has to begin to change" (Medici, 1970 quoted by Hall, 1991a, pp. 10). In less 
than ten days, his Government launched the National Integration Plan (PIN), which 
financed the construction of the Trans-Amazon highway (BR-230) connecting the 
Northeast with Amazonia.
1.4.2 - The World Bank
The World Bank played a significant role not only in making the Carajas project viable, 
but also in assisting this industrial project. As already mentioned, the Bank loan was 
fundamental for CVRD aspirations and represented 20.4% of total expected foreign 
funding for the Carajas iron-ore operation. However, this loan assumes a greater 
importance insofar as most of Japanese and European loans was made conditional on the 
World Bank's approval of the project. In addition to US$ 304.5 million from the Bank, the 
main foreign lenders were: Japanese financial institutions (over US$ 530 million), such as 
the Japanese Exim Bank and Japanese commercial bank syndication; the EEC (US$ 400 
million), through the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); the German KFW 
(US$ 130 million); and the US Exim Bank (US$ 58 million). Despite the massive 
external funding, the Federal government, through BNDES and FINAME, and CVRD, 
through convertible debentures (partial privatisation mentioned above) and own financial 
resources, were required to channel a significant amount of money into the Carajas 
project. Indeed, the total amount of foreign loan, including The World Bank, was 
estimated at US$ 1.5 billion, while the total cost of the project was US$ 4.5 billion 
(World Bank, 1992).
CVRD signed long-term contracts with several clients, such as German, French, Japanese, 
Korean, in order to assure sales during its first years of iron-ore production. Owing to 
these contracts previously negotiated by CVRD, the World Bank understood that the 
market risks for the Carajas project were reduced. This point is significant insofar as 
financial and economic aspects were always the main priorities, as will be seen below, for 
the World Bank. Its lending strategy for Brazil consisted of four main objectives and the 
Carajas project fitted in well with two of them, namely:
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"...to ease the foreign exchange constraint on national developm ent by supporting projects 
designed to  increase export capacity and substitute imports; and to provide part o f  the m edium  and 
long-term  capital flows required by the country in order to sustain satisfactory growth and achieve 
its em ploym ent creation and regional developm ent objectives" (W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 8).
The loan to help finance the Carajas project was approved on August 10, 1982, but before 
this approval the Bank undertook a preparation mission in February 1981; a pre-appraisal 
mission in July 1981; an appraisal mission between October 26 and November 11, 1981; 
and four post-appraisal missions, which took place in January, two in February, and May 
1982. The preparation mission focused on financial and economic aspects, such as market 
constraints, financing plan, the size of the project, while the environmental issues were 
not mentioned by the Bank specialists, who stressed that
"the Bank's ro le in support o f  the operation would be "critical" in two respects, by providing a 
"catalytic effect" on other external funding sources, as well as reinforcing Brazilian government 
com m itm ent to the undertaking, and by strengthening project organisation and management 
arrangem ents in CVRD for efficient project implementation" (W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 60).
During the pre-appraisal mission, the Bank team concentrated on CVRD's proposed 
measures for managing the environment in the Carajas project which included the creation 
of the GEAMAM in January 1981 and the CIMA in June of the same year. Although 
environmental measures were considered serious and comprehensive , the Bank specialist 
pointed out that they were insufficient and much more had yet to be done (evaluations, 
studies and preventive measures). Problems related to indigenous population settled close 
to the Carajds project were mentioned by the Bank mission, which recommended the 
participation of an Amerindian specialist in the appraisal mission. The financial and 
economic aspects of the project continued to receive special attention.
With respect to the project appraisal mission, the Bank team, which included several 
specialists, such as anthropologist, mining and transport engineers, financial analysts, etc., 
considered the environmental protection component of the Carajas project good enough 
for its purposes and at the same time FUNAI agreed to elaborate a plan for the protection
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of Indian reserves. This plan was carefully analysed during the loan negotiations, which 
were held in June 1982. Despite all these considerations, the economic and financial 
aspects continued to be the main priorities and this point is confirmed by the Bank 
memorandum, which identified the principal post-appraisal issues as being:
"the adequacy o f  the technical design and accuracy o f cost estim ates for the port and railway 
com ponents; the capability o f  the iron-ore m arket to absorb C arajas' output w ithout a  depressant 
effect on ore prices; and econom ic justification for the project in light o f possible additional 
production potential in C V R D 's southern system" (transmittal m em orandum  for yellow  cover 
SAR, M ay, 6 ,1 9 8 2 , quoted by the W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 64).
In this memorandum, the Bank stressed that
"the estim ated econom ic rates o f return (13% and 15% for 35 and 50 m illion tons o f iron-ore per 
year, respectively) are satisfactory for new m ining projects where large capital investm ents and 
long lead tim es to developm ent are required" (transmittal m em orandum  for yellow cover SAR, 
M ay, 6, 1982, quoted by the W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 64).
and emphasised that
"the role o f  the project as a m ajor foreign exchange is...particularly im portant to the government's 
plans to  im prove Brazil's balance o f payments" (transmittal m em orandum  for yellow  cover SAR, 
M ay, 6 ,1 9 8 2 , quoted by the W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 64).
The two first post-appraisal missions undertaken by the Bank were related to the transport 
component of the Carajas project which received special attention, principally because the 
railway and deep-port components corresponded to more than 60% of total project capital 
costs (World Bank, 1992). However, these missions corroborated the appraisal 
conclusions, stressing that engineering work for the railway had been carefully 
implemented by CVRD. The other two post-appraisal missions concerned the urban 
development component of the Carajas project. The Bank specialists suggested 
improvements in the new Carajas town and the necessity of establishing land use controls 
and regulations for the deep-port area in Sao Luis. With regard to Parauapebas, the urban 
specialist recommended, as seen in chapter three, the implementation of basic
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infrastructure and social services. However, the plans for this urban nucleus, unlike those 
for the company town, were not evaluated by the World Bank before its loan approval. 
They were only approved by the Bank in late October 1982.
1.4.3 - The Greater Carajas Programme (PGC)
th e  Greater Carajas Programme (PGC) covered an area of 895,000 square kilometres, 
which is equivalent to 10.6% of Brazil or larger than France and United Kingdom 
combined (see Fig.l). The PGC was the largest and most ambitious “integrated” 
development plan ever devised and implemented for an area of tropical rainforest. The 
concept of the “integrated” development plan has its roots in studies undertaken by the 
CVRD with assistance from the Japanese International Co-operation Agency (JICA), 
which was part of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. These studies clearly 
proposed the implementation of industrial (whose top priority was the export-oriented 
mineral), agricultural, livestock and silvicultural projects in the Caraj&s region. In fact, 
these studies were important for convincing the incoming Figueiredo government to 
support this regional development strategy. This programme comprised four major 
projects: an iron-ore mine (the Carajds Project), which was the PGC's centrepiece; two 
aluminium plants: the ALBRAS-ALUNORTE complex and ALUMAR, of which the 
former was located at Barcarena, near Belem and the latter in Sao Luis; and the Tucurui 
hydroelectric scheme on the River Tocantins. In addition, the PGC involved investments 
in infrastructure such as roads and rail transport and also in agriculture, cattle-breeding, 
fisheries, agroindustry, forestation, reforestation, lumbering and utilisation of energy 
sources.
It is important to stress here that the implementation of the Carajas Project, one of the 
ideas advocated by the CVRD (1979), would be the beginning of a development corridor, 
based firstly on the export mineral and agricultural products, and gradually embracing the 
establishment of industrial clusters (in the sense of development poles) and agro- 
industries also directed at the internal market. Consequently, the “integrated” 
implementation of these activities would supposedly result in a substantial development
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of the region and of Brazil as a whole. Moreover, as the harmonious combination of State, 
private and foreign capital would be essential for the success of the PGC the CVRD 
(1980) would clearly be interested in furthering the PGC and obtaining official approval 
of it. This interest was very clear because of the difficult obstacles faced by the CVRD for 
obtaining the necessary resources for the interdependent mineral (the Carajas Project, 
ALBRAS and MRN) and infrastructural (the Tucurui hydroelectric, the Carajas railway, 
deep-water port and new town) projects in which it was involved and dependent upon to 
varying degrees. On the other hand, the Figueiredo government decided categorically to 
support the PGC because this programme represented a more profitable strategy for 
Eastern Amazonia than cattle-breeding and also, because there was a great possibility of 
attracting overseas official and private capital and generating foreign exchange to service 
Brazil's foreign debt. Thus it was important and convenient for both CVRD and the 
Brazilian government that the PGC was presented as a ready-made and attractive 
“integrated” regional development strategy.
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Hall (1991b) emphasised that the PGC was a combination of projects implemented 
previously and of new projects supported by legislation for special fiscal incentives, 
which were established in order to attract national or foreigner investors in the name of 
regional development. The Brazilian government hoped that, once these several 
investments were set up with the support of a wide range of fiscal incentives, further 
industrial and agribusiness ventures would be attracted to the PGC's “development poles”, 
particularly along the Carajas railway corridor at Parauapebas, Maraba, A^ailandia, 
Buriticupu, Santa Ines, Rosario, and Sao Luis (World Bank, 1992). In order to understand 
the PGC and its social and environmental impacts, it is necessary to describe below its 
major components: the Carajas Project, two aluminium plants and the Tucurui 
hydroelectric scheme.
1.4.4 - The Carajas Project
The Carajas Iron-Ore Project was the centrepiece of the entire programme and comprises 
the mine, the railway, a deep-water port and also the town sites. The iron-ore mine is 
located at the Serra dos Carajas and its eighteen billion tonnes of high-grade iron-ore are 
the largest reserves in the world. The iron-ore is extracted by highly mechanised open-pit 
operations and because of its high quality requires no concentration or treatment except 
beneficiation, which involves consecutive crushing, screening and solid-recovery (Santos, 
1986). After this process, the processed ore, in the form of sinter feed (mainly) and 
pellets, is transported by conveyor belts to the storage yards. In addition to the iron-ore, 
the Serra dos Carajas also contains other minerals such as: manganese (sixty five million 
tonnes, which is the second largest manganese reserve in Brazil), copper, nickel, chrome, 
cassiterite, tungsten and gold (Santos, 1986).
The port of Ponta da Madeira was built in the Sao Marcos Bay, which is located nine 
kilometres southwest of the island of Sao Luis (capital of the state of Maranhao). There 
are places in this port whose width and depth make them most suitable for large bulk 
carriers of up to 360,000 deadweight tonnes (dwt). The iron-ore from the Carajas mine is
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unloaded by two rotating car-dumpers designed to empty two cars simultaneously. The 
discharged ore is carried by conveyor belts to the storage yard. This sector is 
complemented by the loading area, whose principal equipment is a shiploader which can 
handle 16,000 tonnes per hour of nominal capacity.
The Carajas railway is a single track, has a total length of 890 kilometres, and connects 
the mine site in Carajas to the Ponta da Madeira terminal in Sao Luis. It was designed 
with the purpose of transporting the high grade iron-ore economically. The railway 
crosses a flat surface without a tunnel or any large construction. The total length of the 
bridges and viaducts is only 11.2 kilometres and the longest bridge (2.3 kilometres) 
crosses the Tocantins River at Maraba. The standard ore train has 200 wagons, with a 
total capacity of 19,600 tonnes, and is pulled by three locomotives. In addition to iron-ore 
and other cargo, the railway also transports passengers from Parauapebas to Sao Luis 
three times a week in both directions.
The setting up of some thirty pig-iron smelters and industrial plants processing iron-ore 
and manganese along the Carajds railway corridor was an essential element in the PGC 
strategy for establishing integrated industrial development. These industries were to be 
concentrated in the following towns: Agail&ndia, Buriticupu, Maraba, Parauapebas, 
Rosario and Santa Ines. By 1989 the PGC Council had already approved, under the fiscal 
incentive scheme, thirteen pig-iron smelters and also six iron-alloy plants, with a total 
projected annual production of over 1.5 million tonnes. The first two of these smelters 
(COSIPAR - Companhia Siderurgica do Para - in Maraba and the Companhia Siderurgica 
Vale do Pindare in Agailandia) came on stream in early 1988, while two others (SIMARA 
- Siderurgica de Maraba - in this town and the Viana Siderurgica do Maranhao in 
Agailandia) initiated their operations at the beginning of 1989 (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 
1992). In order to make their production economically viable, these industries had access 
to a cheap source of fuel, namely charcoal obtained using the native rainforest. As a 
consequence, this industrial strategy was shown to be harmful to the environment and this 
specific problem will be discussed below.
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An important component of the Carajas Project is the company town built for 
approximately 6,000 inhabitants and which has a relatively advanced infrastructure; good 
housing, shops, school, supermarket, banks, a hospital, an airport, a sports and leisure 
club, a cinema, a theatre, a hotel, public transport, and also zoological and botanical 
gardens. This urban nucleus is surrounded by a four metre high fence in order to protect 
the community from the animals which live freely in the surrounding forest. 
Environmental destruction is completely prohibited within a 411,948 hectare area under 
company control, which confers an idyllic atmosphere to the town on the top of the cool 
mountain and at the same time produces an unreal image of the area as a whole, a false 
Utopia, due to the unprecedented deforestation of most of the surrounding native forest. 
Carajas town was originally intended for the CVRD's administrative staff and contract 
service workers, but the CVRD's Superintendency changed the initial objective and only 
the company employees were allowed to live in the town, while contract service workers 
were forced to live in Parauapebas/Rio Verde, which is located outside the CVRD's 
perimeter.
Strongly contrasting with the Carajas town, which was well planned and equipped with 
modem facilities, the nearby town of Parauapebas was planned to accommodate a 
population of up to 10,000 by 1988, including principally CVRD contract service 
workers. Basic infrastructure, housing investments and social services such as schools and 
hospital were conceived on a much smaller and infinitely worse scale than at Carajas. Rio 
Verde is completely different from both cities, principally because it was totally 
unplanned. It spread out along the highway, practically having bordered it, and has poor 
housing conditions (most houses are roughly made of wood) and a precarious urban 
infrastructure. In fact, Rio Verde originated as the “red light district” in order to provide 
services to construction workers close to Carajas and Parauapebas. Nowadays, Rio Verde 
has become a district of Parauapebas which means that its situation has improved a little 
bit.
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1.4.5 - The Tucurui Hydroelectric Scheme
Industrial development in Eastern Amazonia, particularly the mineral sector, is strongly 
dependent on abundant and inexpensive supplies of electricity. Thus, Tucurui was built in 
order to provide cheap power to stimulate industrial growth in the region by attracting 
domestic and foreign investors. It is the largest hydroelectric plant ever built in a tropical 
forest, and is also the fourth largest in the world and stands on the Tocantins River, 
approximately 200 kilometres north of the Carajas mine. At a cost estimated at US$4.6 
billion (two-thirds funded by foreign loans), it was inaugurated in November 1984 and its 
twelve turbines were to generate a total of 8,000 megawatts. As a key element in the 
whole PGC, Tucurui supplies the aluminium complexes of ALBRAS-ALUNORTE at 
Barcarena and ALUMAR in Sao Luis (both companies were to consume over half of 
Tucuruf s total output) and also the iron-ore mine, plants set up along the Carajas railway 
corridor, and the needs of the cities in the region.
The implementation of Tucurui generated social and environmental impacts, such as the 
displacement of up to 35,000 people (including six small towns), the loss of Indian lands 
(those of the Parakana and Gaviao tribes), deforestation of the surroundings, which 
provoke siltation and climatic changes, failure to clear vegetation from the area to be 
flooded (2,500 square kilometres), which resulted in acid water, proliferation of water 
weeds and water-borne diseases (malaria, bilharzia and river blindness) and anaerobic 
decomposition. However, these impacts were not taken into account by the authorities 
(including the power company ELETRONORTE) because the most important target was 
to bring Tucurui on stream in order to provide electricity for those great projects set up in 
the PGC area, which were to solve the Brazilian external debt. These impacts will be 
discussed in chapter three.
1.4.6 - The Aluminium Plants
Amazonia's bauxite reserves are estimated at 4.4 billion tonnes, or 15% of the world's 
reserves, which means that Brazil possesses the third largest aluminium deposits, just
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behind Guinea and Australia (Santos, 1986). The bauxite reserves in Eastern Amazonia 
are at Carajas (48 million tonnes), Almeirin (404 million tones) and principally at 
Trombetas (1,170 billion tonnes) and Paragominas (2,794 million tonnes).
Two major integrated projects date from 1967, when the deposits were discovered in 
Trombetas, in northwestern Para, by the Canadian multinational, ALCAN, and were later 
incorporated into the PGC. These projects are the largest industrial ventures in the region 
apart from the Carajas Iron-Ore Project. The US$ 1.9 billion ALBRAS-ALUNORTE 
complex at Barcarena, near Belem, is composed of two distinct joint ventures between 
CVRD and the Nippon Amazon Aluminium Company (NAAC): ALBRAS and 
ALUNORTE, which were to produce 320,000 tonnes of aluminium and 800,000 tonnes of 
alumina, respectively. This complex was only implemented in 1982, when the Brazilian 
government agreed to provide a basic infrastructure (port and urban schemes) and strongly 
subsidised energy production from the Tucurui hydroelectric plant (Neto 1990; Hall, 
1991a; World Bank, 1992). Thus, ALBRAS production reached 100,000 tonnes of 
aluminium, but the second stage of this project was delayed because of disagreements 
over additional concessions to the Japanese, and, as a consequence, the plan to increase 
the annual production to 320,000 tonnes was adjourned sine die. The ALUNORTE half of 
this project had more serious problems and its inauguration was postponed from 1985 to 
1989. The crucial point of this problem was related to the continued economic viability of 
ALUNORTE, since the price of alumina produced by this company was practically double 
that in the international market. However, the CVRD and the Brazilian government were 
reluctant to abandon this project because of the dependence generated by this measure, on 
the supply of imported alumina controlled by a major foreign multinational. In 1987, the 
Japanese decided that they would withdraw from ALUNORTE, leaving the project at a 
virtual standstill.
The second major alumina-aluminium complex, ALUMAR, is located near Sao Luis, the 
state capital of Maranhao and is also the largest privately funded project ever undertaken 
in Brazil. This US$ 1.3 billion complex is a joint venture between the American ALCOA, 
which holds 60% of the shares, and Billiton Metals (a subsidiary of Royal Dutch-Shell) 
with 40%. Its annual production was planned to reach 500,000 tonnes of alumina and
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110,000 tonnes of aluminium. It is important to note that the Brazilian government saw 
great potential in this project for generating foreign exchange. In addtion to the strong 
official support, ALUMAR was favoured by several kind of incentives from SUDAM, the 
Maranhao state government (access to local resources such as land and water) and, last 
but not least, PGC (exemptions from income tax, IPI and ICM; subsidised electricity from 
Tucurui and also the transmission line to Sao Luis).
In accordance with the Brazilian government, ALCOA could purchase large bauxite 
reserves at Trombetas and had three important goals: to expand its production, assure 
supplies for the ALUMAR plant and also reinforce its competitive position in relation to 
the rival ALBRAS-ALUNORTE at Barcarena (Neto, 1990; Hall, 1991a). In order to 
finance the second phase of the ALUMAR plant (inaugurated in 1986), ALCOA decided 
to sell 36% of its Brazilian subsidiary to Camargo Correa, using the US$260 million 
revenue derived from the PGC tax incentives to the large construction companies. 
ALUMAR was expected to be the third largest aluminium smelter in the world. 
Nevertheless, it is important to stress here that ALCOA, although it achieved its industrial 
objectives, was responsible for several social and environmental problems, such as the 
displacement of up to 20,000 people (principally fishermen and small farmers), an 
increase in unemployment in Sao Luis, pollution of the sea, which affected fishing, and 
also atmospheric pollution caused by aluminium hydroxide emissions, which contributed 
to an increase in skin irritations, respiratory illnesses and dying crops. However, these 
aspects will be taken up in chapter three.
1.4.7 - Agricultural Plans
Mineral operations were the central focus of the PGC, but agriculture and forestry were 
important components in development plans for the Carajas Programme, at least in the 
early planning phases. Indeed, the earliest studies undertaken by the CVRD (1979, 1980) 
and also its Japanese consultants (IDJC, 1980) suggested that the transport infrastructure, 
principally the Carajas railway, should be utilised for expanding export-oriented large- 
scale farming and silvicultural activities, and at the same time that Carajas should become
55
Chapter I
a real “export corridor” based on agriculture, ranching and forestry. The CVRD improved 
these proposals and suggested a US$11 billion plan to exploit ten million hectares of 
which three million hectares were to be divided into 300 cattle ranches of 10,000 hectares 
each; four million hectares were to be devoted for large-scale rice cultivation; 2.4 million 
hectares were to be designed for sugar and manioc plantations and 800 ethanol distilleries; 
and also 1,800 square kilometres along the railway corridor which were to be destined for 
eucalyptus plantations in order to supply the planned pig-iron smelters (Feamside, 1986; 
Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992).
Subsequent studies undertaken by the Japanese specialists from JICA (Japan International 
Co-operation Agency) suggested that there was an excellent export potential for some 
products already familiar to the international market, such as soybeans, palm-oil and 
rubber, while others such as Brazil nuts, animal foodstuffs, cotton and a variety of tropical 
fruits needed more prudence because of possible market restriction. Nevertheless, none of 
these Japanese suggestions were implemented mainly because that agricultural 
development in Amazonia, with its high plan-implementation costs, was not the top 
priority for the Brazilian government, whose most important objective was centred on 
mineral extraction and processing, which offered exceptional possibilities for increasing 
the foreign exchange earnings and also for improving the balance of payments. In 
addition, the Japanese proposals were seriously criticised for their social and 
environmental aspects. Most of these critics alleged that such plans would stimulate land 
concentration, rural violence, deforestation and also discriminate against small farmers.
The most comprehensive agricultural development plan for the PGC area was 
undoubtedly the PGCA, which was produced by the Ministry of Agriculture in 1983, 
budgeted at US$1.18 billion and also heavily influenced by the Japanese and the CVRD's 
previous proposals. Thus, the PGCA emphasised large-scale, capital intensive modem 
technology and exported-oriented agribusiness. Its overall objectives were to increase and 
diversify the production of food and industrial goods within seven “development poles” in 
the Caraj&s region. Although the PGCA has not been implemented, other attempts to 
develop agricultural and livestock projects were implemented within the PGC area. These 
projects were supported by fiscal incentives from the own PGC and, in some cases,
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together with SUDAM incentives. By mid-1987, over twenty such projects had been 
approved by the PGC Council, ranging from the Tucuma private colonisation scheme, oil 
palm plantations and processing facilities to ranching, meat plant, margarine, ethanol, 
poultry and charcoal production. Nevertheless, the most interesting point is that the major 
investors in these projects were also major participants in industrial and infrastructural 
developments, such as the large construction firms Mendes Junior and Andrade Gutierrez 
(Hall, 1991a).
These projects, by its own characteristics and also by generous subsidies granted, 
contributed to aggravate the environment impacts in Eastern Amazonia. In relation to this 
point, cattle ranching continued to encourage land concentration, land conflict and 
environmental destruction; the pig-iron smelters continued to use charcoal from the native 
forest, which has been devastated. Thus, such schemes mirrored the official strategy for 
Amazonia and also were in agreement with previous agricultural and livestock plans for 
the region.
Another contemporary programme of the PGC was the POLONOROESTE,which was 
elaborated for Rondonia and Western Mato Grosso. Its main objective was to absorb the 
human influx in a sustainable manner by expanding infrastructure and increasing 
agricultural productivity, rural incomes, and social welfare (Redwood, 1993). At a cost of 
US$ 1.6 billion and implemented with assistance from the World Bank (which financed 
34% of the total cost), the major components of this “integrated” development programme 
(such as the PGC) included: the improvement of the Cuiaba-Porto Velho highway, which 
was its centrepiece; the extension of the road network; agricultural colonisation projects; 
the environmental protection measures for the region as a whole and also measures to 
protect the indigenous population. Despite its intentions, the POLONOROESTE was 
responsible for generating several kinds of problems such as deforestation; pollution of 
rivers; the attraction of thousands of migrants searching for land and job as well; the 
invasion of the indigenous reserves and so on. These problems were very similar to those 
in the PGC area.
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The regional policies and frontier integration undertaken in Amazonia from the 1960s to 
the mid-1980s had a common basis, which was to modernise this region through a policy 
of industrialisation and capital-intensive agriculture. However, the most effective 
instrumental capable of transforming the Amazon region were the “growth poles” or 
“development poles”. In fact, few countries adopted the ideas of the French economist 
Fran?ois Perroux to the extent that Brazil did, but this discussion will be taken up in the 
next chapter.
1.5 - Research Structure
The specific objective of this research is to verify the causes which have contributed to 
producing the negative social and environmental impacts on Parauapebas. In this regard, 
the analysis of development strategies implemented in Amazonia becomes fundamental 
because these strategies were based on development pole theory, which advocated, inter 
alia, that beneficial spread effects would be generated to the peripheral areas through the 
establishment of development poles. Analysed in this manner, Parauapebas assumes 
special importance insofar as it was within the limits of the Carajas pole, was a product of 
the Carajds project and at the same time was designated as one of the PGC's development 
poles. In fact, all these attributes make Parauapebas an ideal case-study for examining the 
assumptions behind Perroux's development pole theory about the trickle-down effects of 
such strategies and, moreover, for understanding the role played by important social, 
economic, and political forces which were also responsible for the adverse consequences 
in the region.
According to its specific and general objectives, this research is divided into seven 
chapters organised as follow. Development policies and frontier integration are outlined 
in the first chapter, which shows that the military governments regarded Amazonia, with 
its tremendous potential of natural resources and uninhabited lands, as a means of rapidly 
tackling a number of economic, social and geopolitical problems. These regional 
development policies, commonly pursued by a combination of domestic and foreign 
interests, aimed to modernise the region and integrate it into national development. By
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following these objectives, the Federal government opted for a policy of industrialisation 
and of capital-intensive agriculture, which was, in essence, discriminatory, favouring 
large-scale farmers to the detriment of the vast majority of peasant farmers. In fact, this 
general negative tendency was caused by development policies and exacerbated with the 
advent of the PGC. Since then, land conflict, rural violence, land concentration and 
increasing deforestation is a reality in Amazonia, as will be seen in this research.
Perroux's development pole theory was regarded by the Federal government as the most 
satisfactory theoretical instrument for transforming Amazonia according to the 
government's objectives. Indeed, the national development policies were strongly 
influenced by this theory, which fitted in well with the geopolitical and economic aims of 
the military regime. The implementation of development pole strategies in the Amazon 
region is discussed in the second chapter, where analysis is centred on the assumptions 
behind this theory about the beneficial spread effects, which were supposed to be 
generated by development poles to their surrounding regions.
Chapter three briefly analyses the social and environmental impacts in urban and rural 
areas generated by development pole strategies in Eastern Amazonia. This broader 
perspective provides a more complete understanding of the phenomena as it occurred in 
Parauapebas, which will be discussed in the following chapters.
The fourth chapter examines directly the planning of public policies and the process of 
their implementation in Parauapebas in order to better understand the future problems of 
this Amazon town. This chapter shows that CVRD badly underestimated the size of 
Parauapebas, despite all the evidence from past projects that the urban population would 
explode around the mining project. It will be argued that CVRD was not really interested 
in the urban problems generated by the Carajas project, as its negligence in relation to this 
urban nucleus testifies.
Chapter five analyses the implications of planning for Parauapebas, focusing on its two 
phases: before and after its emancipation. It will be shown that the worrying situation 
(inadequate urban infrastructure and services, critical nosological table, and a problematic
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educational sector) in this Amazon town was responsible for the emancipatory 
movements and that its political emancipation, despite limited improvements, did not 
solve the mounting problems, which remain to be tackled in the face of its scarce financial 
resources.
The following chapter uses the development pole theory to analyse the problems faced in 
Parauapebas, which have been discussed to a large extent in the previous chapter. In fact, 
this chapter is a complement to the second chapter, which focused on the assumptions 
behind this theory in relation to beneficial spread effects of such development pole 
strategies.
Finally, the seventh chapter briefly summarises the principal impacts produced by such 
development strategies upon Parauapebas, draws some lessons learned from these 
experiences and finishes by raising some important questions which must be addressed in 
order to avoid the adverse effects generated by such development pole strategies.
1.6 - Methodology
This research consciously employs a variety of methods to examine the context of 
Parauapebas and understand the transformations undergone by this Amazon town. 
Unstructured interviews, participant observation, existing literature (books, articles, 
theses, etc.) and data from government agencies, NGOs and private firms are used in this 
dissertation. The reasons for employing such different methods lie in the fact that this 
combination was the best way of achieving the research objectives and also for dealing 
with the difficulties encountered during fieldwork. Unquestionably, the limitations of 
official statistics in Amazonia are extreme and there are very long delays between the 
gathering and publication of data, which are principally released by Brazil's census bureau 
- IBGE. An example of such delay can be seen in the fact that the penultimate census was 
done in 1980, when Parauapebas had not yet come into existence and the last census was 
undertaken only in 1991, when Parauapebas had already become a municipality. Despite
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the considerable gap between official censuses, these difficulties were overcome by using 
data from other sources, such as IDESP and SEPLAN/Para, which were available.
Preliminary, as well as final, research was undertaken at the British Library of Political 
and Economic Science, which is a reference library for the social sciences in United 
Kingdom. The fieldwork embraced the following places: Rio de Janeiro (the capital of the 
tate of Rio de Janeiro); Belem (the capital of the state of Para); the town of Maraba (in the 
state of Pard); the town of Parauapebas (in the state of Para); and Brasilia (Brazil's 
capital). In Rio de Janeiro, a number of key people were interviewed1 and data were 
collected from IBGE, CVRD, IBAM, the consultant firms NATRON and Mayerhofer & 
Toledo, FASE, IPUR-UFRJ, and Greenpeace. The documents and information gathered 
from both consultant firms were extremely valuable insofar as they played an important 
role in formulating plans for the Carajas region. For instance, NATRON was responsible 
for elaborating the Plano Diretor do Corredor da Estrada de Ferro Carajas (The Master 
Plan for the Carajas Railway Corridor) and the Mayerhofer & Toledo firm had previously 
elaborated the document Diretrizes para a Integracao dos Nucleos Urbanos de Rio Verde e 
Parauapebas (Directives for the Integration of the Rio Verde and Parauapebas Urban 
Nuclei) and afterwards became involved in the Master plan.
IBAM was also a valuable source principally because this institute had been contracted 
out by CVRD to elaborate a proposal for the implementation and management of basic 
sanitation services which aimed to support the local government in its decision about 
what would be the best sanitation system for the municipality of Parauapebas. Despite the 
importance of the other sources, CVRD and LBGE's documents were focused on. In fact, 
specific material was available only at CVRD, while at the same time other data 
concerning social and economic indicators related to this research were obtainable only 
from IBGE.
In Belem, documentary research was undertaken at SUDAM, FSESP, FNS (old SUCAM), 
IDESP, Goeldi Museum, NAEA-UFPa, NUMA-UFPa and SEPLAN/Para, CPT and 
SDDH. The last two institutions were useful sources, supplying extensive material about
1 The entire list of interviewees is provided in appendix I.
61
Chapter I
human rights and land conflicts in southern Para. In addition, some key people were 
interviewed (see appendix I). In Maraba, the research material was collected from UFPa 
campus, FASE, INCRA, SDDH-Maraba, CAT, CEPASP and FUNAL In fact, CAT and 
CEP ASP were more helpful in providing information about local problems and their 
solutions for the region than in providing specific documents. At FUNAI, plenty of 
material about the indigenous tribe Xicrins do Catete was obtained and at the same time 
permission for visiting its reserve, which is within the municipality of Parauapebas, was 
given. By this means, indigenous leaders were contacted and interviewed about their 
relationship with CVRD as well as with the local authorities. They also answered queries 
about a number of specific violations which had been recorded on their lands, such as 
invasions by lumber enterprises, and physical aggression in general.
During a visit to the Carajas mine, the structure of this industrial project, in which each 
detail was carefully planned and implemented, and the competence with which CVRD 
manages it, created a very good impression. This impression was reinforced by 
observation of the company town. This town is provided with an excellent urban 
infrastructure and facilities, has no problems related to robbery, assault, burglary, etc., and 
is well-maintained by CVRD, the streets being completely clean and free of dust and even 
of cigarette ash. In fact, this is a surreal town, when compared with most Brazilian towns 
and principally the Amazon ones, and the sharp contrast between the company town and 
Parauapebas, stressed in the existing literature (Piquet, 1988; Hall, 1991a; Roberts, 1991a; 
1995a; Becker, 1992; World Bank, 1992) was confirmed by personal observation. In 
Carajas town, selected people were interviewed from both the employer's and Trade 
Union's sides, CVRD and METABASE, in order to obtain a real picture of the local 
problems, and data was collected from them.
In Parauapebas, documentary research was undertaken at the Municipal Secretary of 
Planning, Municipal Secretary of Health, Municipal Secretary of Education, Municipal 
Secretary of Production, ITERPA, CONDEPE, and EEPP. In addition, a number of 
people were selected for interviews, intentionally representing a wide range of civil 
society varying from the planning secretary of Parauapebas to the representatives of 
several labourers' unions, NGOs, and MST. The interviews with individuals from
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different sectors of the civil society were particularly important insofar as they effectively 
contributed to creating an understanding of the complexity of Parauapebas. In Brasilia, 
data was principally gathered from ISPN and the Regional Development Secretariat of the 
Ministry of Regional Integration. Naturally, some key people were interviewed in Brazil's 
capital.
As already mentioned, this research combined a number of methods for analysing the 
transformations undergone by Parauapebas. However, the use of multiple sources of 
information is a quite difficult task insofar as data gathered during the research needed to 
be properly examined, categorised and cross-checked with the purpose of addressing the 
main questions of this dissertation. The reason for cross-checking the evidence can be 
explained by the fact that there exist some limitations in relation to the sources of 
information. For instance, the interviewees could only provide their personal point of 
view, which could be motivated by their current status or represent only partial access to 
information. In addition, they could have forgotten about or have become confused about 
important facts since many issues were related to past circumstances. The official 
documents, such as government plans, programmes, etc., express official beliefs with 
respect to the policies already or to be implemented. Thus, information was necessarily 
cross-checked in order to corroborate or disprove its veracity.
The secondary sources, i.e. official documents, data from NGOs and private firms, 
provided plenty of evidence about the object of study. However, this strategy was 
complemented by observation and by note-taking methods of data collection, which were 
considered and, consequently, employed during the fieldwork as another important 
strategy. According to Adler and Adler (1994), the observation method embraces three 
steps: descriptive, focused and selective observation. These steps were essential for 
considering the whole environment; for directing the researcher's attention towards the 
more relevant circumstances; and for selecting those aspects which were more significant 
for the research purposes.
Another method commonly employed in this research was the interviewing strategy, in 
which people were selected to be interviewed before or during the observation phase. The
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interviews were conducted informally. Fontana and Frey (1994) point out that this type of 
interview is termed unstructured, in contrast to structured interviewing. These authors 
stress that in unstructured interviewing the researcher does not use close-ended questions 
or a formal method of interviewing. This is as opposed to a researcher in a structured 
interview, who asks the respondent several questions established previously, with a 
limited set of categories of answers. The central point here is that unstructured 
interviewing does not impose any previous categorisation, whereas structured 
interviewing aims to gather information by means of pre-established categories.
Interviews conducted during the fieldwork were deliberately unstructured. The result of 
visiting the Carajas project and of talking to people involved in, or affected by, this 
industrial project is that many stories collected were so bewitching that they sometimes 
dominated the researcher's analysis. Indeed, this research is guided by the conviction that 
the human phenomenon is better understood when numbers are only one of several 
important means of describing the impacts occurred in the Carajas region, and are not the 
raison d'etre. In this regard, unstructured interviews were chosen over systematic surveys, 
which have a natural propensity to reduce every fact to a numerical problem.
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Development Pole Theory and the Brazilian Amazon
2.1 - Introduction
The first chapter showed that government policies for Amazonia, especially for Eastern 
Amazonia, have had negative social and environmental impacts and at the same time it 
highlighted that these development policies were heavily influenced by Perroux's 
development pole theory. In fact, his ideas were present in most national development 
plans. There are particular reasons for this wide acceptance of the concept of development 
pole and one of them is centred on its underlying idea that it was possible to achieve 
economic growth, interregional equilibrium and also integration of underdeveloped 
regions by means of a strategy of decentralised development. This basic idea, whose 
appeal was very strong, fitted in well with the geopolitical (national integration and 
occupation of Amazonia) and economic objectives of the military regime. In this regard, 
development pole strategies were vigorously implemented when the Federal government 
launched the PND II (1975-79) in which the POLAMAZONIA programme had been 
formalised and these strategies continued with the advent of the PGC in the 1980s.
According to their potentialities, several development poles were selected. Owing to its 
huge iron-ore reserves, Carajas was considered the most important pole and Parauapebas 
assumes particular importance because it was one of the PGC's development poles and at 
the same was located in the Carajas area of influence. The main purpose of this chapter is 
to examine the development pole strategy implemented in the Amazon region, but 
focusing on the assumptions behind this theory with respect to the beneficial spread 
effects, which were supposed to be generated by such induced poles to their peripheral 
areas.
Chapter II
2.2 - Historical Background
Francis Perroux was an important source of ideas and his development pole theory, 
whose influence on Latin American countries, principally Brazil, was significant, has a 
remarkable place, allied to other theories and strategies of development, in economic 
development theory. In order better to understand Perroux's theory, it is important to set 
his work in historical context.
The term “pole” was first introduced by Perroux in his 1950 article “Economic space: 
theory and applications”, which was a product of his lecture at Harvard University in 1947 
(Perroux, 1988b). In this article, Perroux discussed “economic spaces”, which were 
categorised into three types: as a plan; as a field of forces and as a homogeneous 
aggregate. This discussion served as a basis for his explaining that the firm was the core 
of the problem and not the region itself, and even the use of the term “pole”, mentioned as 
synonymous with “centre” (this reference is important because it marks the origin in the 
economic literature of the conceptual confusion caused by Perroux, who never made a 
clear distinction between growth pole and growth centre), emphasised this belief, as 
Perroux stressed:
“As a field o f forces, econom ic spaces consist o f cen tres  (or poles or foci) from  which centrifugal 
forces em anate and to which centripetal forces are attracted. Each centre being a centre o f 
attraction and repulsion, has its proper field, which is set in the fields o f other centres. Any banal 
space whatever, in this respect, is a collection o f centres and a place o f passage for forces.
The firm, considered as centre releases centrifugal and centripetal forces. It attracts m en and 
objects (personal and material aggregations around the firm) into its banal space, or it removes 
them  (diverting tourist activities, land reserved for further expansion, etc.). It attracts economic 
elem ents, supplies and demands, into the space o f its plan, or it rem oves them.
Through this process, the economic zone o f influence, whether or not it is linked to the 
topographical one, is determined. The topographical zone o f influence o f M ichelin in France is 
inscribed in a region, but its econom ic zone of influence, like that o f all large firms, defies 
cartography” (1950, pp. 95-96).
This article, based on his lectures at Harvard at the end of 1940s, was relevant because 
Perroux provided some insights into his views on the development of capitalist economies 
and, at the same time, he paved the way for the construction of his own theory. Despite
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Perroux's first mention of pole, he only discussed the concept of pole in his 1955 article 
“La Notion de Pole de Croissance”, which can be considered his most important and 
influential work.
Some important factors contributed to Perroux"s conclusions about growth poles in 
particular, and also his views on economic development in general. The first factor was 
related to post-war problems of economic reconstruction and co-operation in western 
Europe where the Marshall Plan, whose main objective was to contain the progress of 
communism, was implemented and a large amount of money was invested in disrupted 
economies such as those of France, Italy, etc. in order to tackle serious problems. The 
success of this Plan generated confidence in the role of economic aid.
The second and more important factor was the controversy between two distinct doctrines 
of economic development: the then prevailing view of “balanced growth” and the 
insurgent “unbalanced growth”. Perroux was well-informed about the current economic 
development literature in the late 1940s and 1950s and in his 1961 book L'Economie du 
XXe Siecle. he made references to the writings of now eminent development economists, 
such as Hirschman, Myrdal, Nurkse, Rosenstein-Rodan, Tinbergen, Rostow, Harod, 
Domar, etc. Perroux was influenced by, and in turn influenced, many of them and also 
future generations of development economists.
The third factor was the great influence of Schumpeter's writings on Perroux's ideas. In 
fact, Schumpeter's innovation concept was essential for Perroux's explanation of the 
growth and development of capitalist economies because Perroux believed that 
entrepreneurial innovation was primarily responsible for the development process which, 
therefore, would encompass a sequence of poles, considered as dynamic centres, over 
time. It is important to stress here that Perroux's growth pole gained prominence in the 
context of the controversy between the balanced growth, and unbalanced growth, theory. 
Thus, it is necessary to examine briefly both theories in order to understand Perroux's 
theory itself.
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The names of Rosenstein-Rodan and Nurkse are closely associated with the theory of 
balanced growth, which advocated that economic development would best be achieved by 
the simultaneous establishment of many complementary industries. The main reason was 
that investments in productive activities and also in infrastructure would only be 
profitable for the ensemble by virtue of external economies. In general, the advocates of 
balanced growth believed that in backward countries the market left to itself perpetuated 
poverty and in order to overcome this situation, heavy investments would be necessary to 
increase productivity, which was impeded by two interrelated factors: low income and 
consequently purchasing power, and the small size of the domestic market, which was 
unable to absorb the output of high-productivity factories. As a means of breaking this 
vicious circle of poverty, these authors defended the central planning of balanced 
industrial investments allied to the need to mobilise both domestic and foreign resources 
to finance the investment programme. In this regard, the government of underdeveloped 
countries had to play a key role in overcoming these constraints because there was a 
complete disbelief in market forces, as Rosenstein-Rodan himself stressed:
“The m arket m echanism  does not realise the “optim um” either in one nation or between nations 
because it relies on such unrealistic assumptions as linear hom ogeneous production functions, no 
increasing returns or economies o f scale or o f agglomeration, and no phenom enon o f minimum 
quantum  or threshold. This obscures the nature o f the developm ent process and the risks involved. 
N othing in theology or technology ordains that God created the world convex downwards” (1984, 
pp. 209).
Although the balanced growth theory had been criticised on several grounds, it remained 
dominant until late the 1950s, when the seminal works of Hirschman, Myrdal and Perroux 
were independently published. Criticisms related to balanced growth theories were based 
on the belief that economic development does not take place simultaneously and in the 
same proportions throughout an economy. The foremost and most influential advocate of 
unbalanced growth was Hirschman, who pointed out that:
“W hatever the reason, there can be little doubt that an economy, to lift itself to higher income 
levels, m ust and will first develop within itself one or several regional centres o f economic 
strength. This need for the em ergence o f “growing points” or “growth poles” in the course o f the
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developm ent process means that international and interregional inequality o f growth is an 
inevitable concom itant and condition o f growth its e lf ’ (1958, pp. 183-4).
The strategy of unbalanced growth advocated by Hirschman had important implications 
for investment decisions because such decisions should stimulate other investments and 
this phenomenon would occur because of their linkages. In this regard, development 
strategies should be based on a few sectors but with strong backward and/or forward 
linkages. Other well-known concepts introduced by Hirschman were “trickle-down” and 
“polarisation” effects, which were created in order to explain the idea that economic 
growth produced positive and negative effects, respectively, on the economies of other 
regions. In fact, these concepts elaborated by Hirschman were similar to those employed 
by Myrdal in his famous book Economic Theory and Underdevelopment Regions (1957). 
His “spread” and “backwash” effects were part of the explanation of the principle of 
“circular and cumulative causation” of inequalities at the international level.
Despite the identical meaning of the Hirschman and Myrdal's conceptual tools, there were 
considerable differences in emphasis and conclusions. In particular, Hirschman believed 
that the emergence of “growing points” (or “growth poles”) and differences in 
development between regions and between nations were inevitable and a condition of 
further growth anywhere; he also believed that the emergence of strong forces was 
fundamental for making a turning point possible, once polarisation effects had proceeded 
for some time. It is important to note here that the term “growth poles” used by 
Hirschman in his seminal book The Strategy of Economic Development (1958) had been 
coined by the French economist Fran?ois Perroux in his 1955 article. The common use of 
this term was not a mere coincidence and showed that these authors had some related 
viewpoints in relation to the process of development, which contrasted with the then 
prevailing balanced growth approach.
When the concept of “growth poles” was elaborated, Perroux, despite his emphasis on the 
interactions among industrial branches, focused his attention principally on economic 
activities and also on the geographical location of population rather than spatial 
development processes. Boudeville, who was Perroux's disciple, was mainly responsible 
for transforming the economic phenomenon that was observed in an abstract space into a
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concept applicable to a geographical space. Thus, the transformation of Perroux's concept 
into an operational tool for regional planning was an important factor for its widespread 
use in several countries. In fact, growth pole strategy was implemented in different nations 
such as the United States, Spain, Italy, Brazil, Venezuela, Kenya, Nigeria, Japan etc., 
whose contexts were completely distinct.
2.3 - Development Pole Theory
Development pole theory has its origins in Perroux's observation of the notion that:
“growth does not appear everywhere and all at once; it appears in points or growth poles with 
variable intensities; it spreads along diverse channels and has varying term inal effects for the 
whole o f the econom y” (Perroux, 1955, pp 308).
This understanding of the process of economic development contrasted clearly with the 
balanced growth approach and led Perroux to consider development itself as 
fundamentally polarised, because the propulsive effects intrinsic to a development process 
tended to be generated by a cluster of economic activities and also tended to engender the 
growth of the economic whole. Although Perroux was not primarily concerned with the 
spatial implications of development in geographical terms, his concept of the growth pole, 
which was elaborated in order to describe and explain the process of economic 
development in an abstract economic space, attracted the attention of regional planners, 
geographers, economists and many other professionals involved with problems of 
regional development. As a consequence, the concept of growth poles, together with 
similar concepts such as growth centres, growing points, core areas, etc., which were 
conceptual tools developed to solve problems of regional inequalities, became a 
catchphrase. The wide acceptance of these concepts, principally of the growth poles, is 
centred on their underlying idea, whose appeal was very strong, that it was possible to 
achieve economic growth, interregional equilibrium and integration of backward regions 
by means of a strategy of decentralised development. However, the use of these concepts 
as slogans in the political discussion of regional problems and, especially, the necessity of 
applying Perroux's theory as a basis for regional planning, contributed to the generalised
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confusion of the concepts and also to his theory losing much of its original content and 
meaning.
In relation to Perroux's theory, Paelinck stressed that:
“the growth pole concept has often been m isunderstood. It has been confused with the notions of 
key industry, basic industry, and industrial ensemble; from  this follows the erroneous conception 
according to which the growth pole would be an industrial monum ent raised to the glory of 
future regional industrialisation, a guarantee o f certain econom ic growth. Or again, to make this 
scarcely rigorous concept m ore precise some would have as a growth pole any important 
im plantation o f firms, preferably industrial, which would exercise salutary effects on the 
geographic area where it is introduced” (1965, pp. 10-11).
More recently, Higgins stated that:
“as initially presented by Perroux, the theory was too com plex, too abstract, and too 
nonoperational to be used as a  basis for planning. Indeed to  apply the pure theory o f Perroux 
would require global planning, if  we take into account P erroux 's m ore recent insistence on 
planning transm ission lines and receptors as well as generators o f growth. P erroux 's economic 
space, in which spread effects are felt, is global. H e argues, for example, that Latin A m erica's 
true growth poles still lie in Europe and, to some degree, in the United States. Such a concept is 
useless for regional planning which is confined to a single country. As a consequence, 
econom ists who found themselves involved in practical regional planning simply discarded the 
pure theory o f Perroux. They converted it into a totally different theory which treated growth 
poles as urban centres, and spread effects as being generated in a particular geographic space, 
namely the region adjacent to the urban centre itself. Once this happy doctrine is accepted, it is 
possible to im agine that by pushing and pulling new  enterprises (m ostly industrial enterprises) 
into urban centres o f retarded regions, it is possible to reduce regional disparities, decentralise 
urbanisation and industrialisation, and accelerate national developm ent all at once. It did not 
take long for this pleasant version o f the growth pole doctrine to spread to developing countries 
and to be applied there as w ell” (1988, pp. 44).
Both statements suggest that Perroux's theory was misunderstood. Nevertheless, an 
important question remains: why did development pole theory generate so many 
bewildering concepts? In order to answer this essential question, certain inconsistencies in 
his theory will be analysed and, thereby, clarified.
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The basis for such confusion is centred on Perroux himself, who, despite being an 
important source of fruitful ideas, was far from clear in his conceptualisation. A good 
example is the term pole, which Perroux never defined exactly and which was interpreted 
as a cluster in geographical space or as a set of linkages in economic space within a 
general equilibrium system. This kind of impreciseness and ambiguity in Perroux's 
writings contributed enormously to the generalised misinterpretation and also to the use of 
his concepts in vague, unclear and oversimplified ways.
These confusions do not invalidate Perroux's concepts at all. His theory that growth 
neither appears simultaneously, nor regularly throughout an economy and that it tends to 
be polarised are unquestionably important. These convictions led Perroux to develop 
other significant arguments, such as: that growth industries (industries de la croissance), 
also termed propulsive industries (industries motrices), tend to be clustered in 
geographical space and moreover, tend to generate spread effects {ejfets d'entramement) 
on their environments; and that these propulsive industries tend to grow faster than and, 
as a consequence, dominate, other industries that are linked with them. Thus, owing to its 
perceived theoretical potential, Perroux's ideas became the focus of interest of several 
professionals, who were seeking a tool for solving problems of national and regional 
development both in industrialised and underdeveloped countries. However, difficulties 
arose when these ideas, which were conceived in an economic space (abstract space), 
were applied to geographical space (banal space). As a consequence, Perroux's theory was 
considerably broadened by other important contributions to his work and, as will be seen, 
some of these contributions differed from the original ideas.
Before examining some of these contributions to Perroux's theory, it is important to 
analyse certain aspects of his own theory. The first aspect is his understanding of the 
development process, an understanding which is essential for perceiving the difference 
between growth poles and development poles. According to Perroux, although growth and 
development can occur jointly in the same place, they are far from synonymous. In this 
regard, he stressed that:
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“growth means a sustained increase in the dimension index for an econom ic entity (for example, 
gross product). (...) Developm ent is the sum of the changes in social patterns and mentalities 
through which the production device is coupled with the population: the latter acquires the 
capacity to utilise the production device to achieve what is considered to be a satisfactory 
growth rate, and the production device supplies a product that serves the population instead of 
being “alien” to it” (1968, pp. 248; 1988a, pp. 70).
This difference between growth and development is fundamental for pinpointing the 
distinction between the development pole and the growth pole. In this regard, Perroux 
pointed out that:
“the growth pole is a set that has the capacity to induce the growth o f another set (“growth” 
being defined as a lasting increase in the dimensional indicator); the developm ent pole is a set 
that has the capacity to engender a dialectic o f economic and social structures whose effect is to 
increase the com plexity o f the whole and to expand its multidimensional return” (1968, pp. 247- 
8; 1988a, pp. 49)
In order to understand Perroux's scheme, it is fundamental to recognise that propulsive 
industries play a key role in the development process. These industries are highly 
innovative and, according to Perroux, innovation or technological progress is the pillar of 
economic development. The propulsive industries tend to be clustered in particular areas, 
which can be centres for the extraction of raw materials, for production and distribution of 
power generation and for technological research, or also agro-industrial centres. Owing to 
their nature, the propulsive industries tend to generate spread effects, such as the increase 
in income and employment, to their environment and some of them can be internal to the 
industry itself. These beneficial diffusion effects are stimulated by geographical clustering 
of these propulsive enterprises and any concentration of them is necessarily considered a 
growth pole or development pole.
The growth or development poles will certainly produce spread effects, but Perroux never 
indicated where these effects would be felt and moreover, there was no guarantee that 
they would be felt in the immediate surrounding region. The main reason for this lies in 
the fact that Perroux's theory was elaborated for an economic space, which was extremely
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abstract, and, therefore, the creation of growth poles and development poles and their 
performance were problems considered on a theoretical plane.
As was mentioned above, transfer of the concept from abstract space (economic) into 
geographical space was carried out by Perroux's disciples, principally by Boudeville, who 
transformed it into useful and important concept for regional development theory. 
According to Boudeville:
“a regional growth pole is a set o f expanding industries located in an urban area and inducing
further developm ent o f economic activity throughout its zone o f influence” (1966, pp. 11).
Besides his emphasis that a set of dynamic industries should be geographically clustered, 
he also widened the definition beyond this point by arguing that there were three types of 
space: homogeneous; polarised; and planning, or programme, space. A homogeneous 
region can be characterised by its relative uniformity; a polarised region is a 
heterogeneous space, which comprises a set of units, or economic poles {poles 
economiques), which have more exchanges (goods and services) or linkages 
(interdependencies) with a dominant pole than with other poles of the same type. The 
notion of polarisation involves the notion of a hierarchy of poles, which are classified 
according to the activities they perform; and the planning region is “a continuous space, a 
technical and geographic instrument to attain a goal localised in the region itself in the 
most economic way” (Boudeville, 1968, pp. 35). In fact, Boudeville, with his new 
concepts, made Perroux's theory more operational, especially in the context of 
underdeveloped countries.
Nevertheless, it is important to stress here that some basic ideas of the unbalanced growth 
theory, principally those advocated by Hirschman, such as the importance of induced 
investment decisions for the promotion of development, and also the belief that 
infrastructure investments could be essential for the development of backward regions - 
although the most important aim was the provision of regularly inducing activities in 
industry, agriculture and services, - provided significant parameters for development pole 
policies implemented throughout the 1960s. During this decade, most of these policies 
were designed to promote the development of backward regions by concentrating
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investment in order to obtain scale and agglomeration economies. Despite this favourable 
context, structural problems persisted and a good example, especially in developing 
countries, is the constant population growth of large urban areas and the concomitant 
decline of some peripheral regions. Although such large urban areas continued to grow 
because new entrants benefited from the economics of agglomeration, the marginal social 
costs prevailed over the marginal social benefits. In this regard, a plausible alternative for 
overcrowded urban areas as for the country itself would be centred in the intermediate 
(medium-size) centres (or development poles), whose accelerated economic and 
population growth could be induced by government policies in relation to infrastructure, 
capital subsidies and other types of incentives.
This development pole strategy stressed the advantages of agglomeration economies and 
at the same time these induced, medium-size development poles were conceived as truly 
poles of attraction for migrants who would otherwise go to large congested urban centres, 
which were considered spontaneous development poles. In addition, these induced 
development poles , according to the theory, would generate beneficial spread effects to 
their immediate peripheral regions, so that in the long-run an “equilibrium growth” 
throughout a country would be expected. An excellent example of this strategy was the 
French spatial development policy of the 1960s, which designated eight metropolitan 
areas whose concentrated investments would stimulate economic and population growth 
and, therefore, would, it was hoped, counterbalance the growth of the Paris region 
(Hansen, 1967; Darwent, 1975).
An important contribution to the understanding of the incidence of economic growth in 
spatial terms and the problems of regional allocation of investments was Friedmann's 
core-periphery, or centre-periphery, model, which, in certain aspects, was related to the 
notions of growth poles (development poles) and also growth centres. According to 
Friedmann, core regions were major centres of innovative change and as a consequence 
the places where development occurred, whereas all other territory consisted of peripheral 
regions. However, the main point is that innovations generated in these dominant centres 
spread to their peripheral regions, whose development is completely dependent on the 
core regions. Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the theoretical
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weakness or validity of Friedmann's propositions, it is interesting to note, as Darwent 
(1975, pp. 548) had pointed out, that French regional planning could be thought of in 
Friedmann's terms because this was “a policy of encouraging spatial integration between 
core and periphery, at the intra-regional scale - the level of polarised region - while 
correcting the imbalance evident between Paris (as a core) and the rest of France (as a 
periphery) at the inter-regional scale”.
It is necessary to highlight the terminological confusion generated by the use of “growth 
pole” (development pole) and “growth centre”. In its origins, both terms were used 
synonymously, but the lack of a precise definition by Perroux allied to the searching for 
conceptual tools in order to overcome regional inequalities led many professionals to 
employ these terms interchangeably as well as definitively. In this regard, a useful 
distinction was made by Kuklinski:
“the prom otion o f growth pole policies is a phenom enon on the national scale, changing not only 
the structure o f a given region where the pole is located but also the interregional proportions in 
the distribution o f population and economic activities o f a given country. The prom otion o f 
growth centres policies is a phenom enon on the regional scale, transform ing the pattern o f urban 
and rural settlem ent inside the different regions” (1975, pp. 9).
However, this distinction was not entirely acceptable and the semantic confusion persisted 
in the regional development literature. It will be recalled that this sort of ambiguity found 
in Perroux's theory generated extensive misunderstandings which, in some cases, could 
have been incidental but also deliberate.
The development pole strategies implemented in the 1960s are closely related to the 
model of hierarchical diffusion of innovation which prevailed at that time. According to 
Hansen (1981, pp. 21), “this urban-oriented framework of economic activities in space 
has two major elements: a system of cities arranged in a functional hierarchy, and 
corresponding areas of urban influence surrounding each of the cities in the system”. 
Within this framework, development-inducing innovations were disseminated from 
higher to lower centres in the urban hierarchy and also from urban centres to their 
immediate peripheral regions. In addition, the magnitude of development, in spatial terms,
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was determined by the size and functions of the urban centre. The hierarchical diffusion 
of innovation model stressed the importance of continuing innovation in large centres as 
the crucial factor for the development of the whole urban-economic system.
This general background showed the connection between the hierarchical diffusion of 
innovation model and the induced development poles that were implemented in order to 
“link lagging regions more closely with the national system of hierarchical filtering and 
spread effects from urban centres to their hinterlands” (Hansen, 1981, pp. 22).
Despite its great acceptance and implementation in many countries, the results of 
development pole policies were highly questionable. However, it is difficult to evaluate 
them concretely because it is not a simple task to find a genuine example of a 
development pole policy that was effectively implemented in practice. Problems are 
manifold. One of them is that in many countries development pole strategies were 
elaborated but were not implemented for various reasons according to their context. The 
serious problem identified is related to the political difficulty of selecting geographical 
development poles because many policies that had begun by concentrating investments in 
a few urban centres were attenuated by political pressures to include more centres, thus 
impeding the inducement of extensive agglomeration economies elsewhere. Nevertheless, 
the foremost problem is the implementation of development pole policies in completely 
different contexts, such as developed countries and developing countries.
In the context of developed countries, it was verified, for example, that development- 
inducing linkages (through innovations) were not only transmitted from larger to smaller 
centres but also in the reverse order, as well as between centres of similar size. Another 
important point was that industrial sources of innovation were increasingly widely 
dispersed, which meant that linkages between these industries involved relatively large 
distances. This evidence undermined the idea that induced development poles could 
generate development in their own peripheral regions. The above evidence contributed to 
the generalised pessimism in relation to the promotion of induced development poles in 
developed countries.
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Developing countries, in general, have manifold problems, which vary from high 
unemployment rates to sharp regional inequalities. Planners and policy makers believed 
that, in order to overcome social and economic disparities between regions and also 
between larger urban centres and their peripheral areas, it would be necessary to 
implement development pole strategies. In the understanding of these professionals, “if 
the developed countries appear to have an orderly hierarchy of central places through 
which development-inducing innovations filter and spread, then this spatial structure must 
also be created in the developing countries” (Hansen, 1981, pp. 32).
Owing to scarce resources in these countries, development pole policies focused on a few 
urban centres selected where investments would be allocated in order to obtain scale and 
agglomeration economies. The argument was that the induced poles would generate 
beneficial spread effects to their hinterlands, which would necessarily be underdeveloped 
areas.
Development pole policies took a number of forms, particularly in developing countries 
such as Brazil. Some focused on infrastructure, aiming at supplying a basic level of 
power, water, transport and other public facilities. Others were based on intermediate or 
heavy manufacturing industries (generally public enterprises), these projects being 
commonly associated with industrial complexes organised around such sectors as iron and 
steel, aluminium, petrochemicals and heavy engineering. The common factor in all these 
projects was the importance of the direct use of large-scale investment resources to 
produce structural changes through accelerated economic growth.
Nevertheless, there were many criticisms related to development pole policies. Some of 
them stressed the fact that that spread effects claimed by the theory were smaller than 
expected and limited in geographical extent, so that peripheral regions were benefited in a 
minimal scale. Others, such as Coraggio argued that development pole theory was:
“really designed for the developm ent o f the poles and their associated social groups and that any 
clever attem pt to “extract” from  it the ideological elements, so as to rem ain with a set of 
technical relationships, is a contribution to the advance o f dom inating ideology” (1972, pp. 39, 
quoted by H ilhorst, 1981, pp. 161).
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Higgins, in turn, pointed out that:
“the strategy applied was seldom  the one that Perroux favoured. Far from  strengthening and 
encouraging existing growth poles, the strategy has been one o f trying to  create growth 
[development] poles in retarded, disadvantaged regions, hoping for spread effects from the 
chosen pole to its own geographical regions...In my view, it is very im portant to m ake it clear 
that “the failure o f the growth-pole [development pole] strategy” was not the failure of the 
P erroux 's theory, but failure o f  a distorted version applied by his disciples, mainly Boudeville” 
(Higgins, 1985, pp. 3, quoted by Polenske, 1988, pp. 105).
In fact, many development pole strategies implemented over the world had just one point 
in common with Perroux's theory: the name. However, Higgins argument that the failure 
cannot be attributed to Perroux's theory but is due to a version that had been 
misinterpreted and applied by his followers - especially by Boudeville - is highly 
questionable because Perroux himself recognise the significance and also the validity of 
contributions made by Boudeville and other disciples to his theory. This suggests that 
Perroux was completely aware of this “distorted version” and agreed with the new 
viewpoints implied by his concept of growth (development) poles.
Although development pole theory had been criticised in many of its aspects, some 
authors, despite difficulties, believed in its potential, principally in the context of Latin 
America. In this regard, Richardson and Richardson stressed that:
“the practical objections to growth [development] pole strategies such as the selection o f growth 
centres, the identification o f propulsive industries, and the choice o f effective instruments arise 
wherever growth [development] centre strategies are adopted, and are in no sense peculiar to 
Latin America. M oreover, the existence o f these difficulties does not provide an argum ent for 
rejecting the growth [development] centre approach, but may instead suggest the need for 
perseverance and im provem ent. The disenchantm ent with growth [development] centre policies 
in many countries is not evidence that the principle o f polarisation is wrong. On the contrary, it 
reflects the over-optim ism  and short-run time horizon o f regional policy-m akers, the failure of 
sustained political will, the use o f deficient investment criteria, bad locational choices, and lack 
o f imagination in devising appropriate policy instruments” (Richardson and Richardson, 1975, 
pp. 169).
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After more than three decades of many experiments with development pole policies in 
Latin America, especially Brazil, some significant factors contributed to Perroux's theory 
having been unsuccessful, and thus it is important to comment on them here. The main 
problem is centred on the selection of development pole locations, which was commonly 
based on criteria such as national sectoral projections and urban population growth 
projections instead of being based on the development potential or demand of the 
peripheral regions. As a result, development poles generated a limited impact on their 
immediate hinterland areas and the reasons for this are: the linkages involved in the 
development process were largely with distant suppliers and markets, and also the derived 
demand for labour and for agricultural outputs frequently encouraged an intense flow of 
migration and supplies from outside the regions where development poles were located. 
In addition to the foregoing problems, employment was not generated to the degree 
expected in view of the considerable resources invested. What boomed instead was 
informally organised work, and mostly on a subsistence basis, and a main reason for both 
these developments is associated with the highly capital-intensive nature of development 
pole activities.
Nevertheless, the most important criticism that was addressed to development pole 
strategies implemented in developing countries was that these strategies were unable to 
improve the social and economic well-being of populations who live in peripheral regions 
and who belong, to a large extent, to the poorest social stratum of society. It is important 
to stress here that development pole policy is one form of the top-down development 
paradigm, which is in fact a development paradigm “from above”. This paradigm placed 
its emphasis on urban, industrial and capital-intensive, technology (innovation), and also 
on the use of external and scale economies.
According to Hansen (1981), the prevalent attitudes toward development pole strategies 
have passed from a period of optimism in relation to the generation of spread effects by 
the creation of induced poles, to one of pessimism when these expectations were not 
realised, and subsequently to a broader understanding that induced development poles 
would be just one aspect of more comprehensive development planning.
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2.4 - The Diffusion of the Development Pole Theory in Brazil
In retrospect, the influence of Perroux's development pole theory in Brazil can be traced 
to the end of 1950s when his disciple Boudeville, who lived in Brazil for three years, 
published an important study in 1957 about the State of Minas Gerais. This study, 
Contribution a 1'etude des Poles de Croissance Bresiliens - Une industrie motrice - La 
Siderurgie du Minas Gerais, focused on the development of the metallurgical industry in 
Minas Gerais and also on the possibilities of transforming the city of Belo Horizonte, 
which is the capital of the State of Minas Gerais, into a powerful development pole. In 
1964, Boudeville published another significant study, Croissance Polarisee du Rio Grande 
do Sul, whose main focus was on the economic polarisation in the state of Rio Grande do 
Sul and he highlighted its capital, the city of Porto Alegre, as the main pole of the State 
and at the same time defined other smaller poles.
The presence of the French geographer, Michel Rochefort, who taught in some Brazilian 
universities, supervised academic studies, fieldwork, etc., in Brazil contributed to the 
consolidation of Perroux's ideas in this country. Although Rochefort had used the 
terminology of his French geographer colleague, Chardonnet, and not that of Perroux, 
Andrade (1977) stressed that it was not significant because the two terminologies were 
similar.
These presences and studies marked the deep influence of Perroux's ideas on Brazilian 
economists, geographers and other professionals involved with regional problems. In this 
regard, private enterprises such as SAGMACS - Economia e Humanismo (Economics and 
Humanism) and EPEA - Escritdrio de Pesquisas Econdmicas Aplicadas (Office for 
Applied Economic Researches) as well as governmental agencies, such as CNG, BNH, 
SUDENE and the Ministry of Planning adopted the development pole theory in their 
plans.
Andrade (1977) pointed out that SUDENE began to adopt development pole theory 
definitively in 1966, when this agency decided to use Perroux's concepts in its HI Master 
Plan {Plano Diretor) for Economic and Social Development of Northeast for the 1966-68
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period. In that same year, SUDENE promoted the First Seminar on Development Poles, 
which was an important event because by congregating several professionals with 
different backgrounds in order to discuss Perroux's theory and Brazilian regional 
problems, it served to diffuse the theory itself even more and also to consolidate the 
prestige of Perroux's ideas in the national territory.
However, that, despite the importance of Perroux's ideas in Brazil, this fact does not 
means that SUDENE, in its Masters Plan, had understood and, more importantly, applied 
his development pole theory correctly. According to Richardson and Richardson:
“although Brazil has had a long experience with regional policies, particularly with the
ambitious SUDENE program m e for the Northeast, its program m es have been too diffuse to be
described as a growth [development] pole approach” (Richardson and Richardson, 1975, pp.
174).
The National Housing Bank (BNH) also illustrates very well the influence of Perroux's 
ideas in Brazil. This Bank was created in 1964 and one of its objectives, clearly stated in 
its report for the 1969 period, was the "creation of development poles and a consequent 
improvement of living condition in rural areas" (quoted by Bolaffi, 1982, pp. 51). In 
addition, famous economists, such as Celso Furtado and Roberto Campos, and other 
professionals were familiarised with Perroux's concept. For instance, Roberto Campos 
(1962, pp. 27) stressed that "a controversy, which only occurs when economic 
development programmes are formulated, is between the supporters of "integrated 
development" and those who support the selection of "growing points"" (as seen above, 
this term, coined by Hirschman, is synonymous with "growth poles"). Furtado in his book 
Teoria e Polftica do Desenvolvimento Economico discussed the main ideas of Myrdal 
(spread and backwash effects), Hirschman (backward and forward linkages), Rosenstein- 
Rodan (Big Push) and also Perroux (growth poles). In relation to Perroux's theory, 
Furtado (1967, pp. 278) stressed that "as the starting point for the formulation of a 
development strategy for underdeveloped countries, the idea of poles shows clearly the 
importance of the connection of [development] projects and this gets closer to the 
doctrine of balanced development".
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Perroux's theory was also discussed by other professional in several articles. In this 
regard, Tolosa and Reiner (1972, pp. 75-76) stressed that "our conceptualisation of 
planned poles as public instruments for achieving national goals of regional development 
implies a policy of urban development co-ordinated at national level (by a central 
planning agency) and implemented at regional level (by a regional planning agency)". In 
another article, Tolosa (1974, pp. 214) emphasised that "growth poles may emerge as a 
result of the performance of market forces or may service as an instrument of 
governmental economic policy in order to achieve a set of national goals of regional 
development". The geographer Milton Santos (1974, pp. 274) points out that "the 
application of the growth pole theory in underdeveloped countries allows to raise the 
problem of knowing if the space can be indifferently defined in developed countries and 
in underdeveloped countries. The majority of those who dedicate to the analyse and 
planning of the space behave as if theories elaborated in developed countries and directed 
to their realities could be transplanted to underdeveloped countries".
Nevertheless, the most important point is that Perroux's theory had been accepted by most 
Brazilian professionals involved with regional inequality problems, who would apply the 
concepts to national plans, such as the PND I, PND n, etc., as well as to regional plans, 
such as those elaborated by SUDAM (especially PDA II). The fact that there were some 
misunderstandings in relation to Perroux's theory is no novelty, because Perroux himself, 
as was seen above, generated this sort of confusion and Brazil was no exception to the 
rule. Another substantial point is that these misunderstandings verified in SUDENE's 
plans do not mean that they have constantly appeared in other Brazilian plans.
It is important to recapitulate some chief points in relation to spatial aspects of the 
national development plans in order to understand and also verify the extent of Perroux's 
ideas. Regional disparities were a constant and serious preoccupation of several Brazilian 
governments, which formulated a number of national development plans in order to tackle 
these problems. In fact, these policies were intensified when Brazil had already created 
one of the most advanced and diversified industrial structures amongst developing 
countries, after the consolidation of the import-substitution process at the beginning of the 
1960s. However, this industrial structure was practically limited to the Southeast region,
83
Chapter II
principally to the two Brazilian states Rio de Janeiro and Sao Paulo. The military regime 
established in 1964 emphasised these inequalities between Brazilian regions and also the 
unequal relations existing between production structures. Each military government 
tackled these problems in a different way, but each of them had some common 
characteristics, which can be exemplified by the fact that their spatial development 
policies were uniform in certain respects, such as centralised decisions at Federal 
government level, adoption of a polarised development model from the expansion of 
economic activities in industrial areas, etc.
During the military regime, spatial planning was considered a cornerstone in the 
development process. The policy instruments adopted by these governments varied from 
the isolated use of fiscal incentives in order to attract private investments for areas lagging 
behind to more integrated development programmes to exploit natural resources in vital 
areas of Amazonia.
With respect to Perroux's theory, the national development plans after the Decenial Plan, 
which was formulated for the 1967-78 period, adopted the terminologies of the French 
economist. In this regard, the Decenial Plan, although it had not passed the stage of being 
only on paper, established in its second chapter the basis for the formulation of a national 
policy of urban development through the characterisation and study of "programme 
regions" (it must be mentioned here that this concept was created by Boudeville in order 
to make Perroux's theory more operational) and also through the definition of 
development poles. In parallel, some studies based on professor Rochefort's methodology 
were undertaken with the purpose of establishing a hierarchy of the urban net and there 
were three levels of development poles: development poles of national interest, poles of 
interest of micro-regional development and poles of equilibrium (Loeb, 1987); the PED 
(1968-70) referred to the creation of regional poles (Haddad, 1981); the PND I (1972-74) 
mentioned the creation of development poles:
"the econom ic occupation and the developm ent process will be effected through: 1) occupation, 
basically by means of: (...); 2) developm ent programmes, based especially upon fiscal incentives 
and exem ptions adm inistered by SUDAM  and SUFRAM A, along the following lines: selection
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o f developm ent and integration poles (priority areas and border zones) to achieve regional 
priorities, via the concentration o f investments; (...)"(Brazil, 1971, pp. 29).
The Second National Development Plan - PND II (1975-79) suggested the creation of 
growth (development) poles, which were called agro-mineral growth (development) poles 
(Brazil, 1974). In addition, the PDA II also mentioned the establishment of development 
poles:
"the spatial strategy o f the Federal governm ent will be com pleted w ith a special project, which is 
being planned by SUDAM  and was included in the Second N ational D evelopm ent P lan (PND 
II), concerning to the establishm ent o f developm ent poles in the region [Amazonia]" (SUDAM , 
1976a, pp. 46).
This evidence clearly shows the popularity of Perroux's ideas among Brazilian 
professionals involved with regional inequality problems. However, this acceptance of his 
ideas does not mean that they were strictly implemented, because it is hard to find any 
example of a development pole policy that was vigorously implemented in practice and 
most of these Brazilian national plans cannot be described as examples of development 
pole approach. Nevertheless, the PND II can be considered the one exception because its 
main policy instrument was the development pole strategy and moreover, the directives 
established in this plan were in fact implemented by the Brazilian government.
Before discussing development strategies adopted by the PND II in the next section, it is 
important to stress that one of the principal objectives stated in this national development 
plan was to consolidate Brazil as a modem industrial economy and in order to achieve this 
objective it was necessary to incorporate the vast “empty spaces” into the market 
economy. Thus, national integration was an essential part of the geopolitical objectives of 
the Federal government for modernising the country. Although there were several 
criticisms of modernisation theories, modernisation remained a prevalent strategy in a 
number of development plans, and in Brazil the development model adopted by the 
Brazilian government was intrinsically associated with the precepts of modernisation 
theory and also with the development pole theory, the latter being used as a regional 
planning strategy.
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Although the economic modernisation theories and development pole theory have 
divergence of perspective and analysis, there are some parallels between them. 
Modernisation theories understood development as an economic problem, being 
economic growth a suitable measure for it. In fact, economic growth was practically 
synonymous with development. In this regard, growth meant the reduction in inequalities 
(both within and between countries), unemployment levels, and poverty. Such 
development would occur because the essential technologies were already available.
After this generalisation, it is important to highlight some basic points of modernisation 
theories, which were impregnated with a profound dualism (traditional-modern) and 
ethnocentricity. First of all, industrialisation was considered the key element for achieving 
economic development, which would transform the stagnant economy of backward 
countries and regions into a modem and dynamic capitalist economy that would provide, 
in the long term, an increase in income levels. However, the main question was the way in 
which underdeveloped countries could best achieve the economic prosperity and social 
development of advanced industrial economies. In this regard, an essential element was 
the entrepreneurial class, which should be psychologically and technically prepared for 
introducing new production functions into the economy, and at the same time they had a 
high propensity to save and invest out of their profit income. It is interesting to note that 
this emphasis on the key role played by entrepreneurship in economic development was 
based on Schumpeter's idea. Allied to the rule played by the entrepreneurial class was the 
capacity of developing countries to absorb modem technologies. Another significant point 
was related to the labour force. There was an acceptance of the existence of 
unemployment and underemployment, especially in the agriculture sector, in developing 
countries and as a consequence, the mobilisation of this labour force into more productive 
activities was considered an essential part of economic development.
The most influential modernisation theorist was Rostow (1960), whose preoccupation 
with the process of economic growth led him to develop a mechanism that catapulted a 
backward economy into take-off. The propulsive mechanism was supplied by the leading 
sectors (could be one or more), but all sectors remain in a continual change as production 
functions, modem technologies become available, and new linkages reach out into the
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economy. The leading sectors were a key element in Rostow's work because the vital 
energies were accumulated there, although they derived from different sources, such as: 
new inventions or the absorption of available technology; the emergence of an 
entrepreneurial class who invested in and exploited the market possibilities; a productive 
agriculture; etc. It is interesting to note here that there are some similarities between 
Rostow's “leading sector” and Perroux's “propulsive industry”, which were concepts used 
for describing the dynamic of industrialisation.
In relation to the development pole theory, it is important to note that Perroux was 
influenced by Schumpeter's ideas, especially his innovation concept. In fact, Perroux 
believed that entrepreneurial innovation was primarily responsible for the development 
process in which the propulsive industries played a key role because they were highly 
innovative and according to him, innovation or technological progress was the pillar of 
economic development. Second, industrialisation was an important aspect of economic 
development. Third, the most important objective was to generate the spread effects, such 
as the increase in income and employment and at the same time produce structural change 
through economic growth. Obviously, the implementation of development poles was the 
essential vehicle for achieving these objectives.
Summarising, the basic idea that permeated these theories and the development model 
itself adopted by the Brazilian government was that the necessity of having an accelerate 
economic growth, principally in terms of GDP, in order to favour the poorest stratum of 
society, which meant that the social development was a consequence of economic growth. 
In other words, problems such as poverty and underemployment were regarded as 
temporary obstacles, which would be overcome through the beneficial spread effects 
generated from dynamic centres, generally richer areas, to the periphery, generally 
backward regions, leading in the long run to a more egalitarian and principally prosperous 
society.
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2.4.1 - The Amazon Region
As was seen above, few countries adopted Perroux's ideas to the extent that Brazil did 
and his influence can be attested by various national development plans that adopted his 
concepts. Although most of these plans implemented his theory partially or in different 
ways, the PND II was the only Brazilian plan whose spatial planning approach was based 
on Perroux's development pole theory and was strictly implemented according to the 
directives previously established. Thus, this national plan is an excellent example for 
analysing the beneficial spread effects generated by development poles to their 
surrounding hinterland areas.
In order to understand the spatial planning approach of the PND n, it is also important to 
bear in mind its objectives and development strategies. Development and security were 
keywords in this national development plan, whose general objectives were: to maintain 
the accelerated growth rate of the “miracle years”; to contain inflation in a gradual 
manner; to keep the balance of payments in relative equilibrium; to improve personal and 
regional income distribution, simultaneously with economic growth; to consolidate Brazil 
as a modem industrial economy; to adjust to new realities of the world economy; to 
initiate a new stage in the struggle for national integration; to implement social 
development strategy in order to guarantee to all classes, especially middle and working 
classes, substantial increases of income, and also to eliminate the “pockets of absolute 
poverty” that were principally located in the Northeast region and in the periphery of the 
great urban centres; and to integrate with the world economy.
According to these general aims, the PND II designed development strategies. The 
consolidation of Brazil as a modem economy was associated with the maintenance of 
high rates of industrial growth and in order to achieve this aim, implementation of 
industrial and agricultural strategies was fundamental. The industrial strategy was based 
on a “new phase” of import-substitution, whose emphasis was on basic sectors in order to 
correct imbalances in the industrial structure and also to save foreign exchange. One 
important aspect is what the PND II called the “Brazilian model of industrial capitalism”, 
which was intrinsically related to the way of making economic objectives viable. This
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model, known as “triple alliance” due to the association of multinational, State and 
domestic capital, aimed at encouraging industrial development through the private sector 
and at the same time ensuring a key role for Brazilian enterprises in the modem industrial 
structure that was desired. It is important to note that the Geisel government placed much 
greater emphasis than previous military governments did on the role of the State and 
principally on its role as protector of national industries.
The industrial strategy comprised five important points: 1) Development of basic sectors 
with special emphasis on capital goods industry, the basic electronic industry and basic 
raw materials. The main groups of basic materials were: iron and steel products; non- 
ferrous metals; petrochemical products; fertilisers; and pesticides. All of these groups 
include their respective raw materials. In addition, there were three other groups: paper 
and cellulose; raw materials for the pharmaceutical industry and cement, sulphur and 
other non-metallic minerals; 2) Opening-up new fields for exportation of manufactured 
goods of greater technological complexity; 3) Greater impulse for industrial technological 
development; 4) A boost to the development of the foodstuffs industry, continuation of 
the drive for modernisation and reorganisation of certain traditional industries; and 5) 
Reduction in regional imbalances in industrial development for the purpose of avoiding 
industrial concentration in a single metropolitan area. In this regard, the idea was to 
favour industrial dispersion in order to strength new centres of production.
Based on these points, fiscal incentives, loans from the BNDE and other sorts of 
government stimuli would be related to decentralisation criteria; industrial poles would be 
set up in order to take advantage of scale and agglomeration economies and also to 
guarantee articulated operation of large, medium and small industries; and the policy of 
identifying, through national and regional planning and also official banks, opportunities 
for industrial programmes and projects in Amazonia and the Northeast.
With respect to agricultural strategy, the PND II considered that this sector would 
contribute to the expansion of the GDP and also to the realisation of Brazil's role as a 
world supplier of food, agricultural raw materials and industrialised agricultural products. 
This document stressed that Brazil was one of the few countries in the world with vast
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spaces at its disposal. As a consequence, the settling of new areas was considered 
fundamental for the expansion of agriculture and the highways system already constructed 
was making access to huge areas in Amazonia and the Centrewest possible. It was hoped 
that the growth in income from agriculture would help to sustain the intense dynamism of 
the rest of the economy by demanding more raw materials and consumer goods and this, 
in turn, would contribute to reducing the deficit in the trade balance.
Another important aspect is that the PND II placed a great emphasis on the diversification 
and regional specialisation of agriculture in order to take advantage of the productive 
potential of each region. Correspondingly, the agricultural strategy comprised the 
following points: A policy of land use for agricultural purposes. These purposes in 
Amazonia were associated with another objective, which was to regularise the land 
ownership and also to distribute land, through INCRA, in areas of tension; modernisation 
of the agricultural sector; institution of agricultural reform and land redistribution 
programmes in problematic areas, where distortions of the system of land tenure were 
viewed as obstacles to agricultural development; strategy for the occupation of new areas, 
specially in Amazonia, the Centre-west and the humid valleys of the Northeast; 
continuation of the policy of establishing new market structures; strengthening the action 
of the public sector in areas where this action cannot be delegated such as: sanitary 
protective measures for crops and livestock; the formation of buffer stocks; a sectorial 
concentration of incentives; social strategy for the rural sector in order to assure the 
producer of a greater participation in the profits of the sector (Brazil, 1974).
One of the most important objectives of the Federal government was national integration, 
which was related to two preoccupations: geopolitical and economic. In fact, the 
occupation of “empty spaces”, especially in Amazonia and the Centre-west, had 
implications of security and sovereignty for the military regime. At the same time, the 
incorporation of these vast spaces into the market economy was fundamental for the PND 
II economic strategy, in which decentralisation of economic activity was a key factor.
The Federal government hoped that these new areas would contribute substantially to the 
growth of GDP, especially through a number of projects (agricultural, mining, livestock,
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forestry, etc.) to be implemented, and at the same time, considered the best way of 
integrating and occupying the regions was by means of the highways system, which was 
already constructed to a large extent (Trans-Amazon highway, BR-230 and the Cuiaba- 
Santarem highway, BR-165). The foremost point in the national integration strategy was 
the “integrated areas” concept, which made concentrated efforts of the Federal 
government and the private sector possible, and moreover allowed external savings and 
scale and agglomeration economies to be taken advantage of. The objective was to create 
blocks of integrated investments in these areas (which was development poles) which 
would, it was hoped, permit the adoption of clear priorities and the physical control of the 
results by selected areas. Several programmes were based on this concept, such as: 
POLAMAZONIA, the Programme for Integrated Areas in the Northeast, the Special 
Programme for the Development of the Pantanal and the Special Programme for the 
Development of the Geoeconomic Region of Brasilia. It is important to stress here that 
colonisation and agricultural enterprises were important elements of national integration 
strategy.
The strategy of the economic occupation of Amazonia (and also the Centrewest) was 
based on (Brazil, 1974; CDE, 1974):
• Utilisation of the natural axes of penetration for Amazonia and the Centre-west 
and principally of the important influxes of people which occurred: the first started in the 
state of Parana and the state of Sao Paulo, passed through the state of Mato Grosso and 
continued to Rondonia; the second started in the same area, ran toward the North of the 
state of Goias and southern Para; and the third started in the Northeast, passed through the 
state of Piauf and the state of Maranhao and continued to the Central Plateau or the South 
of Para;
• Promotion by the government of the occupation of the most fertile land of 
selected areas (and therefore geographically separated), and of the development of 
comparative advantages;
• The orientation of export activities, associated with export corridors, aiming at 
clear comparative advantages and dynamic sectors of the international market (beef, 
mineral deposits, lumber, cellulose). Export activities were expected to grow at a rate of 
25% annually.
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According to these guidelines, the PND II established the following points in order to 
occupy Amazonia productively: the creation of the POLAMAZONIA, which comprised 
fifteen development poles and whose investments were estimated at Cr$4 billion; the 
setting up of the mineral-metallurgical complex of Eastern Amazonia, which embraced 
the integrated Carajas - Itaqui scheme (iron-ore mining and steel mills), the bauxite- 
aluminium complex (Trombetas - Belem) and a large number of other undertakings 
associated with exploiting the hydroelectric potential of the Araguaia - Tocantins region 
(Sao Felix and Tucuruf); lumber exploitation in a planned way; and conclusion of the 
industrial district of the Free Zone of Manaus and the establishment of its agricultural 
district.
The social development strategy of the PND II was related to the maintenance of an 
accelerated rate of economic growth. The rationale was that rapid expansion, through 
accelerated growth, would provide more income to, and increase consumption by, 
everybody and, moreover, would encourage more investment. In other words, given high 
rates of growth it would be possible to undertake redistributive policies “while the cake is 
growing” (Brazil, 1974, pp. 69). The Brazilian government opted for the market economy 
and, consequently, government actions were directed towards private initiative, which 
was responsible for developing some sectors, such as manufacturing industries, 
construction industries, commerce, farm and stock raising, insurance, etc. In order to 
achieve this objective, the private sector was stimulated and encouraged, through a 
number of incentives, to invest therein, while the Federal government concentrated its 
investments in those sectors considered of national interest and security and in those 
which were not of interest to private initiative. Thus, the government, through its 
enterprises, limited its activities principally to economic infrastructure, i.e. energy, 
transport, and communication, although its activities also embraced some groups of basic 
materials, especially petrochemical, and iron and steel products, and their respective raw 
materials, which were considered strategic.
Another important point of the PND II is related to the integration of the Brazilian 
economy with the international economy. In order to maintain the balance of payments in 
relative equilibrium, the strategy was: to expand economic relations with other countries,
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including those of the ex-socialist block; to stimulate exports in categories such as 
manufactured goods, ores and non-traditional agricultural products in order to consolidate 
the system of export corridors; and to maintain the policy of diversification.
In connection with all these points above, there was a policy of urbanisation (see Fig. 2.1) 
that served as a basis for both national development and the occupation strategy 
advocated by the PND H The main points of the urban development strategy were: the 
implementation of nine metropolitan regions that were already created: Sao Paulo, Rio de 
Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Fortaleza, Porto Alegre, Recife, Salvador, Curitiba and Belem; 
the identification of the functions that were to be performed by the national metropolitan 
centres and also by the regional metropolitan centres, especially in areas of greatest 
demographic and economic concentration; and decentralisation, through the definition of 
medium-sized centres (poles), on national and regional scale. The principal objective was 
to take advantage of the existing agglomerations in economic, social and political terms. 
With respect to Amazonia, the setting up of urban poles was fundamental for the 
occupation of the region.
The urban development strategy for Amazonia and the Centre-west was based on: the 
development of the cities of Manaus and Santarem and also of the metropolitan region of 
Belem. The aim was to complement their urban infrastructure and support their 
productive secondary and tertiary activities; the implementation of the development 
guidelines for the geo-economic region of Brasilia, especially the occupation along the 
road axes which led to the Brazilian capital (principally the Brasflia-Anapolis-Goiania 
axis); the development of the following cities: Cuiaba, Campo Grande, Corumba, 
Dourados, Macapa, Boa Vista and Rio Branco; and the establishment of selected urban 
poles along the main highways (the Trans-Amazon, the Cuiaba- Santarem, the Belem- 
Brasflia, etc.) and also in the hinterlands. The objective was to occupy and to promote the 
agricultural and agro-industrial development of the region.
Urban development strategy for the Northeast followed practically the same directives as 
had been established for Amazonia and the Centre-west. In this regard, regional urban
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poles that were performing or were to perform as centres of regional polarisation would 
be strengthened by productive activities and investments in urban infrastructure and social
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Fig. 2.1 - National Urban Development Policy 
Source: Brazil, 1974.
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apparatus. These poles, it was hoped, would play as important a role in containing 
migration as in supporting agricultural and agro-industrial activities. The most important 
“integrated” projects to be implemented were: the improvements of urban infrastructure in 
Sao Luis by the Carajas Project, the Itaqui port in the state of Maranhao, the Suape port in 
the city of Recife, and principally the petrochemical pole at Cama?ari, which is located in 
the metropolitan region of Salvador.
The spatial development strategy of the PND II was formalised in the POLAMAZONIA 
programme (see Fig. 2.2), which was set up by Decree-Law n° 74,607 on September 25, 
1974. This programme aimed to establish fifteen development poles in selected areas 
throughout “Legal Amazonia” according to their potentialities, which were: mineral, 
forestry, agro-livestock and agro-industrial. In this regard, infrastructure, capital subsidies, 
taxation and other countless similar incentives were provided by the Federal government 
in order to accelerate economic growth and also create the necessary conditions for these 
poles to generate the hoped-for spread effects to their peripheral areas. The selected 
development poles were: Xingu-Araguaia; Carajas; Araguaia-Tocantins; Trombetas; 
Altamira; Pre-Amazonia Maranhense; Rondonia; Acre; Jurua-Solimoes; Roraima; 
Tapajos; Amapa; Juruena; Aripuana; and Marajo.
In the five years from 1975 to 1979, the Federal government predicted the investment of 
an amount estimated at Cr$4 billion in the POLAMAZONIA using resources from 
already existing programmes such as: PIN, PROTERRA, FDPI, etc. In broad terms, 
POLAMAZONIA aimed to increase the cattle herds of the region, especially in the North 
of Mato Grosso, northern Goias and South of Para, to five million head by the end of the 
1970s; support the growing of traditional regional crops such as rubber, sugar, cocoa, 
dende, fruit, pepper and rice and also finance research into these crops; and exploiting the 
vast mineral deposits in the region. It is important to describe below the main 
characteristic and the planned implementation of the Carajas pole in order better to 
understand what were the expectations of the development poles strategy in the region.
Carajas, pole 2, comprised the entire municipality of Sao Joao do Araguaia, practically all 
the municipality of Concei^o do Araguaia and part of the municipalities of Maraba,
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I) Xingu-Araguaia; II) Carajas; III) Araguaia-Tocantins; IV) Trombetas; V) Altamira; VI) Pre-Amazonia 
Maranhense; VII) Rondonia; V III) Acre; IX) Juru£-Solimoes; X) Roraima; XI) Tapajos; XII) Amapa; 
X III) Juruena; XIV) Aripuana; and XV) Marajd.
Fig. 2.2 - Development poles Selected by POLAMAZONIA 
Source: SUDAM, 1976b.
Sao Felix do Xingu and Santana do Araguaia, all of them in the state of Para and covering 
an area of 88,300 square kilometres (SUDAM, 1976b). This pole was a priority area 
under the POLAMAZONIA programme because of its huge iron-ore deposits (estimated 
at 18 billion tons) principally in the valleys between the Xingu and the Tocantins rivers 
and the Carajas mountain chain. In order to exploit these vast deposits, mining was 
programmed to start in 1978/79 and the feasibility studies recommended that the ore 
should be carried by rail from the mine to the port of Itaqui, which was located 940 
kilometres away from the Carajas mine and close to Sao Luis, the capital of the State of 
Maranhao. The Carajas pole also had reserves of manganese, cassiterite, diamond and tin 
and a survey was started to determine how best to use the natural resources of the region.
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Moreover, to the west of the iron-ore deposits there was land with a high potential for 
agro-livestock and also forestry resources, both of which were to be exploited by private 
enterprises. In fact, agro-livestock, and especially mineral undertakings, were the main 
activities of this pole and it is interesting to note that six years before the PGC had been 
established, the potential and strategic importance of iron-ore, manganese, bauxite and 
other mineral deposits in eastern Amazonia was completely understood and stated.
The document POLAMAZONIA: Carajas traced a complete picture of this region, 
pointing out its main problems and recommending guidelines in order to accelerate the 
development of this area. Owing to the importance of this pole, it is necessary to describe 
these problems and also the programmed actions for it. In this regard, problems related to 
agro-livestock, food supply and colonisation were (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 124-127): an 
agrarian structure in which 90% of the land was estimated to consist of large rural 
properties (latifundios), which were considered a significant problem for implementing 
agriculture and cattle ranching activities; the lack of technical knowledge (use of 
rudimentary methods of cultivation); insufficiency of financial resources; transport 
difficulties because the system of highways, despite the construction of the axes of 
penetration, was still insufficient and its completion and also the construction of a 
network of vicinal roads were considered essential for providing easier access to new land 
and, therefore, for the export of its production to other centres; the lack of, and high prices 
of, basic products because of the location of the Carajas pole, to which access was very 
difficult and which was far from the principal production centres of basic products for 
agro-livestock activities; an unsuitable commercial system, in which the persistence of 
aviamento system and of the role of the “intermediary” in the commercial process were 
considered evidence of this problem, which was aggravated by difficulties in transporting 
the products out of the pole and by insufficiency of credits, of technical assistance and 
also of a storage system; and the lack of agricultural research.
Based on these problems, the guidelines were: the delimitation of an area estimated at 
2,200 million hectares, in the south-east of the pole for livestock and long-cycle crops, as 
indicated in the PND n, such as rubber, sugar-cane, cocoa, dende, fruit, pepper, etc.; the 
development of short-cycle agriculture, especially that of subsistence, as in traditional
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areas of cultivation represented by the spontaneous nucleus of colonisation (inclusive 
within the area reserved for livestock and permanent crops) and in the areas to the south 
of the city of Sao Felix do Xingu, in the extreme north-east of the pole, where long strips 
of fertile land had been identified, which were destined for colonisation. The area in the 
north-east of the pole was also reserved for short-cycle crops. This area comprised the 
valleys of the Baixo Itacaiunas and Baixo Araguaia and was crossed by the Trans- 
Amazon highway, where the activity described above had already begun; to promote the 
designation of the land reserved for these activities, especially the land programmed for 
colonisation in the Municipio of Sao Felix do Xingu, and also the small strips of land 
close to the city of Maraba, where some of these strips were being designated for 
colonisation that was being promoted along the Trans-Amazon highway; to implement a 
widespread programme to experiment on different crops, liming and fertilisation in order 
the better to obtain detailed information of cultivation zone by zone; to establish control 
posts to determine the influx of products and their consumption, which were completely 
unknown, with the purpose of elaborating a programme for supplying the existing urban 
nucleus and also to develop a programme for agricultural production, whose objective 
was to supply the local and external market; to set up an integrated programme of 
technical assistance, principally for small farmers, in order to change the predominating 
productive system of agriculture.
This programme was to be supported by other programmes such as: local experiment on 
crops, land on designation of growing plants for vegetative propagation and for seed, the 
supply of basic agriculture products required for the rationalisation of the agricultural 
activity, the control of animal health and the provision of storage facilities; the correction 
of the distortions in the existing methods of cattle raising through the allocation of fields 
for research into the production of seeds, of leguminous, and of grass and also the 
development of research on cattle in order to reach better levels of productivity; to 
intensify the use of credit for the benefit of farmers; and to make transport of the products 
viable in order to improve the region commerce.
With regard to timber, the problems pointed out in the POLAMAZONIA: Carajas 
document (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 127-128), were: the use of rudimentary technology and
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the predatory character of forestry exploitation; the lack of specialised labour to supply 
the needs of the sector; the lack of data and, therefore, ignorance in relation to the 
behaviour of tree species in plantations; difficult access for timber extraction, which was 
aggravated by the lack of transport; and the lack of knowledge of the properties and also 
of the use of timber species in forestry. On the other hand, the recommendations were: to 
plan the rational exploitation of forestry in order to reach a qualitative and quantitative 
level of timber production which would be suitable for the great potential of the region; to 
reconcile forestry exploitation and the use of the land in general with conservative 
measures that would assure the continuous renewal of forestry resources; to take 
advantage of the timber to be felled in the area of mineral exploitation, whose extent was 
estimated at 590,793 hectares, principally of those species of commercial value for export 
from the pole although most of them would be required for civil construction within the 
pole; to delimit the areas destined for the protection of the indigenous population, for 
colonisation and agrarian reform, for the implementation of livestock projects and also for 
the development of sustainable forestry exploitation; to rationalise timber exploitation in 
the region, by means of modem techniques of extraction and forest renewal in order to 
overcome predatory extraction.
In relation to mining (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 127-129), the main problem was that the 
difficult access to potential areas of ore made research in these locations very expensive. 
Nevertheless, the main directives were associated with the development of research in 
order to discover new potential areas; to define the real possibilities of areas rich in 
carboniferous deposits, which had been discovered in the river Fresco region; to research 
on the use of materials for civil construction, principally limestone, in agriculture and 
industrial undertakings.
With respect to fisheries (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 128-129), the principal problems stressed 
in the document were: the lack of the minimum infrastructure essential for developing this 
sector; the lack of financial and technical support; primitive fishing because of unsuitable 
equipment and the use of obsolete techniques; and the lack of orientation to organise the 
fishermen into co-operatives and colonies. On the other hand, the main guidelines were: 
to promote the creation of Central Co-operatives supported by Basic Co-operatives and
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fishermens' colonies, which would act as a technical instrument essential for modernising 
the primitive fishing; to support this primitive system in the main fishing zones of 
Amazonia, where one of them, which was affected by the rivers Xingu, Tocantins and 
Araguaia, showed excellent prospects for development, but to achieve this objective it 
would be necessary to solve the following basic problems: production, commerce, 
storage, transport, conservation (by cold and salt), technical assistance, training and 
credit; to assure the spontaneous positive trend of the primitive fishing production; and to 
assure that the excess of fish would be absorbed by the consumption markets, principally 
those of large urban centres.
According to the document (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 132-133), the Carajas pole also showed 
problems in the hierarchical level of its existing urban nucleus; insufficiency of 
urbanisation; a disorientated growth of the urban nucleus; and the lack of a suitable basic 
infrastructure in the urban centres. In order to tackle these problems, the planners 
established the following directives: to elaborate the “Master Plan” for developing the 
cities of Concei9 ao do Araguaia and Sao Felix do Xingu; to promote the urban expansion 
of the city of Maraba, and moreover to implement its basic urban infrastructure; and to 
improve the water-supply system in the urban nucleus of Conceigao do Araguaia and 
Santana do Araguaia. In relation to the basic services, the document stressed the 
importance of constructing a port near the city of Maraba in order to transport the regional 
products, of improving the existing airports and also constructing new ones, of 
constructing 891,5 kilometres of highways and more 2,8 kilometres of bridges (over the 
rivers Araguaia and Tocantins) during the 1975/79 period, of gradually increasing the 
system of generation and distribution of the existing electric power in the cities of Sao 
Felix do Xingu, Concei9 ao do Araguaia, Santana do Araguaia and Maraba, which were 
the support nucleus for the development of the region.
In relation to health and education (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 130-131), both sectors were 
rather problematic. The lack of infrastructure and the few existing medical centres had 
neither the necessary equipment nor specialised labour, and high levels of malaria, 
leprosy, leptospirosis and leishmanioasis were the main health problems stressed by the 
document, while the principal problems in the educational sector were: 67% of the
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population was illiterate; 78% of the teachers had no license to teach in the elementary 
school and 67% of the unlicensed teachers had just completed primary school; the few 
courses offered by the educational system (Maraba had just one specialised course); the 
high percentage of non-specialised labour, which was unable either to satisfy the demand 
to be generated by economic activities or to increase the productivity of the existing 
economic sectors. In order to tackle all these problems, the planners stressed the 
importance of intensifying the struggle against the above diseases, of improving the level 
of education, of training teachers in order to assure higher productivity from teaching, and 
of providing specialised courses in order to train the labour available in the region.
The POLAMAZONIA: Carajas document stressed that the projects which were being 
implemented or to be implemented in the Carajas pole would generate 81,500 jobs 
including 80,600 in construction activities, in the 1975/79 period (SUDAM, 1976b; pp. 
118). It was expected that the Carajas project alone would generate 20,000 jobs in the 
construction phase and between 3,000 and 4,000 permanent jobs.
Although Carajas was unquestionably the most important pole, there were fourteen other 
selected development poles. Thus, agro-livestock, forestry, mineral, agro-industrial and 
infrastructure projects would be financed by POLAMAZ6NIA in order to take advantage 
of their economic potentialities. In addition, the cities of Manaus (the capital of the State 
of Amazonas), Belem (the capital of the State of Para) and Sao Luis (the capital of the 
State of Maranhao) were classified as urban poles. The idea was the same: to transform 
these capitals into dynamic centres or poles, from which development could spread to 
their peripheral areas. The Federal objectives for these urban poles were centred on the 
development of their infrastructure.
According to POLAMAZONIA, the actions of the Federal government, of the State 
governments, and also of private initiative would be co-ordinated in these fifteen 
development poles and the plans for the development of each pole would be part of an 
integrated development plan. Obviously, the specific objective of massive investments in 
infrastructure allied to countless types of fiscal incentives provided by the Brazilian 
government was to attract private industries and consequently to set in motion a dynamic
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process of economic growth, but in addition to this objective there was a general one: to 
occupy “the empty spaces” (SUDAM, 1976a; 1976b).
With the coming to power of the Figueiredo government, the development of Eastern 
Amazonia gained a new impetus and as a consequence the POLAMAZONIA programme 
was maintained, the PGC was set up and infinite additional incentives were created in 
order to accelerate economic growth, solve the foreign debt problem and also consolidate 
geopolitical objectives, such as the occupation of empty spaces, which had been 
established by previous military governments. However, it is important to highlight here 
that with the advent of PGC in 1980, seven development poles were established along the 
Carajas railway corridor at Parauapebas, Maraba, Agailandia, Buriticupu, Santa Ines, 
Rosario and Sao Luis. The logic was the same as for previous development poles: the 
stimulus to mineral, agro-livestock, lumbering and infrastructural undertakings would 
attract industrial and agribusiness ventures, and would thereby accelerate the development 
of the region.
Although the POLAMAZONIA programme had been formally abolished in 1987, the 
emphasis on development pole strategies continued, of which a good example is the 
“Master Plan” for the Carajas Railway Corridor, which had been elaborated in order to 
correct the errors of the Carajas programme implementation. In fact, the document 
recognised that the expansion of agro-livestock had occurred with speculative aims and 
had been encouraged by fiscal incentives and capital subsidies. These factors had 
contributed to generating serious conflict over land and also to increasing the level of 
urbanisation in the Carajas corridor region. At the same time the Master Plan stressed that 
the implementation of the great industrial projects oriented towards the external market 
reinforced the process of modernisation and urbanisation, which were on course since the 
construction of transport infrastructure, in the region. Thus, past Amazonian development 
strategies had resulted in negative social and environmental impacts and the Plan 
highlighted that the pressure on the indigenous community was becoming more intense 
(SEPLAN/PGC, 1989).
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In order to tackle the above problems, the Plan proposed a wide access to land; to give 
priority to those projects that meet the basic needs of the local population; to increase the 
level of self-determination of the local population; to restructure the urban and transport 
systems with the purpose of not only improving the regional access to the external market, 
but also to the urban functions; prioritise projects, those related to the development of 
basic activities for export, in peripheral regions which would facilitate: the rational and 
non-predatory use of renewable natural resources, the employment creation for the 
regional labour force, and the competitiveness in external markets (domestic and foreign) 
based not only on prices and scale of production, but also on the qualitative differentiation 
of products (SEPLAN/PGC, 1989). Indeed, the Master Plan suggested a "bottom-up" 
development strategy for the Carajas corridor region to avoid a situation of an export- 
enclave, in which limited positive effects are generated to local, regional, and even on the 
Brazilian economy (SEPLAN/PGC, 1989). The "bottom-up" approach advocated a 
community participation in the planning process and the Plan emphasised a greater 
decentralisation of decision-making through a number of formal and informal channels. 
Despite the importance of this development paradigm, the Master Plan clearly stressed 
that the social development should be planned by the Federal government, which had to 
have the social question as a fundamental priority. However, the Master Plan remained 
only a plan on paper.
Development poles, induced or not, associated with massive investments and all sort of 
incentives are essential for understanding the process of transformation that occurred, 
principally in Eastern Amazonia. However, these strategies implemented by the Brazilian 
government were intrinsically related to other important factors, such as the geopolitical 
objectives and also the pattern of economic development, which together were 
responsible for the change introduced in the region. Thus, in order to better understand the 
Amazonian situation and the effects generated by development pole strategies in 
particular, it is fundamental not to dissociate these factors.
The occupation and also the national integration of Amazonia as a whole were the highest 
priorities for the military regime, and government policies that had been implemented 
hoped to attain these objectives. In this regard, colonisation projects reflected in
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programmes such as PIN and PROTERRA, the construction of highways such as the 
Trans-Amazon, the Cuiaba-Santarem, Northern Perimeter road, etc. were concrete 
examples of these policies. Despite their importance, these policies did not significantly 
alter the Amazon region, but the context changed with the PND n. In fact, this national 
development plan placed considerable emphasis on expanding the mineral sector, 
especially Carajas iron-ore, and also on infrastructural projects, which were considered 
very important for Brazilian development. This emphasis was complemented by the 
POLAMAZONIA programme, whose proposals were based on development poles.
By involving selected areas, which would receive large-scale investment resources, would 
involve infrastructure undertakings and where industries would be located owing to 
countless government incentives, development pole strategies proved to be an important 
instrument for transforming the Amazon region, especially its Eastern part. It is important 
to note that the performance of these poles was conditioned to favour internal conditions, 
which meant that the Federal government should supply several public facilities, such as 
water, transport, power, etc., but in addition to these infrastructure undertakings it was 
fundamental for the linkages between these poles to create favourable external conditions, 
which meant the construction of highways and vicinal roads. In this regard, the road 
network was a decisive factor in paving the way for the occupation of the region.
According to the theory, development poles would attract a population in search of 
employment and as a consequence, they would become productive. In fact, a mass of 
unemployed construction workers, landless rural labourers and migrants from different 
regions of Brazil was attracted to these poles, which could not absorb them because 
employment generation was very limited. As a result, most of the unemployed entered the 
swollen informal sector. Owing to the rapid influx of migrants, these poles, especially 
Parauapebas, had a rapid population growth rate, which is intrinsically associated with the 
growth of squatter neighbourhoods in which most of population lives. In this regard, Rio 
Verde, now a district of Parauapebas, provides an excellent example, because it is 
essentially a poorly-serviced, large-scale squatter settlement, whose population had grown 
from 3,000 in early 1984 to on the order of 30,000 people in 1986 (World Bank, 1992). In 
these low-income districts and neighbourhoods, the level of formal employment among
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male adults does not usually exceed 10% (World Bank, 1992) and most of this population 
combines seasonal jobs in agriculture with irregular activities in construction work and 
gold prospecting or is employed in a wide range of marginal urban commercial and 
service occupations. In addition, women and many children are similarly engaged in a 
vast range of informal commercial and service activities.
Another significant point is that the economic benefits generated by development poles to 
their peripheral areas as well as to the population were very limited and the reason for this 
is centred on the fact that linkages involved in the development process were largely with 
distant suppliers and markets. In fact, the central point is that these industries set up in 
Amazonia during the 1970s and 1980s generally formed isolated enclaves, because they 
were established in local economies with which they had little contact and moreover, their 
capital, plant and many workers came from outside the region. These industries were 
located in Amazonia either for infinite fiscal incentives or as the result of policy decisions 
by the Federal government, which had opted for large export-oriented development model 
in order to solve some important problems, such as difficulties in the balance of 
payments, the increase of foreign debt and also the rapid decline in the GDP. In this 
regard, the main objective was directed to extra-regional interests, either in the Centre- 
South or abroad, while the growth of internal regional markets was relegated completely 
to second or an even lower place.
In essence, POLAMAZ6NIA was set up in order to promote the occupation and also an 
integrated development of Amazonia Legal through fifteen development poles, which had 
been previously selected. As was seen above, the predictions of this programme, in 
quantitative terms, were vague and restricted to some sectors, especially mining which 
was the key sector. In fact, this programme placed great emphasis on infrastructural 
undertakings because it was considered essential for attracting private investments to the 
region. Nevertheless, it is important to stress here that this emphasis on infrastructure was 
one of the forms taken by development policies (principally in development countries), 
which sought to invest large amount of resources in backward regions with the clear 
purpose of producing structural changes through accelerated economic growth.
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Despite the importance of the POLAMAZONIA programme, one basic question remains: 
why did the Federal government adopt the development pole theory? In order to answer 
this question, it is important to recapitulate the chief points mentioned beforehand. On the 
one hand, Perroux's theory had a very strong appeal because its underlying ideas 
suggested that economic growth, interregional equilibrium and integration of backward 
regions could be achieved through a strategy of decentralised development. On the other 
hand, the military regime was acutely aware of the sharp regional inequalities in Brazil 
and this problem was introduced in its geopolitical and economic objectives.
Becker and Egler stressed that:
“the ideology o f  developm ent poles showed itself to be the m ost adequate m odel for territorial 
organisation proposed  by the authoritarian state, since it involved the creation o f privileged 
locations, from  the perspective o f capitalist accum ulation, capable o f interlinking the national and 
international circuits o f financial and m ercantile flow s” (1992, pp. 100).
Unquestionably, the main focus of the Federal government was economic, but at the same 
time the implementation of development poles associated with infrastructural 
undertakings, which meant the completion of the axes of penetration (see Fig. 2.1 above) 
and principally the construction of a network of vicinal roads, were essential for the 
strategic occupation and also for the integration of Amazonia. In addition to the 
geopolitical and economic objectives, the Brazilian government hoped that development 
poles would act like efficient counter-magnets to the large and congested metropolitan 
areas by attracting populations in search of employment. Thus, the military government 
saw the development pole theory as a convenient theoretical tool which served to justify 
its distinct objectives.
106
Chapter II
2.5 - Summing-up
The concept of development pole, which was elaborated in order to describe and explain 
the process of economic development, was based on the following argument: the 
propulsive effects intrinsic to a development process tended to be generated by a cluster 
of economic activities and also tended to engender the broader economic growth. Owing 
to its perceived potential, this concept attracted the attention of many professionals 
involved with problems of regional development. However, Perroux's concept was 
conceived in an economic space, which was too abstract and non-operational to be 
applied as a basis for planning. Boudeville, who was Perroux's disciple, was the main 
responsible for transforming this concept into an operational tool for regional planning 
and this fact was essential for its widespread use in several countries.
According to the theory, development poles could be induced and the logic was that these 
induced poles would act such as efficient counter-magnets to the large and congested 
metropolitan areas; would produce scale and agglomeration economies; and would 
generate beneficial spread effects to their immediate hinterlands, so that in the long-term 
an “equilibrium growth” throughout a country would be expected. In addition, the 
accelerated economic and population growth would be encouraged by government 
policies in relation to infrastructure and several types of incentives.
These ideas advocated by development pole theory showed to be a convenient theoretical 
justification for the specific geopolitical (national integration and occupation of 
Amazonia) and economic objectives of the military regime. In this regard, the 
POLAMAZONIA programme was established and massive investments were channelled 
into infrastructure undertakings, capital subsidies, taxation and thousands of other 
incentives with the clear purpose of producing structural changes through accelerated 
economic growth.
In pushing forward with a development strategy that was associated with the development 
pole theory and also with the basic precepts of economic modernisation theory, the 
military government opted for a policy which would be responsible for negative social
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and environmental impacts. This chapter has outlined the development pole theory, 
always focusing on its expectations, especially in Amazonia with POLAMAZONIA and 
the Carajas pole. The next chapter will analyse the negative impacts in urban and rural 
areas generated by development pole strategies in Eastern Amazonia.
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A Brief Overview of Regional Impacts in Eastern Amazonia
3.1 - Introduction
This chapter gives an overview of the social and environmental impacts generated by 
development pole strategies in eastern Amazonia. This brief overview will prepare the 
way for understanding a number of problems occurred in Parauapebas.
As seen in the previous chapter, the Brazilian development policies were heavily 
influenced by Perroux's development pole theory, which showed to be a convenient 
theoretical justification not only for economic objectives (accelerated economic growth), 
but also for the geopolitical objectives (national integration and occupation of Amazonia) 
of the military regime. These development strategies implemented in Eastern Amazonia 
have had negative social and environmental impacts in urban and rural areas. The Carajas 
project allied to several other public interventions in that region have been responsible for 
attracting, directly or indirectly, a considerable flow of migrants, which has worsened the 
already inadequate infrastructure and services-capabilities of all cities and towns along the 
Carajas corridor.
Municipal governments have attempted to tackle a number of problems, with very limited 
assistance from the CVRD, in their municipalities, improving some facilities, but they 
have not been succeeded. In fact, the local administrations have been totally unable to 
deal with the growing local demand, and dismemberment of some districts contributed to 
exacerbating the already problematic situation.
Chapter III
3.2 - Social and Environmental Consequences of Carajas
In general, Brazilian public policies within the economic sphere can be characterised by 
inefficiency in proposing a well-organised and efficient spatial occupation. Although the 
enormous investments of regional infrastructure have contributed to reducing the isolation 
between distant regions of the country and have shown alternatives for investment and for 
extraction of the economic surplus, they have also accelerated spatial occupation, which 
has resulted in predatory exploitation of natural resources, and has aggravated social 
disparities, reproducing and intensifying situations of poverty which occur in other 
Brazilian regions.
The intensive migration in response to road building was inevitable. However, official 
colonisation projects supported by INCRA and GETAT, the discovery of gold at Serra 
Pelada and principally the Carajas Project were determining factors in attracting these 
flows into Eastern Amazonia. In fact, urban areas, from the state capitals of Sao Luis and 
Belem to small cities located along the Carajas corridor, have experienced a rapid growth 
rate since the advent of the PGC. For example, the population of Parauapebas increased 
from 8,577 in 1980 to 53,312 in 1991 at an average annual rate of 18.07%; Maraba grew 
by more than 90,150 at an average rate of 8.34% per year; while in Imperatriz, even 
though the demographic growth rate was less (4.05%) than in Maraba, the population 
increment in absolute terms was even greater, the number of inhabitants increasing from 
294,816 in 1980 to 456,044 in 1991 (IBGE, 1991).
The Carajas Project was responsible for generating considerable amounts of temporary 
and permanent employment, which reached a total of 27,000 jobs at the peak of 
construction activities (August 1982) at the mine, rail and port sites. As a consequence, 
the very rapid growth of cities along the Carajas corridor is also related to the permanence 
of most of these construction workers, who generally came from the low-income southern 
and north-eastern Brazil, in the region. Despite important effects produced by substantial 
flows of migrants, the principal point is that these flows were products of official 
development policies, which had serious social and environmental impacts in rural and 
urban areas.
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3.2.1 - Urban Impacts
With regard to impacts on urban development, it is unquestionable that industrial 
activities in Eastern Amazonia have brought some benefit to the cities in the region. For 
example, the number of persons transported by the Carajas railway increased from
571,000 in 1990 to 836,000 in 1995 (Mayrink, 1996) and at the same time large quantities 
of products ranging from pig-iron to food have been carried. In addition, there have been 
noticeable improvements in road-building and sanitation infrastructure, and also in the 
construction of schools and hospitals in several cities, which previously lacked such 
facilities. Another important point to note is the increase in indirect employment and 
income effects generated by industrial activities, which have contributed to the 
development of the local economies. For instance, the permanent jobs created directly by 
the Carajas project support between 20,000 - 25,000 people, including family members 
and other dependants, and it is likely that two or three times this number are supported in 
the Carajas corridor region through a number of activities indirectly related to this project 
(World Bank, 1992). Insofar as CVRD employees' salaries are higher than the regional 
standards, there is increased demand for goods and services, which in turn stimulates the 
local economies, although these signs are more visible at nearby Parauapebas than in 
other towns and cities along the Carajas corridor such as Maraba, Santa Ines, Agailandia, 
Sao Luis etc.
However, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the amount of direct and indirect 
employment to be created in the region is only an estimate, and moreover, these estimates 
must be treated with caution because they represent a possibility and not the reality. For 
example, in January 1988 the PGC approved thirteen industrial projects, which were to 
generate 5,149 jobs directly and 31,537 indirectly (Gistelinck, 1988), but of those pig-iron 
plants approved only five are now in operation, and probably the other plants will not be 
built in the near future because of potential environmental destruction. On the other hand, 
the impressive growth of the cities has had several negative impacts, such as deficiencies 
in infrastructure and services, underemployment, poverty, illiteracy, health and nutrition 
problems, urban displacement and involuntary resettlement.
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Indeed, the substantial flow of migrants, stimulated directly or indirectly by industrial 
projects and other public interventions in the region, has aggravated the already 
inadequate infrastructure and local service-provision capabilities. Municipal governments 
have attempted to solve the countless problems of the cities along the Carajas corridor 
with very limited assistance from the CVRD. This has resulted in improvements of some 
facilities, but these efforts have been totally inadequate. The reason for this lies in the fact 
that the necessary improvements in urban infrastructure requires financial resources 
beyond what is available in municipal budgets. The local authorities have been unable to 
find a solution to the growing needs, and some political changes (dismemberment of some 
districts) have exacerbated this situation. A classic example of this can be seen in the 
municipality of Maraba, which lost considerable revenues from taxes on Carajas ore 
production and wild-cat gold mining at Serra Pelada through the political emancipation of 
the former districts of Parauapebas and Curionopolis.
All cities along the Carajas corridor have experienced problems of infrastructural 
deficiency. Water supplies are usually untreated, sewage and trash collection and storm 
drainage systems are restricted to a few, higher income neighbourhoods, while sewage 
treatment and adequate solid waste disposal are basically non-existent. In Parauapebas, 
the water supply is taken directly from the local river (Parauapebas River), which is 
contamined with mercury from gold prospecting at nearby wild-cat gold mining 
(garimpos). With regard to Buriticupu colonisation villages, Bom Jesus da Selva/Km 100, 
Trecho Seco, Pequia and A?ailandia, water scarcity is a tremendous problem which has 
forced many inhabitants to obtain their water from wells, although most of water table is 
contamined. The reason for this lies is that sewage is disposed of in local rivers. The Jacu 
and Pequia rivers, which supply water for the towns of Agailandia and Pequia 
respectively, have become sewage dumps where excrement as well as industrial refuse is 
disposed of (Coelho, 1991).
It is worth noting that the widespread use of private wells aligned with the extensive 
deforestation occurring in most towns along the Carajas corridor region, has contributed 
considerably to a lowering the water table. This is also the case in the Buriticupu 
colonisation area, where people have been forced to sink wells deeper and deeper 
(Coelho, 1991). Another important point is that few roads in towns such as Parauapebas,
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and in the poorer districts of larger cities like Maraba and Agailandia are paved, and this 
generates a serious problem: soil erosion. In extreme cases, soil erosion can disintegrate 
houses precariously built. Coelho (1991) points out that soil erosion has affected the 
urban areas of A9 ailandia, whose streets have become deep gullies leaving many people 
homeless during the rainy season.
As a consequence of intensive migration, the growth of urban districts in the cities along 
the Carajas corridor has resulted in large-scale squatter settlements poorly provided with 
municipal services. A large part of the population in these low-income districts is 
underemployed in a wide range of informal commercial and service activities (principally 
women and children), while male adults combine seasonal jobs in agriculture with 
irregular activities in construction work and gold prospecting or are engaged in a variety 
of marginal urban commercial and service occupations, such as sidewalk vendors selling 
fruit, candy and cigarettes, drivers and carters, assorted repairmen, car washers and 
watchers. Women find additional income as cleaning women, seamstresses, baby-sitters 
and prostitutes. Many farms and firms avoid registering employees, who would then be 
entitled to rights and benefits such as job stability, social security and so on, because 
businessmen consider the official taxes too numerous and also extremely high. The direct 
result is that the informal sector in Brazil has expanded to a very significant proportion of 
the economy. In 1988, 47.4% of the non-agricultural employees did not have their work 
cards signed (Martine and Torres, 1991) and one of the indicators of informality is the 
number of employees with signed work cards. The proportion is certainly larger in the 
Carajas corridor area, where any kind of formal employment is scarce.
Public health impacts are directly associated with a lack of basic urban services and 
facilities. This is reflected in the rapid increase in a variety of health problems and a 
worsening of social indicators, such as infant mortality. In 1988, the municipality of 
Parauapebas showed high incidences of malaria, tuberculosis, leprosy, measles, hepatitis, 
whooping cough, meningitis and tetanus which exceeded the state of Para averages 
(IDESP, 1990). The Brazilian researcher Coelho (1991) stressed that the most common 
diseases to be found in the municipalities of Agailandia and Santa Luzia were malaria, 
diarrhoea, allergies, verminoses, influenza, malnutrition and snake or scorpion bites. 
Amongst them, malaria presented the highest rate of incidence; a good example of this
113
Chapter III
can be seen in Presa de Porco/Vila Pindare, where 60% of inhabitants was infected with 
this disease. In addition, there were high occurrences of leprosy, tuberculosis and sexually 
transmitted diseases in both municipalities.
Sexually transmitted diseases are intrinsically related to a lack of information, of hygienic 
habits, of treatment and, principally, to high rates of prostitution, which is a very common 
phenomenon in the Amazon frontier. Widespread urban poverty and malnutrition are 
reflected in high indices of mortality, especially infant mortality, which averages 125 per
1,000 live births in Sao Luis (World Bank, 1992). In urban areas of A9ailandia and Santa 
Luzia, 40% of the low-income population has lost a family member since their arrival in 
the region and the incidence of infant mortality is significant (Coelho, 1991). Industrial 
activities such as pig-iron smelting with its associated atmospheric pollution, have 
contributed to the increase of allergic, respiratory and dermatological problems in cities 
which are closer to these activities, such as Marabd and A?ailandia.
Access to formal education is also connected with the insufficiency of urban services and 
facilities because even schools are frequently non-existent or greatly overcrowded in most 
of the region. In 1984, 59.04% of the school-age (from 7 to 15 year-old) population in 
Santa Luzia and 70.27% of that population in A5 ailandia were out of school (Gistelinck, 
1988). Despite improvements, the school deficit continued significant. For example, five 
years later, the municipal administration estimated that at least 50% of school-aged 
children were not able to attend school in Agailandia (Coelho, 1991). At the same time, in 
the low-income districts in Sao Luis, only 44% of primary school-aged children were 
effectively enrolled, while in the municipality of Maraba, 65% of its population did not 
attend school beyond the first school year (World Bank, 1992). In Parauapebas, 90% of 
primary teachers had not completed primary school themselves (IDESP, 1990), while 
20% of adults were illiterate (Mayerhofer, 1986; Roberts, 1991a). Moreover, there is a 
lack of basic facilities such as teaching materials. These problems, associated with the 
need to supplement family incomes, contribute towards making the situation more 
dramatic.
Urban displacement and involuntary resettlement are a direct result of industrial projects 
implemented in Eastern Amazon and at the same time reflect the negligence of the
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Brazilian authorities and planners, who failed to take into account the small communities 
affected by industrial activities. In general, the displaced population neither obtained any 
substantial compensation nor was attention paid to providing alternative sources of 
housing or employment. The villages were simply demolished and the only option for 
most of the displaced was to live in squatter settlements. There are numerous examples of 
displacement caused by industrial projects, such as the ALUMAR factory, the 
construction of CVRD's infrastructural undertakings (rail and port complex) and the 
Tucuruf dam and reservoir. These will be described briefly below.
As indicated in chapter one, ALUMAR succeeded in achieving its industrial objectives. 
However, the ALUMAR complex was responsible for significant social and 
environmental impacts in Sao Luis. In fact, this complex, which covers one-sixth of Sao 
Luis island's 60,000 hectares, displaced 7,000 families, mainly small farmers and 
fishermen (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992). Although this fabric had created 2,000 jobs, 
most skilled and semi-skilled workers were hired from southern Brazil. This aluminium 
plant stimulated a considerable flow of migrants to Sao Luis. As a consequence, local 
unemployment increased and the city's capacity to provide suitable urban infrastructure 
and facilities substantially worsened. In addition, the ALUMAR plant affected the local 
ecosystem by generating aluminium hydroxide emissions which destroyed farmers' crops 
and caused serious respiratory illnesses and skin diseases. As well it produced waste "red 
mud" which polluted the sea and caused widespread disruption of the artisanal fishing 
industry. It is important to stress here that most of displaced people were forced to leave 
the area and were offered no financial compensation, alternative employment or housing.
In relation to the Tucuruf hydropower project, it was implemented, as already mentioned 
in chapter one, in order to supply subsidised power for the aluminium complexes of 
ALUMAR and ALBRAS-ALUNORTE, the Carajas mine, the metallurgical plants set up 
along the Carajas corridor, and to meet the needs of towns and cities in the region. 
However, the dam and reservoir, which occupy an area of 2,500 square kilometres, caused 
the displacement of up to 35,000 people (60% rural), including the inhabitants of six 
small towns (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992). Owing to the fact that no planning 
authority was created to oversee and co-ordinate a comprehensive resettlement strategy,
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serious problems occurred and ELETRONORTE, a poorly equipped State power 
company, was put in charge of conducting this process.
Indeed, ELETRONORTE did not take into consideration alternative provisions or 
adequate compensation. For instance, criteria adopted for indemnifying displaced people 
clearly ignored the Amazon region’s land tenure structure insofar as "land is frequently not 
owned de jure by individuals with legal titles but this does not detract from their de facto 
right to permanent occupation of the land as individuals or in groups" (Hall, 1991, pp. 
160). In this regard, an important segment of the rural population (60% of displacees), 
namely posseiros, became ineligible for any type of compensation and this fact created 
strong popular resentment towards the authorities. Furthermore, the reservoir flooded a 
100-kilometre stretch of the Trans-Amazon highway (BR 230), partially flooding the 
INCRA colonisation project near Maraba and as a consequence, up to 800 colonists had to 
be relocated from their 100-hectare plots to areas of uncleared rainforest. This took place 
despite the fact that Tucuruf was planned before the construction of the Transamazonica. 
This fact characterises the sheer incompetence, as well as the inadequate planning of the 
hydroelectric project.
The Tucuruf dam also impacted Indian tribes. The physical area occupied by the Gaviao 
da Montanha tribe was completely destroyed and its cemeteries and villages are now 
submerged in the Tucuruf reservoir. This tribe was forced to move to the Mae Maria 
reserve, which is bisected by the BR 322 highway and crossed by the main Tucuruf 
transmission line as well as by the Carajas railway (Ferraz & Ladeira, 1991). Another 
serious impact caused by the Tucuruf dam on Indian population relates to the Parakana 
tribe, which had 30% of its land flooded (Magalhaes, 1991). This substantial loss implied 
that a new area had to be chosen and demarcated, a task continually postponed by the 
Federal government, which never took the Indian question seriously. A number of further 
hydroelectric projects along the Xingu river are planned, and the social consequences are 
predictable insofar as there are several indigenous territories in this region. The 
environmental impacts generated by the Tucuruf project will be discussed in section 3.2.3.
In order to build its rail terminal and port complex, CVRD expropriated an area of 2,200 
hectares affecting several communities, namely Santo Antonio, Mapaura, Boqueirao,
116
Chapter III
Irinema, Itaqui, Conceisao, Gapara, Pianco, Moco, etc., which consisted of small farmers 
and fishermen (Andrade and Correa, 1986/87). Perceiving that they would be evicted with 
only a minimal compensation, the community decided to defend its interests and to fight 
against CVRD. After a five year struggle, a period during which the villagers of 
Boqueirao were subjected to intimidatory pressures which lead many of them to give up 
the cause, CVRD agreed to resettle the remaining families of those small villages to 
"Morro Pelado" ("Naked Hill"), renamed afterwards "Alto da Esperansa". Although this 
new area was provided with a primary school, power supply, social centre and communal 
standpipes, CVRD only liberated the plots for displaced families three years after the 
indemnification for improvements made on the expropriated land. During this period, the 
money received was spent on family support and, consequently, the majority part of these 
families were left with insufficient funds to purchase construction materials to rebuild 
their houses. In addition, their previous occupations as fishermen and farmers were no 
longer viable, principally because this new area was distant from the sea and its soil 
completely infertile, as is suggested by the name of the area.
The displacement of population in Sao Luis is a direct consequence of the Carajas project. 
In fact, the construction of CVRD's rail and port terminal facilities affected many small 
farmers and fishermen, who lived within the city's “greenbelt”. There is no agreement in 
relation to the number of people displaced by these undertakings because while informal 
local observers estimate it to be 10,000, CVRD admit to only 1,800 (World Bank, 1992). 
However, the main point is that the means by which expropriation and resettlement were 
conducted meant that most of the displaced people were unable to obtain alternative 
houses or jobs, and even the indemnity offered was very limited. In making any gains at 
all, the small village of Boqueirao despite a struggle, was apparently only an exception to 
the rule, insofar as most of small communities affected by the Carajas project as well as 
the ALUMAR plant, which was responsible for displacing 20,000 people, were simply 
evicted. Their population was considered to be unworthy of notice, a hindrance to the 
plans of companies and Brazilian planners, and the government.
Many people displaced by these industrial undertakings found a place to live in very poor 
districts such as Itaquibacanga, whose population is estimated at 80,000. As a result, there 
was an increase in underemployment rates in the area. This considerable flow of people,
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as has already been mentioned, generates a number of social consequences. A very telling 
indicator is infant mortality, which increased from 90 to 190 per live births among 
displaced people (World Bank, 1992).
3.2.2 - Rural Impacts
The Brazilian development policies for Amazonia in general, and the Carajas region in 
particular, adopted a clear latifundio-bi&sed model, which operated in favour of large- 
scale, individual and corporate landowners (with generous subsidies) to the detriment of 
the vast majority of peasant cultivators. Thus, these policies have been responsible for 
transforming the rural sector, which has also experienced several and interrelated impacts 
such as the growing land conflicts, rural violence, food insecurity and land concentration.
Eastern Amazonia has witnessed a rapid increase in land conflicts as a direct result of land 
battles between peasant cultivators and indigenous groups on one hand, and larger 
commercial farmers on the other. In fact, violent land conflict is a common phenomenon 
in Brazil's history and Amazonia is no exception. Land-grabbing has followed the 
agricultural frontier in Brazil as migrants moved westward from the Northeast, and 
northward from the South over the past three decades. It is important to highlight that 
rural violence and land concentration in Eastern Amazonia were intensified throughout 
the 1980vs with the implementation of both the PGC and the Carajas Project, which were 
responsible for increasing land values in the region. Exacerbated land concentration, 
struggle for land, and moreover, greatly stimulated migration into the region were other 
results. In addition to both projects, there were two measures which contributed to the 
increase of rural violence and land concentration: the government's “Cruzado Plan”, 
which was an economic reform package for the 1985/86 period and also the Brazilian 
plan for agrarian reform, known as PNRA. The “Cruzado Plan” temporarily reduced the 
large speculative profits obtained on the financial market, on the one hand, but, at the 
same time made property (rural and urban) the best investment for those with funds to 
spare. The PNRA expropriated areas of under-utilised land and encouraged peasant 
evictions and violent confrontation (Hall, 1991a).
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According to the Ministry of Agrarian Reform and Development (MIRAD, 1987), by 
1981 over half of Brazil's land conflicts occurred in Amazonia. Within Amazonia, the 
state of Para had the highest death-rate from land conflicts, registering 568 cases from 
1964 to 1992, while the municipalities of Maraba, Sao Joao do Araguaia and Xinguara in 
the Carajas Project area accounted for approximately 36% of the total death-rate in Para 
(Bemo de Almeida, 1994). Moreover, intense land conflict still occurs in several areas, 
notably in the western part of the Carajas area, known as the “parrot's beak”, which is 
located in the confluence of the states of Para, Maranhao and Tocantins and is 
synonymous with rural violence.
In general, most deaths associated with land conflicts in Amazonia have derived from 
gunmen hired by landowners, mining companies, property companies and agro-livestock 
enterprises to expel small farmers or to assassinate peasant activists who decided to offer 
resistance to land-grabbers. In these assassinations are included the non-peasant activists 
such as lawyers, priests, bishops, politicians, and other professionals who have defended 
the interests of small farmers in the region. In Eastern Amazonia, however, the rising 
number of fatalities is related to a decision taken by peasant farmers to organise into a 
movement to better to resist land-grabbers, and this attitude is reflected in the spread of 
estate occupations throughout the region and also in the significant number (twenty-eight 
to 200 in 1986) of gunmen and bodyguards recruited by estate owners killed by their own 
intended victims (Hall, 1991a). It is interesting to note that many bodyguards and gunmen 
hired by landowners are members of the police force in civilian clothes.
The use of violence against the peasant families is changing in Brazil, with oppressors 
emphasising non-fatal aggression methods, which assumed several forms such as threats, 
intimidation, physical and sexual abuse of women and minors, beatings, evictions, 
kidnappings and also slave labour. Denunciations of slave labour increased from 4,483 in 
1991 to 16,442 in 1992 in Brazil as a whole. In the state of Para, the situation is 
considered “macabre” because the terrible condition of slave labour is associated with 
cases of beating, enchaining and also death (Bergamo, 1993).
The persistence of rural violence in Brazil is associated with both the police and judiciary, 
whose local and state structures are slow and corrupt. In addition, there is omission and
119
Chapter III
even connivance of the Federal government, which could use its powers to ensure that the 
law is better enforced. Moreover, the State is also responsible for elaborating and 
implementing development policies for Amazonia, which have helped to increase land 
concentration and the exclusion of a large part of the peasant population from access to 
land. A recent confrontation between the police of the state of Para and landless workers, 
occurred in Eldorado dos Carajas, which is very close to Parauapebas, on April 17, 1996, 
not only illustrates perfectly this situation, but also suggests that rural violence is far from 
finishing in Brazil. By 1500 landless workers obstructed the highway PA-150 to protest 
against the postponement of the Federal government to settle their families in the 
Macaxeira farm. The governor of the state of Para send its police troops, which came 
from Maraba and Parauapebas, to remove them by force and the result was a brutal 
massacre of seventy landless workers, being nineteen deaths and fifty-one seriously 
wounded (Bergamo & Camarotti, 1996). One year later and nothing was done to 
investigate and punish the main responsible for this tragedy.
The problem of rural violence embraces the indigenous question because the programmes, 
projects and plans implemented and also encouraged by Brazilian governments have 
directly affected Indian people. There are forty tribal territories under the PGC's area of 
influence which are located in the states of Para (18), Maranhao (18) and Tocantins (4) 
and whose legal situation is: thirty-six areas officially recognised and four unrecognised 
by the Federal government (Bemo de Almeida, 1994). In addition, there are twenty-seven 
tribal territories within the direct area of influence of the Carajas Project, i.e. within a 10- 
kilometre radius of the mine and railway (Hall, 1991a). The Brazilian government has 
been acutely aware of its obligation to protect and assist the indigenous population and 
this obligation is clearly confirmed by several laws and decrees which date from the 
Brazil monarchy to the present day. However, in practice the Federal government has 
never tried to implement this legislation in favour of the interests of the Indians.
In fact, Amazonian development policies implemented during the military regime and 
continued by the civilian governments have been directly responsible for countless 
impacts on the indigenous population, whose lands have been coveted because of their 
valuable natural resources. In 1983, the Federal government sanctioned Decree N° 
88,988, which legitimised mechanised mineral extraction on all Indian lands, demarcated
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or not, and thus mineral concession was permitted to State, private, Brazilian and 
multinational enterprises, including the CVRD. As an immediate consequence of these 
policies and also of the authorities' slowness in assuring territorial protection and 
assistance to the indigenous population, Indian lands in the PGC area have registered 
several violations including assassinations, invasions by agricultural, mining and 
lumbering enterprises, physical aggression, threats of deaths and outbreaks of disease.
Bemo de Almeida (1994, pp. 67-82) catalogues a sequence of recent violations of Indian 
lands in the PGC region. Some of them are: the Kaiapo Indian Area (Kaiapo A'Ukre, 
Kaiapo Gorotire, Kaiapo Kikretum, Kaiapo, Kokraimoro, Kaiapo Kuben and Kran Ken 
tribes) - invasions by gold miners, lumbering and agrolivestock enterprises; an outbreak 
of respiratory diseases; mercury contamination; physical aggression by an ex-Lieutenant 
of the Brazilian Army against Kenti Kaiapo; the Trincheira/Bacaja Indian Area (Kaiapo 
Xicrin do Bacaja, Kaiapo and Kararao tribes) invasions by lumbering enterprises and 
2,500 gold miners; the Cana Brava Indian Area (Guajajara tribe) - thirteen cases of 
cholera with one death registered; physical aggression by federal policemen against 
Indians; the assassination of the Indian Augusto Pereira because of land conflict; invasion 
by 2,400 inhabitants of the small village of Sao Pedro dos Cacetes. In addition, other 
transgressions occurred in Indian lands such as: the Guajajara tribe (Rio Pindare Indian 
Area) and the Gaviao tribe (Mae Maria Indian Area), whose territories were divided by 
the PA 156 road, by the BR 322 highway from A9 ailandia to Sao Luis, the Carajas 
railway line and power transmission lines; moreover demarcation itself sometimes takes 
place to the detriment of indigenous groups, as in the case of the Xicrin, whose southern 
boundary was deprived of an eight kilometre-wide strip that was subsequently occupied 
by sawmills and a GETAT colonisation project, which resulted in further invasions of the 
reserve by small farmers and timber extractors (Hall, 1991a).
An agreement supported and encouraged by the World Bank was signed by the CVRD 
and FUNAI in 1982 in order to provide land demarcations and for long-term development 
of indigenous groups located in the Carajas region. Nevertheless, this official agreement 
failed and the reason for this failure is centred in Amazonian development policy itself, 
which clearly shows the contradictions between the real interests and priorities manifested 
by the Federal government, Brazilian (state and private) and foreign companies and the
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actual circumstances of the indigenous population. The CVRD and also FUNAI are 
significant examples of these contradictions. The Brazilian enterprise was an important 
part of the agreement and, moreover, oversaw the Indian Support Programme, which 
suggests that the CVRD had a resolute commitment to protect Indian groups in the 
Carajas area, but at the same time this company was responsible for invading tribal 
territories in search of minerals and also for obstructing “the demarcation process in an 
attempt to guarantee access to valuable bauxite deposits” (Treece, 1987, quoted by Hall, 
1991a, pp.90).
In 1968 FUNAI substituted the old SPI, and this year is very significant because it is the 
beginning of both the most cruel period of the authoritarian regime and the “economic 
miracle”, which means that this agency was created under strong centralisation and the 
influence of the ideology of Development and National Security (the fact that for a long 
time FUNAI was firstly “occupied” by militaries and secondly by employees without any 
experience with Indians is not a coincidence). These points are fundamental for 
understanding the authoritarian and bureaucratic attributes of FUNAI and its behaviour, 
which is marked by complete subjection to military, government and commercial interests 
and also by total monopolisation of Indians and its inherent tradition of making life 
difficult for researchers and outside consultants. Thus, its Indian policy, whose aim was to 
integrate them into Brazilian society progressive and harmoniously instead of giving them 
a certain autonomy, was completely in line with government priorities and this fact can be 
illustrated by Mr. Costa Cavalcanti, the second President of FUNAI, who in 1969 
announced: "We do not want a marginalised Indian, what we want is producing Indian, 
one integrated into the process of national development" (Beltrao, 1977, quoted by 
Treece, 1991, pp. 268) as well as by Mr. Nestor Jost, then head of the Carajas Inter- 
ministerial Council, who said: “the Indians will reach a degree of acculturation sufficient 
for them to be assimilated as workers on the project” (Treece, 1987, quoted by Hall, 
1991a, pp.92).
Indian groups were not consulted before the project implementation. Although relevant, 
this fact cannot be considered surprising because Brazilian plans hardly took the interests 
local of the population into account and the PGC and The Carajas Project were no 
exceptions. Indeed, Indians and peasants have been victimised by development policies
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and the PGC has exacerbated the violence against them by generating opportunities for 
economic gains in industrial and agricultural sectors and also land speculation. Everything 
would be perfect for the Brazilian government, domestic and foreign investors if it were 
not for the unpleasant and unwanted presence of small farmers and the indigenous 
population, who are a concrete impediment to direct access to land and minerals.
This confrontation between small farmers and Indian groups on the one hand, and heavily 
subsidised commercial and speculative interests on the other, is a product of the incessant 
struggle for access to land and the most appalling fact is the evident connivance of the 
Federal government with all forms of violence such as removal, suppression, hostility and 
slowness of political-juridical structures, assassinations and so on used against these 
groups. It is important to stress here, however, that the victims of such strategies have 
opposed resistance instead of accepting their destiny passively. In fact, land struggle has 
contributed to forging a social consciousness and principally to unite disadvantaged and 
unprotected groups, which have been supported by a variety of institutional organisations 
such as trade unions, left wing parties, NGOs and the progressive Catholic Church.
Intrinsically related to rural violence is the problem of land concentration and speculation, 
which can be considered a typical feature of development policies for Amazonia. 
Although polarisation of landownership in the region had already reached an advanced 
stage before 1980, the implementation of the PGC exacerbated this process, in the first 
instance through its generous subsidies to larger farmers, and secondly, through the rise in 
land values as a consequence of industrial, agricultural and infrastructural activities 
generated by this programme. These factors associated with a great variety of fiscal 
incentives granted by the PGC itself and also SUDAM and SUDENE (many ventures 
were benefited from both sources) made Eastern Amazonia extremely attractive for 
private investors. It is important to note that these countless subsidies allied to high rates 
of inflation encouraged the acquisition of large rural properties with speculative aims.
The tendency towards land concentration in Eastern Amazonia can be best illustrated by 
recent data related to the PGC area. There are 465 rural properties of over 10,000 hectares 
(451 located in the state of Para and 14 in Maranhao) totalling 12,930,467.7 hectares, 
which account for 14,3% of the Carajas Programme. According to Bemo de Almeida
123
Chapter III
(1994), this percentage would considerably increase if it had been possible to collect 
similar data for the states of Tocantins and Maranhao. This trend observed at regional 
level is also confirmed at a microregional level. Compared with the 1980 agricultural 
census, the 1985 census shows clearly that the number of smallholdings of less than ten 
hectares fell from 15% to 4% in Pindare, from 5% to 3% in Imperatriz, from 10% to 6% 
in Mearim, from 3% to 0.2% in the “Parrot's Beak” and from 44% to 15% in Sao Lufs. 
On the other hand, the area controlled by large rural properties of more than 1,000 
hectares increased significantly from 10% to 37% in Pindare, from 22% to 37% in 
Imperatriz, from 38% to 58% in the “Parrot's Beak” and from 9% to 53% in Sao Luis 
(World Bank, 1992). Santa Ines is an important example because it is affected by the 
Carajas Iron Ore Project (through the Carajas railway) and is also the future site of four 
metallurgical plants approved by the PGC Interministerial Council. Thus, in this 
municipality, farms of less than one hundred hectares decreased their share of agricultural 
land from 33% to 21% between 1980 and 1985, while the area covered by latifundia 
between 1,000 and 10,000 hectares more than doubled from 23% to 49% over this same 
period (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992).
These examples certainly indicate that land concentration is strongly associated with the 
expulsion of small farmers and that the PGC was an important factor in exacerbating this 
process. Hall properly stressed that:
a direct cause is the subsidies provided to large-scale agricultural and industrial com mercial 
enterprises, but perhaps even m ore im portant is the indirect stimulus given by such “developm ent 
poles” to land values and the increasing attractiveness o f the area as a source o f purely speculative, as 
opposed to productive, investm ent in land as a long-term  hedge against B raz il's  ram pant inflation 
(1991a, p 106).
Rural violence, land concentration and conflicts were products of Amazonian 
development policies, which also had an important impact on food security and, 
consequently, on the nutritional levels of the population in the region. This impact has its 
roots in the decision made by authorities and planners, particularly in the mid-1970s, in 
favour of livestock, lumbering and the production of cash crops for export, to the 
detriment of food staples; the total control over agricultural lands of largely unproductive 
estates; the increase in landless small farmers owing to the incessant process of expulsion
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and also the impediment to access to new land and the rise in temporary wage labour on 
larger estates.
Food deficits occurred in the Carajas region in particular and for Amazonia as a whole. 
From the state capitals such as Belem to the towns along the Carajas corridor, urban areas 
in Eastern Amazonia experienced problems in maintaining supplies of foodstuffs, which 
had to be imported expensively from distant southern Brazil. As seen in chapter four, 
Parauapebas is a very good example of this phenomenon. This point is illustrated by a 
national survey which showed that Belem and other cities in Amazonia experienced 
Brazil's highest prices for food staples such as root vegetables, green vegetables, beans 
and fruits (Hall, 1991a). The shift in crop-production patterns associated with rural 
violence, land concentration and worsening landlessness have contributed to making the 
rural population poorer. The underlying cause of the lack of food entitlements is poverty, 
which is also responsible for nutritional and health problems. It is worth noting that all 
these above mentioned problems directly affect urban development insofar as migration 
from rural to urban became more intense as people seek economic opportunities. A result 
of this are local authorities completely unable to meet the growing demand for urban 
services.
3.2.3 - Environmental Impacts
Until the 1960vs, the forest cover of Amazonia remained practically untouched because 
the only great government initiative to develop the region was the construction of the 
Belem-Brasflia highway (BR-010), in the late 1950vs. Since then, especially at the 
beginning of the 1970vs, deforestation has increased at an exponential rate as a direct 
result of the construction of new highways such as the Trans-Amazon highway, the 
Cuiaba-Santarem highway (BR-165), the Cuiaba-Porto Velho highway (BR-364) and 
several vicinal roads, which paved the way for the rapid occupation of the region. This 
impressive destruction of the rainforest can be corroborated and illustrated by some 
significant data. In an 8,000 square kilometre area polarised by the city of Maraba, the 
area deforested increased from 1.8% in about 1972 to 37% in about 1985 (World Bank, 
1992); from 1977 (before the implementation of the PGC) to 1985, the annual
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deforestation in southern Para (equivalent to 10% of Amazonia) increased by 6,715% 
(Hall, 1991a); another important source estimated that deforestation in the Legal Amazon 
region increased from 152,200 square kilometre to 415,200 square kilometres 
(Hagemann, 1994). According to recent data, 12% (600,000 square kilometre) of the 
Amazon forest has already been devastated. This represents an area bigger than France 
(Veja, 1995).
It is important to bear in mind that the Amazonian development policies which were 
responsible for the environmental destruction, were made in accordance with foreign and 
domestic commercial interests. The development of the Amazon region since the military 
coup has been implemented through several private undertakings as well as those 
supported by the Federal government. These undertakings comprise: the construction of 
new highways and vicinal roads; cattle-ranching; lumber industry; official and 
“spontaneous” colonisation; mining together with associated infrastructural projects, such 
as railway and hydroelectric power; and pig iron smelters. All these initiatives are 
interrelated and have contributed to aggravating, to a greater or lesser extent, the 
rainforest destruction. However, it is important to discuss below, the environmental 
problems generated by each, separately.
With respect to cattle-ranching, conversion into pasture means that the soil is no longer 
protected by its original vegetation. This lack of natural protection results in soil erosion, 
leaching and loss of fertility. These problems have had a dual impact: firstly, on the 
economic viability of livestock production because the decline in pasture productivity due 
to them has been aggravated by the soil compaction by cattle hooves. Without heavy 
applications of expensive fertilisers and herbicides, Amazonian soils, which are already 
characterised by poor quality, became exhausted and susceptible to invasion by weeds, 
many of which are extremely harmful to the cattle. Secondly, this impacts the 
environment itself, because concomitant with deforestation are those factors mentioned 
above, species loss, flooding, spread of diseases, general impoverishment of the rural 
population and so on.
Another important source of deforestation in Amazonia is peasant farming because its 
methods are based on traditional forms of “slash-and-bum” agriculture, which is limited
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in terms of sustainability. This method consists of clearing small areas of forest, burning 
the vegetation, growing a few harvests of food crops and finally abandoning the exhausted 
soil in order to reproduce the same process elsewhere. Abandonment is due to the 
impoverishment of already poor soils, which are unable to sustain permanent agriculture. 
“Slash-and-bum” agriculture practised by the indigenous population and also by caboclos, 
i.e. by a limited number of people, does not affect the environment, but when practised by 
thousands and thousands of migrants, is potentially harmful to the environment, leaching, 
laterisation, weed invasion, soil erosion, loss of nutrients, etc. being the inevitable 
consequences.
Despite its significance, traditional slash-and-bum agriculture affected only a small 
portion of the total deforested area. In fact, small farmers in colonisation schemes or 
spontaneous settlements have deforested far less than medium- and large scale 
landowners, who cleared the native forest in order to introduce crops or pasture land. 
According to Hagemann (1994), in 1980 42% of deforestation was attributed to small 
farmers (up to 200 hectares of landownership), while medium- and large farmers (from 
200 to 5,000 hectares of landownership) were responsible for 57%. This deforestation rate 
rose to 70% between 1990-91.
The destructive potential of the lumber industry is determined by wholesale deforestation, 
which devastates an entire area, and also by the felling of selected species of trees. 
Amazonia has become a major producer of timber in Brazil. In fact, this region's 
production increased from 14% in 1976 to 66% (corresponding to 24.6 million of cubic 
metre) of the country's timber in 1989 and this increase contributed to making Brazil one 
of the world's largest producers. This impressive production is also related to the number 
of sawmills in the region. In the state of Para alone, their number increased from 1,500 in 
1986 to 3,500 in 1991 (Hagemann, 1994). The lumber industry has been responsible for 
reducing stocks of various valuable species and also for many invasions of the indigenous 
areas. It must be mentioned here that an important stimulus for deforestation lies in the 
demand for hardwoods from industrialised countries, both for luxury and basic timber 
products.
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In addition to livestock production, farming and lumbering, two other important causes of 
deforestation in Brazilian Amazonia are dams and mining, both of which were key 
elements of the PGC. Besides causing serious social problems such as the displacement of 
thousands of people, as mentioned above, the implementation of Tucuruf hydroelectric 
plant has generated tremendous ecological impacts, which can be related to two basic 
problems: the deforestation of surrounding areas and also the failure to clear vegetation 
from the area to be flooded. The impressive increase in local deforestation for fanning, 
lumbering and cattle-ranching has provoked siltation, which has been responsible for 
negative results such as the reduction in regular natural flooding of the valley floor (which 
affects fishing, interrupts riverine agriculture and destroys crops) and at the same time it 
can affect the Tucuruf s future performance.
However, the most serious ecological consequences results from the failure of authorities 
to take into account the warnings of specialists, who alerted them to the necessity of 
removing vegetation from flooded areas. This process has led to problems of “acid 
water”, which kills fish, destroys rivers and corrodes turbines and other equipment; 
proliferation of water weeds, which obstruct turbines provoke frequent shut-downs and 
are the ideal places for water-borne diseases such as malaria, yellow fever, river blinness 
(oncherciasis) and schistosomiasis (bilharzia) to breed; they also provides sites of the 
anaerobic decomposition of rotting biomass (World Bank, 1992).
The Carajas project has also had, direct or indirect, environmental impacts. Deforestation 
in the Carajas region has been considerable and the reasons lie in a number of 
interconnected factors including: 1) The attraction of an intense flow of migrants to the 
region in order to implement the mine and railway. Many of these labourers later decided 
to remain in the area as small farmers, gold prospectors or to undertake any type of urban 
service; 2) The construction of new roads and the improvement of existing ones to 
provide access to the Carajas mine. These roads made the access to remote areas viable 
and, consequently, substantial rural areas were cleared by colonisation projects, logging 
companies, cattle-breeders squatters and gold prospectors; 3) Private land speculation in 
the Carajas region in general and along the corridors formed by the railway and project - 
supported roads; 4) Lumber requirements for the implementation of the railway and other 
facilities related to the Carajas project as well for the provision of shelter and services to
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the population attracted; and 5) The use of fuel wood from the forest to produce charcoal 
for the pig iron smelters located along the Carajas corridor (World Bank, 1992; 
Redwood, 1993).
Indeed, the above factors contributed to significantly increasing deforestation in the area 
influenced by the Carajas project. According to the World Bank (1992), 99.2% of the 
areas cleared was native forest. Some good examples serve to illustrate perfectly this 
accelerated deforestation. With respect to the state of Para, in an area of 8,000 square 
kilometre polarised by the city of Maraba, while only 1.8% of the total area of the region 
had been deforested by 1972, this percentage had increased to 8% by 1980 and to 37% by 
1985 (World Bank, 1992). In the state of Maranhao, specifically in the municipality of 
Agailandia, the rate of deforestation increased from 8.1% of the total area in 1975 to 
20.6% in 1978 and to 46.9% in 1988 (Coelho,1991). An IBGE study found that less than 
1% of the native forest around Santa Ines remained untouched in 1988 (World Bank, 
1992).
Besides clearing land for the implementation of the railway, road and urban facilities at 
the Carajas mine site, the construction of the railway resulted not only in deforestation of 
an 80 meter strip along of its length of 850 kilometres, but also in timber extraction for 
the production of railway sleepers. The area cleared, including those for the train stations, 
maintenance yards, housing for CVRD employees and crossings, was approximately 
20,000 hectares, while the railway sleepers required at least 50,000 hectares of high 
quality wood (World Bank, 1992). A more direct environmental impact caused by the 
Carajas project relates to the pig iron industries implemented, and those to be set up, 
along the Carajas corridor. One of the major constraints of the industries is exactly their 
environmental impact on forests and air quality, insofar as they use wood-based charcoal 
both as an energy source and as a reacting agent.
The main reason for the use of fuelwood is economic the cheapest source of fuel is the 
charcoal from the native forest. It is important to stress here that part of the charcoal 
produced in the region is derived from the remaining scraps of timber at local sawmills, 
but the capacity of these suppliers is limited and production will tend to occur at 
increasingly greater distances, a fact which has important implications not only for the
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long-term economic viability of these industries, but also for the sustainability of the 
native forest. In addition to deforestation, dense industrial smog produced by the 
operations of these pig-iron industries associated with the burning caused by other 
enterprises, such as tree-failing and farming, have resulted in an increase in the 
atmospheric pollution, which represents a real danger to the health of local population as 
well as to local air traffic.
Inside CVRD's concession at Serra dos Carajas, the native forest has been preserved. The 
reason for this lies in the Carajas project's environmental protection measures, which vary 
from air and water pollution monitoring and control at the mine and port areas, to the 
establishment of an "environmental zoning" exercise for the Carajas region. However, this 
idyllic situation represents a sharp contrast to the situation outside CVRD's main entrance 
gate, where the pace of deforestation is considerable. Although the Carajas project can not 
be directly blamed for most of the adverse environmental impacts generated by other 
public and private sector interventions such as road building, fiscal incentives, wild-cat 
gold mining, etc., that have occurred on the region, it has indirectly reinforced and, in 
certain areas, accelerate this process by improving access and consequently, attracting a 
significant flow of migrants to the region.
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6.3 - Summing up
This chapter has shown the adverse impacts generated by development policies 
implemented in Eastern Amazonia. Industrial undertakings have been responsible for 
attracting an intense flow of migrants, which have worsened the already precarious urban 
infrastructure and services of urban nucleus in the region. In fact, all cities and towns 
along the Carajas corridor have problems of infrastructural deficiency. Water supplies are 
commonly untreated, sewage and trash collection and storm drainage systems are usually 
restricted to higher income neighbourhoods, while sewage treatment and adequate solid 
waste disposal are scare. The insufficiency of urban services and facilities affects directly 
the health and education sectors. The impacts on the health sector are aggravated by 
widespread urban poverty, which is caused by the intense flood of migrants attracted to 
the region in search of economic opportunities. In general, the towns and cities in the 
Carajas region present high incidences of a number of diseases, which vary from malaria 
to sexually transmitted diseases, and also high indices of infant and foetal mortality. With 
regard to the education sector, schools are frequently lacking or greatly overcrowded in 
most of the region and these problems connected with the need to supplement family 
incomes contribute to making the situation more problematic.
The Brazilian development policies, principally for Eastern Amazonia, adopted a clear 
latifundio-bascd model, which favoured large landowners with generous subsidies to the 
detriment of the vast majority of small farmers. In this regard, these policies have affected 
directly the rural sector, which have undergone many and interconnected impacts, namely 
land conflicts, land concentration, rural violence, and food insecurity. The implementation 
of both the PGC and the Carajas project, by increasing land values in Eastern Amazonia, 
exacerbated land concentration and rural violence, and moreover, stimulated a 
considerable flow of migrants into the region.
Rural violence is intrinsically associated with land concentration and speculation, which 
are a direct product of development policies. The implementation of the PGC including 
the Carajas project exacerbated this process through generous subsidies provided to large 
farmers and also through the indirect stimulus given by development poles and land 
values. These factors made Eastern Amazonia an area extremely attractive for purely
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speculative investment in land. Another important impact caused by development policies 
is on food security, which affects directly the nutritional levels of the population in the 
region. Food insecurity is a common phenomenon in Eastern Amazonia, whose urban 
areas, from the state capitals to towns along the Carajas corridor, which have to import 
food from the Centre-South.
In relation to the environmental impacts, it is important to bear in mind that the forest 
cover of Amazonia remained practically untouched until the military coup. All 
undertakings, varying from cattle ranch to pig iron smelters, stimulated by Amazonian 
development policies are interconnected and have contributed to worsening deforestation 
and environmental degradation in Eastern Amazonia. Although the Carajas project is not 
directly responsible for most of environmental impacts that has occurred in the Carajas 
region, it has indirectly contributed to this process by attracting a considerable flow of 
labourers, many of whom decided to remain in the region after the construction works; by 
constructing and improving new roads, facilitating the access to remote areas of the 
region; by means of private land speculation along the Carajas railway corridor; through 
lumber requirements for construction of the Carajas project facilities; and more directly 
through the consumption of charcoal from native forests promoted by the implementation 
of metallurgical industries. The next chapter will analyse the planning and 
implementation process of public policies in the city of Parauapebas in order to better 
understand the existing discrepancies between what had been initially planned and what 
was concretely implemented.
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Planning for Parauapebas: Expectations
4.1 - Introduction
In order to exploit the huge iron-ore reserves at Carajas, which had been designated as an 
important development pole in the POLAMAZONIA programme, the Carajas Project 
(also known as the Carajas Iron-Ore Project) was created. While this project was being 
implemented, CVRD believed that the construction of a high standard urban nucleus on 
top of Carajas mountain would be necessary for attracting and convincing skilled labours 
from Southern Brazil to live in that town and, consequently, to operate the iron-ore mine. 
Planners were acutely aware that the Carajas Project would inevitably attract a large flow 
of migrants to the region and, at the same time, that Carajas town which was christened 
Parauapebas ought to be preserved from the population and activities not directly related 
to mining.
In fact, Parauapebas, which was to accommodate a population of 5,000, was built with the 
clear aim of avoiding the formation an enormous shanty town at the CVRD's entrance 
gate and also of reducing some past problems with this kind of human agglomeration, 
such as the occupation of hills and areas liable to flooding. Despite planning Parauapebas, 
however, CVRD could not avoid the formation of a peripheral settlement, which came to 
be known as Rio Verde, contiguous to the planned town. Rio Verde originated 
independently of Parauapebas because of several factors, such as poor planning, CVRD's 
under-estimation of the pace of urbanisation, its decision to force service workers to live 
outside Carajas town, etc. These aspects, allied to a certain negligence on the part of local 
authorities and a difficult relationship between CVRD and these authorities, contributed 
to generating serious and worsening problems in the area. This chapter aims to analyse the 
planning and implementation process of public policies in Parauapebas in order to better 
understand the situation of the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde
Chapter IV
4.2 - General Considerations
It is worth recapitulating previous regional development interventions in Eastern 
Amazonia in order to better understand the contrast between what had been originally 
planned and the reality of what was implemented in the town of Parauapebas, discussed in 
this chapter. This is also important for understanding the implications of planning for the 
twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde, which will be taken up in chapter four.
The 1964 military coup, as seen in the first chapter, was a watershed in Brazil's history, 
principally in relation to actions undertaken in Amazonia. In fact, the authoritarian 
regime, motivated by geopolitics, xenophobia and development objectives, implemented 
regional policies which were essential for stimulating the forces that promoted the 
occupation and integration of Amazonia.
During the 1960s, the military regime launched "Operation Amazonia" and established 
the Superintendency for the Development of Amazonia (SUDAM) to exploit the already 
perceived potential of the region in a more aggressive way. SUDAM offered profitable 
tax and credit programmes to investors from southern Brazil and abroad, principally for 
cattle ranching.
The National Integration Programme (PIN), launched in 1970, the Programme of Land 
Redistribution and Stimuli to Agro-industry in the North and Northeast (PROTERRA), 
which was in fact a complement to PIN and was set up in 1971, and the First National 
Development Plan (PND I) for the 1972-74 period inaugurated a new phase in Amazonian 
development.
Although the fiscal incentives for cattle ranching continued, the first half of 1970s was 
characterised by construction of new highways, such as Transamazdnica (BR-230) and 
Cuiaba-Santarem (BR-165), with special emphasis on directed resettlement projects. 
These projects, which were the most important "social" objective, aimed at absorbing the 
Northeast's "surplus" labour and the Transamazdnica, according to official propaganda, 
would thus connect "men without land to land without men" (Hall, 1987; 1991a; Schmink
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&Wood, 1992). Another important aim, which was PROTERRA's major social objective, 
was to increase agricultural production through promotion of agro-industry as well as the 
creation of a new class of "modem" small and medium farmers.
Colonisation projects, road-building and agro-industries were encouraged by the Federal 
government largely for geopolitical reasons, which meant integration and occupation of 
Amazonia. Thus, a major expansion of the road network allowed greater military 
penetration and, consequently, control over the region, which was perceived as being 
potentially threatened, from the military point of view, by communist guerrillas in the 
"Araguaia War" and by foreign interests, which were represented by neighbouring 
countries who share the Amazon rainforest.
Settlement projects, new highways, especially the Transamazdnica, and other 
undertakings were regarded by the authoritarian regime as synonymous with economic 
progress, national unity and the sensitivity of the Federal government to social issues. 
Other concerns were to divert public attention from internal political conflicts as well as 
to maintain the social structures in the South and, principally, in the Northeast. In this 
regard, Amazonia functioned as a "safety-valve" for social tensions in these regions. In 
addition to this role, the Federal government hoped, by attracting North-eastern migrants 
to Amazonia, to alleviate urban pressures in Southern Brazil. Rapid expansion of the road 
network paved the way for the occupation and integration of Amazonia and facilitated 
access to the exploitation of its already perceived huge natural resources.
The early 1970's were the "miracle years" in which Brazil had achieved an impressive 
rate of economic growth providing a wave, which was greatly stimulated by the Federal 
government, of optimism in relation to the country's future (transformation into a great 
world power) and of nationalism as well. The rapid economic growth achieved during 
those years was based on aggressive development policies elaborated in order to attract 
foreign investments, principally through fiscal incentives, and to stimulate capital 
accumulation in the Brazilian industrial sector, particularly in the consumer durable-goods 
sector (moreover, this sector absorbs a great number of workers and did not require 
significant imports). Reduction in wages and tax incentives were measures considered
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essential for achieving exponential economic growth. Allied to these factors, the "miracle 
years" also relied on a brutal political repression and on the centralisation of power in the 
hands of the Federal government. These characteristics, centralisation and political 
repression, despite the lessening of the latter in the subsequent years, would be maintained 
until the end of the military regime.
The focus on the consumer durable-goods sector caused some deterioration in 
intermediate-goods and basic-inputs sectors, this deterioration forced the Federal 
government to increase its imports. As a result, a crisis occurred in the balance of 
payments in 1973 and coincided with the first oil shock, which made the situation even 
worse. All these problems occurred in late 1973, which marked the end of "miracle years" 
as well as the change in the Presidency of the Republic. At the beginning of 1974, Geisel 
assumed power and his government established the PND n, which ignored restrictive 
economic policies and the first oil shock and decided to build up large-scale industrial and 
other projects. High rates of investments in sectors that represented the ultimate stage of 
import-substitution industrialisation, i.e. in intermediate inputs (especially in chemical 
and metallurgical industries) and capital goods, were considered essential for attaining 
high rates of economic growth.
Problems in the balance of payments and the first oil shock coincided with the failure of 
directed colonisation in Amazonia. In fact, the policy of social colonisation, principally 
alongside the Trans-Amazon highway (the settlements were known as Agrovilas, 
Agropolis and Ruropolis), proved to be a great disappointment. Although several factors 
were responsible for the discrepancy between government promises included in the 
official objectives and the success of settlement projects, the crucial factor was that the 
planning was itself over-centralised and hastily implemented (Hall, 1987; 1991a; 
Almeida, 1990; World Bank, 1992).
The Geisel administration's option for developing large-scale projects was definitively 
sealed with the POLAMAZONIA programme, which aimed at establishing fifteen 
development poles, of which Carajas was one, in selected areas that would be endowed 
with investments in infrastructure and a stimulus to export-oriented activities. In addition,
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POLAMAZONIA represented a significant change in governmental policy compared with 
the "social colonisation" period of 1970-74 in favour of large corporate agribusiness, 
livestock production and private colonisation projects, together with continuous 
investments in infrastructure as well as in mining and mineral-processing activities (the 
exploitation of the Carajas iron-ore was obviously included).
Indeed, this change was a consequence of pressures exerted on the Federal government 
through the AEA (Association of Amazon Businessmen) by businessmen anxious for a 
return to the previous policy of the 1960s, in which Amazonian occupation was based on 
large-scale private enterprises, and benefited from generous federal fiscal incentives. The 
main argument used to lobby the Brazilian government was the failure of directed 
colonisation projects and its negative environmental impacts on Amazonia in terms of 
deprestation, etc.
However, agrarian policy biased heavily in favour of large-scale commercial farming for 
export, was responsible for more serious social and environmental problems. Cattle 
ranching proved to be a tremendous failure in many ways. The financial return was 
unsatisfactory because of a number of problems such as soil erosion, declining soil 
fertility, soil compacting, weed invasion and leaching, which were aggravated by radical 
methods, especially chemical defoliants and the chains pulled by bulldozers, used to clear 
the land. These methods not only had irreparable environmental impacts, but cattle 
ranching also generated very little employment and this fact caused severe criticism of 
this form of Amazonian settlement (Hecht, 1985; Hall, 1987; 1991a).
These technical, ecological and social objections were associated with another serious 
negative aspect, namely the improper use of the government funds by "entrepreneurs" 
who used the scheme in order to obtain cheap money, which was invested in other sectors. 
In fact, land was commercialised with speculative aims because it had simply become the 
main commodity instead of processed meat, which never became, in spite of official 
belief, a major stimulus to Amazonian development (Branford & Glock, 1985; Hall, 
1987; 1991a; Hecht, 1985; Schmink & Wood, 1992). The fiscal incentives granted by the
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Federal government for cattle ranching encouraged land concentration, land speculation, 
land-use for unproductive activities, environmental degradation and social conflict.
The Brazilian government, through POLAMAZONIA, had also emphasised private 
colonisation schemes, which became a very interesting alternative for large southern 
companies wanting to make considerable profits. Owing to the reduction of government 
incentives for cattle ranching, these companies, encouraged by government incentives, 
acquired huge areas of land at nominal prices, divided them and resold them to small 
farmers. According to several authors (Branford & Glock, 1985; Hall, 1991a; Schmink & 
Wood, 1992; World Bank, 1992), the economic performance of such private colonisation 
schemes varied from abandonment of land because of soil exhaustion to its use for more 
successful schemes, where it was possible to develop crop production and agribusiness 
activities.
Nevertheless, these schemes generated serious problems such as the invasion of 
Amerindian reserves by colonising companies as well as the invasion of the entire project 
at Tucuma, close to the Carajas Project, by approximately 12,000 families of landless 
small farmers, large land-grabbers and wild-cat gold prospectors. Even so, these schemes 
attracted a large number of small farmers to Amazonia from north-eastern and, 
principally, southern Brazil.
By the beginning of the 1980s, the economic situation in Brazil was aggravated by the 
second oil shock in 1979, which contributed enormously to increasing the country's 
external debt. The Federal government, under the Figueiredo administration, launched the 
PND m, which prioritised the increase of exports as the best way to tackle the worrying 
foreign debt. Owing to the failure of cattle ranching as a major means of developing 
Amazonia, the Brazilian government decided to put its trust in the mining sector. 
Although it was no novelty to the Amazon region, the Figueiredo government gave a 
tremendous boost to this sector by intensifying the implementation of the Carajas Project, 
which had officially started in 1978, and by establishing the Greater Carajas Programme 
(PGC), which was the largest and most ambitious plan for mineral exploitation in Eastern 
Amazonia.
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The Carajas Project and the PGC were regarded by the Federal government not only as a 
means of tackling the foreign debt problem and obtaining massive loans, but also as a 
means of achieving geopolitical objectives, namely the occupation and integration of 
Amazonia. The PGC embraced projects that had previously been implemented, such as 
the Carajas Project, which was the cornerstone of the entire programme, the aluminium 
complexes ALBRAS-ALUNORTE and ALUMAR, and the Tucuruf hydroelectric 
scheme, and a number of smaller livestock, agricultural, forestry, lumbering and 
silvicultural projects. In addition, vast infrastructural investments were made to 
accompany these projects. By encouraging such distinct projects, the Federal government 
hoped to attract new industrial and agribusiness ventures to the PGC's development poles 
and its additional fiscal incentives and subsidised credit, which were a complement to 
SUDAM and SUDENE incentives, played an important role.
As seen in the first chapter, the PGC aggravated existing negative trends in Amazonia. 
This programme attracted thousands of construction workers (principally to the Carajas 
Project), wild-cat gold miners (especially at Serra Pelada) and small farmers (to private 
colonisation schemes) in search of job opportunities, wealth and land respectively, as well 
as many other migrants in search of whatever employment they might find. Urban areas, 
to which access was facilitated by the construction of roads, became swollen, and the 
accelerated spatial occupation contributed to predatory exploitation of natural resources 
and to aggravation of social disparities. In addition, the PGC also exacerbated the rural 
violence associated with land conflicts, land concentration and environmental 
degradation. Although mineral and infrastructural projects were the PGC's main 
priorities, the agricultural, agroindustrial and livestock projects were also significant in 
that they clearly reinforced a latifundio-biased model, which favoured large-scale, 
individual and corporate landowners to the detriment of the vast majority of small 
farmers.
Indeed, many negative social and environmental consequences were determined by factors 
such as Brazil's high inflation - which stimulated land speculation -, the political and 
economic influence of large landowners, the inefficiency of the police and judiciary in 
tackling land-grabbing, the economic recession which caused public spending cuts, and to
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some extent the intense flow of migrants, all factors that were beyond the immediate 
control of government planners. Despite contextual factors beyond the control of policy­
makers, the socio-economic and environmental impacts that occurred in Amazonia were 
understood as a natural and even necessary consequence of progress by successive 
governments, whose major development strategies were based on modernisation 
principles and development pole theory, which became, with its famous beneficial spread 
effects, a convenient tool for different aims of the military regime. By establishing 
development poles through large-scale investment resources, the government hoped to 
accelerate economic growth, which in turn would serve to tackle Brazil's huge foreign 
debt, and produce structural changes by means of spread effects, and, last but not least, to 
occupy Amazonia, which was a clear geopolitical objective.
It is important to stress here that the formulation and implementation of regional 
development strategies was controlled by the Federal government through its institutions, 
mainly MIPLAN, which was transformed into a powerful planning secretariat (SEPLAN) 
attached directly to the Presidency of the Republic in May 1974 (Ulyssea, 1982). The 
structure was thereby significantly changed and the regional Superintendencies such as 
SUDAM, whose plans were reduced to a mere elaboration of regional strategies defined at 
Federal level, were relegated to a secondary role (Neto, 1989). By centralising planning, 
the Brazilian government imposed its regional strategies upon State and Municipal 
governments, which had to accept the official ruling. Although planning for Amazonia 
was technocratic, over-centralised and negligent in relation to the interests of the vast 
majority of urban and rural populations, the crucial point is that the State played a vital 
role in sponsoring the development of the region. Through its institutions, agencies and 
enterprises, the State, by omission or by its incessant activity, marked the Amazon region 
indelibly.
The advent of the civilian "New Republic" in 1985 marked the beginning of progressive 
changes in the Federal government's stance. In fact, the State's intervention in the 
economy was still strong and its initiatives in Amazonia followed practically the same 
directives as past development policies. For example, the geopolitical aims in occupying 
Amazonia and securing its borders against incursions continued under the Calha Norte
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Project (PCN), which entered public awareness through criticisms and denunciations 
made by the Indigenist Missionary Council (CIMI) in October 1986, one year after the 
project was bom (Oliveira Filho, 1990).
The emphasis on development poles persisted, although the POLAMAZ6NIA 
programme was formally abolished in 1987. Owing to a promising initiative of 
restructuring landownership, a new ministry - MIRAD - was created and a few months 
later, in October 1985, the National Agrarian Reform Plan - PNRA - was launched. 
Implementation of the PNRA was hamstrung by intense pressure from the landowners' 
lobby, called the Rural Democratic Union (UDR), and was later weakened under the 1988 
Constitution (Hall, 1991a). As a result, the unequal structure of property ownership, 
consolidated ironically by Brazilian agencies such as GET AT which had special powers 
to regularise land tenure issues in Amazonia (Bemo de Almeida, 1990; 1992), continued 
unalterable.
Despite the appearance of unchangeability, the context in which all the problems persisted 
did change. Brazil's new Constitution, ratified in 1988, stated that the Federal 
government, through its agencies, was responsible for protecting and preserving the 
environment for future generations (Brazil, 1988). In contrast to the military regime, 
domestic pressures from the Brazilian NGOs regarding the environmental impacts 
generated by development policies in Amazonia allied to pressures from international 
lobby groups that were acutely aware of the contribution of Amazonian deforestation to 
the "greenhouse effect" compelled President Samey to launch the "Our Nature" (Nossa 
Natureza) Programme in 1989. This included the temporary suspension of fiscal 
incentives for cattle ranching in Amazonia and at the same time the setting up of IBAMA, 
a new federal agency which was responsible for co-ordinating environmental affairs 
nation-wide.
The 1988 Constitution marked a very important change in relation to the role of the 
Federal government. This new federal Constitution approved and encouraged a major 
decentralisation of responsibilities, a substantial redistribution of revenues, and an 
increase in the power of State and Municipal governments. Decentralisation as well as
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redistribution of revenues were centred on both the Municipal Participation Fund (FPM) 
and the State Participation Fund (FPE), by means of which the Federal government 
transferred part of its revenues to different levels of government. Socolik (1989), for 
example, showed that in 1988 the FPM represented approximately 25 percent of the 
current revenues of municipalities, albeit this percentage was much more significant in the 
North and Northeast regions, where it represented almost 50 percent.
The growth rate of transfers in the state of Para increased considerably from 4.41 percent 
in the 1982-88 period to 29.27 percent after the 1988 constitutional reform. This increase 
in the amount of transfers from the Federal government to Para as well as to other 
northern states was, as suggested by Almeida and Campari (1995), an important factor in 
strengthening the economy of the region. However, the crux of the matter is that while the 
state and municipal governments, the main beneficiaries of the constitutional reform 
(Serra & Afonso, 1991), enjoyed not only more economic but also political autonomy, 
principally because of the end of the military regime in 1985.
This trend has its roots in the late 1970s, in the neo-liberalism of Thatcher and. Reagan 
Deregulation and State withdrawal became key priorities in the economic policies 
advocated by advanced capitalist nations. This period, in which conservative governments 
assumed power, coincided with the incoming Figueiredo government (1979-85), which 
was responsible for setting-up the Greater Carajas Programme (PGC). Neto (1989; 1990) 
argues that because of Brazil's huge external debt, foreign financial agencies undermined 
Government control over national economic planning and this dependency was well- 
illustrated by the PGC, whose regional development strategy had been distorted in order 
to decrease the Brazilian foreign debt and fulfil the requirements of global corporate 
strategies.
Neto's analysis, although partially true, does not provide a whole picture of the reality. As 
Hall (1991a) points out, the Brazilian government used Carajas for a number of economic, 
political, geopolitical and social purposes and, of course, the foreign interests were 
significantly benefited in this process. In this regard, the thesis that national and, 
consequently, regional planning were entirely controlled by foreign interests does not
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correspond with the facts. Nevertheless, it is unquestionable that there was international 
pressure on the Brazilian government and also that multilateral agencies, specially The 
World Bank and the IMF, played a preponderant role over the developing countries such 
as Brazil in making them follow neo-liberal policies.
Despite conservative winds from advanced capitalist nations, the pressure on developing 
countries began to be intensified only after the Mexican moratorium in 1982 (the PGC 
had been established two years before). After that, the developing countries which wanted 
to obtain loans from the international financial system (private or public) had to follow 
the structural adjustments imposed by IMF. Indeed, the indebtedness of developing 
countries throughout the 1980s led many of them to increase their exports in order to 
solve their balance of payment problems and this fact marked the beginning of the great 
influence and pressure of multilateral agencies on debtor countries. Thus, the huge loans 
provided by these agencies were destined to cover balance of payments deficits and also 
to restructure the third-world economies. However, these loans were accompanied by the 
famous conditionalities, which were a subtle form of pressure applied by multilateral 
agencies.
With regard to Brazil, trade-policy conditionalities were included rather loosely in the 
letters of intent to the IMF. Initially vague commitments were signed by the Brazilian 
authorities only in 1983, although the Federal government was reluctant to agree with the 
World Bank's proposals to eliminate exports, reduce tariffs, devalue the exchange rate to 
the extent proposed, etc. According to Abreu (1993), since the mid-1980s, modest trade 
reform had curtailed the more generous export-promotion schemes and implemented 
import liberalisation through a cut in tariffs and the number of items subject to licensing 
and prohibition. This reform was partly a result of trade conditionalities that were 
included in agricultural-sector and "export development" World Bank loans and was also 
partly due to IMF conditionalities. However, negotiations on a completed trade reform 
loan remained unresolved.
The crucial point is that the Brazilian government was reluctant to accept of the 
unrestricted liberalisation required by the World Bank and the IMF programmes during
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the 1980s. This reluctance relied upon the confidence of the Federal government that the 
rapid economic growth based on its economic policy of combining export promotion and 
import substitution would provide favourable conditions for exchange trade concessions 
with the advanced capitalist economies; and also upon the successful Brazilian tradition 
of import substitution. Moreover, this reluctance clearly shows that the State was neither 
powerless nor dominated by foreign interests.
In spite of its resistance throughout the 1980s, the Brazilian government, now under the 
Collor administration, implemented a stabilisation plan and finally capitulated to the 
liberal trade policies advocated by the international financial agencies and principally by 
the U.S. Although the liberal "package" had been implemented, the period of the Collor 
government was marked by high inflation, economic recession, low rates of economic 
growth and corruption which led to the President's impeachment in 1992.
The weakening of the State was another important characteristic of this period and was 
intrinsically related to President Collor's macroeconomic austerity plan, which was based 
on liberal policies. As a consequence, regional development strategies were also affected 
by this change in Brazilian economic policy. According to SUDAM itself 
(SUDAM/PNUD, 1993), there was no regional policy for Amazonia and the action of the 
State in the region was fragmented, compensatory and very limited. Even the 
environmental issue, to which President Collor had paid special attention by designating a 
well-known agronomist, Mr. Lutzemberger, as Secretary of the Environment and also by 
launching "Operation Amazonia", through which IBAMA hoped to reduce Amazonian 
deforestation, proved to be more a question of rhetoric than a sincere commitment.
After President Collor's impeachment, the Federal government was headed by Vice- 
President Itamar Franco. Despite the successful "Real Plan" (Plano Real) for combating 
inflation, the Itamar Franco government continued the liberal reforms initiated by the 
previous administration. A question of overriding importance is that the Federal 
government was less capable of implementing its own development policies. The reasons 
for this lie in the political and economic crisis in Brazil since the late 1970s and also upon 
the economic adjustment plans advocated by advanced capitalist economies as well as by
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multilateral agencies. These plans were based on the belief that the State machine should 
be sharply reduced in size in order to be capable of achieving sustained economic and 
social development and institutional growth. In addition to these factors, the shift of 
economic and political power towards the state and municipal levels of government was 
another important element. Since the institutionalisation of changes in the distribution of 
tax revenues between different tiers of the State in the 1988 Constitution both state and 
municipal governments have become more independent.
The direct consequence of these changes between the tiers of government was that the 
states and municipalities became responsible to a large extent for policy formulation and 
implementation. However, it is worth stressing here that there are considerable differences 
between Brazilian states and municipalities in relation to issues, such as technical 
capacity, the ability to forge external links and obtain access to funding and implement 
policies (Interview, 1995).
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4.3 - What was the original concept behind Parauapebas?
“Parauapebas is our vision of the future”.
(Luis Carlos Nepomuceno, Manager of the
Sustainable Development Department of
CVRD, Jomal da Vale, September, 1992)
Before examining the original concept behind the town of Parauapebas, it should be 
stressed that Brazilian State enterprises were fundamental instruments in developing 
policies formulated by the Federal government. In this regard, the CVRD played a pivotal 
role in designing and implementing development strategies for Eastern Amazonia. CVRD 
was largely interested in expanding its activities in Eastern Amazonia because of the vast 
mineral resources in Carajas, and the advantages to be gained from heavily subsidised 
electricity prices and infrastructural developments, as well as the plentiful and cheap 
supplies of timber from the native forest that would make economically viable the setting 
up of an integrated iron and steel industry in the region (Hall, 1991a). Allied to CVRD's 
interests, the Federal government was, by the late 1970s, searching for another 
development strategy, which would be based on strategies other than cattle ranching. In 
fact, the government was disenchanted with cattle-ranching because it proved to be an 
ineffective way of developing and integrating the Amazon region, and moreover, this 
strategy generated serious social and environmental impacts, while generous funds 
granted by the Brazilian government to encourage livestock production were misused. As 
a consequence, the focus was re-directed towards mineral exploitation.
Mineral exploitation had been encouraged in Eastern Amazonia since POLAMAZdNIA, 
which was established in 1974. Despite being included in previous government policy, 
mineral activities acquired more importance with the advent of the PGC because this 
programme was imbued with a concept of integrated development. The idea of an 
"integrated" regional development seemed to the Figueiredo government a strategic 
opportunity which would serve many purposes, but would principally tackle Brazil’s huge 
foreign debt.
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The Federal government, through its State enterprises and bureaucracies, was a dominant 
presence in all national territory and principally in Eastern Amazonia, with the PGC. In 
this regard, the government believed that its economic, social and geo-political objectives 
could only be achieved through the development of the region. However, such an 
achievement would require centralised planning. By inducing and directing industrial and 
agricultural development in the region, the negative consequences were considerable. 
These negative impacts can be attributed largely to the Federal government, which 
consciously chose the development pathway for the region.
The state and municipal governments played a secondary role in the development of their 
regions to the extent that a great part of the development projects or programmes, such as 
the Carajas Project and PGC, were formulated and implemented during the military 
regime, which did not allow any pressure, interference or participation by different tiers of 
government. In fact, planning for development was a totally "top-down" process, in which 
local needs were determined by the Federal government. Even functions of a purely local 
nature such as primary education and urban infrastructure were financed and implemented 
by the central State. This situation only began to change under civilian rule and, 
principally, after the 1988 Constitution, which established decentralisation and gave more 
political and economic power to state, and especially, municipal governments.
The mineral deposits at the Serra dos Carajas were discovered in 1967 by the Companhia 
Meridional de Mineragao (CMM), a Brazilian subsidiary of U.S.Steel. Aware of the 
importance of its discovery, U.S. Steel asked the military government for exploration 
rights over the area. However, the military government did not want to place such power 
in the hands of a single foreign company, and after exhaustive negotiations a joint venture 
called AMZA (Amazonia Mineragao S.A.) was established in 1970, with 51% of its share 
capital controlled by the CVRD (Brazil's State mining enterprise) and 49% by U.S. Steel, 
in order to undertake feasibility studies for the exploitation of iron-ore and also other 
mineral resources at Carajas.
Several studies were undertaken by AMZA and the best proposal was an “integrated” 
project consisting of mining operations, a processing plant at the mine site, a railway and
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a deep water port at Ponta da Madeira, Sao Luis. In 1975, AMZA initiated construction 
activities of the port and at the same time began to build the PA-275 road to connect the 
already existing PA-150 highway and the Serra dos Carajas. One year later, the Brazilian 
government officially allowed AMZA to construct and operate the Carajas railway. 
Nevertheless, this joint venture collapsed in 1977 when U.S.Steel decided to withdraw 
from the project, selling its share in AMZA to CVRD. In 1981, the State mining company 
formally incorporated AMZA in order to strengthen its control over the Carajas Project.
In parallel with the feasibility studies for the exploration of mineral resources in the Serra 
dos Carajas, other studies were undertaken in order to construct an urban nucleus in the 
Carajas highlands. During 1974-79, the dimensions as well as the aspects of the 
architecture, urbanism, landscape gardening, and transport facilities of this nucleus were 
defined. Recent Brazilian1 and even international experience, with projects for, and the 
performance of, isolated urban nuclei for specific purposes were considered with the aim 
of drawing important lessons from them (Piquet, 1988).
While the Carajas Project was being implemented, a temporary urban nucleus was built 
close to the mine site for CVRD employees and contract service workers. This nucleus 
was progressively depopulated with the transfer of CVRD staff to the definitive town at 
the top of the Carajas mountain. It had previously been foreseen that CVRD contract 
workers would also be transferred to the new town, but the State mining enterprise 
changed its plans and decided to restrict residence to just its employees. This decision 
forced service workers to live outside the Carajas project gate, specifically in the town of 
Parauapebas, which is some 40 kilometre east of the mine site.
!With regard to the construction in Amazonia of urban nuclei close to mining activities, 
the main examples considered were: the urban nuclei of ICOMI. which were constructed 
in 1960 to support the exploitation of manganese in the Federal Territory of Amapa (now 
State); the urban nucleus of Trombetas. which was built to support the exploitation of 
bauxite, whose operational phase was initiated in 1979 by the MRN (Mineragao Rio 
Norte), a subsidiary of CVRD; and the urban nuclei of Tucuruf. which were constructed in 
1976 when the Hydroelectric project was being implemented, and for which the Vila 
Pioneira was built at the beginning of the construction activities, and soon after two 
temporary villages were built for construction workers and a permanent town for workers 
involved in operation and maintenance of Tucuruf Hydroelectric. In addition, CVRD's 
past experience with the town of Itabira in the State of Minas Gerais was very important 
for designing the town of Carajas.
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In order to operate the iron-ore mine in Carajas, the CVRD needed to import skilled 
labourers from the Centre-West and South regions, which are the most developed regions 
of Brazil. Thus, a strong incentive was necessary to attract and convince engineers from 
there to move from those regions to live in an inhospitable and underdeveloped area 
without attractions or facilities. The key attraction was the high-quality urban nucleus 
located in the Carajas highlands on a 640 metre-high plateau about 12 kilometres from the 
N4E mine.
Indeed, the urban nucleus on the top of Carajas mountain is an impressive company town, 
successfully constructed, with a high level of urban design providing most modem 
services and community facilities, such as schools (primary and secondary), a 
supermarket, shops, public transport, a cinema, an airport, a sports and leisure club, a 
hotel, a well-equipped hospital, rubbish collection and banks. In addition, this nucleus 
possesses zoological and botanical gardens and the residences resemble, in terms of 
quality, those of middle and upper middle class districts anywhere in Brazil. It is worth 
noting that the town was composed of such standardised block units (see Fig. 4.1) and this 
geometric order, once established, shows clearly an artificial and rational control over 
space and at the same time a standard gridiron plan was essential for the rapid occupation 
of the area.
Carajas town as a whole is totally controlled and well maintained by CVRD. For example, 
environmental destruction is inadmissible within the 411,948-hectare area under company 
responsibility, which makes this town very attractive. However, this pleasant atmosphere 
is completely unreal because of the unprecedented deforestation of most of the 
surrounding area. Moreover, behind the peaceful climate in the town there are several 
conflicts among CVRD employees which are related to two basic problems: lack of 
freedom and absence of affinity with the town (Eiras de Oliveira, 1989; Interview, 1995).
The lack of freedom is caused by the need to work and live in close proximity to 
neighbours twenty-four hours a day. The absence of affinity with the town is due to the 
rigid control exercised over people as well as the urban nucleus by the CVRD, which has 
absolute power to specify, for example, the boundaries of the gardens of the houses and
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Fig. 4.1 -  Carajas Urban Plan
Source: Planning Secretariat o f  the M unicipality o f  Parauapebas
what kind of plants may be put there. This urban nucleus is the product of a well-designed 
and implemented plan. Approximately US$150 million were spent on its construction and 
over US$ 8 million are spent annually on its upkeep (Piquet, 1988; Roberts, 1991a).
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Although the urban nuclei of Carajas and Parauapebas have both been planned, there is a 
sharp contrast between them, which can be illustrated by the blatant difference in the 
infrastructural investments made in these towns. While roughly US$ 3 million were spent 
in Parauapebas, Carajas received fifty times that amount (Piquet, 1988; Roberts, 1991a). 
The CVRD was largely responsible for this contrast, which will be made clearer 
subsequently when the origins of Parauapebas as well as the formation of the peripheral 
settlement surrounding this urban nucleus will be discussed. By clarifying this visible 
contrast, the role and limitations of the CVRD itself in the region will be better 
understood.
4.4 - Parauapebas: its origins as a planned town.
Parauapebas is intrinsically connected with the Carajas Project. In fact, the origin of this 
urban nucleus is associated with the exploitation of iron-ore at the Serra dos Carajas and 
accordingly, it is possible to affirm that the urban nucleus of Parauapebas is a direct 
product of the Carajas Project, which became the cornerstone of the entire PGC. This 
programme was also important for Parauapebas to the extent that this nucleus was 
selected as one of the PGC's own development poles.
It would appear that, based on past Brazilian experiences related to the implementation of 
urban nuclei close to mining activities, the Construction Department of AMZA, which 
was responsible for the planning and the implementation of the urban nucleus of 
Parauapebas, was convinced that the Carajas Project would inevitably attract a great flow 
of migrants to the region while Carajas town was being established. In this regard, the 
AMZA document stressed:
“ ... even with a tenacious policy o f opening up the pioneer nucleus (o f Caraj&s) to a large extent to 
a population and activities not directly related to the undertaking [the Carajas Project], the urban 
structures o f the town will not make the settlem ent o f all contingent o f adventurers migrating 
unwisely to the area socially, econom ically and spatially viable in the short-term.
“This population, attracted by the perspective o f econom ic opportunities derived from  the stages 
o f im plem entation and operation o f the mine, will tend to reproduce peripheral settlements, such 
as those o f  the periphery o f the urban nuclei o f ICOM I, o f Jari or, to a large extent, in the “free”
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towns which surround the Pilot Plan o f Brasilia, at the border o f the new tow n” (AM ZA, Pianos 
urbam sticos dos nucleos de Carajas e Parauapebas, 1981; quoted by M ayerhofer, 1986, pp. 6).
The real intention was to avoid the formation of an enormous shanty town at the gate of 
the company town as well as to reduce some problems that past experiences with this kind 
of human agglomeration could bring, such as the occupation of hills and flooded areas, 
the invasion of the strip belonging to the highways and principally the “sanitary short 
circuit” between the systems of water supply and sewage disposal. On this point, the 
AMZA document emphasised that:
“Owing to the short distance o f this nucleus (Carajas) from the spontaneous agglom eration, the 
involvem ent o f AM ZA will also be necessary, although to a lesser extent, in order to provide a 
m inim um  urban infrastructure to the spontaneous agglom eration which will certainly form  at the 
foot o f  the Serra [dos Carajds], at its border with the AM ZA property, and the developm ent o f the 
m ining activities will tend to attract a great contingent o f population not directly related to the 
com pany [CVRD]” (AM ZA, Pianos urbam sticos dos nucleos de Carajds e Parauapebas, 1981; 
quoted by M ayerhofer, 1986, pp. 6-7).
Indeed, the original proposal was to transform this area, which became the town of 
Parauapebas, into an area of “planned invasion” in Mayerhofer's terms (1986). This 
“planned invasion” was to have represented an alternative to the haphazard settlements 
which were commonly encountered in Brazil's peripheral regions. In this regard, an area 
of approximately 170 hectares close to the CVRD's gate was poorly urbanised in order to 
receive migrants not directly related to the company and attracted to the region because of 
the economic opportunities generated by the Carajas Project. Like Carajas town, 
Parauapebas presented an urban geometric design (see Fig. 4.2), which was a condition 
for rapid building and, consequently, for settling a large contingent of migrants. Despite 
the similarity, the geometric design of Parauapebas was infinitely simpler than that of the 
company town and this simplistic plan consisted of, and is illustrated by, a poor 
urbanisation, a water-supply and sewage disposal systems, and four buildings: a hospital, 
a school, a police station and the local administration. All this urban infrastructure and 
facilities was originally planned to accommodate 5,000 people and was implemented by 
CVRD. The donation of this urbanised area to the municipality of Maraba had been 
foreseen since the beginning of the implementation of Parauapebas.
152
Chapter IV
PARA ESTA Q AO
FERROVIARIALOTEAM ENTOs
CVRD
RIACHO D O CE 
□ D p - '
BAIRRO PRIM AVERA
M i— ^ M h n l l l l h n  b a i r r o
p i DA D E N O V A j Q |p j  M AR^hAo
BAIRRO U N I A O j j
Fig. 4.2 - Parauapebas Urban Plan
Source: EBAM, 1994a.
Owing to the predictions of an inevitable and massive flow of migrants that would be 
attracted to Parauapebas, those responsible for the administration of this urban nucleus 
were advised on the following points:
“In the exercise of the powers conferred upon the Development Council of Parauapebas, 
especially the sanction of land titling, it is important to bear in mind that the foremost objective of 
the nucleus [Parauapebas] is to accommodate a population not directly related to the CVRD, but
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one which will be - and is already being - attracted to the region by the econom ic opportunities 
derived from  the Carajds Project.
“In the first years o f the occupation o f the area, this population will not have the resources to 
ensure access to essential urban services. The investments m ade by the CVRD in urbanisation, 
and in networks o f infrastructure and com munity equipm ent aim  at providing these basic 
conditions, reducing the problem s usually associated with spontaneous undertakings such as the 
Carajas Project.
“Thus, the nucleus o f Parauapebas will tend to be inaccessible to m ost m igrants if  they are 
required to construct their own houses and/or the charge for the public services is beyond their 
means, which will induce the form ation o f a shanty town at the periphery o f  the planned town as 
well as distorting the basic function for which it was originated” (M ayerhofer, M ., Procedim entos 
a A dotar para a O cupa?ao de Terceiros dos Lotes Urbanisados pela CVRD em  Parauapebas, 
1982; quoted by himself, 1986, pp. 7-8).
This warning was given to those responsible for Parauapebas before the massive and 
definitive occupation of the area which lies outside the limits of the planned urban 
nucleus. In fact, this prediction came true: migrants occupied the area, which belonged to 
GETAT, without any planning whatsoever. In the short-term, the population of this 
peripheral settlement, which came to be called Rio Verde, exceeded that originally 
estimated for Parauapebas and eventually became the main urbanisation pole of the 
Parauapebas valley (Mayerhofer, 1986; Piquet, 1988).
In mid-1983, GETAT donated to the Municipality of Maraba the above-mentioned area of 
approximately 150 hectares, which was destined for the “formation of the urban 
patrimony of the settlement of Rio Verde do Para [the Brazilian State]” (Clausula 
Primeira do Tftulo de Domfnio 4 (GETAT) 82 (1) 007; quoted by Mayerhofer, 1986, pp. 
8). Some months later, CVRD adopted the same attitude and donated to the County of 
Maraba roughly 170 hectares related to the urban nucleus of Parauapebas.
In October 1984, exactly one year after the donations made by CVRD and GET AT, an 
aerial photographic survey of the whole area revealed the existence of one thousand 
buildings in Rio Verde, while the urbanised nucleus of Parauapebas, whose distance from 
Rio Verde is less than two kilometres, showed practically only those constructions built 
by CVRD (Mayerhofer, 1986; Piquet, 1988). In fact, the population of Rio Verde
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increased rapidly from some 3,000 in early 1984 to 9,419 a year later, and subsequently to 
25,000-30,000 in early 1986 (adapted from Mayerhofer, 1986 and World Bank, 1992).
After describing the origins of both urban nuclei, Carajas and Parauapebas, as well as the 
formation of the peripheral settlement of Rio Verde, some important and related questions 
remain: what were the principal factors that contributed to the population growth of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde? Why did the population growth at Rio Verde increase much 
faster than at Parauapebas? In order to answer these questions , it is necessary to 
recapitulate some key points.
Although the Carajas Project had been mainly responsible for attracting thousands of 
migrants to the region of Parauapebas - Rio Verde, other factors contributed to the 
population growth of this area. One of these factors was GET AT s determination to 
establish colonisation schemes (Carajas I, II and DI) close to the Carajas Project. GETAT 
was set up in 1980, during the Figueiredo administration (1980-85), to defuse social 
tension and land conflict in the “parrot's beak” (the area where the States of Maranhao, 
Para and Tocantins meet) region.
Subordinated directly to the National Security Council, the agency was granted special 
powers to expropriate land, resettle the landless, grant titles and implement colonisation 
projects. Instead of confronting large landowners, small farmers were encouraged by 
GETAT to abandon conflictive areas with the guarantee of being resettled elsewhere, on 
plots generally smaller than the officially recommended minimum of one hundred 
hectares for Amazonia and with scant regard for maintaining family or community 
cohesiveness (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992)
In fact, one of GETATs major activities was the setting up colonisation projects. The 
three resettlement schemes, Carajas I, II and HI were close to the iron-ore complex, to the 
immediate Southwest of Parauapebas. When GETAT was abolished, in May 1987, only 
the latter two schemes were operational, with 2,136 families settled on fifty-hectare plots. 
Carajas I, which was to accommodate 4,000 families, as well as eight projects elsewhere, 
which were to resettle 5,000 families, were never implemented (Hall, 1991a; World Bank,
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1992). Therefore, these colonisation projects stimulated a considerable inflow of migrants 
to the Carajas region, obviously including Parauapebas, but at the same time they did not 
generate the stability of land tenure originally envisaged.
GETAT's performance was intrinsically associated with the criterion of national security, 
which continued to be a relevant preoccupation of the previous military government. The 
adoption of security criteria to solve land conflicts was related to two objectives: 
alleviation of tensions through the transfer of peasant cultivators (posseiros) to the 
colonisation projects areas, which acted as “safety-valves”; and principally an economic 
objective, because those lands occupied by peasant cultivators were coveted by large 
landowners as well as for large projects. This economic objective was clearly stressed in 
the document elaborated by GETAT and the General Secretary of National Council:
the disorganised invasion o f lands situated along the access roads to the Serra dos Carajas and 
o f those located in the vast area o f its [the Caraj&s Project] influence was already initiated and 
tends to be intensified in an uncontrollable way. This situation, if  it is not rapidly corrected, will 
irrem ediably prejudice... the developm ent projects o f  the region” (CSN-G ETA T, Estudos sobre o 
Projeto Carajas, 1981; quoted by B em o de A lm eida, 1992, pp. 270).
Apart from the economic objective, this statement also demonstrates the preoccupation 
with the inflow of migrants, which had already been initiated and whose influx was to 
become more intense in the short term.
There were several reasons for GETAT's failure to successfully tackle the problems of 
rural violence and land distribution, but consideration of these reasons is beyond the 
scope of this chapter. It is sufficient to stress here that this agency consolidated as well as 
reinforced an unequal structure of property ownership in favour of large capital 
enterprises which deny permanent access to the peasantry. The aspect related to land 
concentration can be verified within the Carajas colonisation schemes themselves. For 
example, one farmer in the Carajas II project purchased over forty plots from colonists, 
and on these 2,000 hectares he intended to expand his cattle herd from 10,000 to 50,000 
head (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992).
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Other important factors in attracting large numbers of migrants to the Parauapebas-Rio 
Verde region were the spontaneous establishment of small farmers and ranches of varying 
sizes and principally extensive gold and other mineral prospecting activities in the 
surrounding region. Serra Pelada, located less than 100 kilometres by road from the 
Carajas mine, was the most important and famous wild-cat gold-mining site. Its rich 
deposits were discovered in the late 1970s and in the early 1980s this site had a 
population of 100,000 wild-cat gold prospectors (garimpeiros). Serra Pelada was made 
viable by the road network, which was implemented because of, and associated with, the 
Carajas Project. The urban nucleus of Curionopolis, which is approximately 10 kilometres 
from Serra Pelada, was founded in order to provide services to Serra Pelada gold 
prospectors, who could not keep their families and women at the nucleus because this was 
expressly prohibited. Parauapebas as well as its peripheral settlement Rio Verde were 
directly due to the Carajas Project, which generated roughly 27,000 jobs at the peak of 
construction activities at the mine, rail and port sites.
Many of those attracted to Parauapebas - Rio Verde arrived in the region either as 
construction workers or to serve the construction camps close to Carajas and Parauapebas 
through commercial activities such as bars, restaurants, boarding-houses, etc. Indeed, Rio 
Verde had its roots as the “red light district” for construction workers in both Carajas and 
Parauapebas. Obviously, the permanence of most of these construction workers after the 
end of the construction phase played a major role in the rapid population growth of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde.
Despite the importance of other factors already mentioned, the Carajas Project was the 
main factor in attracting extensive population flows to the region of Parauapebas - Rio 
Verde. It is possible to affirm that Parauapebas as well as Rio Verde were direct products 
of the Carajas Project because without this project neither nuclei would have come into 
being. The growth of Parauapebas and Rio Verde reflected a number of factors and the 
foremost was establishment of the Carajas Project. However, the question of why 
population growth in Rio Verde was higher than in Parauapebas has not yet been 
explained.
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Before answering this question, it is important to stress here that Parauapebas and Rio 
Verde have been deliberately considered as distinct urban nuclei in this study because the 
two nuclei, although originating from the Carajas Project, appeared for different reasons. 
Thus, this differential treatment shows that Rio Verde originated independently of 
Parauapebas owing to several correlated aspects, such as poor planning, CVRD's lack of 
interest in tackling the mounting problems in the region, etc., which will be discussed 
below.
The rapid growth of Rio Verde compared with that of Parauapebas can be explained by 
various factors, such as the extension of the construction of the urban nucleus of 
Parauapebas by one and a half years, during which plots of land were not made available 
for the settlement of people in the area itself; the emergence of tertiary activities caused 
by the existence of construction camps, by other opportunities for work which were being 
generated at the same time in the Serra Norte and by the surrounding wild-cat gold- 
mining sites. These tertiary activities in turn induced the invasion of land immediately to 
the east of the construction camps, this invasion being the origin of the settlement of Rio 
Verde; and an elitism in relation to the quality of life, housing and work, which was 
imposed on the applicants who wanted to occupy the plots of land in the brand new urban 
nucleus of Parauapebas (Mayerhofer, 1986; Piquet, 1988; Mayerhofer & Toledo, 1988a).
With regard to this last factor, the requirement to self-build their own houses and pay 
charges for public services were imposed on all migrants who arrived in Parauapebas in 
search of job opportunities, but at the same time these requirements were beyond the 
economic means of this population. As a result, Parauapebas become inaccessible to most 
migrants who were obliged to look for another place to live in and the viable alternative 
was the surrounding area of Rio Verde. In fact, the 1985 CVRD survey (Mayerhofer, 
1986) showed clearly that there was a large difference between population growth in the 
two urban nuclei, Parauapebas having a population of 2,313 and Rio Verde 9,419, which 
means that the population of Rio Verde was four times greater than that of Parauapebas.
The factors mentioned above contributed to the rapid population growth in Parauapebas 
and, principally, in its peripheral settlement Rio Verde. If the urban infrastructure of the
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former urban nucleus was already inadequate for accommodating all migrants attracted to 
the area, the urban infrastructure of the latter nucleus was practically non-existent. In 
addition to these factors, there was CVRD's refusal to accommodate contract-service 
workers, despite the availability of land in Carajas town, forcing these workers to live in 
Parauapebas or Rio Verde. This refusal is significant insofar as that it reveals one of the 
CVRD's facets, namely a type of social discrimination in relation to people who do not 
work for the company and, consequently, live outside its main entrance gate. The various 
facets of the State mining company will be made clearer in the next chapter, when the 
. implications of what had been planned for Parauapebas will be discussed.
This decision taken by CVRD showed clearly its real intention of establishing the town of 
Carajas as a company enclave and at the same time it implied an increasing pressure on 
the already debilitated urban infrastructure and services in both outside urban nuclei. 
Despite the future consequences caused by CVRD's decision, the point here is that the 
Brazilian State mining company was committed to accommodating service workers in 
Carajas town, as established in the Loan Agreement. In this regard, the World Bank report 
(1992, pp. 93) stressed that:
“CVRD shall reserve about 1,000 plots for additional service workers in the first stage o f 
developm ent o f  [Carajds township] and shall enter arrangements w ith BNH, for carrying out a 
credit program m e to finance the construction or purchase o f the houses to be built on such lots, in 
order to enable the perm anent settlem ent o f such service workers in such townsite over a  period of 
about five years from  the Com pletion Date” .
According to this paragraph, there was a commitment with which CVRD did not comply. 
CVRD's non-compliance with the Loan and Guarantee Agreement with the World Bank 
is intrinsically associated with another important point, which is related to the original 
plans made for the urban nucleus of Parauapebas. As was previously indicated, CVRD 
originally planned this urban nucleus to accommodate a population of 5,000, but later the 
company revised its plans and decided to double the number planned in the first proposal. 
Thus, the town of Parauapebas was to house 10,000 people by 1988 and the change in 
CVRD's plans is important for understanding the problems in this urban nucleus.
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CVRD did not change its plans because of any failure found in its original plan or for any 
moral principle, but simply because its plan for accommodating 10,000 people was one of 
the conditions established in the Loan Agreement. In February and May 1982, the World 
Bank urban development specialist visited the area in order to evaluate the urban 
development component of the Carajas Project. In relation to the town of Parauapebas, the 
Bank specialist recommended that:
“ ... the tow n 's sanitation infrastructure and com m unity facilities be designed to accom m odate an 
expected population o f 10,000 residents by the late 1980 's” (W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 66).
At the same time, this specialist noted that:
“ ... there was an urgent need for the provision o f urbanised plots by D ecem ber 1982 since more 
than tw enty fam ilies are currently squatting on the edge o f tow n” (W orld Bank, 1992, pp. 66).
Significantly, the place mentioned by the Bank specialist subsequently became the 
peripheral settlement of Rio Verde.
In accordance with this recommendation by the Bank urban development specialist, 
CVRD was required under the Loan and Guarantee Agreement to send, by September 
1982, the final plans for the town of Carajas together with a plan for housing a population 
of 10,000 in the town of Parauapebas by 1988 for review and approval by the World Bank 
(World Bank, 1992). Indeed, these documents were sent by the Brazilian State mining 
company within the stipulated deadline and were approved by the Bank in late October 
1982.
Associated with the previous questions about CVRD's non-compliance with the 
regulation as well as the change in its prior plans for Parauapebas, there is another 
important question related to the faulty prediction of the size of the population to be 
attracted to the town. In order to have a concrete idea of this error, CVRD had predicted 
in its later plan for Parauapebas a population of 10,000 by 1988 (the company had 
predicted 5,000 people beforehand), while the report of the Bank supervision mission,
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whose visit to the area was in March 1986, estimated that the total population of 
Parauapebas plus Rio Verde would be between 45,000 and 50,000 (World Bank, 1992).
This error occurred although a number of documents had predicted that a considerable 
flow of migrants would be attracted to the region. In this regard, GETAT's document 
Estudos sobre o Proieto Carajas (Studies on the Carajas Project) elaborated in 1981 and 
mentioned above was a clear example. In addition, a better and more important example 
was provided by the 1976 document POLAMAZONIA: Carajas, which stressed that:
“... the process o f exploring iron at Caraj&s will provoke a considerable dem ographic influx 
reflected in urban nuclei near the mineral exploration area, necessitating the im provem ent o f the 
deficient existing urban network, and the im plem entation o f others with the end in m ind of 
receiving and sheltering the m igrant flux that will com e in search o f work” (SUDAM , 1976b, pp.
81).
The World Bank in its report suggested that the basis for such a faulty prediction centred 
on the fact that neither the implementation of GETAT's colonisation schemes, which 
were close to the Carajas mine, and their associated demands, nor the demands generated 
by extensive gold and other mineral prospecting activities were completely taken into 
account in the planning of the urban nucleus of Parauapebas. In relation to the 
colonisation schemes, the Bank argued that their development had only been formally 
authorised in October 1982, practically one month after CVRD had been required to send 
the definitive plans for Parauapebas for review and approval by the Bank (World Bank, 
1992).
The arguments used above to justify CVRD's faulty prediction are not convincing. On the 
contrary, they make the CVRD failure worse, because neither the colonisation schemes 
nor the expanding small-scale prospecting activities near the Carajas mining concession 
could be ignored, even partially. Moreover, it is very difficult to imagine that a powerful 
company such as CVRD would not have been acutely aware of the previous predictions 
made by several agencies such as SUDAM, GETAT, etc.
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CVRD's faulty prediction of the pace of urbanisation, its non-compliance with the 
regulation and the change in its plans for Parauapebas reveal not only negligence on the 
part of CVRD, but equally that this company was not really interested in the problems 
generated by the Carajas Project. In this regard, the improvements made in Parauapebas as 
well as in other towns along the Carajas corridor were more the result of foreign and 
domestic pressures than of CVRD's commitment to regional development. However, this 
discussion will be elaborated in the next chapter.
As shown above, the growth of Parauapebas and Rio Verde was the result of several 
factors, which led to an extremely rapid influx of migrants, which contributed to 
worsening the already inadequate urban infrastructure and services of Parauapebas and 
Rio Verde. The situation at both nuclei compared with that at Carajas town presented a 
sharp contrast, and a plausible explanation for these growing disparities lies in the fact 
that CVRD had total control over Carajas town, whose urban infrastructure and 
community facilities were well-maintained by the company, while the town of 
Parauapebas as well as its peripheral settlement Rio Verde were the responsibilities of the 
Municipality of Maraba, whose seat of government was in the city of Maraba, 
approximately 170 kilometres away. Due to the growing demands for urban infrastructure 
and services in the city of Maraba itself, whose population had also increased rapidly, 
partly because of the construction of the Carajas railway, Parauapebas and Rio Verde 
were a low priority for the Municipal authorities.
After all these considerations about the origins of the towns of Carajas and Parauapebas, 
and the formation of the peripheral settlement of Rio Verde as well as the rapid growth of 
these latter urban nuclei, an important question remains: would better planning have 
prevented the emergence of Rio Verde and, consequently, would it have provided a more 
appropriate urban infrastructure and services in the "planned" town of Parauapebas?
Some factors which contributed to the aggravation of many social and environmental 
problems were beyond the immediate control of the Federal government and CVRD 
planners; for example, Brazil's rampant inflation and economic recession. But in relation 
to Eastern Amazonia and, specifically, the Carajas region, the most significant factor was 
the exacerbation of the already limited urban infrastructure and services of the local urban
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nuclei by the intense flow of migrants. Tens of thousands were attracted to the region in 
search of job opportunities, land and wealth generated by the Carajas Project, colonisation 
projects (principally GETAT's settlement projects Carajas I, II and IE) and nearby wild­
cat gold-mining sites at Serra Pelada and surrounding areas.
Although these factors were beyond the control of planners, the negative social, economic 
and environmental impacts that occurred in Eastern Amazonia were accepted not only as 
natural, but as a necessary condition of progress by consecutive governments, whose 
development strategies were based on modernisation principles and, principally, on 
development pole theory. It is worth noting here that development pole theory, as seen in 
the second chapter, stressed that the advantages of scale and agglomeration economies 
were essential elements for achieving economic growth.
Two interconnected questions here are extremely important. First, development pole 
theory, like other development theories, assumed that development depended entirely on 
economic phenomena. Thus, an increase in economic indicators, such as gross national 
product (GNP) and income per capita, meant that beneficial spread effects (trickle down) 
were being generated in the form of jobs and other economic opportunities. On the other 
hand, problems such as poverty, deforestation, underemployment and unemployment 
were considered of secondary importance insofar as the achievement of high rates of 
economic growth by means of development poles and the generation of trickle down 
effects were factors that would lead to balanced growth throughout the country in the 
long-term and, consequently, would overcome these problems.
The second question is related to the attraction of thousands of migrants to these induced 
development poles. The crux of the matter is that a "surplus" population was important 
for setting in motion the economic process, was useful for CVRD and met the geopolitical 
objectives of the Federal government. However, the number of migrants exceeded 
completely the predictions made by CVRD for the region and this fault prediction shows 
not only incompetence, but also opportunism on its part. The reasons for this lie in the 
fact that the State mining company was acutely aware that the Carajas region would 
attract an intense flow of migrants and at the same time a "surplus" population at
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Parauapebas was convenient because labourers would always be available and, 
consequently, would provide Carajas town with a number of services such as an informal 
market vending , cleaning women, car washers, baby-sitters, seamstresses, brothels, etc.
The belief that development pole strategy was a means of achieving high rates of growth 
as well as of promoting social welfare in the region was intrinsically related to the idea 
that poverty and underemployment were secondary problems. This belief, together with 
the importance of "surplus" labour for the economic viability of development poles, partly 
explains attitudes of the CVRD in relation to its commitments to regional development in 
general and to the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde in particular. Yet CVRD did 
not play a passive role, development poles proving to be a useful and convenient strategy 
for its negligent attitude in the region.
With respect to the Carajas region, CVRD's faulty prediction of the pace of local 
urbanisation, its "unawareness" in relation to previous predictions made by agencies such 
as SUDAM and GETAT, its non-compliance with the Loan and Guarantee Agreement 
with the World Bank and the change in its plans for Parauapebas, principally because of 
pressure from the World Bank, clearly show its negligence as well as its lack of interest in 
the local problems, which were to a large extent a product of the Carajas Project. There 
are some reasons that explain CVRD's behaviour and one of them is based on the 
questions mentioned above. However, these questions were alluded to the context of 
development pole theory and it is worth examining briefly in respect to the Carajas 
region.
The main priority and what really mattered to CVRD was the mineral exploitation and 
correlated activities. In this regard, a pleasant town at the top of Carajas mountain was 
carefully planned and constructed by CVRD because of the importance of attracting and 
convincing skilled labours from Southern Brazil to operate the iron-ore mine. Every 
aspect considered fundamental for making the Carajas Project work properly was taken 
into account by CVRD. Although "surplus" labour was an important aspect, the State 
mining company had no intention of building a town for migrants in accordance with the
164
Chapter IV
pattern of Carajas town and the blatant difference in the amount of money spent in the 
two towns, Carajas and Parauapebas, was irrefutable evidence of this.
Indeed, Parauapebas town was "planned" and implemented by CVRD with the obvious 
purpose of avoiding the formation of a shanty-town at the foot of Carajas mountain. Since 
Parauapebas was of secondary importance for CVRD, the company did not pay much 
attention to the problems of this urban nucleus, which became worse and the formation of 
Rio Verde is a concrete example. As already mentioned, the belief that an increase in 
economic growth was a necessary condition for generating the hoped-for trickle down 
effects in the hinterlands and, at the same time, the recognised importance of a "surplus" 
population for achieving high rates of growth, were important, but nevertheless 
insufficient, to explain the attitudes of CVRD. Thus, other factors have to be taken into 
account in order to provide a whole picture of the situation.
Corruption, misuse of municipality funds and, principally, the lack of municipal resources 
were other important factors that contributed to exacerbating urban problems. With regard 
to the municipality of Maraba, its considerable area, the rapid increase in its population, 
and its insufficient financial resources for tackling growing local problems were relevant 
reasons for Parauapebas and Rio Verde to be considered of low priority by the municipal 
authorities.
Despite the importance of the above factors, many problems in Parauapebas and Rio 
Verde were due to the problematic relationship between CVRD and local authorities. 
Most of these difficulties were caused by the omnipresence as well as omnipotence of 
CVRD itself, which considered local authorities as a group that only knew how to 
complain about its circumstances and whose lack of competence and dynamism was an 
obstacle to the solution of local problems and also a continual annoyance to the company. 
This type of attitude has its roots in the creation of CVRD. In fact, this company was 
established during Vargas' New State (.Estado Novo), which initiated a long tradition of 
centralised planning in Brazil. This tradition continued throughout the military regime, a 
period from which CVRD became a powerful mining company (see chapter 1). However, 
the role of CVRD is discussed in greater detail in the final chapter.
165
Chapter IV
Although not passive, the role of the state and municipal governments in the planning 
process was very limited. Paradoxically, these governments were anxious for the 
implementation of development projects in their regions because these projects meant a 
probable chance of "progress" and, principally, of obtaining a considerable amount of 
money from taxation. Despite these good prospects, the possibility of interference or even 
of participation in the planning process was very restricted because it was a top-down 
process in which objectives were determined by those who had the power, the CVRD and 
the Federal government.
This situation is well-illustrated by the relationship between CVRD and local 
governments. Owing to the fact that these governments represented the interests of the 
local population and could also provide a number of incentives to companies which 
wanted to set up in their municipalities, they were important elements in the development 
process in their region and, thereby, were entitled to a preponderant role in every decision­
making related to the interests of their region. However, the dominant role was played by 
the CVRD, which determined the priorities for the region and excluded local governments 
from any participation and discussion about local development. In this inverted situation, 
these governments were practically subordinated to the interests and objectives of the 
State mining company.
The top-down process was the current model of planning adopted by the military regime. 
Decisions, plans and strategies were taken, formulated and implemented by the Federal 
government, which centralised every function in its own hands. This centralisation fitted 
in well with the geopolitical and economic objectives of the authoritarian regime. In this 
regard, there was no opportunity for other tiers of government, specifically state and 
municipal governments, to take part in the planning process. Changes only began to occur 
with the advent of the civilian government in 1985 and, principally, with the 1988 
Constitution, which gave more economic and political power to state and, especially, to 
municipal governments.
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It is important to stress here that the lack of improvements in urban infrastructure and 
facilities in the Parauapebas - Rio Verde region was the underlying cause of the struggle 
for the emancipation of this region from the Maraba administration. It was hoped that the 
emancipation (independence) of Parauapebas, which would include its satellite Rio 
Verde, would improve its situation principally because the new Municipality would have 
its own revenue base. However, this theme will be discussed in the chapter four.
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4.5 - Summing up
Parauapebas is intrinsically associated with the Carajas Project because without the iron- 
ore project, the urban nucleus would not have come into existence. In fact, this town was 
envisaged as an area of “planned invasion”, in other words, an alternative to human 
settlements that were commonly encountered in Brazil's peripheral regions. Thus, the 
urban nucleus was urbanised in order to accommodate a planned population of 5,000. 
However, this number seriously underestimated the rapidly expanding population in the 
area and the emergence of Rio Verde, a peripheral invasion very close to Parauapebas, 
was concrete evidence.
The explosive growth of Parauapebas and Rio Verde was due to several factors which 
contributed to the rapid flow of migrants to the region. This great flow of migrants led to 
a worsening of the poor infrastructure and services in both urban nuclei and was, to some 
extent, beyond the control of policy-makers. It was difficult to predict the magnitude of 
the flow of migrants because of the existence of colonisation projects, the spontaneous 
establishment of small farmers and ranches of varying sizes, various wild-cat gold-mining 
sites in the surrounding area and, of course, the Carajas Project itself in the region. 
However, the intense flow of migrants was largely stimulated by the Federal government, 
whose overriding development strategies in Eastern Amazonia were based on 
modernisation principles and development pole theory.
In accordance with development pole theory, a "surplus" population was a necessary 
condition for setting in motion the dynamic process of economic development. The belief 
that high rates of growth would generate a "trickle-down" effect to benefit the entire 
population has been unfounded in relation to the Carajas region. In this regard, the 
attraction of tens of thousands of migrants was a deliberate attempt to make the Carajas 
pole viable and policy-makers were not worried about the number of migrants attracted to 
the region, certainly because of the economic objective, but also because of the crude and 
extremely convenient "trickle down" assumptions.
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CVRD's faulty prediction of the pace of urbanisation, its non-compliance with the Loan 
and Guarantee Agreement with the World Bank, its "unawareness" of previous prediction 
made by government agencies and the change in its plans for Parauapebas, occasioned 
principally by pressure from the World Bank, can be partly explained by the factors 
mentioned above. Although the negligence of the CVRD and its lack of interest in 
tackling local problems were obvious, other factors are also important for understanding 
the consequences in Parauapebas and Rio Verde.
Corruption, misuse of municipality funds and the lack of municipal resources were other 
important factors that contributed to the worsening of the situation in local urban nuclei. 
These factors were associated with problems such as technical capacity , the ability to 
forge external links and obtain access to funding and to implement policies, which were 
faced by all municipalities, and the municipality of Maraba was no exception. 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde were considered of low priority because of the factors 
mentioned above and also because of the growing demands for urban infrastructure and 
services throughout the whole municipality, which occupied a considerable area, 
especially in the city of Maraba, whose population growth had been extremely rapid, 
principally because of the construction of the Carajas railway.
Furthermore, many problems in Parauapebas and Rio Verde were caused by the 
problematic relationship between CVRD and local authorities. This problem has its roots 
in the omnipresence and omnipotence of CVRD and in its inherent lack of sensitivity to 
the nature of local problems which led the company to adopt hostile attitudes to the 
population of both urban nuclei. The disagreement between the two sides over their 
individual responsibilities was also an important part of the problem. The local authorities 
considered CVRD mainly responsible for the many problems generated in their 
municipalities and most of their negligence was based on this attitude, while the CVRD 
alleged that local problems were beyond its competence. All these aspects contributed to 
making this relationship continually difficult and also to generating a widespread 
resentment against CVRD.
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CVRD's behaviour, faults and attitudes suggest clearly that what really mattered to the 
company was the Carajas Project and those preconditions considered essential for making 
this industrial project work properly. Thus, every detail of the Carajas Project was 
carefully planned and implemented by CVRD, which did not pay much attention to other 
aspects that were relegated to secondary importance. In fact, the CVRD could have done 
much more than it has done to tackle local problems, which were, to a large extent, 
generated by the company itself. In this regard, the planning process represents a more 
significant example than do CVRD's attitudes and behaviour.
The planning for development was very technocratic, over-centralised and clearly took 
priority over the economic aspects. Indeed, it was a "top-down" process in which even the 
local needs were determined by the Federal government - through its agencies, institutions 
and enterprises -, which did not tolerate any type of pressure, interference or participation 
by different tiers of government. By centralising every function and by giving priority to 
the economic aspects, planning fitted in well with the geopolitical and economic 
objectives of the Federal government on the one hand, but was absolutely negligent in 
relation to the interests of the vast majority of urban and rural populations on the other 
hand. In this regard, development planning contributed, to a large extent, to the process of 
social exclusion, as will become clearer in the next chapter, which will discuss the 
implications of the planning process for Parauapebas and Rio Verde.
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The Implications for Parauapebas: Success or Growing Pains?
5.1 - Introduction
By the time Parauapebas was implemented, its peripheral settlement of Rio Verde was 
already established. Due to the substantial flow of migrants, encouraged largely by 
government policies, problems were multiplied and aggravated in both urban nuclei. 
These problems, which varied from inadequate urban infrastructure to high levels of ill 
health and poor educational provision, were not successfully tackled by the municipality 
of Maraba, which was responsible for both nuclei. In fact, the Maraba administration had 
to cope with many problematic areas, such as Curionopolis and Eldorado, in the 
municipality itself, but its difficult relationship with CVRD contributed to making the 
situation in the Parauapebas/Rio Verde region even worse.
The worrying situation in the Parauapebas/Rio Verde region was the underlying cause for 
the emancipation of this region from the municipality of Maraba. It was hoped that the 
investment of tax revenues, principally those related to the Carajas mine, in the new 
municipality of Parauapebas would not only improve its circumstances, but would also 
represent the beginning of a new development phase in the region. Indeed, many 
improvements have been made in the municipality of Parauapebas since its emancipation, 
but thousands of problems remain to be tackled in the face of severe funding problems.
This chapter will analyse the implications of planning for Parauapebas, focusing on its 
two phases: before and after the emancipation. This focus will provide a whole picture of 
Parauapebas in which its gradual development will be traced.
Chapter V
5.2 - Parauapebas: before and after its emancipation
“(...) In principle, this separation [of Caraj&s town and 
Parauapebas] was natural. After all, CVRD needed to 
maintain the security of an urban nucleus [the Carajds 
town] (...). Owing to this, we are preparing Parauapebas 
to become a town where it will be worthwhile settling 
down".
(Lufs Carlos Nepomuceno, Manager of the Sustainable 
Development Department of CVRD, Jomal da Vale, 
September, 1992).
Chapter three discussed the question of planning for Parauapebas and showed how it was 
centralised in the hands of CVRD, which ignored local governments before, during and 
after the implementation of this urban nucleus. This centralisation cannot be dissociated 
from the CVRD's behaviour and attitudes, which together undoubtedly demonstrated that 
the Carajas Project was the foremost preoccupation of CVRD. Consequently, all other 
aspects, including the town of Parauapebas itself, were considered secondary.
Although CVRD was not responsible for every problem generated in Parauapebas and Rio 
Verde, because of its importance for regional development, the company could have done 
and could still do much more to improve the living conditions in both nuclei. In fact, the 
worsening situation of Parauapebas and Rio Verde was the result of many factors, 
including the ineffectiveness of local administrations. These factors are important as 
causes, but insufficient to provide a complete view of the current problems of these urban 
nuclei. Thus, in order to better understand the real situation of the twin towns of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde, the implications of planning for Parauapebas will be traced 
below but always focusing on two different phases of this town, before and after its 
emancipation (the new municipality was to include the peripheral settlement of Rio 
Verde). This focus will provide a picture of Parauapebas since its embryonic stage of 
development up to the present day.
Before examining the implications for Parauapebas, it is important to make some 
observations about local government, its relationship with CVRD, its responsibilities and 
the problems which provoked the emergence of the new municipality of Parauapebas. As 
seen in the last chapter, CVRD considered the town of Parauapebas of secondary
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importance. In fact, this urban nucleus was "planned" and implemented by CVRD with 
the clear purpose of avoiding the formation of a shanty town very close to its main 
entrance gate. The formation of a shanty town was regarded by CVRD as a probable and 
permanent "focus of tension", which could cause continuous trouble for the Carajas 
Project. Thus, there was no propensity towards humanitarian actions in CVRD's plans. 
The reputation of the Carajas Project was its principal preoccupation and, consequently, 
nothing should hinder its progress or its broader image.
The fact that the GETAT's colonisation projects, specifically Carajas II and IH, were 
located on the southern boundary of CVRD's iron-ore concession area is no coincidence. 
CVRD asked GETAT to locate these settlement projects strategically around its territory 
in order to avoid possible invasions. Thus, these projects, despite their other objectives, 
were part of CVRD's "buffer zone", which was completed by the Indian reserve of Xicrin 
do Catete, west of CVRD's area and whose demarcation was supported by the 1982 
CVRD/FUNAl/World Bank agreement; by the areas of Gleba Aquiri and Gleba Cinzento, 
which were areas destined for the Armed Forces; and by Gleba Ampulheta, which 
belonged to the state of Para. In 1985, the state of Para, through ITERPA, implemented a 
colonisation project named Jader Barbalho in Gleba Ampulheta.
In addition to its concession area (approximately 412,000-hectare), CVRD occupied a 
total of 199,000-hectare in parts of three distinct areas: Gleba Cinzento, the largest one; 
Gleba Aquiri; and Gleba ampulheta, the smallest ones. The CVRD's interest in these 
areas was not in vain. Important mineral deposits, especially gold and copper, had been 
discovered there and the company already had plans to exploit them. In 1989, IB AM A 
created three environmental-conservation areas: the environmental-protection area of 
Igarape Gelado of 21,600 hectares; the biological reserve of Tapirape of 103,000 hectares; 
and the national forest of Tapirape/Aquiri of 190,000 hectares. These two latter areas 
overlapped to a large extent the areas destined for the Armed Forces, the Gleba Cinzento, 
whose area was 165,000 hectares, and the Gleba Aquiri, whose area was 141,000 hectares 
(IDESP, 1990; Bemo de Almeida, 1994). Although CVRD had already occupied a 
considerable part of both the biological reserve and the natural forest, the company
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became responsible for the protection of the three environmental conservation areas and, 
thereby, expanded its territorial dominion considerably.
Despite all the precautions taken by CVRD against possible invasions or any interference 
that could affect its industrial project, the company could not avoid a number of problems 
which were generated principally by the intense flow of migrants attracted to the region in 
search of jobs. However, the company itself, with its traditional arrogance, lack of 
sensitivity to problems which were not directly related to the Carajas Project and its 
hostile attitudes towards the local population, contributed to the exacerbation of region's 
problems as well as to the generation a growing wave of animosity towards itself. A very 
good example is the agricultural colony Jader Barbalho, where 700 families of small 
farmers were accommodated by ITERPA.
These small farmers were dissatisfied with their situation and, principally, with CVRD, 
which did not allow them to transport their crops along the Raimundo Mascarenhas road, 
which was paved by CVRD and was within its concession area, to the town of 
Parauapebas. Consequently, these colonists could not market their products, which rotted 
on their plots (IDESP, 1990). However, CVRD argued that the exclusiveness of the 
Raimundo Mascarenhas road was perfectly normal because it was a private road and if 
access had been made easier, the colonists and local wild-cat gold prospectors might have 
been able to occupy the area. Owing to the general dissatisfaction and the fear of possible 
conflicts, the CVRD solved this problem by constructing a ring-road around the mining 
enclave from the colonisation project to Parauapebas.
It is worth noting that CVRD alleged that the Raimundo Mascarenhas road was private, 
although the company belonged to the Federal government and, consequently, this 
"private" road was constructed with public funds. One of the most important 
characteristics of this company is its clever use of its dual status - a State enterprise which 
acts like a private one - depending on the situation, but this theme will be made clearer 
below. Despite having been solved, this situation does illustrate a certain kind of 
behaviour by CVRD as well as the difficulties faced by small farmers in transporting their
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products to the towns. Similar difficulties occurred on the agricultural projects Carajas II 
and HI.
The construction of new highways and vicinal roads associated with official colonisation 
projects supported by INCRA, GETAT and, to a less extent, ITERPA, the discovery of 
gold at Serra Pelada (the huge and most famous wild-cat gold-mining site), the extensive 
gold and other mineral prospecting activities in the surrounding region and principally the 
Carajas Project were determinant factors in attracting an intense flow of migrants into 
Eastern Amazonia. In fact, urban areas, from the state capitals of Sao Luis and Belem to 
small cities located along the Carajas corridor, have experienced an impressive growth in 
population since the advent of the PGC. For example, the population of Parauapebas 
increased from 8,577 in 1980 to 53,312 in 1991 at an impressive average annual rate of 
18.07%; Maraba grew by more than 90,150 at an average rate of 8.34% per year; while in 
Imperatriz, even though the demographic growth rate was less (4.05%) than in Maraba, 
the population increment in absolute terms was even greater, the number of inhabitants 
increasing from 294,816 in 1980 to 456,044 in 1991 (IBGE, 1991).
Indeed, the substantial flow of migrants, which was basically a product of official 
development policies, resulted in predatory exploitation of natural resources and 
aggravated the already inadequate infrastructure and local-service capabilities. The 
adverse impacts caused by the impressive growth of the cities reproduced and intensified 
situations of poverty which occurred in other Brazilian regions. With respect to 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde, these two urban nuclei had countless problems, which varied 
from inadequate urban infrastructure to high levels of ill health and poor educational 
provision. Despite the significance of these problems, two important questions remain: 
who was the responsible for that region? How did those responsible tackle these 
problems?
The authority responsible for Parauapebas, Rio Verde and surrounding invasions was the 
municipality of Maraba, which was also included other problematic areas, such as the 
towns of Maraba, Curionopolis, Eldorado, etc. Owing to the many problems in distinct 
areas within its own municipality, the municipality of Maraba could not successfully
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tackle all them at the same time. This argument partially explains the unsatisfactory 
performance of the County in the Parauapebas/Rio Verde region.
In order to tackle a number of problems in Parauapebas, the municipality of Maraba 
maintained a local sub-administration (sub-prefeitura), whose autonomy was extremely 
limited. This limitation was reflected in two facts: the first two years of the sub­
administration were subsided by CVRD; and the agreement between CVRD and the 
municipality of Maraba that 10% of royalties from mineral exploitation in Carajas should 
be applied to programmes and investment projects in the urban nucleus of Parauapebas 
(from beginning of its third year of administration) was never complied with by the 
municipality of Maraba.
Besides these above facts, the relationship between CVRD and local authorities was never 
good because of different understandings of, and positions on, their individual 
responsibilities. On the one hand, local authorities believed that CVRD should be 
responsible mainly for the problems generated in the area and, consequently, they wanted 
the Brazilian company to take firm action. Indeed, most of the negligence of the local 
authorities can be explained by this attitude. On the other hand, CVRD believed that 
municipal and State authorities had to assume their responsibilities in order to deal with 
regional problems, which not considered CVRD's responsibility.
In fact, CVRD never understood (or never wanted to understand) the tenuous limits that 
separated its social responsibilities from that of the local governments. The reason for 
such a lack of understanding centred on CVRD's dual status (a State company that acted 
like a private one), which was reflected in its own behaviour. This permanent “identity 
crisis” contributed, to a large extent, to making the relationship between the Brazilian 
company and municipal authorities more difficult. As a direct result, this problematic 
relationship made the situation in Parauapebas and Rio Verde even worse.
It is important to highlight here that the dual status was cleverly used by CVRD for 
obtaining large foreign loans from the World Bank, Japan, and EEC, etc. as well as some 
special advantages, such as the mining concession, from the Federal government. In the
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first example, CVRD stressed its competence, dynamism and other attributes which were 
generally associated with private companies. In the second instance, CVRD emphasised 
its status as a State company and, therefore, its importance for the development of Brazil 
in general and of the Amazon region in particular. The use of its dual status became 
problematic when the objective was to cope with regional impacts, which were generated 
to a large extent by the company itself.
Until 1986, the Parauapebas administrator was appointed directly by the Mayor of 
Maraba. From that year, inhabitants of Parauapebas/Rio Verde could elect their 
representative, who continued under the authority of the municipality of Maraba. In spite 
of electing a sub-Mayor, the situation in both urban nuclei remained practically the same 
as before. As a consequence, the dissatisfaction of the population rose gradually and 
became the germ of emancipatory movements in the region. It was expected that the 
creation of the new municipality of Parauapebas (Municfpio de Parauapebas) would be 
the beginning of an important stage in the development of the region, principally because 
mining royalties could be invested there.
Besides being a powerful mining company, CVRD also planned the town of Parauapebas, 
constructed most of its urban facilities and implemented its urban infrastructure. Owing to 
all these aspects, the CVRD's presence in the area has been strongly felt by the local 
administration and population as well. This presence has meant a constant involvement of 
CVRD in local problems. Its participation in the development process of the region and in 
the discussion about problems and the future development plans for the twin towns would 
be an important and salutary experience for local communities, administrators and, 
especially for CVRD itself. However, problems arose principally because of CVRD's 
“identity crisis”, which made its understanding of its role and of its fundamental 
importance for the development of the region very difficult.
Owing to this ambivalent attitude, CVRD was generally hostile towards the population of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde. One of these attitudes was the severe security control 
exercised by CVRD guards at its entrance gate, where people who wanted to visit Carajas 
town had to be inspected. In addition to subjecting people to certain embarrassments, such
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as personal belonging searches, this attitude shows explicitly the CVRD's aim of keeping 
people away from its territory in general and Carajas town in particular. In other words, it 
means a clear process of social exclusion, which was corroborated by CVRD's decision of 
transforming its urban nucleus in Carajcts into a “company town”. Obviously, there was 
widespread resentment against the Brazilian State mining company.
This resentment caused by CVRD's attitudes and decisions and worsened by the blatant 
contrast between Carajas town and the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde was 
vividly manifested in, and ridiculed by, some popular expressions. For example, Carajas 
town was called the “gold cage” or “fantasy island” by the population of Parauapebas and 
Rio Verde; CVRD's entrance gate was designated a “chain”, although there was no chain 
on that gate; and the superintendent of CVRD was known as “vice-roy” (see Mayerhofer, 
1986; Piquet, 1988).
The extremely rapid population growth, CVRD's decision to transform Carajas town into 
a company enclave, the inability of the municipality of Maraba to cope with all the 
problems in the municipality itself, and the problematic relationship between CVRD and 
local authorities were important factors that contributed to generating a problematic 
situation in Parauapebas and Rio Verde. The difficult resulted in widespread 
dissatisfaction, which was, in turn, the underlying cause for the emancipation of this 
region from the municipality of Maraba. It was hoped that the investment of the mining 
royalties in the new municipality would not only improve its circumstances, but would 
also mark the beginning of a new development phase in the region.
The municipality of Parauapebas was established on 10 May 1988 by state law n° 5,443 
sanctioned by the Governor of the Para state Helio Mota Gueiros. However, this new 
municipality only initiated its activities on 1 January 1989, when the Mayor, Mr. Salmen, 
the vice-Mayor, Mr. Araujo, and nine town councillors (vereadores) were installed 
(IDESP, 1990; A Provmcia do Para, 1994). The first Mayor of Parauapebas was a doctor, 
who had moved from the state of Sao Paulo to follow big construction projects in 
Amazonia and had worked, always as a doctor, for the construction firm Andrade 
Gutierrez and, principally, for the colonisation projects near Parauapebas town before his
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arrival at this town in 1985. Owing to his work as a rural doctor in these colonisation 
projects, Mr. Salmen became very popular amongst the poor population and won the first 
municipal election in Parauapebas, based on a political platform stressing social 
programmes and economic development for the region that would not neglect the least 
favoured in the population (Roberts, 1991a).
Since tax funds including mining royalties began to flow directly to the municipality of 
Parauapebas in 1989, a series of actions could be undertaken by this new municipality 
and, consequently, several improvements, such as the road repairs, the construction and 
restoration of rural schools, expansion of the sewage network, the repair of the water- 
treatment which had been completely abandoned (IDESP, 1990), were made in the region. 
Although significant, these improvements fell far short of meeting growing local 
demands.
According to Mr. Salmen:
"It is im portant that Parauapebas obtains the necessary support from  the PGC [the G reater 
Caraj&s Programm e] to be a harmonious and integrated municipality. In this regard, the 
m unicipality needs [financial] resources to bring electricity to  CED ERE II project, which is 
located in an agricultural region with a large number o f rural producers, and to construct a road 
from  CED ERE II to Agua Azul to integrate them  into the municipality; to  structure and organise 
the tax collection system in order to invest collected taxation in benefit o f the population; to 
im prove the infrastructure o f the hospital; to construct m ore schools and im prove the existing 
ones" ( IDESP, 1990, pp.12).
This statement shows clearly the difficult situation of the municipality of Parauapebas, 
which was deficient in everything, and also the lack of financial help from the Federal 
government, whose support, as suggested by the Mayor, would be essential for tackling 
the social problems generated, to a large extent, by development projects in the region. It 
is also implicit in Mr. Salmen's words that the municipal budget, in which mining 
royalties played an important part, was not cope with the complete range of problems. 
There were innumerable problems which had accumulated over the years and which were 
aggravated by the continuous and intense flow of migrants. Furthermore, some taxes, 
principally those for which the Federal government was mainly responsible, were
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financially insignificant for Parauapebas, principally because of local problems, such as 
lack of tax collectors and law enforcement capacity. Even in relation to the ICMS tax, 
which formed the largest part of the municipal budget, there was a serious problem which 
was connected with the delay of the Brazilian census data.
The total population level helps to determine tax revenues and the delay in census data 
implied that the amount of money received by the municipality of Parauapebas never 
corresponded to its real situation. For example, when Parauapebas became independent, 
in 1989, the previous census had been carried out in 1980, when there was neither a 
municipality nor a town of Parauapebas. Nowadays, this problem continues because the 
money from the ICMS tax is based on the 1991 census and, consequently, there is a 
considerable gap between what the municipality receives and what it should receive. This 
financial difference is extremely important for a municipality such as Parauapebas whose 
population growth is continuous and rapid.
Despite the problems mentioned above, the municipality of Parauapebas was, 
paradoxically, privileged because of its location. In this regard, any increase in production 
of iron-ore and any diversification by CVRD into other mineral means that this 
municipality will receive more money from the ICMS tax as well as mining royalties. 
Indeed, there was a considerable increase in the ICMS tax and, consequently, the 
municipality of Parauapebas' income became the third largest in the state of Para. In 1994, 
Parauapebas' income was R$ 14,285,714.00 and the municipality foresaw more than 
double this amount for 1995, which was estimated at R$40,000,000.00 (IBAM, 1994b). 
Despite its significance, the municipal budget was still insufficient, as will be seen in the 
following sections, for tackling mounting problems, which varied from the lack of schools 
and hospitals to inadequate urban infrastructure and facilities, in the region. Although 
there is no data available related to the size of the municipal funding gap, the dimensions 
as well as the substantial number of problems that must be faced seriously by the 
municipal administration will provide a clear idea about the discrepancies between the 
significant municipal budget and the growing problems to be solved.
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With respect to the lack of federal support to the municipality of Parauapebas, it is 
important to bear in mind that the Federal government at that time began to be shrunk 
and, consequently, its presence in Eastern Amazonia was drastically reduced. This 
occurred because of the Brazilian economic crisis (high rates of inflation, balance of 
payment problems, etc.) and the 1988 Constitution, which had approved and encouraged a 
substantial decentralisation, a considerable redistribution of revenues and an increase in 
the power of state and municipal governments. As a consequence, the municipality of 
Parauapebas could only depend on itself to face the countless problems in the region, 
because CVRD's assistance only materialised in accordance with its interest and 
convenience.
In fact, the worrying situation in Parauapebas, in which problems were being multiplied 
rapidly, led Mr. Salmen to affirm that this municipality, despite being located at one of the 
world's largest and richest mineral reserves, presents a tremendous paradox, which is "our 
wealth [of the municipality of Parauapebas] has generated our own poverty, our own 
misfortune, i.e. we export iron and have to deal with the social onus, the poverty 
generated by the Carajas Project" ( IDESP, 1990, pp. 10).
Despite the improvements in the municipality of Parauapebas, Salmen's administration 
was accused of fiscal irregularities, which led him to temporarily withdraw from his 
function as Mayor. Only owing to judicial decision was he allowed back to could carry on 
his administration. Nevertheless, his accounts were rejected by the Tribune of Municipal 
Accounts (Tribunal de Contas do Municipio) as well as by Municipal council (Camara 
Municipal).
The new Mayor of Parauapebas, Mr. Francisco Alves de Souza, was elected in November 
1992 and installed on 1 January 1993. Unlike from his predecessor, Mr. Souza was of 
humble origin, he had no university degree (his job was to make curtains) and, his 
potential clientele was formed by CVRD's employees, who lived in Carajas town. He was 
known by his nickname "Chico das Cortinas" (which was an allusion to his job), which 
became the slogan of his election campaign (Interview, 1995).
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Although Mr. Souza had made some improvements in Parauapebas, the main 
achievement and pride of his administration was the agreement between CVRD and the 
municipality to provide the whole population of the Parauapebas town with water, sewage 
disposal and garbage collection facilities. The financial resources to implement this 
project were obtained from the World Bank through CVRD, which acted as an 
intermediary between the municipality and multilateral agencies because this urban 
project was part of CVRD's environmental programme (IBAM, 1993a and 1994b; 
Parauapebas em Revista, 1994). The implementation of this project began in September 
1994.
This basic sanitation project is very illustrative in many respects. The central point is that 
CVRD, by alleging the existence of corruption in Mr.Souza’s administration, became 
responsible for practically all stages of this project, while the municipal administration 
was only in charge of supervising and paying its costs, which were deducted from mining 
royalties by CVRD. Thus, fiscal irregularities were corroborated by CVRD's attitude and 
at the same time this project shows clearly that the municipal administration was very 
limited and dependent on the mining company, which continued to have a considerable 
influence upon the region.
Like the former Mayor, Mr. Souza experienced difficulties in tackling mounting problems 
in the municipality, which continued to receive a large number of migrants in search of 
economic opportunities; was aware that the municipal budget was not sufficient for 
dealing with all problems at the same time; and was also involved with a series of 
irregularities (EEPP, 1993). In spite of these similarities, the relationship with CVRD was 
completely different. While Mr. Salmen used whatever means he could to put pressure on 
CVRD to assume its responsibilities for local problems, Mr. Souza was the opposite and 
his actions did not bring him into any conflict with CVRD. In fact, his administration, as 
mentioned above, maintained a dependent relationship with the mining company.
The lack of improvements in urban infrastructure and facilities in the Parauapebas/Rio 
Verde region was the main reason for the birth of the municipality of Parauapebas. On the 
one hand, administrative autonomy brought some improvements, principally because the
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new municipality had its own revenue base. On the other hand, many problems persisted 
while others were generated and the municipal budget, despite being invested in the 
region, was insufficient for tackling every problem. Paradoxically, the worrying situation 
remained and the local government as well as CVRD contributed, to a large extent, to 
generating this situation. In the following sections, a series of social problems will be 
traced in order to provide a whole picture of the municipality of Parauapebas.
5.3 - Population
It is important to stress that the data which will be used here as well as in the subsequent 
sections of this chapter are related to two phases of Parauapebas: before and after its 
independence from the Municipality of Maraba. The first phase, which covers the 1980- 
88 period, is associated with the embryonic stages of Parauapebas and Rio Verde, while 
the second one, initiated in 1989 when the first Mayor was installed, is connected with the 
beginning of a new phase in its own development, which was mainly based on royalties 
from the mineral resources of Carajas. In 1985, the combined population of Parauapebas 
and Rio Verde was estimated at 13,603 and both nuclei had an average of 4.34 persons 
per household, which was less than that of the Municipality of Maraba and of the State of 
Para as well (see table 5.1). This average cited in the 1985 CVRD census reflects the 
initial stages of these nuclei, which were undergoing a brutal process of transformation.
Table 5.1 - Persons per Household in the Area, Municipality and State
Location Urban Population Urban Households Persons/household
Parauapebas - Rio 13,603 4,34
Verde
Municipality of 
Marabapflll
State of Para
Source: SUMIC/ASE - CVRD, 1985 and Demographic Census of the State of Para
(Mayerhofer, 1986)
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Roberts (1991a) pointed out that the total population of Parauapebas town (which 
included its satellite Rio Verde and other peripheral invasions) was estimated at 29,019 in 
1990. Thus the population of this town increased more than 100% in five years. The 
population of Parauapebas, Rio Verde and other surrounding invasions were estimated at 
2,313; 9,419 and 1,871 respectively by the 1985 CVRD census (Mayerhofer & Toledo, 
1988a). Five years later, Roberts estimated these population at 3,905; 13.937 and 11,178 
respectively, showing a rapid growth.
According to the 1991 Brazilian census, the population of the municipality of 
Parauapebas was 53,312, its urban population estimated at 27,452 (IBGE, 1991). The 
difference between both, these two, estimates does not invalidate the main argument: the 
rapid growth of this town. The lack of recent data is a serious problem in Brazil as well as 
in Eastern Amazonia in particular and the latest estimates show completely different 
numbers. For example, while CVRD (Carvalho, 1994) estimated the population in the 
municipality of Parauapebas at 75,000, the municipal administration itself estimated 
101,440 (Parauapebas em Revista, 1994). Despite these differences, the main point is that 
the municipality continued to attract a significant number of migrants.
With regard to the origins of the population of Parauapebas and Rio Verde, most migrants 
came from the Northeast (68%), although one-third of this contingent was from the State 
of Maranhao (see table 5.2). This fact was confirmed by American sociologist Roberts 
(1991a) five years later and, therefore, after Parauapebas became independent from the 
municipality of Maraba. By interviewing a sample of 100 households in this town, 
Roberts found that 68% of adults were Northeastemers, 36,2% of this contingent from the 
state of Maranhao.
5.4 - Activities
The 1985 SUMIC/CVRD survey showed that there were 3,908 people employed in 
Parauapebas/Rio Verde at that time (see table 5.3). According to this survey, only 1.3% of 
the employed population worked in the surrounding wild-cat mining-sites. This number
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reveals that both urban nuclei were completely independent of this economic 
activity.
Table 5.2 - Origin of families
Number of Families Percentage
MarabS
Para State (except Maraba) 
Maranhao State
r *  • '  c *  *Goias State 
Northeast 
Other Regions 
Total
33
181
1043
357
1088
433
3135
■ 1<
5.8% 
33.3% 
11.4% 
34.7% 
13.8% 
100%
Source: SUMIC/ASE - CVRD, 1985 (Mayerhofer, 1986)
However, 44.2% of the population was absorbed by the metallurgical industry because 
most of the employees in this activity were residents of Carajas town. The reasons for this 
significant number are associated with the criteria adopted by the survey for classifying 
activities, such as workers who were directly or indirectly involved with the maintenance 
services of vehicles, including agricultural machinery, and the fact that some of the 
CVRD contract workers, specifically those who were married, had “opted” to live in 
Parauapebas/Rio Verde because of difficulties in finding accommodation for their 
families in Carajas town (Mayerhofer, 1986; Piquet, 1988; Mayerhofer & Toledo, 1988a).
Table 5.3 also shows the importance of the tertiary sector, which absorbed 37.4% of the 
population, and is explained by the fact that CVRD employees as well as those who were 
employed by CVRD contract firms still working at the Serra dos Carajas represented a 
reasonable market.
However, the question of unemployment has not been mentioned in the above table. This 
question is very important because the construction phase of the Carajas Project was 
finishing in 1985 and, as a consequence, massive unemployment was imminent. It was
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hoped that the setting ip of the Copper Project by CVRD as well as of two iron-alloy 
plants by companies COJAN Engenharia and PROMETAL, which were to generate a 
total of 566 direct jobs, would alleviate such anticipated unemployment. By 1987, these 
two industrial plants together with twelve pig-iron and another three iron-alloy projects 
had already been approved by the PGC Council. The setting up of these kind of industrial 
plants was a key element in the PGC strategy to establish an “integrated” industrial 
development along the Carajas railway corridor.
Table 5.3 - Population according to activities
PRIM ARY 539 13.8
-Agrolivestock 487 12.5
-Wild-cat mining sites 52 1.3
SECONDARY 1877 48.0
-Metallurgical industry 1727 44.2
-Other industries 150 3.8
TERTIARY 1461 37.4
-Commerce 808 20.7
-Services 653 16.7
OTHERS 31
ooo
TOTAL 3,908 100%
Source: SUMIC/ASE - CVRD (Mayerhofer, 1986; Piquet, 1988; Mayerhofer & Toledo, 
1988).
Despite the importance )f the industrial sector for the development of Parauapebas/Rio 
Verde, another factor centred on the linkages between these urban nuclei and the 
surrounding rural area. It was hoped that both nuclei could achieve their own development 
by marketing primary products and supplying goods and services to their immediate
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hinterland. In this regard, GET AT's colonisation projects played an important role 
because one of the objectives of these projects was to stimulate food production to meet 
rapidly increasing urban-nuclei demands.
In order to achieve this objective, the agricultural colonisation schemes close to the iron 
mine, specifically Carajas II and ID, were provided with a reasonable infrastructure: 561 
kilometres of roads, 8,855 metres of gutters and 240 metres of bridges (Danna et al,
1993). In addition, these agricultural colonisation projects were served by two small urban 
nuclei called CEDERE- Centre for Regional Development, which were created to support 
both resettlement projects.
The CEDERE I and CEDERE II were 25 and 70 kilometres respectively from Rio Verde 
and were provided with the same basic infrastructure: a heath clinic, a primary school, a 
refectory, accommodation for interviewing candidates, three offices for GET AT's 
employees, a storehouse and a radiotelephone station (CPT, 1986). Allied to these 
colonisation projects, there was another: the Carajas I, which was initially expected to 
absorb 4,000 families. In spite of the infrastructure and official support given to colonists, 
food production was still incipient in 1987, the year in which SEPLAN (Mayerhofer & 
Toledo, 1988a) undertook its fieldwork to elaborate the document Plano Diretor do 
Corredor da Estrada de Ferro Carajas (Master Plan for the Carajas Railway Corridor) and 
when GET AT was abolished.
GET AT's colonisation schemes were also understood as an alternative to the urban 
development of Parauapebas/Rio Verde. However, the abolishment of GETAT and other 
agencies marked the beginning of a complete abandonment of government-sponsored 
colonisation. The failure of these colonisation projects and consequently the idea of 
encouraging small farmers to increase food production in order to supply local demands 
was based on several factors, which will be discussed in the next chapter. At the moment, 
it is sufficient to stress that these failed colonisation schemes helped to attract an intense 
flow of migrants, which contributed to worsening the already inadequate urban 
infrastructure and facilities.
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Although the setting up of two pig iron plants in Parauapebas had already been approved 
by the PGC, they were never implemented and the reasons for this were due entirely to the 
environmental risks. By using wood-based charcoal both as a fuel and as reacting agent, 
these industries have been responsible for causing deforestation and atmospheric 
pollution, which represents a considerable danger to the health of local populations as 
well as to local air traffic. In addition, the pole of Parauapebas, where these two plants 
were to be set up, was located in a valley surrounded by Serra dos Carajas and, 
consequently, a critical area with problems of ventilation and thermal changes. Therefore, 
the establishment of these plants in Parauapebas would certainly contribute to the increase 
of allergic, respiratory and dermatological problems which are caused by this type of 
industrial activity.
There was a significant increase in the number of shops and industries registered in the 
municipality of Parauapebas. For example, there were 200 shops in 1989 (IDESP, 1990), 
414 two years later (SEPLAN/Para, 1995) and 1,105 in 1994 (Parauapebas em Revista,
1994). Thus, the number of shops increased more than five times in only five years and 
this fact shows clearly the importance of the tertiary sector. With regard to industries 
located in this municipality, the Department of Finance of the state of Para registered 16 
industries in 1989 (IDESP, 1990), principally: timber (3) and food products (3). Within 
three years, there were 63 industries (SEPLAN/Para, 1995): timber (33), food products 
(6), metallurgical (2), mechanical (3), non-metallic (2), chemical (1), mineral extractive 
(4), perfumery, soaps and candles (3), graphic (1), footwear and textile (3) and other 
industries non-specified (5).
These numbers above, especially those related to industries, must be treated with caution 
because they may suggest a promising and dynamic industrial pole and Parauapebas is in 
fact far from it. In this regard, it is important to take some points into consideration. 
Firstly, the term industry is generally associated with a particular branch of trade which 
employs large numbers of people and uses machinery and/or modem industrial methods. 
Nevertheless, this idea does not fit in well with the local reality because these industries in 
Parauapebas are small commercial establishments and not exactly large-scale industries.
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Secondly, the metallurgical, mechanical and non-metallic industries are likely to be 
subcontracting firms which work for CVRD. By subcontracting workers, CVRD tried to 
save a considerable amount of money as well as avoid possible strikes. Thus, 
subcontractor workers meant that the State-owned company was free from paying social 
security benefits, such as paid vacation and sick leave, etc. At the same time, CVRD, by 
subcontracting firms to undertake severed services at the Carajas mine, divided, 
intentionally or not, the working class and, consequently, made strikes a remote 
possibility. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse CVRD policy of 
subcontracting workers, which will be taken up in the next chapter.
In relation to the second question, the existence of subcontracting firms in the region 
means job opportunities, but the increase in employment is relative because it was 
verified that the number of CVRD employees decreased insofar as more subcontracting 
firms worked for CVRD (Santos, 1994). It is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse 
the relationship between CVRD and subcontracting firms, a theme which will be taken up 
in the next chapter.
It is worth nothing that the number of timber industries increased ten times in a short­
term. The reasons lie in the dynamic production of furniture, as suggested by IDESP 
(1990), and, principally, in the civil construction activities because Parauapebas, as 
already mentioned before, continued to attract thousands of migrants. These activities are 
intrinsically related to accelerated deforestation in the municipality of Parauapebas.
5.5 - The Urban Structure
Located just outside of CVRD's main gate, the urban nucleus of Parauapebas was 
originally planned to accommodate a population of 5,000 inhabitants and its urban design 
was totally geometric. The straight lines and right angles of geometric design adopted in 
Parauapebas, instead of winding roads, culs-de-sac, free areas, etc. commonly seen in 
planned cities, demonstrate a preoccupation with rational occupation of space, which was 
seen as the best way of settling migrants.
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The basic urban infrastructure and social services implemented by CVRD comprised: a 
water-pumping station, a water-treatment plant, a water-distribution network, a system of 
sewage disposal, an electricity network, a building for local administration, a police 
station and a prison, a hospital and a school. In addition, CVRD was to construct twenty- 
five housing units and accommodation just for its employees who would work 
permanently at Parauapebas railway station. It is important to stress here that in the 
localities other than Carajas and Parauapebas, urban investments consisted mainly in the 
provision of housing units for CVRD employees who worked on the railway corridor, 
plus assorted community facilities in the towns of Rosario, Vitoria do Mearim, Santa Ines, 
Nova Vida, Pequia and Maraba.
Unlike Parauapebas and Carajas town, Rio Verde was totally unplanned and the map (Fig 
5.1) shows clearly the planned and the “invaded” part. Rio Verde, called “burgeoning 
town” and “squatter colony” by different missions of the World Bank, spread out along 
the highway and its population was increasing so rapidly and perfectly predictably in the 
short term in view of its contiguity with Parauapebas. With regard to its urban 
infrastructure, the Rio Verde nucleus was essentially limited to ungraded lanes and 
precarious electrical connections, while other facilities such as a water-distribution 
network, a water-treatment plant, a water-pumping station, street lighting, and storm 
drainage, were non-existent. In general, housing conditions in Rio Verde were also very 
inadequate because most of the houses were built with rough-cut lumber slats and 
corrugated fibreglass, while their floors were compressed earth or cement. In the poorest 
parts of Rio Verde, the houses were wattle-and-daub: mud and stick adobe with thatched 
roofs and floors also of compressed earth. Both types of houses stood in sharp contrast 
with the homogenous brick and title-roofed houses of Carajas.
Owing to the explosive growth and the lack of any kind of planning in Rio Verde, areas 
which were not suitable for construction, such as the periodically flooded lowland areas 
and hills, were occupied by migrants. In fact, Rio Verde, like Curionopolis and many 
other frontier towns, had its origins in a group of bars, restaurants and brothels to serve
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construction workers at Carajas and Parauapebas as well as local wild-cat gold 
prospectors.
With regard to the situation of Rio Verde, a 1986 World Bank report noted that, although 
CVRD had already spent some US$ 13.7 million in Parauapebas, another US$ 18 million 
were required to implement necessary improvements in infrastructure networks and 
community facilities in the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde. This report 
recommended that these improvements should be set within an integrated land use 
planning framework and proposed that such a plan should be elaborated by consultants to 
CVRD on the basis of terms of references approved by the Bank (World Bank, 1992). 
Indeed, this plan was drawn up by the consultant firm Mayerhofer & Toledo in mid-1986. 
However, a subsequent Bank mission in September-October 1986 continued to stress “the 
urgent need to rehabilitate, sanitise and expand the urban networks of Parauapebas to 
serve the expansion areas in Rio Verde” (World Bank, 1992, pp. 94). Thus, the changes 
pointed out and required by the World Bank were not made by CVRD, despite the loan 
received by his company. Another mission, which was undertaken jointly by the World 
Bank, specifically its Operation Evaluation Department (OED), and SEPLAN, visited 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde in April 1989 and verified that the improvements made in 
both urban nuclei continued to be insignificant.
Due to the continuous arrival of new migrants, other areas were occupied in a disorderly 
fashion in the town of Parauapebas and, consequently, new districts such as Bairro da Paz, 
Maranhao, Uniao, Riacho Doce and Primavera were formed (see Fig. 5.1). The urban 
infrastructure and facilities of these new districts were practically non-existent. However, 
in these districts were benefited insofar as improvements were made in the old districts 
such as Rio Verde and Cidade Nova, which was the origin of this town.
According to a recent study undertaken by IB AM (1993a), the situation of Rio Verde 
improved because it had an electricity supply, street lighting, garbage collection and most 
of its streets were paved. In addition, housing conditions follow a regular pattern. The 
Uniao district is close to Cidade Nova, which was the planned part, and to the PA-275 
highway. In this regard, housing conditions were considered good by IB AM's technicians
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and this is the predominant pattern in this district, although there is a small percentage 
(7,52%) of houses built precariously. Cidade Nova is the best district in terms of urban 
infrastructure and, consequently, housing conditions in this district are good. Bairro da 
Paz and Maranhao are similar, because they are served only by street lighting and 
electrical connections, being scarce their paved streets. Most of houses in these districts 
are very poor. With respect to Riacho Doce and Primavera, housing conditions in the first 
district are precarious, while in the second are regular.
5.6 - Basic Sanitation
With regard to basic sanitation, especially water supply, the urban nucleus of Parauapebas 
was provided with a water-pumping station, a water-treatment plant and a water- 
distribution network, which were insufficient to meet local demand. Even those who 
received mains water were frequently affected by the same problem: lack of water, and 
usually because of pump failure or electricity cuts. In addition, there was another problem 
which was more serious and was related to water contamination. In Parauapebas, the 
water supply is taken directly from the Parauapebas river, which flows outside the town 
and is polluted with mercury by nearby wild-cat gold mining.
There was no water-distribution network in Rio Verde. The alternatives for obtaining 
water were to sink a well or take it directly from nearby creeks (igarapes). According to 
the 1985 CVRD survey (Mayerhofer, 1986), 65.8% of houses in Rio Verde and other 
peripheral invasions nearby obtained water from wells, while 32.2% obtained it from 
creeks or by other methods. This same survey also indicated that 90% of 1,000 houses 
inspected had their wells built close to the cesspits and this short distance was a 
tremendous threat to the health of the local population because fifteen metres is the 
distance considered satisfactory for avoiding the “sanitary short-circuit” between the 
water-supply and sewage-disposal systems. In addition, it was verified that more than 
43% of houses with no water supply did not have water filters to safeguard against 
intestinal-tract bacteria. As a result of all these problems, practically 100% of patients
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examined in a 1985 health campaign suffered from diseases caused by intestinal bacteria 
and parasites (Mayerhofer, 1986).
With respect to the sewage system, the situation of both nuclei was problematic. In 
Parauapebas, the system was frequently blocked because of inadequate housing 
connections as well as by the precarious laying of the sewage network. Although four 
artificial lakes (lagoas de estabilizagao) were planned for treatment of raw sewage, only 
one was working, and very precariously. The situation in Rio Verde was even worse 
because this nucleus and other surrounding invasions were not served by the sewage 
network at all. As a consequence, excrement was disposed of in pits (black as well as dry 
pits), which was the predominant system, or in the open air.
This dramatic situation is confirmed by table 4.4, which shows that the sewage disposal 
system served less than 11% of houses in Parauapebas and only 0.63% of the total houses 
in Rio Verde and adjacent invasions. This table must be interpreted with caution because 
of its central columns, “dry pit” {fossa seed) and “black pit” {fossa negra). These systems 
are usually adopted in areas where the water supply is non-existent or problematic and 
their advantage is that they are cheaper than other systems, they can be constructed 
individually and they also diminish the risk of contaminating rivers and creeks.
Although different, the similarities between the two systems are much more evident, 
principally in relation to the region of Parauapebas, Rio Verde and other surrounding 
urban agglomerations. The main difference between “black pit” and “dry pit” systems is 
that in the first the excrement is deposited directly in the pit, while in the second, the 
excrement is disposed of by means of a lavatory. Despite being more hygienic and 
obviously more comfortable than the “black pit” system, the “dry pit” represents a more 
serious threat to contamination of the water table because this system requires water in 
order to function. It is also important to observe that the simple presence of a lavatory in 
the house indicates a better economic condition, which contributes to establishing some 
differences among urban agglomerations.
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In relation to the “black” and “dry” systems, 55.83% of the total houses in Parauapebas, 
Rio Verde and surrounding invasions had “black pits” (fossas negras), while less than 
11% had “dry pits” {fossas secas). Allied to these numbers, 21.71% of houses in all these 
nuclei did not have any inside sanitation, which means that excrement was disposed of in 
the open air. Table 5.4 shows clearly that the sewage network was totally unable to meet 
local demands and Parauapebas is the concrete example because 11.70% of houses in this 
nucleus were not connected with the sewage network, which serves less than half of the 
total number of houses in this town. In Rio Verde 70.69% of its houses had “black pits”, 
22.31% had no inside sanitation and just 6.10% had “dry pits”. Thus, the total percentage 
of the houses in this nucleus not served by the sewage network was 99.10%. The same 
trend is noted in the surrounding invasions, but one specific characteristic distinguishes 
Rio Verde from other peripheral invasions: the percentage of houses with “dry pits” was 
6.10% in Rio Verde and 1.02% in the invasions.
Table 5.4 - Systems of sewage disposal (in percentage of total number of houses)
Parauapebas 10.95 6.82 2.40 2.48 22.65
Rio Verde 0.60 3.93 45.63 14.40 64.56
Invasions 0.03 0.13 7.80 4.83 12.79
TOTAL 11.58 10.88 55.83 21.71 100.00
Source: SUMIC/ASE - CVRD, 1985 (Mayerhofer, 1986).
As mentioned above, CVRD and the municipality of Parauapebas signed an agreement in 
June 1993 to provide water-supply, sewage-disposal and garbage collection systems for 
the whole town of Parauapebas. With respect to the situation of basic sanitation in this 
town, the EBAM's reports (1993a;1994a ;1994b) show clearly that few improvements 
have been made since its implementation.
In relation to water-supply, this system only served 6,000 inhabitants, while the total 
population of the town of Parauapebas was estimated at 48,500 (IBAM, 1993a). Those
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inhabitants who were served by this system lived principally in Cidade Nova, which was a 
district privileged in terms of infrastructure and services because it was the original 
nucleus constructed by CVRD. Nevertheless, 85% of the urban population obtained water 
from wells, which were poorly built and located close to the cess pits and this short 
distance was a serious threat to public health.
With regard to the sewage system, the situation of Parauapebas town was even more 
problematic. This system was already insufficient for meeting local needs and this 
problem was aggravated by the continuous arrival of migrants. Thus, most of the 
population was not served by the sewage network and as a result, the excrement was 
disposed of in pits, the predominant system, or in the open air, principally in the 
Parauapebas river and the Coconut creek (igarape do Coco). Both methods, pits and open 
air, represented a threat to the health of local population because of the "sanitary short- 
circuit" (the short distance between well and pit) and pollution of local river.
5.7 - Urban Maintenance and Transport
Urban maintenance-services in Parauapebas and Rio Verde were non-existent in some 
cases and precarious in others. For example, the streets, public square, gutters, etc. were 
not cleaned either in Parauapebas or in Rio Verde. As a consequence, the grass grew close 
to the gutters and contributed to making the drainage of rain water difficult. At the same 
time, the rapid growing of grass along the strip of the PA-275 road obstructed visibility 
and impeded the use of the hard shoulder, which made this road unsafe for pedestrians as 
well as drivers.
In relation to trash collection, Maraba County was responsible for this service, which was 
highly precarious. The trash was collected on alternate days only in the centred areas of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde and was disposed of in the open air, the trash dump being less 
than 500 metres from the urbanised area. This service was eventually abolished. As a 
result, the population of Rio Verde deposited its trash alongside roads, and in 
Parauapebas, it was disposed of in the streets as well as in the backyards. In fact, this
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situation went from bad to worse and is well-illustrated by the permanent free-market that 
was held on a public square, called Praga do Mercado, in Rio Verde. This free-market 
produced daily a large amount of garbage which was not collected and, consequently, 
caused fetidness and was a threat to public health, which in turn provoked discomfort and 
trouble in the local population.
The means of access to the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio Verde was by road, 
railway and by air. CVRD had constructed an airport, which was very close to Carajas 
town, and transferred its control and operation to the Ministry of Aeronautics. At the time, 
there were direct flights by jets connecting Carajas with Brasilia and Belem twice a week. 
Moreover, there were regular direct flights to Belem and Brasilia as well as other cities of 
the States of Para, Maranhao and Goias. However, there was a limitation, which was due 
to the fact that the airport was located in CVRD's concession area, for the inhabitants of 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde: obtaining of authorisation to pass through the company's 
gate and, consequently, to have access to the airport. This caused a lot of dissatisfaction 
between those who lived outside the CVRD's enclave.
Road access was via the PA-150 and PA-275, which were paved. The PA-275 road, 
specifically the strip from the CVRD's gate to the Serra dos Carajas, is called Raimundo 
Mascarenhas and was constructed and paved by the Brazilian State mining company. As a 
consequence, this strip was restricted to the company's own use and this fact created 
severe problems, as seen before, for 700 families of small farmers settled in the 
agricultural colony Jader Barbalho who wanted to transport their crops to the town of 
Parauapebas. These difficulties were similar to those faced by colonists in the agricultural 
projects Carajas I and n.
The town of Parauapebas did not have an adequate system of urban transport. Despite the 
precariousness of the system, which subjected the passengers to great discomfort and risk, 
eighteen buses of the Transrodovia company connected Parauapebas and Rio Verde to 
CEDERE, Sao Geraldo and Xinguara (Mayerhofer & Toledo, 1988a). The public 
transport which connect the railway station with the twin towns of Parauapebas and Rio 
Verde was problematic because of the times of the trains, which departed and arrived in
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the early morning, and principally because of the bad condition of the road, which became 
impassable in the rainy season. The transport of passengers and cargo by rail was 
inaugurated in 1985 and one year later this service became regular. At that time, the 
service ran two or three times a week in both directions on the Carajas line, which 
covered the route between Parauapebas and Sao Luis in seventeen and a half hours.
Regularity, safety, speed and low fares were the advantages offered by the Carajas railway 
to the passengers. There were also advantages related to the transport of goods because 
the rail fair was cheaper than that by road. However, the Carajas railway was built to 
transport iron-ore from the Carajas mine to the port of Itaqui and stations along the 
railway were not provided with shelter for passengers, platforms for mounting and 
dismounting, depots for storing the goods, car parks, public conveniences, etc.
Nowadays, only Cidade Nova, Rio Verde and Paz are served by the garbage collection 
system, but even so this system is a complete failure. The municipality has three trucks 
and one of them is responsible for collecting the trash in Cidade Nova three times a week, 
while the other two trucks are in charge of the other two districts. However, these trucks 
are frequently switched from their original functions. In addition, the area destined for 
garbage-disposal was considered inadequate by the consultant firm EPC due to the 
existence of a temporary watercourse (in the rainy season), which brings about the 
lixiviation of garbage and, consequently, contaminates other watercourses in the region 
(IBAM, 1993a).
With regard to other aspects mentioned above, the improvements were extremely limited. 
Thus, the system of urban transport has remained precarious, subjecting passengers to 
discomfort and risk. Some stations along the Carajas railway were improved, but the 
changes, in general, were very limited.
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5.8 - Health and Literacy
In relation to basic health services in Parauapebas, CVRD constructed a hospital, which 
was transferred to the State health agency FSESP, with a capacity of 25 beds to attend an 
estimated population of approximately 12,000 (IDESP, 1990; Roberts, 1991a). However, 
medical staff, which comprised a general practitioner, a surgeon, a dentist and the director 
of the hospital (Mayerhofer, 1986), as well as the equipment, were completely insufficient 
to meet local demand, from over 90,000 people. A great part of this population came from 
surrounding towns, such as Curionopolis, Eldorado, Rio Maria and Xinguara, whose 
health services were worse than that those of Parauapebas.
A sharp contrast is provided by Carajas town, in which CVRD constructed a beautiful, 
well-maintained, equipped and staffed hospital, called Yutaka Takeda, only for its 
employees. This hospital contains 52 beds and was built to attend the 6,720 inhabitants of 
this urban nucleus. The World Health Organisation (WHO) considered the proportion of 5 
beds for every 1,000 inhabitants the ideal situation for a hospital (IDESP, 1990). In this 
regard, Carajas town showed an excellent level with 7.7 hospital beds per 1,000 
inhabitants, while Parauapebas presented a critical situation with 0.23 beds per 1,000.
The fact that the hospital in Carajas town was for CVRD's exclusive use demonstrates the 
absurdity of the situation in which thousands of people did not have access to a modem 
hospital, which was 80% underused. In addition, this fact illustrates the behaviour by 
CVRD, whose significant characteristic, as mentioned above, was its clever use of its dual 
status, and contributes to making the real intentions of this company clearer. By restricting 
the hospital access to its employees, CVRD acted like a private company, but this 
company is truly a State-owned company which mobilises public funds for the 
implementation and maintenance of health and other services owing to that specific 
condition.
Public health impacts are intrinsically associated with inadequate urban infrastructure and 
local service-provision capabilities, which were tremendously aggravated by the 
substantial flow of migrants attracted to the region in search of economic opportunities. In
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addition, these migrants, who were attracted principally by the Carajas Project and 
surrounding wild-cat gold mining, came from other disease-ridden areas of Brazil. As a 
result, this population introduced new diseases, such as Chagas disease (American 
trypanosomiasis) as well as schistosomiasis (bilharzia) into the area and made the control 
of those already existing illnesses more difficult. The lack of slaughterhouses was another 
serious threat to the health of the local population because cattle were slaughtered in 
unsuitable locals such as streets, with no hygiene or controls.
Based on all these problems, the nosological table of the twin towns of Parauapebas and 
Rio Verde was critical (see table 5.5). According to the 1985 CVRD census (Mayerhofer, 
1986), both urban nuclei presented high incidences of malaria, trachoma, leishmanioasis, 
tuberculosis and syphilis.. In addition, practically 100% of those patients examined had 
dermatological problems and suffered from intestinal infections.
Only four years after the 1985 CVRD census, the municipality of Parauapebas showed a 
rapid increase in a variety of health problems and a worsening of social indicators, such as 
infant mortality. In this regard, table 5.6 indicates that high incidences of malaria, 
tuberculosis ,leprosy, measles, hepatitis, whooping cough, meningitis, tetanus and 
infectious diarrhoea and parasitic diseases exceeded the state of Para averages (IDESP, 
1990).
Table 5.5 - The Results of Medical Examination
Main Diseases Patients Positive Cases
Researched Examined N
Trachoi
Malaria
Leishmanioasis
Tuberculosis
Syphilis
Source: CVRD/SUMIC (Mayerhofer, 1986).
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Table 5.6 - Coefficient of incidence of Diseases in Parauapebas and in the state of Para 
(100,000 inhabitants).
DISEASES
Infectious diarrhoea and parasitic diseases
Malaria
Tuberculosis
'C VV/ B -5,  ^ -1
Leprosy 
Measles 
Hepatitis
Whooping Cough
COEFFICIENTS 
PARAUAPEBAS STATE OF PARA
ii . £
■
Meningitis
Tetanus
1,142 723.1
10,101 2,744.7
107 76.9
196 45.8
86 2.2
67 27.2
25 7.2
20 1.3
7 0.6
Source: FSESP and Secretaria de Saude Publica do Estado do Para (IDESP, 1990).
Widespread urban poverty and malnutrition were reflected in high indices of mortality 
(see table 5.7), especially infant mortality (up to one year old), which averages 46 per
1,000 live births, and foetal mortality, which averages 82,8 per 1,000 live births (IDESP, 
1990).All indices of mortality in Parauapebas showed in the table bellow exceeded the 
city of Belem averages.
Table 5.7 - Main Health Indicators
Indicators Coefficient
Parauapebas ( I) Belem (2)
General Mortality/1,000 
Infant Mortality/1,000 live births 
Maternal Mortality/1,000 live births
Foetal Mortality/1,000 live births
5.9
46.0 
2.2
82.8
31.1
3.7
26.3 
0.7
26.0
26.3Birth Rate/1,000 hab.
■ ■ ■ ■ 1   _
Source: (1) FSESP, 1988; and (2) Secretaria de Saude Publica do Estado do Para, 1988
(IDESP, 1990).
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Although the incidence of most of diseases had decreased, the nosological table (see table 
5.8) elaborated by FNS (SMS, 1994) in 1994 shows clearly that the municipality of 
Parauapebas continued to present high indexes of malaria, infectious diarrhoea and 
parasitic diseases, tuberculosis, leprosy, leishmanioasis, whooping cough, measles, 
tetanus, sexually transmitted diseases, infectious hepatitis and respiratory diseases.
In 1991, the indicators of infant mortality, which averages 39.1 per 1,000 live births; of 
general mortality, which averages 3.73 per 1,000 inhabitants; of maternal mortality, which 
averages 1.31 per 1,00 live births and of foetal mortality, which averages 41.15 per 1,000 
live births (SEPLAN/Para, 1995) decreased in comparison with the same indicators from 
table 5.7, which had been registered in 1988. This decrease, although continued high, 
shows clearly that the municipality of Parauapebas was making some improvements.
Despite the improvements in the health sector, the situation was still worrying. The 
reasons for high incidences of most of diseases in the municipality of Parauapebas are 
intrinsically related to problems such as inadequate housing conditions, the "sanitary 
short-circuit", the consumption of non-treated water, the consumption of milk and food 
products with no sanitary inspection, lack of an adequate basic sanitation, lack of an 
effective combat (vaccination, etc.) against virus responsible for diseases and also against 
the factors which favoured the proliferation of these virus. In addition, the infrastructure 
of the health system is not sufficient for meeting the growing demands of local 
population, which is prevented by CVRD from using the modem hospital Yutaka Takeda 
in Carajas town. In a region which lacks everything, this prohibition is surreal and 
inconceivable and makes the life of poor population much more difficult.
With regard to the education sector, the situation in Parauapebas and Rio Verde was also 
dramatic. Problems had their origins in a great demand and scarce human and financial 
resources, which in turn were associated with the lack of urban services and facilities. A 
blatant contrast was provided by Carajas town, which has an excellent educational 
infrastructure with nursery, primary and secondary schools and well-qualified teachers. In 
March 1984, the school's staff (teachers, directors and people for administrative services)
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Table 5.8 - Incidence of diseases in Parauapebas (population estimated at 94,000 hab.)
DISEASES
Aids
:
Soft chancre
Condyloma 
Whooping cough 
Infant diarrhoea 
Chagas disease 
Schistosomiasis 
Gonorrhoea 
Leprosy 
Hepatitis 
Genital herpes 
Respiratory infection 
leishmanioasis 
LinfogranulomaJVenerum 
Malaria 
Meningitis
Gonocoecal ophthalmia
N° of Cases Percentage
30
01
03
51
08
1267
08
05
70
108
12
05
2409
210
05
1752
07
02
10Measles 
Syphilis
Tetanus 05
Tuberculosis 22
Source: FNS (SMS, 1994)
0.002
0.006
0.002
0.006
gPBWlf
0.104
0.016
0.010
0.142
0.220
0.024
0.010
4.916
428.5
0.010
3.575
0.014
0.004
0.02
0.061
0.010
0.044
numbered 49 for a total population of 691 students (CVRD, 1984). At the beginning, the 
school system was run by the CETEP (Centre for Technical Teaching of the State of 
Para), whose central office was in Belem (capital of the Para State). However, educational 
services were supervised by the well-known Pitagoras (Pythagoras) school, which was a 
private educational institution from Belo Horizonte (capital of Minas Gerais State).
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The Parauapebas and Rio Verde region comprised five schools: one private and four 
public schools. These five schools had a total of 4,652 places (Mayerhofer, 1986). 
However, the total demand, which consisted of 6,799 people of school age (up to eighteen 
years old) and of 6,362 adults, in the region was of 13,161. Thus, the gap between supply 
and demand was 8,509. This considerable gap means that the school system in the twin 
towns was totally insufficient to meet local demand.
In 1985, CVRD undertook a census (Mayerhofer, 1986) which showed that 21.64% of 
adults in Parauapebas, Rio Verde and adjacent invasions were illiterate. According to the 
World Bank (1997), adult illiteracy is defined as the proportion of the population aged 
fifteen years old and older, who can not, with understanding, read and write a short, 
simple statement on their every day life. From this total, Parauapebas had only 1.60%, 
while Rio Verde and surrounding invasions had 20.04% of illiterates (with no educational 
attainment). This significant difference between these urban nuclei also illustrates the 
existing inequalities of each kind of occupation.
It was predicted that the Euclydes Figueiredo school would be able to absorb a total of 
1,480 students in four shifts of four-hours (Mayerhofer, 1986). In 1985, 2,829 students 
were registered in the school, which was in fact functioning with 91% of students above 
the limit originally planned. Overcrowded schools, a common phenomenon in 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde, mean problems related to internal space, a large number of 
students per classroom, loss of teaching quality and, principally, the lack of educational 
infrastructure, which was completely unable to meet local demand. In addition to these 
problems, there was another: the low level of qualification of teachers, which contributed 
to making the situation even more difficult.
In 1989, the municipality of Parauapebas comprised 92 schools, 13 urban and 79 rural 
(IDESP, 1990). Despite the increase in the number of schools, the situation of the 
municipality was very problematic: its educational infrastructure continued to be 
insufficient for meeting the growing local demand; 90% of elementary teachers had not 
completed primary school (IDESP, 1990; Roberts, 1991a); 20% of adults in town were 
illiterate (Roberts, 1991a), which meant they did not any educational attainment; rural
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schools were poorly built and worked precariously and there was neither teaching 
materials for students nor manuals for teachers (IDESP, 1990).
Although data have not been updated, there was a significant increase in the number of 
schools in the municipality of Parauapebas, by 1991 (SEPLAN/Para, 1995); 252 schools: 
20 in the urban area and 232 in the rural area. According to Decennial Plan for Education 
(SEMED, 1994), there were 36,800 people of school age (from 4 years old to 17 years 
old), but only 22,460 were registered and this fact means that approximately 40% of 
student population was not even able to attend school. The reasons for this problem lie 
principally in the insufficient number of places in schools for meeting the existing 
demand and high incidence of repeater students, which is estimated at 30% in 1994 
(SEMED, 1994), while the national average was 19% in 1993 (World Bank, 1993).
In relation to the lack of sufficient places in schools for attending the local demand, the 
Decennial Plan for Education predicted that would be necessary to construct 406 
classrooms in ten years (1994-2004) in order to solve this problem. However, the 
construction of 40 classrooms per year, as suggested by the Decennial Plan itself, was 
beyond the capacity of municipal courses, principally because of other important 
problems, such as the lack of qualified teachers and the little participation of the state of 
Para in the construction of new schools. All these problems associated with the low 
salaries paid to municipal teachers, low level of qualification of these teachers, a large 
number of students per classroom (the average is 50 students per classroom in both, 
primary and secondary, schools), etc. contribute to making the quality of teaching, 
principally in the public schools, very poor.
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5.9 - Summing up
This chapter has focused on two distinct phases of Parauapebas: before and after its 
emancipation from the municipality of Maraba. Although different, these have some 
connections and similarities that will be essential for understanding the development of 
this town. In the first phase, neither Parauapebas nor Verde had any autonomy and, 
consequently, were directly subjected to the Maraba municipal administration and 
indirectly to CVRD. However, Parauapebas/Rio Verde was not a priority for the 
municipality of Maraba, which had countless other problems to tackle. In addition, CVRD 
itself maintained a difficult relationship with the local authorities and adopted hostile 
attitudes towards the population of Parauapebas and Rio Verde, such as the rigid control 
exercised by CVRD guards in its entrance gate and its decision to establish Carajas as a 
“company town”, which meant social segregation and exclusion, contributed to making 
the local problems even more difficult.
These aspects allied to a large and intense flow of migrants, who arrived in the region in 
search of economic opportunities, contributed to producing a serious situation in which 
the Parauapebas/Rio Verde region presented inadequate urban infrastructure and services; 
a critical nosological table and worrying problems in the educational sector. This situation 
provoked the emancipation of the region, which would begin a new phase, as hoped, in its 
development. In fact, the emancipation has brought many improvements to the 
municipality of Parauapebas.
Paradoxically, the situation in Parauapebas, despite improvements, was still worrying. 
The municipality continued to present high indices of infant and foetal mortality and high 
incidences of many diseases. These impacts on public health are intrinsically related to the 
lack of basic urban services and facilities, widespread urban poverty and malnutrition. In 
addition, the situation of educational sector was also problematic. The reasons for this 
serious situation lie in the flow of migrants, who arrived continually in the region; in the 
Federal government, which reduced drastically its presence in the region; in the CVRD, 
which could do much more to improve local living conditions, but the company's
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assistance only materialised in accordance with its own interests; and in the local 
governments; which has many limitations.
This chapter has provided a whole picture of Parauapebas, always focusing on the 
improvements made and on the problems generated. The next chapter will analyse the 
local impacts in the light of development pole theory.
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The Beneficial Spread Effects and the Case of Parauapebas
6.1 - Introduction
The last chapter provided a complete picture of Parauapebas in which its development 
was traced. It was verified that, despite improvements, the municipality of Parauapebas 
continues to present a problematic situation, which can be partly explained by a number 
of factors, varying from a difficult relationship between CVRD and local authorities to the 
limitations of local governments. However, these factors are unable to explain entirely the 
socio-economic transformations undergone by Parauapebas. These transformations are a 
direct product of development policies, principally development pole strategies, 
implemented in Amazonia. Owing to its privileged location in the Carajas immediate area 
of influence, Parauapebas offers a special opportunity to examine the beneficial spread 
effects generated by development poles. While the second chapter focused on the 
assumptions behind this theory in relation to the beneficial spread effects, the main 
purpose of this chapter is to analyse the local problems in the light of development pole 
theory itself.
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6.2 - Development Pole Strategies
“We have every possibility of making Brazil successful. 
The condition is to prevent past mistakes from repeating 
themselves in the future. It is to break the hegemony of, 
and perverse domination by, our selfish dominating class. 
This class and its technocrats only plan against the 
people and examples of their actions are countless. So 
there it is, this horrible Carajas Project”.
(Darcy Ribeiro in: O Brasil como Problema, 1995)
As seen in chapter four, Parauapebas, despite its political independence, continues to 
present a worrying picture, whose origins may be traced to development pole strategies 
adopted by the Brazilian government during the 1970s. From the government's point of 
view, the implementation of the regional infrastructure as well as the Carajas Project was 
to be the basis for the future development of the region. In fact, the Carajas Project has 
been a tremendous economic success, as will be shown in the next chapter, but on the 
other hand its social and environmental impacts have been considerable. The discrepancy 
between economic and social results is a distortion of the economy in which highly 
profitable projects generate enormous poverty in surrounding areas.
Parauapebas is a by-product of the Carajas Project and, consequently, the situation of this 
town and of the municipality itself is intrinsically related to spread effects generated by 
development poles. Owing to its location, Parauapebas is a privileged case. This town is 
in the immediate area of influence of the Carajas mine, which was the most important 
pole - the Carajas pole - designated by POLAMAZONIA, and at the same time was one of 
the PGCs development poles. Therefore, to understand the present situation of 
Parauapebas it is essential to analyse local problems in the light of development pole 
theory itself.
The idea advocated by development pole theory (see chapter two) that economic growth, 
interregional equilibrium and integration of backward regions could be achieved through 
a strategy of decentralised development harmonised with the geopolitical as well as with 
the economic objectives of the military regime. Development pole strategies were 
strongly implemented by POLAMAZONIA. This programme, launched by the Geisel 
administration in the PND n, lasted thirteen years, from 1974 to 1987, and its spatial
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strategy contributed considerably to the opening up of the Amazon region for the 
exploitation of its vast resources and to tens of thousands of migrants.
Development pole policies in Brazil concentrated basically on infrastructure, of which 
POLAMAZONIA is a perfect example. Heavy infrastructural investments, associated 
with existing fiscal and credit incentives, were made by the Federal government in order 
to create, as pointed out by Mahar (1989, pp. 40), "a more favourable investment climate 
in Amazonia for private enterprise”. In fact, the military government had opted for the 
market economy and, therefore, development planning and government actions were to be 
oriented towards the private sector in order to support and encourage investments while 
the government itself, as producer and investor, was to restrict its activities to those areas 
considered of national interest and security.
The implementation of POLAMAZONIA was part of government strategy for 
overcoming the serious problems caused by the sharp oil price increases of 1973-74. 
Restrictive policies were ignored by the Brazilian government, which opted for an 
ambitious programme of import-substitution investments in capital goods and basic raw 
materials. In this regard, the export potential of Amazonia, a region with vast mineral 
resources and which offered favourable conditions for agriculture and forestry, was 
viewed by the Geisel administration as an important contribution to boosting Brazil's 
foreign exchange earnings and improving its balance of payments.
POLAMAZONIA marked a significant change in government policy in favour of large- 
scale private enterprises to the detriment of small-scale colonisation schemes, but this 
change, notwithstanding intense entrepreneurial lobbying, was perfectly compatible with 
the government's economic objective, which was to attain high rates of economic and 
industrial growth. It is worth noting that this objective was totally compatible with 
development pole strategy. The Carajas Project, the Greater Carajas Programme (PGC) 
and other industrial undertakings were implemented within the logic of development pole 
theory.
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Indeed, the Federal government implemented development pole strategies with the clear 
purpose of attaining its economic and geopolitical (national integration and occupation of 
Amazonia) objectives. Although these strategies have been abandoned since the 
abolishment of POLAMAZONIA in 1987, they marked the Amazon region indelibly. 
With respect to this point, two important questions remain: What did development pole 
policies accomplish? And what were the impacts caused by these policies? Owing to its 
favourable location, Parauapebas is an ideal place for answering these questions, which 
will be taken up in the next section.
The allocation of POLAMAZ6n IA funds to development poles and sectors (see table 
6.1) shows the real priorities of the Federal government and at the same time provides 
some evidence which will be useful for understanding subsequent impacts on the region. 
For instance, the Carajas pole was by far the major beneficiary of resources allocated in 
1975-79. This pole also received more resources than others for urban development as 
well as transport sectors. On the other hand, it obtained insufficient funding for other 
important sectors, such as agriculture, health and basic sanitation, education and culture, 
etc., especially for a pole which had the highest rate of population growth throughout the 
1970s (Bunker, 1986; Vasconcelos dos Santos, 1986)
In relation to the 1980-85 period, the priorities for the Carajas pole, in financial terms, 
continued to be the urban development and the transport sectors, although the latter was 
the most favoured sector in comparison with the others. Despite this fact, it is important to 
observe the sharp contrast between 1975-79 and 1980-85, when the sum invested in the 
first period was practically three times the amount spent in the second. This decrease in 
investment was due to two factors: the establishment of the PGC, which overlapped with 
a considerable part of POLAMAZONIA"s area; and the economic crisis faced by the 
Federal government, which needed to cut public spending.
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Table 6.1 - POLAMAZONIA - Investment in Sectors and Poles (1)
Cr$l billion
Sectors \ Agricult. 
Poles
Transp. Others (2) TOTAL
1975-79
Acre
Caraj3s
Pr6-Amaz.
Mar.
588.064
87.671
67.349
77.392
Develop. Culture and Sanit.
808.411 55.866 90.602 573.285 246.803 2363.031 72.7
90.454 6.009 5.600 16.559 7.652 213.915 6.6
151.590 7.728 14.065 296.117 18.330 555.179 17.1
72.651 19.876 23.464 65.323 37.664 296.370 9.1 ■
Tapaj<5s 115.954 117.543 3.815 7.971 12.255 125.265 382.265 11.8
Others(3) 239.698 376.173 18.438 39.502 183.031 57.892 914.734 28.1
1980-85 202.917 255.158 74.571 69.351 169.936 117.506 839.439 27.3
Acre 27.487 22.908 8.255 4.387 24.442 16.494 103.953 3.2
Carajas 9.606 30.398 8.147 8.273 45.267 11.081 112.772 3.5
Pr€-Amaz. 20.055 22.906 13.416 15.062 32.757 24.062 128.258 3.9
Mar
Tapajds 44.270 41.900 6.876 3.356 4.289 7.395 108.086 3.3
Others(3) 101.499 137.046 37.877 38.273 63.201 58.474 436.370 13.4
TOTAL 790.981 1063.569 130.437 159.953 743.221 364.309 3252.470 100.0
% 24.3 32.7 4.0 4.9 22.9 11.2 100.0
Source: MINTER-SEPLAN-PR (Vasconcelos dos Santos, 1986).
(1) - Values adjusted to 1985 prices
(2) - assistance and welfare, science and technology, energy, industry and services, 
government planning, employment and mining and community development.
(3) - Amapa, Altamira, Jurua-Solimoes, Marajo, Roraima and Trombetas.
Although POLAMAZONIA was a programme directed essentially at infrastructure 
development, it should have made clear its expectations of beneficial spread effects to be 
generated by industrial undertakings in the region. However, this did not happen. These
/V
expectations remained rather vague and the document POLAMAZONIA: Carajas is a 
good example. This document is eminently descriptive, providing a whole picture of the 
region, showing its main problems and suggesting guidelines in order to set in motion the 
development of the area. Nevertheless, spread effects were somewhat nebulous. They 
were expected, but they were neither clearly described nor quantified, just hoped for and 
suggested along with the text.
Two important facts must be taken into consideration. Firstly, the document 
POLAMAZONIA: Carajas is much more vague, even considering that the Carajas pole
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embraced the Tucurui Hydroelectric scheme in its area, in respect of forestry, agro­
livestock, food supply and colonisation schemes than in relation to mineral undertakings, 
which were, of course, the top priority and the Carajas Project as well as the railway 
connecting the mine to the port were strongly emphasised. In fact, the document gives a 
clear impression that other activities were only loosely attached to the main priority. 
Secondly, the document POLAMAZONIA: Carajas presented a sharp contrast with the 
Master Plan for the Carajas Corridor, which, after its elaboration in 1989, was shelved by 
government.
Much has been written about development pole theory and some authors (see chapter 2) 
blamed Perroux's disciples, especially Boudeville, for its failure, of theory, which had 
been completelly "distorted" by them. In this regard, Roberts (1995a) not only agreed with 
this interpretation but added that this "distorted" theory, broadly adopted in Latin 
American countries, when associated with plans for resource-led development led to the 
premise that "mining can be a motor for a diversified regional economy". Both 
interpretations were far from being true. As seen in the second chapter, Perroux was 
acutely aware of other contributions, principally those of Boudeville, to his theory, and 
moreover, Perroux himself recognised their importance and legitimacy.
In relation to the second interpretation, it is important to remember that Boudeville had 
published a significant study in 1957 of Brazilian growth poles, in which the metallurgical 
industry was regarded by him as a growth or propulsive industry, which, according to 
Perroux, tends to generate spread effects on its environment. Boudeville, in his study 
(1957), focused on the state of Minas Gerais, which was rich in iron-ore (CVRD exploited 
the iron-ore mine in the town of Itabira) and stressed that one of the characteristics of the 
emergence of this growth pole (development pole) was the presence of the mineral 
resource. However, the central point is that the exploitation of iron-ore led to the 
establishment of the metallurgical industry and steel production led automatically to the 
setting up of other branches of the metallurgical industries in the region. In other words, 
the iron-ore mine was the starting point for the economic growth of Minas Gerais state.
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Boudeville made some comments on the agricultural sector of the state of Minas Gerais. 
This sector was responsible for 50% of Minas' income and this fact was considered a 
"fundamental symbol of poverty" (1957, pp. 10) because the agricultural income of 
developed countries was low, even when this sector was developed in these countries. 
According to the author, the reasons for the weakness of the agricultural sector of Minas 
relied upon "the primitive and sclerosed tradition" of this sector and the solution would be 
its mechanisation. It is interesting to observe that this solution was adopted by the 
Brazilian government in programmes such as POLAMAZONIA and PGC practically two 
decades later.
Although mineral resources were important, the key element was the propulsive (growth) 
industry, which was responsible for generating effects on the entire economy. In this 
regard, Perroux (1968; 1988a) pointed out that there were certain industrial combinations 
-principally exemplified by the following: power + iron and steel + metal goods + 
engineering - that have the virtue of generating new industries and providing the entire 
industrial sector with the capacity for renewal. Despite the importance of these 
combinations which can induce economic growth, the author himself stressed that not all 
the components are necessarily located in the same country and even when these 
components have to be created, they cannot all be created in the same country.
Owing to this problem, Perroux stressed that:
"...m ultinational investments carried out under properly form ulated program m es designed to 
foster sim ultaneously the industrialisation, the development, and the relative autonomy of the 
regions concerned, can led to the establishm ent o f two types o f com binations o f  industries: (a) 
industrial com plexes, around com m on centres for the extraction o f raw  materials, pow er 
generation, and distribution and technological research; and (b) agro-industrial com plexes, for on- 
the-spot processing o f agricultural products, either for export or for dom estic consumption" 
(1988a, pp.69).
Perroux's idea mentioned above fitted in well with the programmes implemented by the 
Brazilian government in the 1970s and 1980s. The exploitation of mineral resources (raw 
material) was regarded by Perroux as a means of attracting catalyst industries, which
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could induce the establishment of others and, consequently, economic growth in the 
region.
Many authors were unaware that development pole strategies were intrinsically related to 
a development paradigm termed "from above". According to Stohr and Taylor (1981, 
pp.l), the development based on this paradigm
"... is driven by external dem and and innovation impulses, and that from  a few dynam ic sectoral 
or geographical clusters [developm ent poles] developm ent would, either in a spontaneous or 
induced way, "trickle-down" to the rest o f the system. Such strategies, as well as being outward- 
looking or externally oriented, have tended to be urban and industrial in nature, capital-intensive, 
and dom inated by high technology and the "large project" approach".
The discovery of renewable natural resources or non-renewable ones assumed a particular 
importance for the development of peripheral regions, because the availability of these 
resources was to stimulate the future formation of an export-base oriented to the internal 
or external market and, consequently, was to promote the economic growth of this area. 
The setting up of this export-base in backward regions aimed to exploit their comparative 
inter-regional advantages, but at the same time infrastructural investments and transfer of 
technology and capital were necessary to initiate the dynamic process of development.
With respect to Amazonia, the great variety of renewable and non-renewable natural 
resources was regarded by the Brazilian government as an extremely favourable factor 
because a diversified economy tends to be less vulnerable to external factors, such as 
market prices or a decrease in the consumption of certain types of goods produced locally, 
etc. It is worth noting that the Amazon region was considered by the PDA II a "tropical 
frontier" and terms in development theory such as "comparative advantages" and 
"multiplier effects", were mentioned not only in this plan but also in the PND II and in 
documents about POLAMAZONIA (Decrees, POLAMAZONIA: Carajas, etc.). These 
terms, used in planning documents, show that the Federal government had the clear 
intention in exploiting the vast natural resources of Amazonia, and the fifteen 
development poles were selected in order to develop their comparative advantages. (CDE, 
1974).
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These efforts based on large-scale investment resources aimed to generate structural 
changes by means of accelerated economic growth. However, planning documents neither 
provided negative scenarios nor commented on probable negative consequences of the 
development model adopted by the Brazilian government. The one exception was the 
PDA II (1975, pp. 35), which stressed superficially that this model, despite the high 
probability of its generating "multiplier effects" in the region, had a propensity to provoke 
"leakage" of profits and capital generated in the peripheral regions to other regions or 
abroad, which would be benefited, instead of Amazonia, by "multiplier effects".
By identifying the problem, considered a "spontaneous characteristic" of the development 
model, the PDA II stressed the importance of tackling it in order to achieve four targets. 
Two of them were important: to make the model generate "multiplier" and "germinative" 
effects within the region as much as possible; and to compensate the region, through 
financial transfers from the Federal government, for the risks of having a development 
biased outwards with no regional benefits. Although vague, these targets are extremely 
suggestive. The probability of having a regional development oriented exclusively to 
outside the region with a few beneficial spread effects generated on the peripheral region 
itself, is characteristic of an economic enclave. The export enclave is not explicitly 
mentioned by the PDA n, but the indirect references made in this document show clearly 
that the planners were aware of this problem.
However, the strategy suggested by the PDA II to avoid this problem was to complement 
the existing infrastructure in order to serve the non-dynamic sectors. Indeed, the strategy 
was also evasive and moreover, the plan, even the document POLAMAZONIA: Carajas. 
which was a detailed plan of POLAMAZONIA strategy, did not discuss important 
matters, such as the dynamism and competitiveness of productive sectors in the region, 
the possibility of "linkages" between these sectors, etc. By paying attention to both 
targets, principally the first one, mentioned above, it is quite clear that what really 
mattered to planners was to achieve high rates of economic growth. This urgency of 
achieving economic growth was due to the pervasive belief, generated to a large extent by
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development pole theory, that once economic growth had taken place, the beneficial 
spread effects would automatically occur in all surrounding regions.
At the beginning of the 1980s, when the Carajas Project as well as the PGC were 
implemented, development pole policies continued to guide Amazonian development and 
Brazil faced a serious economic crisis. Brazil's trade deficit rose from US$ 1 billion in
1978 to US$ 2.8 billion in 1980; the deficit in the balance of payments increased from 
US$ 3.2 billion in 1979 to US$ 3.6 billion in 1980; imports rose from US$ 18 billion in
1979 to US$ 23 billion in 1980; the current account deficit rose from US$ 10.5 billion in 
1979 to US$ 12.8 billion in 1980; and inflation rose from 77% in 1979 to 110% in 1980 
(Malan & Bonelli, 1992, pp. 87-88). This difficult situation led Mr. Delfim Netto, then 
Minister of Planning in the Figueiredo administration (1979-85), to make some 
unequivocal declarations in relation to the Carajas Project and the PGC.
In 1982, he declared that:
"when we have Carajds [the C ara jls  Project] working at full-scale, it will represent an export o f 
the order o f US$ 9 to 10 billion a year. It will be an increase over the norm al exports. This means 
that the export curve will raise, w ill generate a gap between exports and im ports, which will be 
the surplus o f the trade balance...W e shall decrease our current account deficit w ith this surplus; 
and it is in this way that we shall dim inish the relative im portance o f  the foreign debt" (quoted by 
Loureiro, 1992, pp. 316-317).
The Carajas Project had already been approved by the Geisel government and the 
construction of the railway was initiated in 1978, but this project and other undertakings 
such as Tucuruf hydroelectric scheme and the aluminium plants gained a definitive push 
under the succeeding Figueiredo administration, which was seduced by the idea of 
developing the region in an "integrated" way, i.e. through the PGC (see chapter 1; Hall, 
1991a). This programme, in which the Carajas Project was the cornerstone, embraced 
mineral, infrastructural, agricultural, livestock and forestry undertakings in Eastern 
Amazonia. In social terms, the creation of a large number of jobs in the industrial and 
agricultural sectors, together with the possibility of absorbing a considerable contingent of 
workers from other regions of Brazil (Amazonia continued to exert its role of "safety-
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valve"), were regarded by the Federal government as a great advantage of this "integrated" 
development programme.
However, the main focus of the PGC was economic. According to Mr. Delfim Netto, this 
programme would help "to eliminate the obstacles which hinder Brazil's growth, taking 
into consideration that, "we are prisoners of the balance of payments...There is no 
alternative model" (quoted by Hall, 1991a, pp.47). However, in 1981, the year before the 
above declaration, Mr. Delfim Netto affirmed that "it is the Carajas Project that will 
ensure the viability of the PGC" (quoted by Neto, 1990, pp. 140). The second declaration 
is suggestive because this programme, in spite of embracing a large number of heavy and 
non-heavy industrial activities , would depend on the Carajas Project to became viable. 
Thus the importance of this project was confirmed, but at the same time the significance 
of the PGC is questionable insofar as the work on the Carajas Project as well as on its 
other important components had been initiated before its implementation.
The main reason for the implementation of the PGC is the fact that the Brazilian 
government, because of its serious economic problems, needed to attract a large amount 
of loans and generate foreign exchange in order to service its huge external debt and 
decrease its worrying balance of payments deficit. Thus, the presentation of a ready-made 
and attractive regional development strategy was convenient and fundamental for the 
Federal government to realise its objectives. The PGC was implemented and this period 
can be considered the apex of development pole strategies. By encouraging a number of 
projects, it was hoped that further industrial and agribusiness ventures would be attracted 
to the PGCvs seven development poles, Parauapebas being one of them.
The setting up of pig-iron industries and iron-alloy plants was a decisive element in the 
PGC strategy to establish an "integrated" industrial development along the Carajas 
railway and two iron-alloy plants were to be located in Parauapebas. Owing to their 
potentially devastating environmental consequences only a few industries were 
implemented. In relation to Parauapebas, there was another specific problem, namely the 
stagnant atmosphere in the region, which could make the problems there worse than ever.
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Although the PGC had highly privileged mineral extraction and processing activities, 
agriculture, lumbering and livestock were, although to a much lesser extent, important 
elements in this programme. The most comprehensive plan for agricultural development 
and related activities in Eastern Amazonia was the Programa Grande Carajas Agricola 
(PGCA), which was elaborated in 1983 by the Brazilian Ministry of Agriculture. Its 
objectives were to increase and diversify production of food and industrial goods within 
seven development poles in the Carajas region by using capital-intensive modem 
technology (Feamside, 1986; Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992). The PGCA remained a 
plan on paper and it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse the reasons for this. 
However, some points are sufficiently important to be considered.
Firstly, the plan was very technocratic, placing great emphasis on large-scale, commercial 
and export-biased production and advocated the intensive use of modem technologies. It 
is worthwhile noting that these characteristics are related to the logic of development 
poles, in which the foremost aim was to achieve high rates of economic growth. Secondly, 
the PGCA was never taken seriously by the Brazilian government, which elaborated this 
document with the clear purpose of presenting an unreed image of the PGC as a fully- 
integrated regional development plan for Eastern Amazonia and, consequently, of 
obtaining substantial foreign loans and investments (Hall, 1991a). What really mattered to 
the PGC was the industrial projects and it was no coincidence that the major beneficiaries 
of fiscal incentives were mineral extraction and processing activities.
In spite of the fact that the PGCA was not implemented, significant investments were 
made in other agricultural, lumbering and livestock projects, even though these projects 
absorbed only about 1% of toted PGC funds (Hall, 1991a). However, the "philosophy", 
which had had been adopted since POLAMAZONIA and which was based on large-scale, 
commercial and export-oriented production was maintained throughout the PGC period, 
and thus the impacts caused by these projects exacerbated the already negative trends, 
contributing even more to producing a worrying social and environmental picture of the 
region.
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The main point is that the socio-economic and environmental impacts on Eastern 
Amazonia were generated by development policies guided by modernisation principles 
and, principally, development pole strategies with their convenient beneficial spread 
effects. This theme will be discussed below and the focus will be centred on Parauapebas.
6.3 - Interindustry Linkages
Economic development occurs at variable intensities throughout the region. Thus 
development for Perroux is highly polarised because the catalytic effects, generally 
produced by a cluster of economic activities, tend to engender the growth of the economic 
whole. The main reason for the occurrence of economic development is technological 
progress or, according to Perroux's preferential word, innovation, which is usually 
introduced by a particular type of industry, a propulsive industry (industrie motrice). This 
type of industry tend to be clustered in special places, which could be cities or areas of 
mining, agriculture, etc. The agglomeration of propulsive industries is a development 
pole.
Development pole theory suggests that development poles will generate spread effects, 
but these effects will not be felt without propulsive industries. These industries play a 
central role in Perroux's theory insofar as they have a higher than average rate of growth 
of product as well as of productivity and a rapidly increasing share in industry as a whole 
(Perroux, 1968. pp. 244; 1988a, pp. 67-68). As a consequence, these industries would be 
able to produce effects on the entire economy. Despite these characteristics, the foremost 
point is that a propulsive industry exerts a propulsive effect on another industry. 
According to Perroux (1968. pp. 243; 1988a, pp. 67), this effect can be either accidental 
or typical in nature, is divided into two components which frequently combine with each 
other: a dimension effect - the increase of demand on B by A, or the possibility provided 
by A to B of increasing its supply; and an innovation effect (or productivity effect) - the 
capacity provided by A to B or induced by A to B to introduce an innovation which for a 
given quantity of factors of production yields the same quantity of product at a lower price 
and of better quality.
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Thus, the interindustry linkages assume a great importance in Perroux"s theory and an 
essential point was to identify which type of industry was propulsive. In general, scholars 
who were involved with the development pole theory were, as pointed out by Polenske 
(1988, pp. 102), interested in looking at interindustry linkages and had the clear aim of 
determining multiplier effects of particular investment programmes. Perroux himself in 
his work (1973) Ueffet d'entramement: de ranalyse au reperase auantitatif provided 
quantitative measures of the propulsive effects as well as a table of intersectoral linkages 
embracing 78 branches of the French industry. Despite the significance of these works, 
the best contribution was given by Hirschman, who introduced the concepts of backward 
and forward linkages into the economic literature.
These concepts were an attemptive at describing the dynamic of industrialisation and, 
because of their clearness and usefulness in the analysis of the industrialisation process, 
they were broadly accepted and became part of the vocabulary of development economics. 
According to Hirschman (1981, pp. 63; 1992, pp. 58), his own concepts were "more 
operational" and "less fuzzy" than Perroux"s propulsive industry, Rostow's leading sectors 
or Dahmen's development block and the main reason for this advantage on other concepts 
relied upon the intrinsic connection between linkages and the input-output model. In his 
book The Strategy of Economic Development. Hirschman only created and defined the 
backward and forward linkage effects and years later he developed two more concepts, the 
consumption linkage and the fiscal linkage.
Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter to analyse concepts developed by 
Hirschman, it is important to understand and comment briefly on them because they are 
useful in interpreting development experiences, principally in those countries such as 
Brazil which adopted an export-led growth model. Consequently, these concepts will 
helpful in examining whether beneficial spread effects have been generated in 
Parauapebas.
Backward linkages are intrinsically related to the stimulus that lead one sector of an 
economy to exert pressure on a second in order to supply the inputs required by the 
former. Forward linkages are related to the pressure that one sector exerts on another,
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which leads to the establishment of new activities that use the output of the first as an 
input. Hirschman considered backward linkage effects more important, principally for 
developing countries, than the forward linkages because the dynamic of the former 
allowed these countries to experience all stages of industrialisation - finished goods, semi 
processed goods and machinery - at once. This industrial path become known as import- 
substitution industrialisation (ISI). This industrialisation process was adopted by the 
Brazilian government for a very long time.
In fact, import-substitution had occurred in Brazil since the beginning of its 
industrialisation, and heavy protective tariffs, subsidies and incentives were important 
instruments of this process. Malan and Bonelli (1992) divided Brazilian development 
based on import-substitution industrialisation into two phases: the first up to the 1960s 
was defined as "inward-looking" development; and the second from the 1960s to the 
1980s was considered an "outward-looking" growth. In both phases, as both authors also 
pointed out, the pattern of development was associated with reliance on a large domestic 
market; a leading role of the Federal government as investor and promoter of specific 
activities; and a policy for attracting foreign investments.
It is worth mentioning that the Geisel government (1974-79), despite the first oil shock in 
1973, opted for the ultimate stage of import-substitution industrialisation which was the 
sector of intermediate goods, specifically chemical and metallurgical industries and 
capital goods. The PND II (see chapter 2) placed a great emphasis on metallurgical and 
chemical industries, principally basic petrochemical (see Evans, 1986), because of their 
ability to creating backward and forward linkages. By setting-up petrochemical poles, 
such as Cama9 ari in the state of Bahia and Polosul in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, and 
mineral and agro-industrial poles, selected by POLAMAZONIA in the North, the Federal 
government aimed to take advantage of scale and agglomeration economies, to maintain 
the high rates of economic growth achieved in the "miracle years", to make these poles 
function as a counter-magnet preventing immigration to the large and congested cities, to 
avoid industrial concentration on the Centre-South and, consequently, to reduce regional 
imbalances, etc.
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After developing both concepts, backward and forward linkages, Hirschman identified 
other types of linkage effects which were useful for detecting not only "how one thing 
leads (or fails to lead) to another", but also for analysing "the causal links involved in the 
complex interactions among technology, ideology, institutions, and development" 
(Hirschman, 1992, pp.74). In this regard, Hirschman added the concept of consumption 
linkage, which was defined as the stimulus for domestic production of consumer goods by 
means of the new incomes earned from staple production and export. The industrial 
development generated by consumption linkages depends on the aggregate income stream 
to which primary exports give rise and also depends on its distribution.
Consumption linkage, as pointed out by Hirschman, is the beginning of the process of 
import-substitution industrialisation insofar as this type of linkage can explain the 
establishment of the first industries in developing countries. These new industries, which 
were set-up to satisfy rising consumer demand, owed their origin to the increase in 
domestic incomes caused by the export of primary products, principally mining and 
agricultural products. Another important way in which one activity can induce another is 
through the ability of the Federal government to tax the incomes accruing from mining 
and other types of enclave enterprises and at the same time to direct these fiscal receipts 
towards productive investments. This situation characterises a particular linkage, the 
fiscal linkage (Hirschman, 1981; 1992).
There are two categories of fiscal linkage: direct and indirect (Hirschman, 1981; 1984; 
1992). Direct fiscal linkage is when a portion of the State's revenue accrues from export 
taxes or royalties. It should be mentioned here that export taxes have been predominant in 
relation to primary commodities produced in enclave conditions, and the mining sector is 
a very good example of this. Indirect fiscal linkage is the increase in fiscal revenues 
through the levying of taxes on imports. All these concepts developed by Hirschman are 
important for understanding to what extent the economic growth generated by staple 
products, based on renewable and non-renewable natural resources (mining and 
agriculture), starts and also stimulate the diversification of the whole economy.
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6.4 - The Case of Parauapebas
Despite its enormous potential, the Carajas region presents weak interindustry linkages 
because the most important industrial sectors in the region are export-biased and 
principally because these sectors produce goods which require practically no processing. 
As a consequence,, their interactions with other sectors of the economy are very limited. 
Thus, large-scale export activities, such as iron-ore and aluminium, can be characterised 
as enclave economies with slight or even no multiplier effects in the region. The tenuous 
intersectoral linkages in the Carajas region are confirmed by its input-output matrix, 
which shows that while the national average of the sectoral multiplier is approximately 
3,1, the multiplier for this region is about 1,2 (World Bank, 1994b).
The mining sector can however generate forward linkages. As mentioned before, the iron- 
ore mine in the state of Minas Gerais was essential for the development of the national 
steel industry. Good examples of forward linkages are pig-iron industries and ferrous- 
alloy plants which were established along the Carajas railway and which were key 
elements in the PGC's industrial strategy. These industries may generate other linkage 
effects that would strengthen the interdependence between different sectors of the 
economy and, would thereby induce the increase in employment and income in the region. 
In fact, the input-output matrix for Carajds indicates that the sectoral multiplier for the 
region increased from 1,2 to 1,6 with the introduction of these new sectors (pig-iron 
production, charcoal, etc.) into the economy (World Bank, 1994b).
This increase, although small, is significant insofar as these sectors are partially or 
completely directed towards the domestic market. In other words, spread effects such as 
an increase in employment and income are most likely to occur in a region whose 
economy has a relatively high degree of intersectoral linkages, which can only be 
achieved through development oriented towards the internal market, or at least not totally 
biased towards the external market.
The PGC approved nineteen industrial projects, six ferrous-alloy plants and thirteen pig- 
iron smelters. Despite high expectations, only one ferrous-alloy plant, set-up by the
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Camargo Correia company in Tucurui and which produces metallic silicon is in operation 
and another, located in Maraba, is being constructed by the PROMETAL company to 
produce iron-manganese alloy. Of the thirteen pig-iron plants originally planned, only six 
plants are now in operation. They are located in three development poles along the 
Carajas railway: Maraba (COSIPAR company); Agailandia (Viena Siderurgica, Vale do 
Pindare, Gusa do Nordeste and SIM AS A companies) and Rosario (MARGUSA 
company). It seems highly unlikely that other pig-iron plants will be built in the near 
future if opposition to these industries continues to be intense. The main objection to them 
is their adverse environmental impact on forests and air quality (Anderson, 1990), but this 
aspect will be taken up later.
There are several reasons for explaining such a discrepancy between the number of 
industrial projects approved by the PGC and the number of projects implemented in the 
Carajas region. Firstly, the withdrawal of the PGC's fiscal incentives under Collor's 
government in response to "structural adjustment". Secondly, the environmental 
constraints , as mentioned above. In this regard, legislation, through Decree n° 140 of 
November 1990, was changed by the President's Regional Development Secretariat. This 
Decree established new criteria for the approval of metallurgical projects as well as for the 
concession of fiscal incentives in the PGC area. In relation to the metallurgical industries, 
this decree also established that they, in order to obtain fiscal incentives, should plan 
sustainable timber plantations in order to become self-sufficient in energy instead of 
producing charcoal from the native forest.
However, the central point is that these industries were regarded by planners as an 
essential element in the region's industrial strategy because the setting-up of metallurgical 
industries would create backward and forward linkages, strengthen the local economy 
and, consequently, many benefits would accrue to the region in the form of taxes (fiscal 
linkages), generation of employment, increase in revenue, etc. Initial optimism estimated 
that the thirteen industrial projects, the pig-iron and ferrous-alloy plants, would generate, 
if implemented as originally planned, 5,200 direct and 31,500 indirect job opportunities in 
the Carajas corridor. In addition, official projections for the total amount of employment 
to be created in several industrial branches (metallurgical, food processing, construction,
225
Chapter VI
lumbering, charcoal, etc.), i.e. in an economy with a satisfactory degree of interindustry 
linkages, were that 85,000 jobs would to be generated directly and another 106,000 
indirectly in the Carajas region by the year 2000 (World Bank, 1992).
The ferrous-alloy plants were not set-up in the Parauapebas region as originally envisaged 
by the PGC. The main reason for this is that Parauapebas is a critical area in terms of 
ventilation and thermal changes because it is located in a valley surrounded by the Serra 
dos Carajas. Moreover, the Master Plan for the Carajas railway (SEPLAN/PGC, 1989) 
stressed that serious impacts on the soil and rivers had already been caused by wild-cat 
gold mining in the region. As a consequence, Parauapebas would not experience the 
postulated spread effects generated by these industrial activities.
Without the implementation of these ferrous-alloy industries, the economic perspectives, 
in industrial terms, for Parauapebas were more limited and, consequently, its dependence 
on CVRD's investments in industrial projects, such as the Salobo copper project, 
increased more than ever. The Salobo copper project illustrates this situation perfectly, a 
situation in which not only Parauapebas, but also other municipalities are greedy for 
industrial investments, and principally the revenues which accrue from them. This project 
is initially planned to last thirty years and the investment is estimated at US$ 1.5 billion 
during the first four years. Production is estimated at 200,000 tons of metallic copper,
200,000 tons of sulphuric acid, 8 tons of gold and 20 tons of silver (O Liberal, 1995).
With this significant investment in production, the municipalities of Parauapebas and 
Maraba are interested in the benefits to be generated by this project. For instance, the 
taxes to be levied by the municipality (one of them) in the first four years will raise an 
estimated US$ 540 million and create at least 1,740 direct and 5,260 indirect jobs, in 
addition to the multiplier effect itself of the Salobo copper project (O Liberal, 1995). In 
view of this prospect, both municipalities are competing for it. The mayor of Maraba 
alleges that his municipality has the necessary infrastructure, water, power, and 
telephones, is connected with the rest of the country by three highways and it is, 
moreover, crossed by the Carajas railway. Parauapebas, in his opinion, does not have the 
infrastructure to support an uncontrollable migration because it has already had problems
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with the extremely rapid growth of its population. On the other hand, the mayor of 
Parauapebas states that the implementation of the project in his municipality would 
compensate for future social problems, because the access to the copper project, 
independently of its location, will be through Parauapebas (Interview, 1995).
Although a technical study has already been undertaken, the decision of where to locate 
the copper plant has been postponed by CVRD in order to reconcile different interests, 
such as those of the municipalities, the state of Para and the shareholders of the company 
itself. It is likely that CVRD is also waiting for the results of its own privatisation in order 
to take a firm decision on this issue. Competition for this industrial project is the result 
both of the amount of money and the direct and indirect employment to be generated by it, 
as well as the possibility that it will revitalise the local economy. In spite of the fact that 
projections are generally optimistic and that industrial projects usually bring about more 
problems than benefits, a new project is regarded by local governments as a chance to 
diversify its economy and make it boom. The negative impacts are usually understood as 
the inevitable "price of progress" and, consequently, the best way to tackle them is to 
stimulate even more economic growth. The belief persists that social and environmental 
questions can be overcome by achieving high rates of economic growth.
With regard to Parauapebas, the main industrial activities are those of the CVRD, such as 
the Manganese project, the Igarape Bahia gold project and the Carajas iron-ore project. 
The most important mining project is unquestionably the last, but all of them are 
interrelated insofar as they are located at the Serra dos Carajas and use the same 
industrial infrastructure, i.e. the railway and the deep-water port, which were components 
of the Carajas project. The fact that the industrialisation of Parauapebas is in the hands of 
CVRD has important implications for the development of the region.
Owing to the lack of forward linkages in Parauapebas (ferrous-alloy plants), other types of 
benefits and employment in the region are related mainly to the implementation and 
operation of the Carajas project. However, this project, as originally expected, was to be 
important for the local economy and principally for Brazil. At the national level, the 
CVRD has claimed that the project has benefited Brazilian industries, most of them
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located in the Centre-South, insofar as the materials and equipment used at the Carajas 
mine are to a large extent provided by domestic industries. Although there are no data 
about the number of jobs created as a result of project demands for goods and services 
produced outside the region, CVRD (World Bank, 1992) pointed out that approximately 
US$ 980 million were spent in material and equipment demanded by the project, but of 
that amount only 9% (or US$ 90 million) was imported from abroad while 91% (or US$ 
890 million) was produced in Brazil. Among the most important goods produced 
domestically and imported by the project was the rolling stock for the Carajas railway, 
which included roughly 2,900 ore wagons, some 570 other types of cargo wagons, and 74 
locomotives. The CVRD also stressed that the Carajas project had positive impacts on the 
domestic shipbuilding industry, principally through the joint Norwegian-Brazilian 
construction of two large ore and petroleum carriers, in which the Brazilian share of the 
contract was US$ 143.5 million (World Bank, 1992).
These positive effects at the national level described above call into question Roberts' 
(1991a, pp. 272; 1995a, pp. 390) assertion that Carajas remained an enclave for the nation 
because "the expensive, high technology equipment is imported, while the low-value, 
high-volume items are produced in Brazil". Although technologically sophisticated 
equipment is very expensive, the sharp difference between the money spent on imports 
shows clearly that the Carajas project had major impacts on the domestic economy. 
However, the central point here is that goods and services must be imported from outside 
the region and this condition, as will be seen in this chapter, makes the Carajas pole an 
enclave with little beneficial spread effects for the surrounding region.
The number of jobs created directly and indirectly in Parauapebas is to a large extent 
related to CVRD's industrial projects, principally Carajas. As already mentioned in 
chapter 4, this project, at the peak of construction activities (1982), employed 
approximately 26,500 workers, of which 24,000 were hired by subcontracting firms and
2,500 were CVRD employees (World Bank, 1992). In 1990, the American sociologist 
Roberts (1995b) stressed that over 80 subcontracting firms supplied 70% of the Carajas 
labour force. Two years later, the German researcher Schonenberg pointed out that there 
were 4,928 workers employed by 138 subcontractor firms and roughly 1,600 CVRD
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employees (Santos, 1994; Roberts, 1995b,). In the following year, these numbers were 
updated by Roberts (1995b), who found 1,573 CVRD employees and approximately
4,500 workers in subcontractor firms. In 1994, there were 1,599 CVRD employees at the 
Carajas mine and 80 subcontracting firms working for CVRD, although the average was 
94 (CVRD, 1995).
According to the World Bank (1992), the Carajas project has generated at least two to 
three indirect permanent jobs for each direct employment and this average can be 
confirmed by the numbers mentioned above. In this regard, the number of subcontracted 
workers can be estimated at 4,800. All these numbers are very informative. During 
construction, the Carajas project attracted thousands of migrants in search of employment 
and 26,500 jobs reflects this phase. In subsequent years, there was a drastic decrease in 
employment, which coincided with the beginning of the operational phase of the project.
Despite the considerable level of unemployment, most construction workers decided to 
remain in the region and look for other economic opportunities in the rural area, in any 
type of urban employment and at surrounding wild-cat gold mining sites. This fact partly 
explains the rapid population growth of towns such as Parauapebas and Rio Verde. The 
Carajas project (see chapter 4) generated a tremendous impact on indirect employment, of 
which Rio Verde is an excellent example insofar as it emerged in order to serve the 
construction camps in the surrounding area through a wide variety of services, such as 
bars, restaurants, bordellos, etc. Rio Verde was not an unusual phenomenon in Eastern 
Amazonia, because Curionopolis and Eldorado emerged similarly, specifically as a result 
of wild-cat gold mining activities at nearby Serra Pelada.
In examining carefully the relation between the direct and indirect employment generated 
by the Carajas project, some important aspects have to be considered. From 1982, the 
peak of construction activities, to 1992, the number of CVRD employees was reduced and 
there was an increase in the number of subcontracted workers between 1990 and 1992. 
However, the numbers of CVRD employees as well as of subcontracted workers showed 
an insignificant variation in the 1992-94 period, whose importance lies in the fact that the 
number of subcontracting workers represented 75% of the total labour-force at Carajas.
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Thus, there was a correlation between the increase in the number of subcontracted 
workers and the decrease in CVRD employees during the 1990-92 period, so the 
proportion of the Carajas labour-force, represented by 75% of subcontracted workers and 
25% of CVRD employees, is maintained in the subsequent period.
The labour-force hired by subcontracted firms was barred by CVRD from living at 
Carajas town and, consequently, from having access to a better quality of life. As a result, 
these workers had to live in Parauapebas and this fact contributed either to stimulating the 
local economy insofar as they had to spend money in the town or to putting more pressure 
on the already inadequate urban infrastructure and facilities. The subcontracted labour- 
force performed tasks which had previously been undertaken by CVRD employees and 
CVRD, by using subcontractors (terceirizagao) as a management strategy, has had 
important impacts on Parauapebas. In this regard, Santos (1994) argues that the spread of 
poverty in Parauapebas is intrinsically related to the use of subcontractors by CVRD. 
Roberts (1995b, pp. 376) goes further and states that the Carajas project was planned on 
the basis of a segmented workforce: as much of the project as possible was farmed out to 
private national subcontractors". In addition, this author (1995, pp. 751) stresses that "by 
segmenting its labour-force and using cheap male labour in its subcontractors, the 
Brazilian state-run mining company CVRD is creating a peculiar society in Parauapebas. 
Brothels, favelas [shanty-towns], split families, informal vending, and land invasions are 
likely to continue as key features of Parauapebas as long as subcontracting does".
Despite the problems generated by this management strategy, the picture of Parauapebas 
is not as black as the above two authors have painted. Although it is beyond the scope of 
this chapter either to analyse the survival strategies of subcontracted workers or to discuss 
Santos' and Roberts' work, some points must be raised. First, the main reason CVRD 
uses subcontractors is essentially economic. Indeed, CVRD, by subcontracting most of its 
workers, aims to save a considerable amount of money insofar as it is freed from paying 
social security benefits for these workers as well as from the costs related to their 
maintenance, such as housing, security services, roads, etc., at the company town. Clearly, 
it is much cheaper to maintain a town for 25% of the total labour-force than for 100%.
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Cost reduction also affects CVRD employees. CVRD has used several strategies, namely: 
construction of three housing nuclei (Chacara do Sol, Chacara da Lua and Chacara das 
Estrelas) in Parauapebas, which encourages its employees, through the Rio Doce Valley 
Foundation, to buy their own bungalows. CVRD estimated that, in July 1995, 178 
employees would be living in these nuclei and, consequently, US$ 90,000 a month would 
be spent in the local market (CVRD, 1995; Carvalho, 1994); resignation encouraged by 
the company, which tries to convince its employees that they would benefit from 
voluntary redundancy (Machado, 1995); the implementation of a particular system of 
work to be adopted at the Carajas mine, which consisted of fifteen working days in twelve 
hour shifts and fifteen days on "holiday". In this system, which is very similar to those of 
marine oil-rigs, the families of CVRD employees would return to their home states and 
their houses in Carajas town would become vacant (METABASE, 1995; Interview, 
1995).
Second, the use of subcontractors does not fully explain the worrying situation in 
Parauapebas. As seen in chapter four, CVRD did not allow subcontracted workers to stay 
in Carajas town, forcing them to live in Parauapebas at their own expense. As a result, 
they helped to exacerbate the already inadequate urban infrastructure in the town. Thus, 
problems already existed when these workers moved down to Parauapebas and, moreover, 
the situation would not be solved in this town even if CVRD allowed them to live in 
Carajas town. The use of subcontractors by CVRD poses an important question: should 
the company subcontract workers or not? Roberts and Santos blame CVRD for 
subcontracting workers and, consequently, for the problematic situation in Parauapebas.
CVRD is a powerful mining company, has several subsidiaries and is a minority 
shareholder in many other industries (CVRD, 1994). Thus, this highly competitive 
company acts within the capitalist logic, optimises its production and maximises its 
profits, and it would be naive to suppose that competitive companies would spend large 
sums when they could avoid such expenses. Unlike most Brazilian companies, the 
considerable autonomy of CVRD had enabled it to act independently of the Federal 
government. This autonomy, as suggested by Neto (1990), was intrinsically associated 
with its intense participation in the competitive world market and with its high
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profitability, which allowed it to be free of State subsidies and to make decisions 
according to criteria established by its own company management. This does not mean 
that CVRD was a State company not committed to regional development, but simply that 
it is still a company committed to making profits. As already mentioned in chapter four, 
this dual status (state x private) has always been present in CVRD attitudes and has also 
been a source of problems between the company and local authorities.
The use of subcontractors (terceirizagao) has caused many problems. For instance, 
subcontracted workers' salaries are lower than those of CVRD employees, although the 
same tasks are performed, under the same conditions and leadership (Machado, 1995; 
Interview, 1995); these subcontracted workers, unlike CVRD employees, do not receive 
any type of social benefit and were forced by CVRD to live in Parauapebas. As a 
consequence, their living conditions are precarious (Roberts, 1991a; 1995b; Santos, 1994; 
Machado, 1995); they rotate amongst subcontracted firms. In order to generate 
competition between these firms for services to be undertaken at Carajas, CVRD may or 
may not renew their contracts. These contracts vary from twenty days to a maximum two 
years. According to Santos (1994), the replacement of subcontracted firms by others is 
usual during the period in which contracts are renewed. When this happens, a certain 
number of workers who worked for the replaced firm is absorbed by the new firm, and, 
although firms may be replaced, the activities undertaken by subcontracted workers 
continue the same as before. However, the status of these workers changes with this 
replacement. In this regard, subcontracted workers are subjected to the "contract for 
experience" (contrato de experiencia), which is the usual practice adopted by all firms 
subcontracted by CVRD (Santos, 1994). This type of contract varies from thirty days to 
forty-five days, but may be renewed for up to ninety days. If a worker is dismissed during 
the period of "experience", the firm only pays the total sum specified in the contract, but 
does not pay for any rights and benefits stipulated in labour legislation.
All the problems described above are serious and affect a considerable number of people. 
However, these problems show clearly that there is a tremendous loophole in Brazilian 
labour legislation and also that different tiers of government have been unable to cope 
with the impacts generated by the employment of subcontractors. To blame CVRD for
232
Chapter VI
employing subcontracted workers and, consequently, for creating, as suggested by Roberts 
(1991a, pp. 220), "an urban crisis in Parauapebas" is to put a great emphasis on a 
questionable aspect. Cost-cutting strategies, which include the use of subcontractors, 
temporary workers, etc., are company responses in a highly competitive market. By 
adopting these strategies, companies such as CVRD aim to increase their competitiveness 
and/or profitability. Thus, this is not a Machiavellian strategy elaborated intentionally to 
undermine the labour-force, but simply a strategy employed by companies which want to 
maintain their competitiveness, and this is the logic in which the market operates and 
companies act.
Therefore, criticisms of these strategies as well as of CVRD, which has employed them, 
are pointless insofar as they do not provide any solution. The understanding of this 
process of economic change and of the underlying forces which generate these changes is 
important for evaluating social policies and, consequently, for tackling local problems. 
CVRD did not adopt such strategies by itself. Many other companies around the world 
have adopted them in order to increase their competitiveness and lower their fixed costs. 
These strategies, as already mentioned, have had impacts on Parauapebas and, principally, 
on the subcontracted labour-force. In the Parauapebas region, these impacts, despite their 
importance, are much more a result of gaps in the labour legislation, whose protection of 
employees is considered by firms too costly, and of the lack of enforcement of the law 
than of the perversity of the strategy itself.
In relation to subcontracted workers, the document (Forum Carajas, 1995) elaborated by 
the international round-table on Carajas neither blames CVRD for employing these 
workers, nor does it claim that the company should have incorporated them as its direct 
employees. This document stressed some important points, such as: parity between 
CVRD employees and subcontracted workers in relation to wages and social benefits; the 
contract between CVRD and subcontracted firms should last four years at least; and other 
items were specified in order to make this subcontracted labour-force less vulnerable and, 
consequently, to minimise the effects of "flexible accumulation", i.e. the use of 
subcontractors. The relevant point here is that there are ways to tackle the problems
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generated by this strategy and it is useless to blame CVRD and subcontracted firms for 
adopting it.
The above thesis is corroborated by the IB AM report (1993a), which suggested that the 
municipality of Parauapebas should subcontract firms to perform some tasks related to 
basic sanitation. It was also added that the demand for subcontracting firms to undertake 
public services tend to increase because of several reasons, which vary from better 
community organisation to a wave of privatisation and the local government has to be 
prepared for this. According to this report (1993a, pp. 66), this strategy "may promote 
local development insofar as small firms and people are employed and the organisation of 
society is stimulated to render services to the government. In short, this strategy prepares, 
in accordance with the language of the Total Quality Management [it should be 
mentioned here that this management strategy is adopted by CVRD], subcontractors for a 
constructive partnership that tends to perfection".
Two points deserve attention: the employment of subcontracted firms, which, under 
certain conditions, can stimulate local economy and that small firms are an important part 
of this process. Although IBAM has been too optimistic in relation to perfect partnership, 
these points were supported by UNCTAD's seminar participants, who also highlighted 
that small firms play a preponderant role in reducing poverty. All participants (UNCTAD, 
1996, pp. 10) stressed that:
"... through extended subcontracting chains, such enterprises [micro- and sm all-scale enterprises] 
can also function as a bridge to help integrate the inform al sector with the formal sector - assuming 
official regulatory harassm ent o f the informal sector is relaxed or elim inated - thereby enhancing 
the poverty-reducing role and econom ic potential o f the inform al sector in the economy".
All these examples suggest that the employment of subcontractor firms is not only an 
irreversible process, but also this strategy, if driven appropriately, can generate positive 
effects on the local economy insofar as more firms, principally those which are low-skill 
and labour-intensive, are subcontracted to undertaken different services. The increase in 
the number of firms implies that more jobs will be created and more taxes paid. With 
regard to Parauapebas, the process of contracting out services is virtually limited to
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CVRD and, as already seen, has a number of problems. However, these firms 
subcontracted by CVRD have to pay taxes and the municipality of Parauapebas collected 
US$ 1,739 million in 1994 (Parauapebas em Revista, 1994) from the ISS tax paid by 
them. This sum is quite reasonable in the local economy. The investments in urban 
infrastructure, basic sanitation, education and other types of improvements made by the 
municipality of Parauapebas as a consequence of the increase in its revenue, which 
accrued principally from taxation, is characterised as an indirect fiscal linkage. It is 
important to stress here that the municipality of Parauapebas was privileged in terms of 
revenue (Parauapebas' income was the third largest in the state of Para), but despite its 
significance, the municipal budget was not sufficient for tackling mounting problems, 
such as lack of hospitals and schools, inadequate urban infrastructure, etc., at the same 
time in the region.
In fact, subcontractor firms generate not only fiscal linkages, but also backward linkages 
insofar as these firms buy equipment and materials in Parauapebas. The increase in the 
number of commercial establishments related to metallurgical and civil construction 
activities illustrates this point. For example, the number of establishments which sold 
machines and equipment increased from 4 in 1989 to 7 in 1991, while those 
establishments which sold electrical material and iron fittings used for construction, 
artefacts, etc., increased from 3 in 1989 to 7 in 1991 (IDESP, 1990; Seplan/Para, 1995). 
Although there is no recent data, it is likely that the number of these commercial 
establishments has increased because the growth of the commercial sector was significant 
between 1991-94, in which the number of establishments more than doubled (see chapter 
five). The examples are not restricted to these above, principally because CVRD contracts 
out many firms to undertake different services and, consequently, there is a strong 
probability that these firms purchase other types of products locally. Owing to the lack of 
data, it is almost impossible to specify those establishments which were induced by 
subcontractor firms, but these firms certainly contributed to increasing the number of 
commercial establishments in Parauapebas.
Commercial establishments, by obtaining a license fee to function freely, have to pay 
taxes, which increase the municipality's revenue and, consequently, its power to tackle a
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number of problems in the region. These establishments also generate employment, 
although the number of jobs created is limited (Roberts, 1995a). However, the central 
point is that the use of subcontractor firms has also generated benefits and not only 
problems as suggested by Roberts. In addition, to fiscal and backward linkages, it is 
important to bear in mind that subcontracted workers, despite their low-salaries which 
varied from just over one minimum salary to a little bit more than four minimum salaries 
(Santos, 1994), play an important role in spending part of their salaries in Parauapebas. 
According to the 1990 Roberts' survey (1995b, pp. 749), 91% of households reported 
buying some of their food at the informal market, although 84% of these households also 
bought at supermarkets, i.e. at the formal sector.
Subcontracted firms as well as workers contributed to stimulating the local economy and 
this is to some extent reflected in the increase in the number of commercial 
establishments and of some industries during 1989-91. Nowadays, firms and workers 
hired by CVRD continue to play an important role in the Parauapebas economy, but the 
emphasis given by Roberts on the subcontracted labour-force is not so relevant as it was 
in 1990. In his random household survey, he found that forty percent of households had 
one or more adults working for a subcontracted firm (Roberts, 1991a, 1995b). Forty 
percent meant approximately 4,500 subcontracted workers living in Parauapebas, which 
had an urban population estimated at 25,014 in 1989 (SEPLAN/Para, 1995) and 
consequently, this labour-force represented roughly 20% of the total urban population. 
Because these workers were concentrated in Parauapebas and, therefore, represented a 
significant portion of its urban population, this town was termed by Roberts as a "city of 
subcontractors".
This situation now in Parauapebas is rather different from when Roberts undertook his 
research at the beginning of 1990s. According to SEMPLA, the urban population of 
Parauapebas was estimated at 65,000 (FASE, 1995), which means that the local 
population more than doubled in five years. Despite this population growth, the number of 
the labour-force subcontracted by CVRD has not changed significantly since Roberts' 
fieldwork in 1990. The number of subcontracted labour-force increased from 4,500 to 
4,800, so these workers, even taken into account both estimates, now represent less than
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8% of the urban population of Parauapebas. Therefore, the subcontracted labour-force has 
become less important insofar as this town has grown rapidly and other commercial 
establishments have been created. The municipality of Parauapebas registered 1,500 
commercial establishments (Parauapebas em Revista, 1994), while there were only 428 in 
1991 (see chapter 5).
This fact contradicts Roberts' point of view that CVRD, by segmenting its labour-force 
and using cheap labourers in its subcontractor firms, was creating a particular type of 
society in Parauapebas (Roberts, 1995b). Indeed, the strategy of contracting out 
(terceirizagao) services has generated impacts on Parauapebas and on the labour-force, 
but these impacts are only part of many existing problems in this town and CVRD cannot 
be blamed for adopting such strategy. The sharp increase in the number of commercial 
establishments associated with the rapid population growth demonstrate clearly that 
Parauapebas is not dependent on subcontractor firms. Thus CVRD is far from creating 
any type of specific society and, moreover, this was neither its objective nor its function. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that CVRD had no responsibilities to the region. On the 
contrary, as a government agency it had broader commitments to stimulate regional 
development. Although the criticism of CVRD in relation to the local authorities (lack of 
competence and dynamism) is partially true, the mining company acted according to its 
own interests and as a State company and the main development agency in the region, it 
could make efforts to promote regional development in another way: strengthening its 
relationship with municipal authorities, providing technical assistance, work together with 
governmental and non-governmental organisations, etc. (see chapter 7). This alternative 
course of action was available, but its main preoccupation was to earn profits. In this 
regard, the rest was relegated to the secondary position.
The increase in the number of commercial establishments is significant in many respects. 
Although there is no data about the number of jobs created by these establishments, it is 
very clear that the tertiary sector is growing in importance in Parauapebas. Its importance 
is not a particular phenomenon of this town. In this regard, Oliveira (1993) pointed out 
that this sector was responsible for absorbing 55,2% of Brazilian workers in 1990 and the 
reasons for this lies in the reorganisation of industrial production associated with an
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expansion of the informal sector. According to a recent research (Visor IPEA, 1997), 68% 
of Brazilian workers are in the commercial sector, which, by including the activity of 
street vendors (comerciantes ambulantes), etc., embraces the informal sector.
In looking at the commercial sector, its association with the informal sector is inevitable, 
and even more so in Parauapebas. Although the lack of data is a real problem, it is 
possible, by a process of elimination, to have an idea of the dimension of the informal 
sector in this town. Formal employment in Parauapebas is concentrated in local 
government (teachers, administrative staff, etc.), industries (construction, metallurgy, 
lumbering, etc.) and some commercial establishments, principally the largest ones. Most 
of these establishments, as suggested by Roberts (1995a), are family-owned and, 
consequently, they do create a few jobs. According to CVRD (1995), 57 firms were 
established between 1992 and 1994 and 788 jobs were created, 197 directly and 591 
indirectly. These firms were created through the PRODER programme, which was 
designed especially by CVRD, SEBRAE and the municipality of Parauapebas in order to 
stimulate the setting up of micro-, small and medium-firms in the municipality. Many 
firms, including those subcontracted by CVRD, avoid registering their employees, as 
already mentioned. The same applies to domestic servants, which are common in 
Parauapebas. The main reason for not signing work cards relies upon the protection 
offered by the labour legislation, which is considered too costly by employers.
The point is that Parauapebas has a small employment base and the continuous arrival of 
job-seeking migrants, who are generally semiskilled and unskilled workers, contributes to 
exacerbating this already difficult problem. The bulk of the labour-force in the informal 
sector tends to create its own employment or to work for small-scale, family-owned 
enterprises. The self-employed workers are involved in a number of activities, which vary 
from street vending, car washing, cleaning, seamstresses, baby-sitting, and prostitution to 
mechanics, carpenters, small artisans, etc. Others have became successful micro- 
entrepreneurs with some employees, most of them relatives. Brazil witnessed 
unprecedented urban population growth, principally after the 1970s. For instance, 55,9% 
of the Brazilian population lived in cities in 1970, increasing to 66% ten years later and to 
77% in 1994 (Oliveira, 1993; World Bank, 1996a). The average annual growth rate
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between the 1980-90 period was 3.3% and 2.7% between 1990-94, while in Parauapebas 
the average was 18.07% in 1991 (World Bank, 1996a, IBGE, 1991).
This large influx of population - and the Parauapebas average was significantly higher 
than the national average - has generated tremendous problems in urban centres because 
their formal sectors are not able to absorb this labour-force. Thus, these workers are 
forced to enter the informal sector, which is characterised by small-scale production; ease 
of entry; labour-intensive and simple technology; family owned enterprises; and 
unregulated and competitive markets (Peattie, 1987). Owing to lack access to financial 
capital as well as the low-skill of this labour-force, its productivity and income tend to be 
lower in the informal than the formal sector and moreover, these workers are not 
protected by labour legislation. Most of these workers are migrants from the poorest 
Brazilian rural areas who had not been incorporated into the formal sector. With respect to 
Parauapebas, most of its population - 68% - came from the Northeast (see chapter 5). At 
the household level, usually most of its members, including women and children, are 
involved in a number of activities as a means of increasing their incomes.
The housing pattern of these workers is intrinsically associated with their incomes, which 
are generally low. As a result, most of them live in shanty towns or in very poor districts, 
in which the urban infrastructure and facilities are precarious. These problems are faced 
by several cities, such as Rio de Janeiro, Sao Paulo and many others in developing 
countries and Parauapebas is no exception to the rule. According to IPEA (Visor IPEA, 
1997), street vending (comercio ambulante) was the activity which achieved the highest 
growth rate in all Brazilian regions and principally in the North (172%), Centre-West 
(154%) and Northeast (130%). The profile of the Brazilian worker, as suggested by IPEA, 
is: no work card signed, no secondary school; if a man, he works in the commerce and 
earns from two to four minimum salaries; if a woman, she works in other services and 
earns from one to two minimum salaries. Although these data are not directly related to 
Parauapebas, they are important to show that the growth of the informal sector is not an 
isolated phenomenon. It is worth noting that these three regions which present the highest 
rates of street vending activity are the poorest ones. This fact is not a mere coincidence,
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because these regions are less industrialised, have less diversified economies and also 
have a great land concentration.
Allied to industrial projects, the agriculture was an important element for the regional 
development. As seen in chapter one, CVRD stressed that the implementation of the 
Carajas project would be the beginning of a development corridor, based firstly on the 
export mineral and agricultural products, and progressively encompassing the 
establishment of development poles and agro-industries directed at the internal market. In 
this regard, the setting up of colonisation projects by GET AT - Carajas I and II - and by 
ITERPA - the agricultural colony Jader Barbalho - had a number of purposes, such as to 
defuse social tension and land conflict in the "parrot's beak", to leave these lands for large 
landowners and large projects and to avoid possible invasions in CVRD's territory, and 
one of them was to stimulate food production to meet the growing local demands (see 
chapters 4 and 5).
In looking at the local food supply, Roberts (1991a; 1995a) found illuminating data. For 
example, 90% of supermarket goods were imported from distant regions such as Rio de 
Janeiro, Sao Paulo, Goias or Anapolis. Supermarkets alone are responsible for 85% of the 
retail food sales in Carajas town, while semiformal vendors controlled 14%. A large 
portion of products - fruits and vegetables - sold by these vendors in a once-a-week 
farmer's market at Carajds was imported from outside the region. It was estimated that 
only 22% of expenditure on food in Carajas was on Amazonian foods and a plausible 
explanation is that most of CVRD employees in the company town came from the Centre- 
South and, consequently, with imported tastes. However, the main reason lies in the fact 
that products from industrialised regions are supplied at large scale, regularly and have 
quality control.
With respect to meals supplied in Carajas to the labour-force, there are cafeterias 
(refeitdrios) which provide three meals a day for most of unmarried workers who live in 
the company town and lunch and/or breakfast for subcontracted workers. Most of larger 
subcontractor firms have their own cantinas and together , these cantinas and larger 
cafeterias serve more than 4,500 meals a day. However, the foremost point is that the
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largest of the cafeterias, which serves over 1,000 CVRD employees a day, purchases 99% 
of its food from Rio de Janeiro because of reliability and ease of purchasing, while the 
other cafeterias and carry-out (marmitex) providers, including large and small ones, buy 
between 50 and 85% of their food money on local products and more than 50% of their 
food budgets are spent on meats, bought from local ranchers or butchers (Roberts, 1995a). 
In general, the cantinas buy approximately 47% of their food locally, although only about 
6% of the money drifts towards the small farmers set up in the surrounding colonisation 
projects.
The food supply in Parauapebas is completely different from Carajas, where all products 
are inspected by CVRD officials. Despite dissimilarities, the supermarkets, small food 
shops (armazens) and even small front-room shops in Parauapebas also import between 
70 and 90% of their foodstuffs. If the formal market in both towns have the same 
behaviour, the exception to the rule is the informal market. In this regard, 80% of food 
sold in this sector in Parauapebas are produced in the surrounding region (Roberts, 1991a; 
1995a).
This situation has not changed significantly since then, albeit the local government has 
tried to tackle these problems. For instance, the SEMPRO, through its Action Plan (1993k 
placed a great emphasis on small farmers and identified some objectives, such as the 
construction and maintenance of secondary roads, the promotion of technical assistance, 
the construction of warehouses for crop storage, etc., in order to increase local production 
and also avoid rural exodus. However, the main initiative taken by SEMPRO is the open- 
air market (feira do produtor), which consists of 150 small farmers and collects US$
15,000 a month on average (EEPP, 1994). This Municipal Secretary aims to improve the 
conditions in which the products are marketed, but until now the only effective help is the 
truck to transport the total production and even so, this help fails frequently.
These problems above show clearly that local government is still unable to support small 
farmers. Although important, the lack of local support does not explain the whole 
situation, simply because it is only part of the problem. However, the main question is: if 
the municipality of Parauapebas has potential to supply the internal and external market
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with its food production, what are the reasons for its failure? The main reason lies in the 
pattern of rural land ownership. In this regard, IDESP (1990) pointed out that there was a 
strong trend towards the expansion of cattle ranching at the expense of subsistence and 
small-scale production of rice, bean, com and manioc, which were the main agricultural 
products of the municipality of Parauapebas. This trend seems to be confirmed by the 
growing size of cattle herds, which increased from 81,000 head in 1991 (Seplan/Para, 
1995) to 300,000 in 1994 (Parauapebas em Revista, 1994). This expansion of cattle 
ranching is corroborated by land concentration verified within Carajas colonisation 
projects themselves. The concrete example occurred in the Carajas II project, in which 
only one farmer bought approximately 2,000 hectares - around forty plots - from colonists 
to expand his cattle herd from 10,000 to 50,000 head (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992).
Land concentration is neither an isolated phenomenon, nor specific to Paraupebas. 
Amazonian development policies adopted a clear latifundio-biased model and, 
consequently, were responsible for generating a number of impacts, such as land 
concentration, rural violence, land conflicts, on the rural area. These impacts were 
exacerbated by the Carajas project as well as the Greater Carajas Programme (PGC), 
which also contributed to the increase of land values. In this regard, the World Bank 
(1992) pointed out that following the creation the municipality of Parauapebas in late 
1988, rural property values in some areas rose by nearly 3000%. The generous incentives 
given by the Federal government to large-scale industrial and agricultural enterprises and 
the acquisition of large land properties for speculative aims principally because of high 
rates of inflation were important factors to generate land concentration, but development 
poles, where the industrial investments would be allocated, also played a significant role 
in increasing in land values and land concentration (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992).
Therefore, land concentration is related to a loss of food security, which is also a 
consequence of development policies which favoured livestock, lumbering and the 
production of cash crops for export to the detriment of food staples. Food deficits occurs 
in Parauapebas and in the Carajas region, where several towns along the railway corridor 
have to import their foods from the Centre-South (Hall, 1991a; World Bank, 1992). It is 
important to mention here that the increase in the size of cattle herds verified in the
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municipality of Parauapebas means deforestation insofar as the native forest is converted 
into pasture. The environmental impact is considerable because the methods, such as 
defoliants, burning and correntao, used to clear the forest contributed to reducing 
drastically soil fertility (Hecht, 1985). The social and environmental impacts caused by 
the PGC as well as the Carajas project on rural and urban areas were discussed, in a 
broader perspective, in chapter three.
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6.5 - Summing up
This chapter has analysed the local impacts of the Carajas project on Parauapebas in the 
light of development pole theory. This theory advocated that by investing heavily in 
selected development poles, economic growth would be generated, which would in turn 
"trickle down" to peripheral regions. Indeed, massive investments were made, through 
POLAMAZONIA, in infrastructure undertakings and the provision of incentives in order 
to achieve high rates of economic growth and, consequently, to produce spread effects to 
local populations. However, the beneficial spread effects in Parauapebas fell below 
expectations, but this phenomenon also occurs in the broader Carajas region, which has 
tenuous intersectoral linkages. This fact is corroborated by its input-output matrix, which 
shows that while the national average of the sectoral multiplier is roughly 3,1, the 
multiplier for this region is about 1,2 (World Bank, 1994b). This multiplier increased to
1.6 with the introduction of new sectors, such as pig-iron, charcoal, etc., into the 
economy, even though it continues rather below the national average.
In Parauapebas, the ferrous-alloy industries were not implemented as originally envisaged 
by the PGC. As a consequence, the economic perspectives, in industrial terms, for the 
region were more limited and its dependence on CVRD's investments in industrial 
projects increased more than ever. Without these ferrous-alloy industries, other types of 
benefits and employment in the region are related mainly to the Carajas project. Indeed, 
this project has generated linkages by demanding goods and services inside and outside 
the region. However, this chapter has shown that external linkages are stronger than 
internal ones. For example, 91% (or US$ 890 million) of US$ 980 million was spent on 
material and equipment produced in Brazil, specifically in the Centre-South; the Carajas 
project had positive impacts on the domestic shipbuilding industry, principally through 
the joint Norwegian-Brazilian construction of two large ore and petroleum carriers, in 
which the Brazilian share of the contract was US$ 143.5 million; 78% of all money spent 
on retail food sales in Carajas town was spent on imported foods; the largest of the 
cafeterias in the company town, which serves over 1,000 CVRD employees a day, 
purchases 99% of its food from Rio de Janeiro; other cafeterias and carry-out providers 
buy between 15 and 50% of their food money on imported products; and the
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supermarkets, small food shops (<armazens) and even small front-room shops in 
Parauapebas import between 70 and 90% of their foodstuffs.
The main linkages in Parauapebas are fiscal because a large portion of Parauapebas 
government revenue accrues from royalties and taxes on mining activities. In this regard 
subcontracted firms and, principally, CVRD represent the principal source of income of 
the municipal budget. However, there are other linkages in the region and the increase in 
the number of small-scale firms as well as commercial establishments is a good indicator 
because this is a clear sign that the local population is demanding services. In fact, the 
service sector is already assuming a tremendous importance and it is likely that this sector 
will be the future of this municipality, principally due to the lack of options for 
diversifying its economy. The belief that the municipality of Parauapebas would supply 
the internal and external market with its food production is far from being the case and 
only the informal sector absorbs a large part - 80% of which is sold locally.
The main reason for this lies in the expansion of cattle ranching to the detriment of the 
subsistence crops, such as rice, bean, com and manioc, which were the main agriculture 
products of the municipality of Parauapebas. This trend is be confirmed by the growing 
number of cattle herd, which increased from 81,000 head in 1991 to 300,000 in 1994. 
This expansion is also corroborated by land concentration verified within Carajas 
colonisation schemes themselves and an excellent example occurred in the Carajas II 
project, in which only one farmer bought approximately forty plots from colonists to 
expand his cattle herd from 10,000 to 50,000 head.
Land concentration and related rural impacts, such as rural violence and land conflicts are 
a direct product of development policies, specially development pole strategies, 
implemented in Amazonia which adopted a clear latifundio-biaszd model. All these 
impacts were exacerbated by the Carajas project as well as the Greater Carajas 
Programme (PGC), which also contributed to the increase of land values. In this 
particular, following the creation the municipality of Parauapebas in late 1988, rural 
property values in some areas rose by nearly 3000%. Many factors, such as the generous 
incentives given by the Federal government to large-scale industrial and agricultural
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enterprises and the acquisition of large land properties for speculative aims principally 
because of high rates of inflation, were important to generate land concentration, but 
development poles, where the industrial investments would be allocated, also played a 
significant role in increasing in land values as well as land concentration.
Land concentration, rural violence, land conflicts, loss of food security, inadequate urban 
infrastructure, intense flow of migrants are problems related either to Parauapebas or 
other towns along the Carajas corridor. The next chapter will briefly summarise the main 
impacts generated by development pole strategies on Parauapebas, will discuss the role of 
the World Bank and CVRD and will conclude with the discussion of policy implications 
for more sustainable policy for Eastern Amazonia.
246
Chapter 7
Conclusion
7.1 - Brief Summary
The central objective of this dissertation is to analyse the adverse social impacts generated 
by regional development policies in Easter Amazonia and illustrated by the town of 
Parauapebas. According to this objective, the first chapter outlined development policies 
and frontier integration that have been implemented in Brazilian Amazonia.
Until the military coup of 1964, government action in Amazonia did not significantly 
affect the environment. After that year, however, this region became the focus of attention 
and its occupation was planned and implemented by the military regime, bringing about 
many negative impacts. In fact, military governments saw Amazonia, with its tremendous 
potential of natural resources as well as its vast "empty spaces", as a means of rapidly 
tackling a number of economic, social and geopolitical problems. The military regime had 
a modernisation project, in which the general objective was to make Brazil comparable 
with the developed countries. This project was permeated by the National Security 
Doctrine, a doctrine embedded in government geopolitics. Thus, in order to modernise the 
nation, the military regime realised several specific aims, which varied from institutional 
reforms, such as the creation of the Central Bank, to stimulating the Amazon economy 
and to populating this region and integrating the national territory.
The military government, considered it fundamental to have complete control over the 
State, which was the only body capable of accelerating the process of modernisation and, 
consequently, of achieving their objectives. Planning became the keystone of the 
authoritarian regime, principally because it was understood to be a rational and neutral 
technique which would increase the degree of efficacy of economic policy. The 
participation of the State in the economy became more intense through the formulation 
and implementation of several national plans and, as a consequence, the process of 
regional planning was centralised and was to be consolidated in the mid-1970s. The State
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intensified its participation in the economy with the clear purpose of expanding private 
enterprise.
At the beginning of the 1970s, the Federal government's presence in Amazonia became 
strengthened principally because geopolitical objectives (occupation and national 
integration) assumed a particular importance in relation to all others. The document 
Target and Bases for Government Action, launched during "the Brazilian miracle" by the 
Medici government for the 1970-72 period, placed great emphasis on two depressed 
regions of the country, Amazonia and the Northeast. In this regard, the construction of 
highways (Transamazonica, the Cuiaba-Santarem highway and Northern Perimeter road), 
the implementation of colonisation projects and the redistribution of unutilised land and 
the promotion of agro-industries in both regions were encouraged by the Brazilian 
government in order to occupy Amazonia's vast empty spaces making it viable in agrarian 
terms; alleviate social tensions in the Northeast and at the same time to avoid agrarian 
reform by encouraging migration from those areas. In addition, the Federal government 
believed that small properties could produce a surplus of staple foods such as rice and 
beans to compensate for the loss of export production.
The First National Development Plan (PND I), formulated for the 1972-74 period, 
maintained the same objectives as those of the previous government plans such as 
national integration, occupation of Amazonia and the acceleration of economic growth. 
Although reserves of iron-ore, gold and copper had already been discovered, the Brazilian 
government planned to discover more minerals in Amazonia with the purpose of 
exploiting them. In this regard, an aerial survey was undertaken and made the future 
commercial expansion in the region possible by confirming the vast mineral wealth in the 
subsoil, the extent of timber reserves and land available for livestock production.
The Second National Development Plan (PND II), launched by President Geisel for the 
1974-79 period, maintained the same priorities established in the PND I. The occurrence 
of the first oil crises in 1973 contributed to the Brazilian government's decision to exploit 
Amazonia's vast natural resources in order to generate foreign exchange through exports. 
In this regard, PND II stressed the importance of expanding infrastructure in particular
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areas such as energy, transport and communications, as well as the export of specific 
products, and of investing in the expansion of basic industries located in selected areas of 
the region. Owing to its resources of comparative advantage ( mineral sector, timber, beef, 
crops, etc.) Amazonia was understood by the PND II as a "tropical frontier" and this idea 
was reflected in the POLAMAZONIA programme. Indeed, this programme aimed to 
establish fifteen development poles in selected areas, in which investments were 
channelled into infrastructure and financial incentives were provided by the Federal 
government with the purpose of stimulating export-oriented activities in favour of private 
enterprises. In addition, POLAMAZONIA marked an important change in government 
policy in favour of large corporate agribusiness, livestock production and private 
colonisation schemes, associated with infrastructure investments, mining and processing 
activities.
PND HI, drawn up for the 1979-85 period, maintained the same preoccupation of previous 
plans: integration and occupation, but focused on increasing exports in order to reduce the 
external debt crisis, which was aggravated by the severe oil stock of 1979. This plan 
stressed the importance of the POLAMAZONIA programme for the occupation of 
Amazonia and, therefore, development poles were regarded by the Federal government as 
a means of integrating Amazonian development and of occupying this region. In fact, the 
Brazilian government put its trust in the mining sector and the implementation of the 
Carajas project, although had officially started in 1978, was only intensified when 
President Figueiredo took power and decided to authorise CVRD to obtain necessary 
funds to carry it forward in October, 1980. One month later, the PGC was created and 
new fiscal incentives established.
CVRD and the World Bank have played a major role in the development of Eastern 
Amazonia. The CVRD was a State-owned mining company, the Bank's client, the 
Government agency responsible for the Carajas project, and took a lead role in 
formulating the PGC. On the other hand, the World Bank made the Carajas project viable 
by approving a major loan to CVRD as well as by encouraging other foreign financial 
institution to fund this industrial project.
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The PGC was the largest and most ambitious "integrated" development plan ever devised 
and implemented for any area of tropical rainforest in the world. This programme 
comprised four major projects: the Carajas iron-ore project, which was the PGC's 
centrepiece; two aluminium plants: the ALBRAS-ALUNORTE complex located at 
Barcarena, close to Belem and ALUMAR in Sao Luis; and the Tucurui hydroelectric 
scheme on the River Tocantins. In addition, the PGC involved investments in 
infrastructure, agriculture, livestock and forestry. It was important and convenient for 
CVRD as well as for the Federal government that the PGC was presented as a ready-made 
and attractive "integrated" regional development strategy and the reasons lie in the fact 
that the State-owned enterprise faced serious problems in obtaining financing necessary to 
implement the interdependent mineral (the Carajas project, ALBRAS, ALUMAR) and 
infrastructural (the Tucurui hydroelectric, the Caraj&s railway, port and new town) 
projects in which it was involved and dependent upon to varying degrees. At the same 
time, the support given by the Federal government to the PGC was based on a 
considerable possibility of attracting overseas official and private capital and of 
generating foreign exchange to service Brazil's external debt.
The Brazilian government hoped that, once several investments were channelled into 
economic and social infrastructure associated with a wide range of fiscal incentives, 
further industrial and agribusiness ventures would be attracted to the PGC's development 
poles, particularly along the Carajas railway corridor at Parauapebas, Maraba, A?ailandia, 
Buriticupu, Santa Ines, Rosario, and Sao Luis. It is important to stress here that the term 
"development pole" was coined by Francois Perroux and all the national development 
plans after the Decennial Plan (the only exception was the Target and Bases for 
Government Action, which was not properly a plan) adopted the terminologies of the 
French economist. However, Perroux's development pole theory is taken up in chapter 
two.
Chapter two focused on development pole theory, which is one of the central themes of 
this dissertation. The concept of the development pole, formulated in order to describe 
and explain the process of economic development, was based on the idea that the 
propulsive effects inherent in a development process tended to be generated by a cluster
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of economic activities and also tend to engender broader economic growth. Because of its 
clear potential, several professionals involved with problems of regional development 
became very interested in this concept. Nevertheless, Perroux's concept was conceived in 
an economic context, which was too abstract and non-operational to be applied as a basis 
for planning. The principal factor responsible for transforming this concept into an 
operational tool for regional planning was Boudeville, who was Perroux's disciple. As a 
result, this concept became very well-known and applied extensively on both sides of 
Atlantic.
Perroux's development pole theory was widely accepted in Brazil, as its presence in most 
national development plans testifies. The main reason for its wide acceptance lies in the 
fact that the theory's underlying idea suggested that economic growth, interregional 
equilibrium and integration of backward regions could be achieved through a strategy of 
decentralised development. According to the theory, development poles could be induced 
by means of infrastructure investments as well as by several types of incentives (fiscal, 
subsidies, etc.) which would attract the propulsive industries into the induced pole and, 
consequently, would initiate the process of economic growth. In fact, the raison d'etre of 
these induced poles was that they would perform as efficient counter-magnets to the 
densely populated cities; would produce scale and agglomeration economies; and would 
generate trickle-down effects to their peripheral areas, so that in the long-term an 
"balanced growth" throughout a country would be expected.
These ideas fitted in well with the geopolitical and economic objectives of the military 
regime, and development pole strategies were vigorously implemented by the Federal 
government through the Second National Development Plan - PND II (1975-79) - and 
these strategies continued with the advent of the Greater Carajas Programme - PGC - in 
the 1980s. The main objectives of the PND II were economic. Thus, in order to maintain 
the accelerated growth rates of the "miracle years" (1968-73), to contain inflation and to 
keep the balance of payments in relative equilibrium industrial, agricultural, urban and 
geopolitical strategies were designed. The industrial strategy was based on a "new phase" 
of import-substitution, whose emphasis was on basic sectors, especially in chemical and 
metallurgical industries. With respect to agricultural strategy, it was hoped that Brazil
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would become a world supplier of food, agricultural raw materials and industrialised 
agricultural products principally because of the vast "empty spaces" at its disposal. The 
Federal government encouraged diversification and regional specialisation of agriculture 
with the purpose of taking advantage of the productive potential of each region.
The national integration strategy was fundamentally related to geopolitical and economic 
preoccupations. In fact, the occupation of "empty spaces", especially in Amazonia, 
assumed great importance for the military regime insofar as these vast spaces had 
connotations of security and sovereignty. At the same time, their incorporation into the 
market economy through a number of projects, which varied from mining to forestry, was 
essential for the government's economic strategy, in which decentralisation of economic 
activities was a key factor. Thus, the best way of integrating and occupying these "virgin" 
areas was by means of the highway system, already constructed to a large extent, and 
principally by economic activities to be stimulated there. The POLAMAZ6NIA 
programme was established for this purpose and massive investments were channelled 
into fifteen previously selected development poles. All these strategies were intrinsically 
connected with urban development strategy based on Perroux's theory and served as a 
basis for the national development and occupation strategy advocated in the PND n. 
Urban poles identified as centres of regional development would be strengthened by 
productive activities and investments in infrastructure and social apparatus. It was hoped 
that these poles would contain migration and support industrial activities.
The spatial development strategy of the PND II was formalised in the POLAMAZONIA. 
This programme comprised fifteen development poles selected according to their 
potentialities, which were: mineral, forestry, agro-livestock and agro-industrial. The most 
important pole was Carajas, because of its huge iron-ore deposits, which would be 
exploited through a 940 km railway linking the mine to the Itaqui port in Sao Luis. In 
addition, the pole also had reserves of manganese, cassiterite, diamond and tin, a great 
potential for agro-livestock to the west of the iron-ore deposits, and forestry resources. 
This spatial strategy continued under the PGC, which embraced mineral (the Carajas 
project was its centrepiece) and associated infrastructure, agricultural, and forestry 
projects to be set up at development poles along the Carajas railway. Through both
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programmes, POLAMAZ6NIA and PGC, a number of incentives and infrastructural 
investments was provided by the Federal government in order to accelerate economic 
growth and, consequently, create favourable conditions for these poles to generate the 
hoped-for trickle-down effects to their peripheral areas.
In fact, professionals involved with regional policy believed that it was necessary to 
implement development pole strategies in order to overcome social and economic 
disparities between regions and also between larger urban centres and their peripheral 
areas. Owing to scarce resources in developing countries, development pole strategies 
focused on a few urban centres selected where investments would be allocated with the 
aim of obtaining scale and agglomeration economies. These strategies took a number of 
forms, particularly in developing countries such as Brazil. Some focused on infrastructure, 
aiming to supply a basic level of power, water, transport and other public facilities. Others 
were based on intermediate or heavy manufacturing industries (generally public 
enterprises), these projects being commonly associated with industrial complexes 
organised around such sectors as iron and steel, aluminium, petrochemicals and heavy 
engineering. The common factor in all these projects was the importance of the direct use 
of large-scale investment resources to produce structural changes through accelerated 
economic growth.
This basic idea of producing structural changes through accelerated economic growth 
permeated modernisation theories and development pole theory. These theories 
understood development as an economic problem, economic growth being practically 
synonymous with development. Accelerated economic growth would thus reduce regional 
inequalities, unemployment levels, and poverty. With respect to Perroux's theory, these 
problems were regarded as temporary obstacles, which would be overcome through the 
trickle-down effects generated by development poles to their immediate periphery, 
generally backward regions, leading in the long-term to a more egalitarian and prosperous 
society.
Chapter three discussed the social and environmental impacts generated by development 
policies in the Carajas region. Usually, Brazilian public policies can be portrayed by
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inefficiency in establishing a co-ordinated and efficient spatial occupation. Although 
massive investments in infrastructure have contributed to making the access to remote 
regions viable and have shown new opportunities for financial gain, they have also 
accelerated spatial occupation. As a consequence, the natural resources have been 
exploited in a predatory way and social disparities have worsened considerably.
Development policies have been responsible for generating negative social and 
environmental impacts in urban and rural areas. In relation to impacts on urban 
development, it is clear that towns and cities in Eastern Amazonia have benefited, to some 
extent, from industrial undertakings implemented in this region. For instance, the Carajas 
railway has transported a considerable number of passengers and has carried large 
quantities of products, varying from pig-iron to food. Moreover, the road and sanitation 
infrastructure was improved and schools and hospitals were constructed in several towns 
and cities, which previously lacked such facilities. The indirect employment and income 
effects produced by industrial activities have partly contributed to the development of 
local economies.
Industrial projects, such as the Carajas project, associated with other public interventions 
in Eastern Amazonia have attracted, directly or indirectly, a substantial flow of migrants, 
which has aggravated the already insufficient infrastructure and service-provision 
capabilities of local urban nuclei. Municipal governments have endeavoured to tackle a 
number of problems, with very limited assistance from the CVRD, of the towns and cities 
along the Carajas corridor, improving some facilities, but these attempts have been totally 
inadequate. In fact, the local authorities have been unable to meet the growing needs, and 
some political changes, such as dismemberment of districts, have exacerbated this 
situation.
All cities and towns along the Carajas corridor have problems of infrastructural 
deficiency. Water supplies are commonly untreated, sewage and trash collection and 
storm drainage systems are usually restricted to higher income neighbourhoods, while 
sewage treatment and adequate solid waste disposal are scarce. The inadequacy of urban 
services and facilities directly affects the health and education sectors. The impacts on the
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health sector are aggravated by widespread urban poverty, which is caused by the intense 
flood of migrants attracted to the region in search of economic opportunities. In general, 
the towns and cities in the Carajas region present high incidences of a number of diseases, 
which vary from malaria to sexually transmitted diseases, and also high indices of infant 
and foetal mortality. With regard to the education sector, schools are frequently lacking or 
greatly overcrowded in most of the region and these problems connected with the need to 
supplement family incomes contribute to making the situation more problematic.
Industrial projects, such as the Carajas project, implemented in Eastern Amazonia have 
generated many impacts and one of them is related to urban displacement and involuntary 
resettlement. In fact, industrial activities have affected small communities by displacing 
their populations without any type of compensation. The villages were demolished and 
the only alternative for most of displaced people was to live in squatter settlements. There 
are several examples of displacement caused by these projects, such as the ALUMAR 
plant, which displaced 20,000 small farmers and fishermen; the Tucurui dam and 
reservoir, which displaced approximately 35,000 people and demolished six small towns; 
and CVRD which expropriated families from small villages, such as Santo Antonio, 
Boqueirao, Itaqui, etc., to "Morro PeladoM("Naked Hill") in order to construct its rail and 
port facilities.
Brazilian development policies, principally for Eastern Amazonia, adopted a clear 
latifundio-based model, which favoured large landowners with generous subsidies to the 
detriment of the vast majority of small farmers. In this regard, these policies have directly 
affected the rural sector, which have undergone many and interconnected impacts, namely 
land conflicts, land concentration, rural violence, and food insecurity. The implementation 
of both the PGC and the Carajas project, by increasing land values in Eastern Amazonia, 
exacerbated land concentration and rural violence, and moreover, stimulated a 
considerable flow of migrants into the region.
Amazonia development policies were responsible for excluding a large part of the peasant 
population from access to land. However, the persistence of rural violence in Brazil is 
intrinsically related to the police and the judiciary, whose local and state structures are
255
Chapter VII
slow and corrupt. In addition, the Federal government, which is also responsible for 
formulating and implementing these policies, could use its powers to ensure that the law 
is better enforced instead of being negligent and even conniving with this situation. A 
recent confrontation between the police of the state of Para and approximately 1500 
landless workers at Eldorado do Carajas , close to Parauapebas, in April 1996, not only 
illustrates the whole problem, but also indicates that rural violence is far from coming to 
an end in Brazil. These landless occupied the highway PA-150 with the clear purpose of 
protesting against the Federal government, which had postponed the resettlement of their 
families, and the governor of the state of Para's immediate reaction was to send in the 
military police to expel them rapidly. As a result, nineteen landless workers were killed 
while fifty-one were seriously wounded (Bergamo&Camarotti, 1996).After more than one 
year nothing was done to punish the main culprits.
Rural violence also embraces the indigenous question insofar as Indian people have been 
directly affected by development policies implemented by the Federal government. In 
fact, Indian lands have been correct because of their valuable natural resources and the 
pressure from mining companies became more intense with Decree N° 88,895 of 1983 
which legitimised mechanised mineral extraction on all Indian lands, CVRD being one of 
the companies that has made many applications to prospect in tribal territories. These 
policies associated with the authorities' slowness in assuring land demarcation and 
assistance to the indigenous population have been responsible for a number of violations, 
such as invasions by agricultural, mining and lumbering enterprises, assassinations, death 
threats and outbreaks of disease, in tribal territories under PGC's area of influence.
Intrinsically connected to rural violence is the problem of land concentration and 
speculation, problems which have been severely aggravated by development policies. 
Although polarisation of land ownership in the region had already reached an advanced 
stage before 1980, the implementation of the PGC including the Carajas project 
exacerbated this process through generous subsidies provided to large farmers and also 
through the indirect stimulus given by development poles and land values. These factors 
made Eastern Amazonia an area extremely attractive for purely speculative investment in 
land during a period of high inflation. Another important impact caused by development
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policies is on food security, which directly affects the nutritional levels of the population 
in the region. The reasons for the impact on food security lie in a number of factors, such 
as: great stimulus given by the Federal government to livestock, lumbering and the 
production of cash crops for export instead of food staples; the total control over 
agricultural lands of largely unproductive properties; the increase in landless small 
farmers due to the process of expulsion from land allied to the impediment to access to 
new lands; and the rise in temporary wage labour on larger rural properties. Food 
insecurity is a common phenomenon in Eastern Amazonia, whose urban areas, from the 
state capitals to towns along the Carajas corridor, have problems in maintaining supplies 
of food stuffs, which have to be imported from the Centre-South.
With regard to environmental impacts, it is important to bear in mind the fact that the 
forest cover of Amazonia remained practically untouched until the military coup. 
Amazonian development policies stimulated a number of undertakings, such as the 
construction of highways and secondary roads; cattle-ranching; lumbering; official and 
"spontaneous" colonisation; mining together with associated infrastructural projects (rail 
and port facilities and hydroelectric power); and pig iron smelters. All these initiatives are 
interconnected and have contributed to worsening deforestation and environmental 
degradation in Eastern Amazonia. Alterations in soil and water quality are associated with 
rapid deforestation. In relation to soils, clearing the forest for pasture on crops results in 
erosion, leaching, loss of fertility, and an increase in soil densities by means of 
compaction, principally when land is used for grazing or heavy machinery is utilised in 
connection with agricultural activity. With respect to water quality, its contamination is 
the result of a number of factors, such as: soil erosion, the use of herbicides and fertilisers, 
increasing urbanisation, and mineral activities. Mercury pollution as a result of gold 
prospecting is a serious problem in the Carajas region.
Although the Carajas project is not directly responsible for most of environmental impacts 
that has occurred in the Carajas region, it has indirectly contributed to this process by 
attracting a substantial flow of labourers, many of whom decided to remain in the region 
after the construction works; by constructing and improving new roads, facilitating the 
access to remote areas of the region; by means of private land speculation along the
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Carajas railway corridor; through lumber requirements for construction of the Carajas 
project facilities; and more directly through the consumption of charcoal from native 
forests promoted by the implementation of metallurgical industries, principally pig-iron 
smelters.
Chapter four analysed the planning and implementation process of public policies in 
Parauapebas. This town is intrinsically connected with the Carajas project insofar as it 
would not have come into existence without the iron-ore project. While this industrial 
project was being implemented, CVRD considered that the construction of a high 
standard urban nucleus on top of Carajas mountain was essential for attracting and 
convincing skilled labours from the Centre-South of Brazil to live in that town and, 
consequently, to operate the Carajas mine. CVRD was conscious that the Carajas project 
would attract a substantial flow of job-seekers to the region and decided to preserve its 
company town from the population and activities not directly related to mining.
Parauapebas was envisaged as an area of "planned invasion", in other words, an 
alternative to human settlements that were usually encountered in Brazil's peripheral 
regions. Indeed, this urban nucleus was built with the clear purpose of avoiding the 
formation of a huge shanty town at the CVRD's main entrance gate and also of 
minimising some past problems, such as reoccupation of hills and areas liable to flooding, 
generated by this type of human agglomeration. Thus, an area of approximately 170 
hectares close to the CVRD's gate was poorly urbanised in order to accommodate a 
population of 5,000, most of them migrants not directly related to the company and 
attracted to the region because of economic opportunities produced by the Carajas project. 
However, this underestimated provision was totally inadequate in view of the rapid 
population growth of the area. Consequently, a peripheral peri-urban squatter settlement, 
known as Rio Verde, emerged contiguous to the planned town.
The reasons for the rapid population growth in the Parauapebas-Rio Verde region lie in a 
number of factors, such as GETAT's colonisation projects (Carajas I,II and IE), the 
spontaneous establishment of small farmers and ranches of varying sizes, several wild-cat 
gold mining sites(especially Serra Pelada) in the surrounding area, and principally the
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Carajas project. In fact, this project attracted a considerable number of migrants, who 
arrived in the region either as construction workers or to serve the construction camps 
close to Parauapebas and Carajas. Rio Verde had its roots as the "red light district" for 
construction workers in these urban nuclei. The permanence of many of these workers 
after the end of the construction phase played a major role in the rapid growth of the 
region. In addition to these factors, CVRD's decision to establish the Carajas town as a 
company town also contributed to affecting the already inadequate urban infrastructure 
and facilities in Parauapebas and Rio Verde. Despite increasing pressure on both nuclei, 
the central question is that there was availability of land in Carajas town and, moreover, 
CVRD was committed to housing contract-service workers there, as established in the 
Loan Agreement with the World Bank
Although population growth in the Parauapebas-Rio Verde region has been extremely 
rapid, the peripheral nucleus grew much faster than in the planned town and this is due to 
two main factors: the extension of the construction of the town of Parauapebas by one and 
a half years, during which plots of land were not made available for the settlement of 
migrants; and a certain elitism related to the quality of life, housing and work, which was 
imposed on those people who wanted plots of land in Parauapebas. These two factors 
made this urban nucleus inaccessible to most migrants, who were forced to live in the 
surrounding area of Rio Verde.
Indeed, all those factors mentioned above contributed to attracting an intense flow of 
migrants, which in turn led to a worsening of the already debilitated urban infrastructure 
and services in Parauapebas (including its peripheral settlement Rio Verde). It was, to a 
certain extent, beyond the control of planners to predict the real dimensions of the flow of 
migrants to be attracted to the region. Nevertheless, the substantial flow of migrants, 
which had already been predicted by government agencies, was largely stimulated by the 
Federal government, whose overriding development strategies in Eastern Amazonia were 
based on modernisation principles and development pole theory.
According to development pole theory, the population to be attracted to development 
poles in search of employment was essential for making them productive. The theory also
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advocated that high rates of economic growth would generate a "trickle-down" effects to 
benefit peripheral areas and their populations. In this regard, the attraction of a substantial 
flow of migrants was an attempt to make the Carajas pole viable and planners disregarded 
the volume of migrants attracted to the region, certainly because of the economic 
objective, but also because of the crude and extremely convenient "trickle-down" 
assumptions. These factors partly explain CVRD's under-estimation of the pace of 
urbanisation in Parauapebas, its non-compliance with the Loan and Guarantee Agreement 
with the World Bank, its "unawareness" of previous predictions made by government 
agencies and the change in its plans for Parauapebas, which was redesigned to house a 
population of 10,000 residents instead of 5,000 originally planned, principally because of 
pressure from the World Bank.
At the same time, the above factors reveal not only negligence on the part of CVRD, but 
also its lack of interest in tackling the problems caused by the Carajas project. These 
particularities of the CVRD are corroborated by the problematic relationship between 
local authorities and the mining company. This problem is partly due to its omnipotence 
associated with its inherent lack of sensitivity to the nature of local problems which led 
CVRD to adopt hostile attitudes towards the local population. The other part is related to 
disagreement between both sides over their responsibilities. In this regard, the local 
authorities believed that CVRD was responsible for most of the problems in these 
municipalities, while the CVRD professed that these problems were beyond its 
competence. In fact, CVRD's faults, behaviour and attitudes indicate clearly that its 
foremost preoccupation was the Carajas project and those pre-requisites considered 
fundamental for making the project work properly. As a consequence, other aspects and 
problems were regarded by CVRD as secondary.
There were other significant factors, such as a lack of municipal resources, misuse of 
municipality funds and corruption, which contributed to making the situation in the 
Parauapebas-Rio Verde region worse. These factors were intrinsically connected with the 
lack of technical capacity, inability to forge external links and obtain access to funding, 
and incompetence to implement policies, which were problems faced by all 
municipalities, including the municipality of Maraba (Interview, 1995). This municipality,
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which occupied a huge area, considered Parauapebas and Rio Verde areas of low priority 
not only because of the factors mentioned above, but also because of the growing demand 
for urban infrastructure and services throughout the entire municipality, especially the city 
of Maraba, which grew considerably because of the construction of the Carajas railway.
CVRD as well as local governments have intrinsically been involved with problems in the 
region. They have been important actors which have played a significant role in bringing 
about negative impacts and in coping with them. These adverse impacts have their roots 
in regional development planning, which was too technocratic, over-centralised and 
totally directed towards economic aspects. All these characteristics were visible in the 
Carajas region, where local governments did not participate in any phase of planning. This 
was typically a "top-down" process, in which decisions were taken from above. At the 
dame time, these development strategies, based on modernisation principles and the 
development pole theory, stimulated a large flow of migrants to the region.
Chapter five analysed the implications of planning for Parauapebas , focusing on its two 
distinct phases: before and after its emancipation from the municipality of Maraba. 
Although distinct, both phases are interrelated and have some similarities. Until its 
political independence, Parauapebas and its satellite Rio Verde came under the 
municipality of Marabd, which maintained a local sub-administration (sub-prefeitura) in 
Parauapebas, and indirectly under the CVRD. As seen in the previous chapter, the 
Parauapebas-Rio Verde region was not a priority for this municipality, which had a 
problematic relationship with the local authorities and this fact caused many problems for 
both urban nuclei.
CVRD considered Parauapebas of secondary importance and the main reason for this lies 
in the fact that this urban nucleus was planned in order to avoid the formation of an 
enormous shanty town, which represented , in the eyes of CVRD, a tremendous source of 
trouble for the Carajas project operation. In this regard, CVRD, by planning and 
implementing the town of Parauapebas, was not motivated by humanitarian aspirations. 
The Carajas project was CVRD's principal preoccupation and, consequently, the mining 
company took all the precautions against possible invasions on interference that could
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affect its industrial project. In this regard, CVRD's "buffer zone", which was formed by 
the GETAT's colonisation projects, by the Indian reserve of Xicrin do Catete, by the areas 
of Gleba Aquiri and Gleba Cinzento, and by Gleba Ampulheta, is a very good example.
In addition, CVRD's arrogance, lack of sensitivity to problems not directly related to the 
Carajas project and its hostile attitudes towards the population of Parauapebas and Rio 
Verde are well-illustrated by the company's decision to forbid small farmers form the 
agricultural colony Jader Barbalho to transport their crops through the Raimundo 
Mascarenhas road, which was within CVRD's concession area, to Parauapebas; by the 
rigid control exercised by the company's guard in its entrance gate; and by its decision to 
establish Carajas as a "company town", which shows clearly the CVRD's objective of 
keeping peripheral population away from its territory, or in other words, a process of 
social segregation and exclusion. All these attitudes contributed to generating widespread 
resentment against CVRD and also to making local problems even more difficult.
The problematic relationship between CVRD and local authorities, the inability of the 
municipality of Maraba to tackle the problems in its own municipality, CVRD's attitudes 
and decisions associated with a considerable flow of migrants, who arrived in the region 
in search of jobs, were to a large extent responsible for producing a problematic situation 
in Parauapebas and Rio Verde. For instance, with respect to urban infrastructure, Rio 
Verde had unpaved streets and precarious electrical supplies, while other facilities such as 
a water-distribution network and street lighting were non-existent. In relation to public 
health, the nosological table of both nuclei was critical and there were high indices of 
some diseases such as malaria and leishmanioasis. The situation of the education sector in 
Parauapebas and Rio Verde was also dramatic, with overcrowded schools, the lack of 
educational infrastructure and low level of teacher qualification a common phenomenon 
in Parauapebas and Rio Verde. This difficult situation generated widespread 
dissatisfaction, which in turn provoked the emancipation of this region from the 
municipality of Maraba. It was hoped that the emancipation of Parauapebas would 
improve its situation, principally through direct investments of mining royalties, and 
would also mark the beginning of a new development phase in the region.
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Although established on 10 May 1988, the new municipality of Parauapebas only initiated 
its activities on 1 January 1989, when the Mayor, Mr. Salmen, the vice - Mayor and nine 
town councillors (vereadores) were installed. Insofar as tax funds, including mining 
royalties, began to flow directly to municipality, several improvements could be made by 
the new municipal administration in the region. Despite their significance, these 
improvements fell far short of meeting growing local demands and the reasons for this lie 
in a number of factors. The municipal budget was not sufficient for tacking all problems, 
which were aggravated by the continuous and intense flow of migrants; the presence of 
the Federal government in Eastern Amazonia was strongly reduced because of Brazil's 
economic crisis (high rates of inflation, etc.) and the 1988 Constitution, which encouraged 
decentralisation, redistribution of revenues, and an increase power of state and, 
principally, municipal governments; and corruption in the municipal administration.
In relation to the inadequacy of the municipal budget, the substantial flow of migrants 
plays a major role in bringing about many problems. In fact, Parauapebas grew from 1980 
to 1991 at an impulsive annual rate of 18.07% and nowadays the population in the 
municipality is estimated at 101,440 inhabitants. However, local problems, such as a lack 
of tax collectors and law enforcement capacity, associated with the delay of the Brazilian 
census data contributed to making some taxes financially insignificant for Parauapebas. 
With respect to corruption, Mr. Salmen's as well as Mr. Souza's administration were 
accused of fiscal irregularities, although only the first has been temporally suspended 
from his administrative functions.
Both municipal administrations were marked by several irregularities. In relation to Mr. 
Salmen's administration, the Municipal Council (Camara Municipal) of Parauapebas 
raised a list of irregularities, such as false invoices, non-existing constructions, ghost 
employees, funds diverted, etc. and Mr. Salmen had his accounts rejected by the 
Municipal Council as well as the Tribune of Municipal Accounts (Tribunal de Contas do 
Municipio) (Parauapebas em Revista, 1994). Although Mr. Souza's accounts has not been 
rejected, his administration was also marked by several irregularities, which varied from 
expropriation of an urban area without legislative authorisation; the duplication of salaries 
of some municipal secretaries; the purchase of curtains from the mayor's firm; irregular
263
Chapter VII
contracts; the rent of a house for a town councillor (vereador); overpayment to firms by 
services (constructions) done in the municipality; to fraudulent competition between firms 
with the connivance of the local administration (EEPP, 1993).
In spite of the importance of these accusations, the existence of corruption in Mr. Souza's 
administration is evidenced by the basic sanitation project, which was the main 
achievement and pride of his administration. This project was a result of an agreement 
between the municipality and CVRD to provide the whole town of Parauapebas with 
water, sewage disposal and garbage collection facilities. Nevertheless, CVRD alleged that 
there was corruption in the municipal administration and became responsible for 
practically all phases of the project, while the municipality was in charge of supervising 
and paying the costs (CVRD deducts the necessary sum from mining royalties) of the 
project (FASE, 1995). In fact, this basic sanitation project is highly illustrative insofar as 
it shows that there were corruption problems in the municipality; it revealed the 
limitations of the municipal administration; and also that CVRD continues to have a 
strong presence in the region, although its assistance only materialised in accordance with 
its own interests and convenience.
The municipality of Parauapebas, despite improvements, continues to present a 
problematic situation. Due to the continuos arrival of migrants, new areas were 
reoccupied and, consequently, new districts were formed in Parauapebas town. Many 
improvements were made in the old districts such as Cidade Nova and Rio Verde, but the 
urban infrastructure and facilities of the new ones were practically non-existent. In 
relation to basic sanitation, the district Bairro da Paz will not be supplied by water, while 
the districts Maranhao, Riacho Doce, Karajas Sul and Cortinas will not have water supply 
and will not be served by the sewage disposal system (FASE, 1995), although the local 
authorities as well as CVRD said that the project of basic sanitation would provide the 
whole town with water and sewage disposal facilities.
The situation in the health and education sectors is also problematic. With respect to the 
first sector, the lack of basic urban services and facilities, widespread urban poverty allied 
to the infrastructure of the health system, which is unable to meet the growing local
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demands, result in high incidences of most of diseases in the municipality. The education 
sector despite the increase in the number of schools faces serious problems, such as 
infrastructure is not sufficient for meeting local demand; low level of qualification of 
teachers, high incidence of repeater students, low salaries paid to municipal teachers, and 
overcrowded schools. All the problems contribute to making the quality of teaching very 
poor in the municipality of Parauapebas.
Chapter six analysed the impacts of the Carajas project on Parauapebas in the light of 
development pole theory. This theory predicts that economic growth would be generated 
through investments in selected development poles, which would trickle-down to 
peripheral regions. In fact, the POLAMAZONIA programme was created and massive 
investments in infrastructure associated with generous fiscal incentives were channelled 
principally into the Carajas pole with the clear purpose of achieving high rates of 
economic growth and, consequently, of generating spread effects to local populations.
The discovery of renewable natural resources or non-renewable ones took on particular 
importance for the development of peripheral regions, because the availability of these 
resources would stimulate the future formation of an export-base oriented to the internal 
or external market and, consequently, would promote the economic growth of this area. 
The setting up of this export-base in backward regions aimed to exploit their comparative 
inter-regional advantages, but at the same time infrastructural investments and transfer of 
technology and capital were necessary to initiate the dynamic process of development. 
With respect to Amazonia, the great variety of renewable natural resources and non­
renewable ones was regarded by the Brazilian government as an extremely favourable 
factor because a diversified economy tends to be less vulnerable to external factors, such 
as market prices, a decrease in the consumption of certain types of goods produced 
locally, etc.
Development pole strategies adopted by the Brazilian government were externally 
oriented, based on capital-intensive industries, and dominated fundamentally by large 
projects, and put a great emphasis on high technology. These strategies were responsible 
directly and indirectly for important impacts, such as: 1) the considerable number of jobs
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generated during the implementation of large industrial projects (principally the Carajas 
project) was drastically reduced during the operation phase, which principally required 
skilled workers. As a consequence, the vast majority of the labour-force, formed 
essentially by unskilled migrants, was condemned to unemployment or underemployment; 
2) the peripheral regions became dependent on goods and services produced outside, 
which made the problems of underemployment and the "leakage" of profits and capital 
generated in the regions worse; 3) the problems above contributed to an increase in 
income inequalities between the local population and also affected the natural resources 
of the region in a predatory way; and 4) the increase in land values and land 
concentration, which resulted in rural violence and land conflicts.
In Brazil, it has been shown that the trickle-down effects of development pole policies 
have on the whole failed to materialise, as illustrated by the Carajas region and, 
specifically, Parauapebas, which assumes particular importance insofar as it was within 
the Carajas pole's area of influence and at the same time was one of the PGC's 
development poles. The central point is that the Brazilian development model was export- 
biased and could not ensure a sustainable regional development principally because the 
very limited, or the lack of, linkages between the export-sector and the rest of the local 
economy, thus hindering the propagation of spread effects generated by the increase in 
export-based activities to the other economic activities in the region. This point is 
corroborated by the Carajas project, which was designed to export iron-ore and generate 
foreign exchange. Although this industrial project has been an economic success, the 
Carajas region has presented tenuous intersectoral linkages because the exploitation of the 
vast iron-ore deposits and of other important activities based on natural resources of the 
region (other mineral and lumbering) have been oriented towards the external market. 
These weak interindustry linkages have resulted in a few beneficial effects being 
generated in the region and Parauapebas is no exception.
Parauapebas is a microcosm of the impacts generated by development pole policies. 
Firstly, industrial activities, especially the Carajas project, attracted a substantial flow of 
migrants, who arrived in the region either as construction workers or to service the 
construction camps close to Carajas and Parauapebas. The continued presence of these
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workers after the construction phase contributed to a worsening of local problems, which 
varied from inadequate urban infrastructure to high levels of ill health and poor 
educational provision. In industrial terms, the ferrous-alloy plants, which were considered 
together with pig iron smelters a key element in the strategy to establish an integrated 
industrial development along the Carajas railway, were not implemented on the scale 
originally envisaged by the PGC. Without these industries, the economic perspectives of 
this municipality have been centralised principally on the Carajas project and on future 
industrial investments to be made by the CVRD in the region.
Indeed, the Carajas project has generated linkages by demanding goods and services 
inside and outside the region. However, the most important linkages have been external as 
confirmed by many examples, such as the purchase of material and equipment produced 
in the Centre-South, the construction of two large ships to carry ore and petroleum, and 
the large-scale import of food from other Brazilian states. These examples show clearly 
that the Carajas project is an enclave with few positive impacts in the region. In addition 
to the external linkages, there are internal linkages in the region, illustrated for example 
by the increase in the number of commercial establishments and small scale firms. 
Despite the importance of these linkages and the service sector being indeed the future of 
Parauapebas principally because of the lack of industrial alternatives for diversifying its 
economy, the main linkages in this municipality are fiscal because a large portion of its 
revenue accrues from royalties and taxes on mining activities. In this regard, CVRD and 
its subcontracted firms are the principal source of income for the municipal budget.
7.2 - Role of CVRD and the World Bank
After summarising the main social, economic and environmental impacts generated by the 
Carajas project on the region, and on Parauapebas in particular, and its underlying 
development pole assumptions, it is important to discuss the policy implications of these 
findings. In this regard, the role played by CVRD as well as the World Bank in Eastern 
Amazonia assumes a particular importance insofar as the mining company was the Bank's 
client, responsible for the Carajas project, and took a lead role in formulating the Greater
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Carajas Programme (PGC), while the World Bank made the Carajas project viable by 
approving a major loan to CVRD as well as by encouraging other foreign financial 
institutions to fund this project.
CVRD played a major role in Amazonian regional development and its performance and 
attitudes have generated negative consequences along the Carajas corridor and, 
specifically, in Parauapebas. In fact, the company's brazen attitudes at Carajas, its 
disregard for the local municipality as well as for other important impacts generated in the 
region are illustrated by many examples, such as: the change in CVRD's plan for 
Parauapebas, which was originally to accommodate 5,000 inhabitants, but which, owing 
to pressure from the World Bank, was doubled to 10,000; CVRD's faulty prediction of 
the pace of urbanisation; the company's "unawareness" of previous predictions made by 
government agencies, such as SUDAM and GETAT; CVRD's non-compliance with the 
Loan and Guarantee Agreement with the World Bank to settle service workers at Carajas 
town, which intentionally became a company enclave; the problematic relationship 
between local authorities and CVRD, which considered them a group that only knew how 
to complain about their circumstances and whose lack of competence and dynamism was 
an obstacle to the solution of local problems and also a continual annoyance to the 
company; and security measures taken in Carajas town.
In order to understand CVRD's behaviour and negligence, some points must be 
understood. First of all, it is important to place the company's attitudes within a historical 
context. CVRD was created and became the world largest mining company within a 
context dominated by a long tradition of centralised planning. If policy decisions were in 
the hands of the Federal government, which did not allow any participation in the 
planning process by different government tiers and if State enterprises were considered an 
extension of the State itself, the CVRD was neither an exception to the rule nor free from 
this type of influence. In this regard, top-down planning and its attributes were part of the 
CVRD's organisational culture and this fact partially explains its negligence in relation to 
local municipality and other impacts generated in the Carajas region. Another factor is the 
type of relationship which existed between the Federal government and CVRD, which 
enjoyed relative autonomy in comparison with other Brazilian State enterprises.
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State-owned enterprises, like private enterprises, tend to grow and diversify their 
investments and CVRD is no exception. This public enterprise became involved in many 
other industries, in a range of products which varied from ores and aluminium to 
woodpulp and timber (CVRD, 1996). Owing to the competitive world market, CVRD is 
always trying to reduce its costs and to achieve global standards of quality (termed ISO 
9,000) and these preoccupation are reflected in its management strategy - Total Quality 
Management- which aims to optimise the whole enterprise. In fact, CVRD is a very 
powerful, competent and profitable enterprise and its high profitability was an essential 
factor in its obtaining considerable autonomy in relation to the Federal government.
The duality of the public and the private is very clear in CVRD. Its private side is 
manifested mainly in its successful performance in the market, where this enterprise 
shows some recognised attributes of private firms, such as competence, dynamism, 
efficiency and pragmatism. Despite these visible qualities, CVRD is a State-owned 
mining enterprise and owing to this condition it has some limitations and commitment 
from which private firms are free. These two contrasting sides of CVRD produce a type of 
"identity crisis", which is reflected in its attitudes. In fact, this duality is the result of the 
relationship between CVRD and the Federal government which involved coincident as 
well as divergent interests and the setting-up of the PGC and Serra Pelada illustrate 
perfectly this situation.
As already seen in chapter one, the PGC was the amalgamation of industrial projects 
implemented previously with new projects supported by a number of fiscal incentives. In 
relation to these projects already initiated, they had been encouraged by the Federal 
government through the PND II - POLAMAZONIA regional development strategy, which 
aimed to exploit Amazonian mineral wealthy rationally. The mineral-metallurgical 
activities were considered top priority by this national plan, which placed great emphasis 
on the role to be played by the State enterprises (principally CVRD) as well as by national 
and multinational enterprises. Thus, CVRD participated in several joint-ventures with 
multinational enterprises, such as MRN, ALBRAS and ALUNORTE, to exploit 
aluminium and at the same time was involved in its own project to exploit Carajas iron-
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ore reserves. The Iron-Ore project embraced the mine, the railway, a deep-water port and 
the company town.
CVRD's self interest here is obvious in view of the fact that it was growing, diversifying 
its investments and aiming to grow much more, but for achieving this objective it was 
necessary to complete these interdependent mineral and infrastructural projects approved 
by the Geisel administration, which was sceptical in relation to the feasibility of the 
Carajas project, principally because of CVRD difficulties in obtaining all the foreign 
funding for it. Worried about the future of this project, CVRD played a fundamental role 
in formulating an "integrated" regional development strategy for Eastern Amazonia which 
was jubilantly adopted by the Figueiredo government. Both CVRD and the Federal 
government profited from this "integrated" regional plan. From the CVRD's perspective, 
the government approval was essential for attracting overseas official and private capital, 
ensuring the continuation of the Carajas project, which was extremely important for its 
organisational strategy. On the other hand, the Federal government saw this ready-made 
regional package as a real and viable possibility for generating foreign exchange to service 
Brazil’s huge external debt.
All industrial projects in Eastern Amazonia, especially Carajas, meant the future survival 
of CVRD, which pressurised the Federal government to switch its iron and steel 
production from the state of Minas Gerais, whose forest was seriously depleted, to 
Amazonia. This interest is confirmed by the fact that the "integrated" regional plan was 
elaborated by CVRD itself and not by the Federal government as it was supposed to have 
been. The logic was inverted and this aspect is significant insofar as CVRD was the main 
beneficiary of the federal government in the region. For instance, the Tucurui dam, a key 
element in the PGC, provided cheap electricity to the Carajas iron-ore complex as well as 
to the aluminium plants of ALUMAR and ALBRAS-ALUNORTE, of which CVRD was 
shareholder. However, the best example is the CVRD's buffer zone. This enterprise 
wanted to avoid invasion or any interference that could affect the Carajas project and as a 
result of this desire, the Federal government , through GET AT, decided to locate its 
colonisation projects Carajas I, II and m  around the CVRD's iron-ore concession area in 
order to complete the protected zone .
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CVRD's difficulties in obtaining funds for its projects (mine, port, railway, town) came to 
an end when the PGC was approved in 1980. Despite its access to foreign funds, CVRD 
had to spend a considerable amount of its own financial resources on the Carajas iron-ore 
complex. As a consequence, this enterprise undertook a partial privatisation by selling 
debentures in the financial market which reduced the Brazilian government's ownership of 
the CVRD from 70% to 56% in 1985 (Neto, 1990; Hall, 1991a). With the necessary 
funds, CVRD was able to implement the Carajas project successfully and its 
organisational efficiency is well-illustrated by the fact that the railway was inaugurated in 
February 1985, ten months ahead of schedule, while the first shipment of iron-ore from 
Carajas mineral deposits was exported through Itaqui port in May 1985 (World Bank, 
1992).
Owing to its efficiency, competence, and, principally, capacity for generating revenue, 
CVRD, unlike most of Brazilian State enterprises, enjoyed a considerable autonomy to act 
independently of the Federal government. Although relative, its autonomy was sufficient 
for constituting a type of a "State within a State" or, in Rueschemeyer and Evan's (1985) 
words, a "semi-peripheral State" and the company town is a vivid example. Security 
measures are taken in Carajas town. For instance, all vehicles and sub-contracted workers 
are routinely searched at the CVRD's main gate by security guards who work for a firm 
ironically called Sacrament. These measures contribute, in addition to the high level of the 
town's urban design, to increasing the tremendous gap which already exists between the 
towns of Carajas and Parauapebas.
Security measures put into effect to protect, in Becker's (1992) word, CVRD's 
"stronghold" and the creation of its "buffer zone" illustrate not only the considerable 
autonomy of the State mining enterprise and, consequently, the reduced role played by the 
Federal government in the Carajas region, but also the CVRD's strategy towards social 
exclusion. As seen in chapter four, the process of social exclusion has its roots in the 
planning of both Carajas and Parauapebas towns and this process has been maintained by 
means of elaborated security precautions in the company town. In fact, the top-down 
planning and its attributes (centralised decision-making, hierarchical structure,
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authoritarian leadership, lack of internal democracy, etc.) were embedded in CVRD's 
organisational culture and, consequently, in its own planning. This authoritarian character 
of the CVRD is reinforced by its omnipresence and omnipotence, which is a direct result 
of its significant autonomy in the region. CVRD is an enterprise committed principally to 
making profits, being regional development a secondary question. This priority is very 
clear and reflected on its attitudes.
Although the CVRD's autonomy was considerable, it was a State enterprise and, 
therefore, its autonomy was limited. For instance, the World Bank approved a loan of 
US$ 304.5 million to CVRD, which was the borrower and responsible for the 
implementation of the Carajas project. However, a sine qua non condition for the Bank's 
approval was that the Brazilian government was Guarantor of the loan. Another example 
is the famous wild-cat gold mining Serra Pelada, which was controlled by DOCEGEO, a 
CVRD subsidiary. The rich deposits of Serra Pelada, discovered in the late 1970s, 
attracted thousands of gold prospectors from all over Brazil and by 1980 the Federal 
government decided to intervene with the aim of organising the gold mine. This 
intervention opposed to DOCEGEO interests which was in favour of mechanising 
production. In 1984 over 2,000 gold prospectors marched towards Parauapebas, which 
had some of its community facilities built by CVRD burned, in order to pressurise the 
Brazilian Congress into revoking its decision to close the mine (Hall, 1991a; Becker, 
1992; World Bank, 1992).
It is important to stress here that the Federal government played an important role in 
development policy formulation and implementation in Easter Amazonia, through a 
variety of special programmes, fiscal incentives and centralised institutional control over 
regional activities. With respect to CVRD, the Federal government was aware of the 
autonomy of the Sate enterprise and supported its actions consciously. The main reasons 
for this lie in the fact that CVRD, due to its competence and efficiency, was essential for 
"solving" the main preoccupations, which were essentially macroeconomic, of the 
Brazilian government: balance of payments and external debt. Due to its considerable 
autonomy, CVRD was integrated with the Federal government only at very highest level 
of policy formulation.
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In addition to CVRD, The World Bank was also an important actor in Eastern Amazonia. 
In fact, the Bank played a significant role in approving the Carajas project and 
encouraging other foreign institutions to help finance this project. The Bank undertook 
several missions, which varied from the preparation to post-appraisal missions, in order to 
give its approval. All these missions gave priority to financial and economic aspects, such 
as market constraint, financing plan completion, market risks, rates of return, etc., of the 
Carajas project, while Amerindian, environmental and urban development issues did not 
receive any attention. This fact is significant insofar as this project was appraised by the 
Bank essentially in economic terms.
This understanding and appraisal of the Carajas project was very limited, principally 
because the World Bank was aware of the Federal government's plan, the PGC, for 
Eastern Amazonia even before its establishment as well as of the fact that the Carajas 
project would be the cornerstone of this programme. This previous knowledge is 
confirmed by the Bank report (1992, pp. 57), which stressed that:
"Using Carajas (i.e. the iron-ore project) as the base, a  m ajor developm ent program m e is being 
considered for the states o f  Parti and M aranhao. The basic concept is to develop an "export 
corridor" in the N orth o f  Brazil...An im portant side effect would be the strong im pact it would 
have on industrial developm ent o f  the N ortheast (i.e. M aranhao). The future availability o f  energy 
at Tucurui prom ises good prospects for exploitation o f the vast mineral deposits in the area which, 
in addition to iron-ore, include: copper...bauxite...nickel...(and) m anganese".
Two other points were the environmental protection measures and the Amerindian Special 
project, which were part of the Carajas project and approved by the Bank. Environmental 
measures consisted of air and water pollution monitoring and control at the mine and port 
areas, soil erosion control along the Carajas railway, environmental education and 
ecological research, the establishment of conservation tracts, greenbelts buffer zones, 
ecological stations and biotic inventories - for the most part inside or on the periphery of 
CVRD's mining concession - and an "environmental zoning" exercise for the Carajas 
region. The CVRD was responsible for implementing these measures, while GEAMAM 
supervised them (World Bank, 1992; Redwood, 1993). With respect to the Amerindian
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Special project, CVRD signed a contract with FUNAI in order to alleviate the expected 
negative impacts of the Carajas iron-ore operation on the indigenous population. Thus, 
land demarcation, long-term development, health and educational services were the main 
aims to be achieved by the Amerindian project, which was under CVRD's and Bank's 
supervision.
This process involving evaluation, negotiation and approval phases showed clearly that 
the World Bank saw the Carajas project as a single sector (mining-cum-infrastructure) 
linked with sectors, such as indigenous tribes, environment and urban development, 
which were totally secondary. In fact, the Bank was unable to place the Carajas project in 
a broader regional policy context and, consequently, verify that the Brazilian government 
was using Carajas for many reasons, but principally for achieving high rates of economic 
growth, which meant that the region would be subjected to an accelerated economic 
development. Thus, the probable social and environmental impacts on rural and urban 
areas to be generated by this government strategy, together with a considerable number of 
migrants to be attracted to the Carajas region were ignored by the Bank. The central point 
is that economic potential of the Carajas project was carefully appraised by the Bank, 
while the potential social and environmental costs were not.
What makes this lack of attempt to appraise the probable negative impacts of the Carajas 
project worse is the fact that the World Bank was acutely aware of the Federal 
government regional development strategy for the Eastern Amazonia represented by the 
PGC. In this regard, agro-livestock, lumbering, infrastructure and mineral (consisting of 
pig iron smelters and industrial plants processing iron-ore and manganese) projects, which 
would be encouraged through a generous fiscal incentives system and set-up in 
development poles along the Carajas railway were not recognised before or during the 
Bank's approval, nor were the probable environmental impacts to be generated by theses 
industrial activities considered.
Indeed, the negligence of the World Bank as well as the CVRD in identifying and 
mitigating the probable negative impacts of the Carajas project was very limited and the 
consequences of such narrowness are felt up to the present day. Nevertheless, other
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factors are also very important for explaining the whole socio-economic transformation 
undergone by the Carajas region and particularly by Parauapebas. In this regard, the role 
played by the Federal government in Eastern Amazonia was considerable. The regional 
development strategies were centred essentially on development poles. It was hoped that 
the implementation of the Carajas project, associated with the development of the regional 
infrastructure, would be the beginning of a development corridor, based on export mineral 
and agricultural products. Despite its economic success, the Carajas project failed as an 
instrument to induce the development of the region insofar as socially and 
environmentally sound regional development was not achieved. In fact, the adverse 
impacts have their roots in development planning, which was too-technocratic, over­
centralised and fundamentally directed towards economic aspects. All these 
characteristics were visible in the Carajas region and, especially, in Parauapebas, where 
local governments did not take part in any phase of the planning process. This was 
typically a "top down" process, in which decisions were made entirely from above.
As seen in chapter six, the Carajas region, despite its tremendous potential, presents weak 
interindustry linkages and, consequently, low level of employment and income 
generation. The promotion of sustainable development in the Carajas region and, 
particularly, in Parauapebas relies upon maximisation of employment and income. Owing 
to the availability of mineral, transportation and energy sources, the metallurgical sector is 
very important for regional development and its verticalization associated with 
diversification of regional economy would benefit the local population. However, 
planning for this must take into account the demands of local civil society for access to 
means of production and subsistence as well as participation in the benefits of economic 
development. These demands can no longer be neglected.
The Federal government, through its planning Secretariat and with financial support from 
CVRD, had already planned the development for the Carajas region. In fact, the Master 
Plan for the Carajas Railway Corridor was designed to "promote self-sustaining growth, 
the improvement of income distribution and environmental preservation" (SEPLAN/PGC,
1 sustainable development is understood here as the type of development which allows the 
rational exploitation of natural resources for economic growth and livelihood of a 
considerable number of people, while ensuring the protection of the environment.
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1989, pp.5). In order to achieve this objective, the plan established resource needs for 
regional development as well as a set of guidelines for the public and private sectors. The 
Master Plan recognised past mistakes of development strategies based on cattle ranching 
and at the same time stressed that the industrialisation of mineral production was 
important for regional development insofar as these industrial activities could generate 
significant linkage effects and, consequently, an increase in employment and income.
However, the central point is that the Master Plan suggested the adoption of a bottom-up 
development approach (see Sthor, 1981) precisely in order to avoid the problems 
discussed so far. By advocating such a development strategy, the plan emphasised 
participation local population in the decision-making process as a means of meeting the 
basic needs of the local population with respect to land access, to employment generation 
and its self-determination. Although decentralisation was implicit in these objectives, the 
plan also stressed the importance of the role to be played by the Federal government in 
planning social development. However, the Master Plan was never put into effect and this 
fact reveals the low priority given by the Federal government to socially more responsible 
development.
The case of Parauapebas shows clearly that the State is still important for promoting 
social development. But, the Sisyphean task of installing the infrastructure, maintaining 
services, planning national development strategies, co-ordinating its actions, and 
controlling its agencies, Superintendencies and enterprises proved to be too much for the 
State, which was unable to simultaneously deal with these tasks. Since the return to 
civilian rule in 1985 and, particularly, after the 1988 Constitution, which approved and 
stimulated a substantial decentralisation, a considerable redistribution of revenues and an 
increase in the power of state and municipal governments, the State apparatus began to be 
shrink and its presence in Eastern Amazonia was significantly reduced.
The reduction in the size of the State is associated with the Brazilian economic crisis and, 
fundamentally, with structural adjustments advocated by the World Bank and IMF. These 
structural adjustments aimed to make the allocation of resources more efficient and also to 
strength the export sector. In this regard, loans were given by multilateral agencies on the
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condition that clients liberalise, decentralise, and deregulate their economies and privatise 
their State-owned enterprises. These market-oriented reforms were intrinsically related to 
a minimal State (Streeten, 1993; 1995), in which the market was considered capable of 
designating the best way of attaining economic growth and also of solving its social 
consequences. Although the limitations of a centralised State are visible, a strong State is 
vital. However, this strong State is necessarily different from that usually adopted in 
Brazil (Hall, 1995; Streeten, 1995) and essential for promoting sustainable development. 
Midgley (1995) stresses that the concept of sustainable development is still poorly defined 
and requires more theoretical refinement to be accepted as a unifying development 
concept. Although vague, this concept is fundamental insofar as environmental issues 
became an essential part of social development. In fact, integration of development and 
environmental concerns are key elements in meeting basic needs, to improve living 
standards of populations, to protect and manage ecosystems. Sustainable development 
presupposes attitudes of solidarity between different government tiers as well as different 
countries in the quest for a better distribution of welfare. In order to promote sustainable 
development, the State must be democratised and the main reason lies in the fact that only 
a democratic State will be able to stimulate and enable civil society (there is a need for the 
empowerment of weak and neglected groups within civil society, such as ethnic 
minorities, the unemployed, etc.) to represent its own interests and participate actively in 
the design and implementation of public policy.
7.3 - Policy Implications
One of the fundamental elements for the promotion of sustainable development is the 
Federal government, which, in order to achieve this objective, should involve a broad 
participation in the decision-making process. This includes the co-operation of different 
government tiers (state and municipal governments), organisations and all social groups 
in relation to public policies and probable interventions which potentially affect the local 
communities in which they are involved with. The Federal government, by involving all 
sectors of society and acting together with them, should delegate decision-making and 
financing powers to those authorities, who have local knowledge and, consequently, who
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are able to implement appropriate policies (Hall, 1995). In addition, the Federal 
government should intervene in the process of price formation, production and finance in 
order to reduce the effects generated by market failures and benefit a considerable number 
of people.
Although general, these actions mentioned above are also valid for Parauapebas. With 
regard to this municipality, the Federal government, in order to avoid past mistakes, 
should:
• support the investments made by the municipality of Parauapebas (as well as the 
state of Para) in social and economic infrastructure;
• implement policies to influence land tenure and property rights, ensuring the 
access of rural people, especially landless and small farmers, to land and natural 
resources;
• finance, through its credit institutions, agricultural and rural development 
projects with the purpose of assisting small farmers;
• develop and implement, agricultural programmes together with the municipal 
government, for reducing land degradation;
• protect Indian lands. Despite being demarcated, the Xicrin do Catete reserve 
(west of CVRD's area and within the municipalities of Parauapebas and Agua Azul) has 
been invaded by timber extractors (Bemo de Almeida, 1994). The protection allied to a 
more complete assistance (demarcation, regularisation, registration and provision of 
health care) must be extended to all tribal lands principally because of increasing pressure 
on their lands; and
• establish environmental protection, management and research for the Carajas 
region. This includes protection of national and state' parks ( and indigenous reserves as 
well), ecological reserves and natural resources (land, water, air, farm and vegetation
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cover). In this regard, the Federal government should strengthen the IBAMA in order to 
make the Brazilian environmental agency able to manage the whole region. Therefore, 
IBAMA should work together with state and municipal governments. These measures 
should be accompanied by ecological research and the aim is to increase knowledge about 
the region's potential natural resources as well as to create database and information 
system to facilitate the monitoring of the region. This monitoring system would be 
important for accompanying productive activities and urban expansion.
Companies play an important role in the social and economic development of a country 
by paying taxes, by providing trading, employment and livelihood opportunities . They 
can play a major role in reducing the impacts on human health and the environment by 
implementing technologies, good engineering and management practices towards 
sustainable development. In relation to all these aspects, the CVRD is a model company, 
which is the world largest mining company, employs a large number of people, pay taxes 
and implemented environmental measures in its concession area successfully. However, 
problems arose when CVRD had to deed with the adverse regional impacts generated 
directly or indirectly, by the Carajas project which means by the company itself.
Indeed, CVRD was a State company committed to regional development, but it was still a 
company committed to earning profits. In addition, its assistance only materialised 
according to its own interests. This fact is corroborated by the vice-Mayor of Maraba, who 
said that "the attempts [to discuss the impacts to be generated by the Carajas project on 
the municipality of Maraba] are always looked in CVRD's proper perspective, according 
to its objectives mine, railway and port. We are considered an accident in the railway 
project" (Braglia, 1986/87, pp.53). Another example is the technical assistance given by 
CVRD to small farmers in the municipality of Parauapebas. This assistance was strongly 
criticised (Dana, et al., 1993) because CVRD aimed exclusively to make these small 
farmers able to produce at large scale and, consequently, to increase their incomes , while 
the planning and organisation of their production and the strengthening their roles as a 
category were completely ignored by the mining company. In order to help stimulating the 
development of the municipality of Parauapebas, CVRD should:
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• provide technical assistance to small farmers as well as to municipal 
administration staff. This assistance must be directed towards local interests and not 
according to the company's interests;
• provide financial support to local projects;
• support the initiatives and the role of small farmers' organisations; and
• stimulate local economy. In this regard, CVRD could invert the logic of food 
supply in Carajas town. Instead of importing approximately 80% of its food from outside 
the region, the company town could be supplied by local production. The company itself 
can help overcoming the problems faced by small producers and the municipality.
Although CVRD have made many mistakes, it is possible to learn from past errors and be 
more accountable in relation to social and environmental aspects, as the case of 
ELETROBRAS (the national power authority). Due to tremendous social and 
environmental impacts caused by its hydroelectric projects (Sobradinho, Itaparica and Ita 
are good examples) as well as the wave of criticisms generated by these impacts, 
ELETROBRAS has adopted, in its latest Master Plan, social and environmental impact 
assessment procedures (Serra, 1993; Hall, 1994). In addition, the company has made 
efforts to work together with other organisations and non-governmental organisations 
have been consulted more frequently. With respect to CVRD, the mining company could 
do much more than it did and its privatisation may be a sign of change in its blatant 
attitudes at Carajas, traditional arrogance and negligence in relation to the negative 
impacts generated by the Carajas project. As a private company, CVRD is free of its 
permanent "identity crisis" and this fact may signify a better relationship with municipal 
authorities and a more awareness of its responsibilities in the region.
The World Bank played a major role in approving the Carajas project and attracting 
additional resources from foreign lenders. However, its appraisal of the project was very 
limited and the main reason lies in the fact that the Bank, despite its previous knowledge, 
did not take into account the Federal government's plans for Eastern Amazonia. As a
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result, the Carajas project presented a few measures to deal with its probable social and 
environmental impacts outside the CVRD's mining concession area. The negligence of the 
World Bank in identifying and mitigating these adverse impacts shows clearly that its own 
environmental polices were almost non-existing by the time the Bank loan was approved. 
Despite the narrowness of its evaluation, the Bank was responsible for some positive 
results. For instance, the Amerindian project was incorporated into the Carajas project due 
to Bank's insistence and it is unlikely that CVRD and the Federal government had 
included tribal protection measures in the Iron Ore project without the Bank's pressure.
In order to avoid or at least alleviate such negative consequences generated by the Carajas 
project, the World Bank should have:
• identified and evaluated previously the social and environmental impacts (ex 
ante social and environmental impact assessment) of project implementation and 
correlated investments (for instance, pig-iron industries);
• taken into account the broader regional development policies context; and
• intensified its supervision, clearly insufficient, of the project's environmental 
protection and urban development components.
These measures show clearly that the Bank should change its very limited approach and 
incorporate social and environmental dimensions into project design and appraisal 
procedures. Due to widespread criticisms of the negative impacts caused by Bank- 
financed projects, such as the POLONOROESTE programme and the Carajas project 
itself in Brazil, the World Bank began to pay more attention to environmental questions. 
In fact, during the 1990s the Bank has employed many environmentalists as permanent 
staff and, consequently, is better able to deal with environmental issues (Hall, 1995). 
Although changes have taken place, social and environmental problems continued to 
occur, as in the case of the Sardar Sarovar dam project in India's Narmada Valley, which 
affected approximately 250,000 people (Cemea, 1993). According to Kolk (1996), the 
environmental destmction caused by these projects and the insufficiency of environmental
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impact assessment are a direct result of environmental departments' lack of power within 
the Bank. Weakness or not, the point is that multilateral agencies have much to do in 
order to make their financial assistance more effective. Social variables are still relegated 
to secondary importance in development planning (Hall, 1988; Cemea, 1991) and the 
achievement of sustainable development implies that social planning and impact 
assessment must be broadened.
The local government plays an important part in the development process. As the tier of 
government closest to the people, municipal governments can develop a strong 
relationship with civil society, NGOs and the private sector. This relationship can 
encourage municipal governments to enhance their responsiveness, mobilise resources, 
improve local services and stimulate the development of the private sector. The 
accountability of local governments associated with the participation of civil society and 
NGOs can lead to a promotion of sustainable development. In this regard, the 
municipality of Parauapebas should:
• invest in economic and social infrastructure. As seen along this dissertation, 
Parauapebas experienced, as a direct result of the Carajas project, rapid population 
growth, which was mainly responsible for aggravating the already insufficient urban 
infrastructure and services. Thus, specific interventions in basic sanitation, housing, 
health, education, transportation and energy sectors need to be designed and implemented 
in the region. Indeed, in 1994 the municipal administration signed an agreement with 
CVRD and the World Bank to implement an urban project which would provide the town 
of Parauapebas with water, sewage disposal and garbage collection facilities. However, 
this project does not cover all districts (FASE, 1995) and much has to be done not only in 
the urban nucleus, but also in the whole municipality;
• forge links with the Federal and state governments, CVRD and foreign agencies 
in order to obtain funds for its projects;
• formulate and implement agricultural policies in association with farmers and 
their rural organisations. These policies, with their appropriate instruments, should place a
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great emphasis on food security in the region, on increase in small farmers income and on 
generation of employment. In this regard, the Frutos do Cerrado (Fruits from Savannah) 
project, elaborated by the municipality of Santa Maria do Tocantins (in the state of 
Tocantins) together with small farmers' organisations of Soninho and Sao Jose, is a very 
good example (MMA/SCA, 1997a). This project is funded by the Pilot Programme for the 
Conservation of the Brazilian Amazon Forest, which aims to help tackling the needs of 
Amazonian population, supporting the productive use of the forest and at the same time 
encouraging the conservation of its natural resources. Although the Frutos do Cerrado 
project has been implemented last year and, consequently, it is too early evaluate its 
results, it is a promising initiative.
• provide technical assistance to small farmers, encouraging them to adopt 
sustainable and efficient farming practices;
• support the formation of farmers' organisations;
• strengthen its relationship with the civil society. There are many ways of 
stimulating the participation of civil society and Porto Alegre is a very good example. Its 
municipal administration encouraged people to take part in "participatory budgeting" 
through local associations and popular organisations. In relation to health sector in Porto 
Alegre, the active participation of social sectors traditionally without voice in 
Hirschman's (1970) words, principally shanty town populations, was fundamental for 
increasing the responsiveness of publicly financed health services to the needs of local 
population (Cortes, 1995).
• stimulate local development. The generation of employment is fundamental and 
the municipal government should support the creation of small firms in order to tackle 
unemployment (Tendler, 1997; Tendler & Amorim, 1996). In this regard, some initiatives 
have been undertaken in the region and the PRODER programme, which was designed by 
CVRD, SEBRAE and the municipality of Parauapebas, is a concrete example.
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Non-governmental organisations play a vital role in the shaping and implementation of 
participatory development. Their credibility lie in the responsible and constructive role 
they play in society. In fact, NGOs have developed a closer relationship with grassroots 
organisations and have become important channels for the expression and defence of 
people's interests. In Brazil, NGOs have evolved from a welfare role in the 1960s and 
1970s towards a more advocacy and lobbying role in the 1980s and 1990s (Hall, 1993). 
Significant examples are: the opposition organised by the Kayapo and other indigenous 
tribes against the construction of a series of dams along the Xingu river valley in 
Amazonia. There was a strong pressure from local groups and NGOs on the Brazilian 
government and the World Bank, which suspended the proposed US$ 500 million Second 
Power Sector Loan for Brazil (Goodman and Hall, 1990); the campaign promoted by 
NGO (formed by 13 rural trade unions, known as the POLOSINDICAL) in favour of 
approximately 40,000 people, who would be displaced by the Itaparica hydropower 
scheme in the Sao Francisco Valley of Brazil's north-east region (Hall, 1992). The 
pressure from the POLOSINDICAL resulted in a comprehensive resettlement of this 
considerable population.
In relation to the municipality of Parauapebas, there are many active non-governmental 
and grassroots organisations acting in the region and EEPP is very illustrative in this 
respect. In fact, this NGO has worked together with small farmers and their organisations 
with the clear purpose of strengthening their roles as category (EEPP, 1993; Dana et al., 
1993). The municipal administration should pay greater attention to the role played by 
such organisations and should also endeavour to develop closer working contact with 
them in order to stimulate the local development.
As seen along this dissertation, Amazonian regional development was heavily influenced 
by Perroux's theory, which advocated that the concentration of investments into selected 
development poles, as in the case of POLAMAZONIA programme, would generate 
beneficial spread effects on income and employment in the region. However, the positive 
effects were limited and the social and environmental impacts of such strategies were 
considerable. Under the Cardoso administration, the conception of development has 
shifted from the notion of development poles to that of development axes (eixos de
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desenvolvimento). According to the document Brasil em Acao2 (Brasil, 1996), these 
development axes, unlike their predecessors development poles, tend to spread positive 
effects to a wider area.
These development sixes are also known as integration corridors (corredores de 
integragao) and the main objective is to integrate the Brazilian Amazonia with the 
Continent and, consequently, provide its access to the world market (MMA/SCA, 1995). 
In this regard, these axes are: 1) the paving of the BR-174 highway, which links Brazil 
with Venezuela providing Amazonia with access to the Caribbean; 2) the extension of the 
BR-364 highway, which connects the state of Acre with Peru, opening for Amazonia 
access to the Pacific; 3) the paving of the Santarem-Cuiaba highway; 4) the Araguaia- 
Tocantins riverway, which will be connected with the Carajas and North-South railways; 
and 5) the completion and paving of the Macapa-Cayenne road, extending the Belem- 
Brasflia highway (Brasil, 1996, Hall, 1997).
The Federal government, in its document Politica Nacional Integrada para a Amazonia 
Legal (MMA/SCA, 1995), recognises that past development strategies in Amazonia had 
reduced positive effects and that the exploitation of the natural resources of the region 
occurred in a predatory way. The government also recognises the importance of the 
metallurgical sector (and support its verticalisation) for Amazonia, but at the same time it 
stresses that old projects and future undertakings in the region must be compatible with 
the environment. In fact, there are several projects, supported by the Brazilian 
government, undertaken in Amazonia with the clear purpose of conciliating productive 
use and conservation of the forest and a good example is the Pilot Programme for the 
Conservation of the Brazilian Amazon Forest (PPG-7), which is funded by the World 
Bank. However, this new development strategy designed by the government may be 
incompatible with the efforts in protecting the environment.
This dissertation analysed the assumptions behind the Perroux's development pole theory 
about the trickle-down effects of such strategies in Amazonia, as illustrated by 
Parauapebas. At the same time, the case-study provided a better understanding of the link
2 Officially translated as "Brazil on the Move".
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between development projects and the negative consequences in the Amazon region. The 
Cardoso administration designed a new development strategy, based on the notion of 
development axes or integration corridors, which aims to stimulate Amazonian economic 
development and integrate this region with the Continent. In this regard, these 
development axes need to be carefully studied in order to avoid limited positive effects 
and serious negative social and environmental impacts occurred in the recent past. 
However, this is a task for future researches.
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Appendix I
The List of Interviewees 
Rio de Janeiro:
Gemal, Jose A., director of NATRON firm.
Toledo, Luiz C., director of Mayerhofer & Toledo firm.
Cordeiro, Berenice de S., Sanitarian Engineer of IBAM.
Piquet, Roselia, Senior Lecturer of IPUR-UFRJ.
Medeiros, Luciano P., Superintendency of Development of Infrastructure Projects of 
CVRD.
Pereira Neto, Vania V., Environmental Adviser of CVRD.
Pacheco, Maria E., the national director of FASE.
Belem:
Hoyos, Juan B., Co-ordinator of NUMA-UFPa.
Andrade, Frederico de, Superintendent of SUDAM.
Cesar, Evaldo G. M., Director of the Division of Basic Studies and Researches of 
SUDAM.
Benatti, Jose H., Director of SDDH.
Maraba:
Pies, Luiz C., Technician of FASE.
Correa, Joao, Technician of FASE.
Hebette, Jean, Director of CAT and Researcher of NAEA-UFPa.
Costa, Roberto L. da, Director of FUNAI.
Karangre and Katendjo, both tribal leaders of the Indian reserve Xicrin do Catete.
Carajas town:
Teixeira, Hemani G., Superintendent's adviser of CVRD. 
Machado, Jose R. S., director of METABASE.
Ribeiro, Jose S., director of METABASE.
Paraupebas:
Romao, Fernando J. G., Planning secretary 
Chain Filho, Jose J., Mayor's Special Adviser.
Borges, Rinaldo Q., Agriculture Secretary.
Rezende, Osmar, Secretary of Education.
Anjos, Vilma dos, Health Secretary.
Paula, Euclides F. de, Director of STR.
Souza, Jose M. O., Director of SIMETAL.
Luiz, Director of SINTEPE.
Neri, J., Director of MST.
Lermen, Darci; Schneider, Milton Z.; Bezerra, Antonio C., members of EEPP. 
Soares, Geraldo M., President of CONDEPE.
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Brasilia:
Cagnin, Joao U., ex-PGC co-ordinator of urban and regional development. Nowadays, he 
works at the Secretary of Regional Development in the Ministry of Regional Integration. 
Sawyer, Donald, President of ISPN.
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Appendix II
Sample of Interviews
The interviews undertaken in this dissertation, as seen in the first chapter, were 
unstructured, which means that they were conducted informally, without close-ended 
questions or a formal method. The aim here is to provide an idea of information, 
evidence, etc. obtained from the interviews.
Interviewee: Fernando Romao - Planning secretary of Parauapebas (May, 1995).
A adutora antiga e completamente insuficiente para resolver os problemas de 
contaminagao do rio Parauapebas.
A firma EPC Engenharia nao participou da licita?ao da obra para a futura rede 
de abastecimento de dgua do municfpio de Parauapebas e surpreendentemente 
ganhou a "concorrencia" e sendo convidada para o empreendimento. 
Importante ressaltar que o dono desta firma e da famflia do superintendente da 
propria Companhia Vale do Rio Doce (CVRD).
Em relagao a obra a ser realizada em Parauapebas, a CVRD tomou a decisao 
no tocante a todos os aspectos (tecnicos e financeiros) ignorando os tecnicos 
da propria prefeitura municipal, que arcara com os custos deste 
empreendimento.
A prefeitura nao esta acompanhando a obra e tudo e deixado nas maos da 
CVRD, que tem total controle das operasoes e exerce esse dominio de forma 
incontestavel. A CVRD nao esteve e nao esta interessada na melhoria da 
qualidade de vida de Parauapebas.
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O Prefeito "Chico das Cortinas" 6 muito limitado. E uma pessoa de origem 
humilde, cujo offcio era confeccionar cortinas e sua principal clientela era 
formada pelos empregados da CVRD. A maioria dos secretarios municipais 
tambem sao extremamente limitados e poucos sao os que demonstram alguma 
capacidade para o cargo que ocupam.
O projeto Salobo triplicara o onus social do municipio de Parauapebas, uma 
vez que este e passagem obrigatoria para se atingir a localidade onde o projeto 
esta inserido.
A secretaria de planejamento estava uma verdadeira bagunga antes da minha 
posse. Era uma secretaria de planejamento so no nome, porque de 
planejamento nao tinha nada. Agora eu comecei a botar "a casa em ordem". 
Comecei a organizar a secretaria de forma a catalogar as informagoes 
dispomveis. Por exemplo, neste momento nos dispomos dos mapas da cidade 
e do proprio municipio, algo que nao era sequer sonhado nesta secretaria. 
Entretanto, ainda falta muita coisa. Nao temos informagoes precisas acerca da 
nossa regiao e precisamos urgentemente fazer um mapeamento do municipio 
para podermos ter a nogao exata dos problemas a serem atacados e saber quais 
sao os mais urgentes. Sem isto, nao podemos fazer muita coisa. Eu propus ao 
prefeito contratar uma firma para fazer um levantamento da regiao com o 
proposito de sabermos qual e a nossa exata situagao, sabermos o que se passa 
em cada esquina, mas o prefeito alegou que a prefeitura nao tern dinheiro para 
contratar uma firma para fazer este tipo de trabalho. Este e um claro exemplo 
da limitagao do nosso prefeito. Quer dizer, sem informagoes precisas nos nao 
temos condigoes para atacar os verdadeiros problemas e todas as agoes do 
govemo local sao empreendidas de forma desorganizada e por isso mesmo se 
mostram ineficientes como um todo.
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